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Abstract 
This study contains three chapters. Since the subprime crisis, it has become increasingly 
important to understand the competing risks of prepayment and default on the single-family 
mortgage market. This research studies the economic factors that affect the competing risks of 
prepayment and default in locations where the aggregate of the prepayment risk and the default 
risk are simultaneously high. 
Chapter 1 outlines the analysis based on thirty-year, fixed-rate, single-family mortgages 
in five Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs): Phoenix, Miami, Tampa, Detroit and Las Vegas. 
These MSAs are chosen from a sample Single-family Loan-Level Dataset constructed by Freddie 
Mac based on high simultaneous prepayment and default rates. The results are estimated by a 
discrete time competing risks model based on restricted multinomial logit. Two different 
combinations of dependent variables are used to make the analysis more comprehensive. The 
first combination is prepayment and default and the second is prepayment and 90-days-
delinquency.  
The indicator for a prepayment penalty and the value of the call option are used to 
evaluate the prepayment risk and the best three combinations (using the Bayesian information 
criterion)  of explanatory variables – the value of negative equity, a negative equity dummy, and 
original loan-to-value ratio – together with the unemployment rate are used to evaluate the 
default risk. Because of the ambiguous effect of the credit score on the prepayment decision 
discussed in the previous literature, two estimations to explain the effect of the credit score on 
the prepayment and default are run. One estimation considers how the credit score affects both 
termination risks and the other considers how the credit score affects only default. The effect of 
the debt-to-income ratio on the prepayment and default is also tested.  
By controlling other mortgage characteristics, such as loan size and loan age, the brief 
summary of results shows us the prepayment penalty has a negative effect on the prepayment 
decision. However, its effect in Detroit is insignificantly positive. The value of the call option 
has a significantly positive impact on the prepayment in each MSA and its effect is the strongest 
among all of the explanatory variables. The unemployment rate has a positive effect on 
default/90-days-delinquency. Moreover, negative equity, the negative equity dummy and original 
loan-to-value are all positively related to the default/90-days-delinquency decision. As expected, 
in most MSAs, the credit score has a strongly positive effect on the prepayment; comparatively, 
it has a strong negative impact on the default. When using the credit score only in the default risk 
and not in the prepayment risk, the effect of the credit score is still significantly negative, but the 
coefficients decrease slightly. Moreover, debt-to-income does not appear to affect prepayment; 
however, it has a positive relationship with the default/90-days-delinquency in most MSAs. A 
Wald test is constructed to test the equality of the coefficients among five MSAs and the results 
of this test support the argument that prepayment and default risks are heavily influenced by 
local characteristics.  
In earlier studies, the proportional hazards model becomes a popular method to analyze 
the single (prepayment or default) risk of mortgages. This model has been developed into a 
competing risks model and been widely used to analyze the prepayment and default risks 
simultaneously in later studies. However, the process of constructing the competing risks model 
is ambiguous. In Chapter 2, this study clearly presents the calculation process of this model 
based on the proportional hazards model using Sueyoshi’s method and then implements the 
model to analyze the termination risks of single-family mortgages in Phoenix.  
Ding, Tian, Yu and Guo (2012) construct a new model based on a class of transformation 
survival models to analyze the risk of bankruptcy and they argue that that the proportional 
hazards model is not the best model to analyze this risk. Therefore, a question is raised by this 
argument: whether the proportional hazards model is the best model to analyze the 
default/prepayment risk of single-family mortgages? A new competing risks model based on a 
class of discrete transformation survival models is constructed in Chapter 2 and it is used to 
analyze the termination risks of the single-family mortgages in Phoenix. The model is controlled 
by the transformation parameters 𝑐𝑝 (for the prepayment risk) and 𝑐𝑑 (for the default risk). When 
𝑐𝑝 = 0 and 𝑐𝑑 = 0, it is the competing risks model based on proportional hazards, and when 
𝑐𝑝 > 0and 𝑐𝑑 > 0, its framework is changed according to the value of 𝑐𝑝 and 𝑐𝑑.  
The results show that the proportional hazards framework is the best model to estimate 
the prepayment risk, but it is not the best model to estimate the default/90-days-delinquency risk. 
The results of both models support the important arguments made in Chapter 1. Comparing the 
coefficients estimated by three competing risks models, the coefficients estimated by the model 
based on the Sueyoshi proportional hazards are insignificantly distinguishable from those 
estimated by the model based on the multinomial logit. Moreover, the coefficients estimated by 
the model based on a class of transformation survival models are significantly different from 
those estimated by the other two models.  
Unobserved heterogeneity is an important component that should be considered in the 
modeling process, even though it is not commonly involved in the analysis of the termination 
risks of the mortgages. In Chapter 3, this study uses latent classes to control unobserved 
heterogeneity of two different groups of borrowers and constructs three competing risks models 
based on the multinomial logit, the proportional hazards model and a class of transformation 
survival models. The models allow the coefficients of the explanatory variables to be different 
between two groups of borrowers by keeping the baseline the same (the coefficients of the loan 
age splines are the same between two groups of borrowers). The models are used to analyze the 
competing risks of prepayment and default/90-days-delinquency of the single-family mortgages 
in Phoenix and the estimated average conditional hazard for prepayment, default and 90-days-
delinquency are compared with those estimated by models that do not control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. The results show that when the loan age is between 120 and 165 months, models 
that do not control for unobserved heterogeneity highly overpredict the prepayment hazard. In 
the average conditional default and 90-days-delinquency hazard, models that do not control for 
unobserved heterogeneity overpredict the average conditional hazard compared with models that 
control for unobserved heterogeneity when the loan age is between around 49 and 94 months. 
Another question answered in this study is that if housing prices did not boom and bust 
since 2004, what would the average conditional default hazard and the average conditional 90-
days-delinquency hazard be? This paper constructs a simulation process by assuming that the 
housing price remains the same since September 2004 and compares the simulated conditional 
hazards with those estimated based on the real trend of the housing price. The results show that, 
in the case when the housing price changes across time, the average conditional hazard 
dramatically increases from around age month 11 and reaches the maximum hazard at around 
age month 54, and then sharply decreases until around age month 93. This dramatic change of 
the average conditional hazard disappears in the case when the housing price is assumed to be 
unchanged after September 2004. The simulated average conditional hazard slowly increases 
from age month 1 up to age month 169 with an average rate of increase of 3.72 percent for 
default hazard and 1.80 percent for 90-days-delinquency hazard. The average difference of the 
conditional hazard is approximately 0.21 percent between the two cases.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, triggered by a large amount of mortgage 
delinquencies and defaults, draws economists’ attention to the termination risks of single family 
mortgages. 
Between 1994 and 2003, when the homeownership rate began a dramatic increase, the 
subprime share was still relatively stable at around 5.5 percent of mortgage originations (Joint 
Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, 2008). However, the subprime share 
increased rapidly to approximately 20 percent from 2004 to 2006. The financial situation was 
worsened by the fact a high percentage of these subprime mortgages (approximately 90% in 
2006) were adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), which were historically offered to the borrowers 
with good credit, bigger down payments and stable incomes (Zandi Mark, 2009). Although the 
ARMs were introduced as early as the 1980s, new versions of the ARMs came with 
extraordinarily low initial rates, known as teasers. At times, teasers were offered at rates of only 
one or two percent and were fixed for two years in most cases. After two years, they quickly 
adjusted higher, usually every six months, until they matched higher prevailing interest rates.  
In truth, most banks expected these mortgages to be kept for a short period. The 
expectation was not that these mortgages would default, but that they would be refinanced before 
the teasers adjusted higher. Most banks allowed borrowers to prepay mortgages with a 
prepayment penalty, which was usually about 80 percent of the six months’ interest. The basic 
assumption was that, with the strong rise in housing prices, the amount of the second mortgages 
against the housing equity would increase. This amount of money would be enough to pay back 
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the existing mortgages and the prepayment penalties. Therefore, borrowers could keep the 
second mortgages with low teasers. For borrowers who have a fixed-rate mortgage, when the 
market interest rate decreases, they have the incentive to refinance and get a new mortgage with 
a lower interest rate. 
However, housing prices peaked in spring 2006 and then began falling. This meant 
refinancing was no longer an option because the second mortgages were not enough to pay back 
the previous ones. Thus, millions of subprime mortgages holders began defaulting on their 
mortgages and banks foreclosed on their houses. More than four million completed foreclosures 
entered the market from January 2007 to December 2011, and approximately 8.2 million 
foreclosures were started (Bennett, 2012). The housing prices dropped dramatically because of a 
large amount of housing availability and the shortage of housing demands, which triggered even 
more defaults. 
Banks that lent subprime mortgages became undercapitalized because, in many cases, the 
values of the houses were less than the original mortgages they lent. The low equity-asset ratio 
and the high loan-asset ratio (which is the amount of properties in the foreclosure process or 
were foreclosed as a percent of assets) caused 466 banks to be shut down by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from September 2007 to December 2012 (Boswel, 2013). 
Approximately 7177 banks were still operating as of September 2012. These banks were 
separated into three groups - the Big Four Banks (Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup 
and Wells Fargo), the Next Thirteen Largest Banks (US Bancorp, Capital One, PNC, Mellon, 
State Street, TD Bank, HSBC, etc) and the Mid-and-Small Banks (all the remaining 7160 mid-
and-small sized banks). The bank data offered by FDIC showed that the amount of loss 
provisions as a percent of loans during the pre-crisis period for the Big Four Banks was 2.26%, 
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for the Next Thirteen Largest Banks was 1.31% and for the Mid-and-Small Banks was 0.94%. 
However, during the crisis period, the amount of loss provisions as a percent of loans for the Big 
Four Banks, the Next Thirteen Largest Banks the Mid-and-Small Banks increased to 12.38%, 
9.30%, and 8.65%, respectively. Since December 31, 2007, approximately $779 billion in loan 
loss provisions were recorded on US banks income statements. Of that amount, $691 billion was 
written off in actual Net Charge-offs (FDIC Bank Data) and the amount the Loan Loss 
Allowance has increased to $167 billion since December 2017. 
Another important financial system negatively affected by the delinquencies and defaults 
during the crisis was the secondary mortgage market. In this market, existing mortgages were 
sold by lenders and packaged into mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and then bought by public 
and private investors, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, pension funds, insurance companies, 
mutual funds and hedge funds (“Mortgage-backed security”, 2016). The value of MBS insurance 
was around 1.35 trillion in 2001 (according to Sifma Statistics),  increased to around 2.7 trillion 
in 2003 and then dropped to around 2.1 trillion in 2006 (gross U.S. insurance agency MBS plus 
private-label MBS). However, the securitization share of subprime mortgages increased from 54 
percent in 2001 to 76 percent in 2004 and then dropped slightly to 75 percent in 2006. Therefore, 
a large number of subprime mortgages were packaged into MBS’. The inability to predict the 
value of MBS because of the large rate of defaults trapped many sellers and investors in the 
secondary mortgage market.  
As an important trigger of the subprime crisis, the default risk is worth comprehensive 
analysis. In addition, the prepayment risk, which greatly influenced the level of the cash flow in 
the mortgage market, should also be considered. Previous literature has provided evidence that 
the prepayment and default risks are distinct but not independent. Therefore, when the 
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probability of prepayment and default are simultaneously high, it is interesting to analyze the 
following research questions: what economic factors affect the competing risks of prepayment 
and default and to what extent they affect the risks?  
To understand these questions, this paper analyzes the economic factors affecting these 
two competing risks in the single-family mortgage market in locations where the aggregate of the 
prepayment and default risks are simultaneously high. The model used is a discrete-time 
competing-risks model based on restricted multinomial logit analyzing information from a 
sample single-family loan-level dataset constructed by Freddie Mac, which contains thirty-year, 
fixed-rate mortgages originated from January 1999 to December 2012. Individual mortgages are 
analyzed according to high simultaneous prepayment and default rates in five MSAs – Phoenix, 
Miami, Tampa, Detroit and Las Vegas.  
To develop a more comprehensive analysis, two different combinations of dependent 
variables are used. The first combination is prepayment and default and the second is 
prepayment and 90-days-delinquency. The indicator for a prepayment penalty and the value of 
the call option1 are used to evaluate the prepayment risk and the best three combinations of 
explanatory variables – the value of negative equity, a negative equity dummy and original loan-
to-value– together with the unemployment rate are used to evaluate the default risk.  
This research also examines the effect of the credit score and the debt-to-income ratio on 
the termination risks. According to the literature, the credit score affects the probability of 
default; however, whether or not it affects prepayment is ambiguous. Therefore, two estimations 
                                                          
1 A call option is an agreement that gives an investor the right to buy a stock, bond, commodity or other instrument 
at a specified price within a specific time period. Prepayment gives a borrower the right to early repay a loan to take 
advantage of lower interest rates, because when principal is prepaid early, future interest payments at a higher 
interest rate will not be paid on that part of the principal. Therefore, in the case of a mortgage-backed security, 
prepayment is treated as a call option. The value of the call option is the difference between the market value of the 
mortgage and the book value of the mortgage measured as a percent of the market value of the mortgage. 
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are run to explain the effect of the credit score on the prepayment and default. The first 
estimation considers how the credit score affects both termination risks and the second considers 
how the credit score affects only default. In addition, other mortgage characteristics, such as loan 
size and loan age, are controlled to make the estimation accurate. 
The brief summary of the main results shows the prepayment penalty has a negative 
effect on the prepayment decision. However, its effect in Detroit is insignificantly positive. The 
value of the call option has a significantly positive impact on the prepayment in each MSA. The 
unemployment rate has a positive relationship with the default/90-days-delinquency. Moreover, 
negative equity, the negative equity dummy, and original loan-to-value generally are positively 
related to the default/90-days-delinquency. As expected, in most MSAs, the credit score has a 
strongly positive effect on the prepayment; comparatively, it has a strong negative impact on the 
default. When using the credit score only in the default risk and not in the prepayment risk, the 
effect of the credit score is still significantly negative, but the coefficients slightly decrease. 
Moreover, the debt-to-income does not appear to affect prepayment, but it has a positive effect 
on the default/90-days-delinquency in most MSAs. To test the equality of the coefficients among 
five MSAs, a Wald test is constructed in this paper. The results of this test support the argument 
that there is not a national financial market for housing and that the financial markets for housing 
are heavily influenced by local characteristics. 
The paper is separated into six sections. In section II, previous literature on the analysis 
of prepayment and default in mortgage markets is summarized. In section III, the dataset, 
explanatory variables and dependent variables used in this paper are clearly discussed. Section 
IV outlines the methodology and section V discusses the results of the five MSAs and the Wald 
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test for the equality of coefficients among MSAs. The paper concludes and recommendations for 
future study are covered in section VI. 
Literature Review 
In the earliest studies using option models in real estate finance, researchers analyze 
either prepayment or default decision, but not both. Findley and Capozza (1977) provide 
evidence that the refinancing risk of variable-rate mortgages (VRMs) and the refinancing risk of 
fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) can be reasonably explained by option theory. The analysis only 
considers interest rate intermediation and by employing the Samuelson-Kruizinga notation, the 
authors clearly show the effect of the bond price (the reciprocal of the interest-rate level) on key 
variables, including the market value of a mortgage, an S&L deposit, equity value, gross wealth 
and net wealth. The analysis is discussed from the separate perspectives of savings and loan 
associations (S&Ls) and mortgage holders. From the S&L perspective, Findley and Capozza 
construct a net equity position in terms of the bond price movement for the true FRMs, the actual 
FRMs and the VRMs. The difference between true FRMs and the actual FRMs assumed by 
authors is that the former cannot be refinanced or accelerated and the latter can be refinanced by 
the borrower and accelerated by the lender. Using these net equity positions, the authors argue 
that the S&L solvency problem consists of forecasting and pricing issues, and the pricing issues 
include an option pricing problem in the case of the actual FRM. Moreover, both problems can 
be mitigated by VRMs. From the mortgages holders’ perspective, the authors construct a net 
wealth equation in terms of the interest rate change for the true FRMs, the actual FRMs and the 
VRMs. The equations are separately discussed under the assumptions of fixed income, variable 
income and bounded income. The results show the VRMs have no adverse effect on the 
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households sector. Therefore, allowing S&L to market residential VRMs would be a wise 
solution for solving the S&L solvency problems.  
While the paper by Findley and Cappoza presents a theoretical analysis only, Epperson, 
Kau, Keenan and Muller’s 1985 study is the first that uses simulation to understand default 
behavior. Epperson et al. analyze the default option and evaluate the pricing of insurance against 
default on FRMs. In this study, the mortgages and insurance are treated as compound put options 
and the prepayment option is ignored. A compound put option means that, at each payment date 
before the last one, the borrowers either default or purchase a new option to default at the next 
payment date by making the scheduled payment.  By assuming the value of the house follows the 
standard lognormal process and the interest rate follows a stochastic process under the Local 
Expectations Hypothesis (LEH), a partial differential equation (PDE) is constructed. The 
valuation of derivative assets as the solution of the PDE involves both housing prices and the 
interest rate. The simulation process provides three important results. First, the value of the 
default option increases as the loan-to-value ratio increases. Second, the volatility of both the 
house price and the spot interest rate significantly affect the value of the default option. However, 
the effect of the house price is stronger than that of the spot interest rate. Third, when the 
insurance coverage is 100 percent of the loan and with the increase of the loan-to-value ratio, the 
percentage increase of the value of the option is less than that of the value of the insurance. This 
result indicates that the additional insurance coverage is less valuable. Furthermore, the authors 
recommend that a complete analysis of FRMs should involve both the prepayment and the 
default option, and the techniques used in this paper can be applied in the future study.  
In responding to the gap in empirical analysis, Green and Shoven (1986) collect 3938 
fixed-rate mortgages from two large California S&Ls and apply the proportional hazards model 
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to estimate the sensitivity of mortgage prepayments to interest rates. The data is available from 
1975 to 1982 for the first association and from 1976 to 1982 for the second. The sample is 
divided into two periods, 1975-78 and 1979-82 according to whether due-on-sale (DOS) clauses 
are enforced or not. The DOS gives the lender the right to claim the face value of the mortgage if 
the borrower sells the residence. The results indicate that the probability of prepayment is 
sensitive to the relationship between the contract rate and the market rate. Moreover, the effect of 
the interest rate during the period for which the DOS clause is unenforceable is much higher than 
that in the period for which it is enforceable. Furthermore, the authors test the sensitivity of the 
average mortgage age at the time of prepayment to the interest rates and found that the average 
age was highly dependent on interest rates.  
Schwart and Torous (1989) follow Green and Shoven’s methodology and add lagged 
refinancing rates, heterogeneity of borrowers and seasonality into the model to predict the 
probability of prepayment. Next, they integrate the prepayment function into a valuation 
framework to evaluate the mortgage-backed security. The dataset used in their study is a number 
of thirty-year, fixed-rate, single-family pools offered by the Government National Mortgage 
Association (GNMA) from January 1978 to November 1987. The results show that the 
conditional probability of prepayment significantly increases when the refinancing rate is less 
than the contract rate and insignificantly increases during the summer. Furthermore, the 
conditional probability of prepayment is positively correlated with the mortgage age until around 
6.265 years, after which point the relationship between the probability of conditional prepayment 
and mortgage age becomes negative. 
Quigley and Van Order (1990) estimate a prepayment function based on a hazard model 
and test whether borrowers exercise their prepayment options in a manner consistent with the 
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optimal strategy developed in contingent claims models. The dataset is from the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and includes 6375 thirty-year fixed-rate single-family 
mortgages issued during the 1976-1980 period. The results show the value of the call 
(prepayment) option being “in the money” has a strongly positive effect on the prepayment 
hazard, and the initial equity insignificantly and negatively affects the prepayment hazard. 
However, after testing the prepayment behavior, the authors conclude the prepayment option is 
not exercised ruthlessly. In their paper, the authors also mention they do not consider default in 
the choice model; however, a more general model should consider that loans are about to prepay 
as well as to default.  
Follain, Ondrich and Sinha (1995) explain that the substantial transaction costs, 
nonfinancial characteristics – such as job change and divorce – personal desire to adjust the 
composition of portfolio, and data limitation are four main reasons that homeowners do not 
ruthlessly make the prepayment decision. Therefore, the authors argue the theoretical predictions 
of the option pricing model do not hold empirically on single family mortgages. In addition, they 
introduce a prepayment model based on the proportional hazard model developed by Meyer 
(1987) to explain the prepayment behavior in the multifamily mortgage market. They also 
consider unobserved heterogeneity in this model. The dataset contains 1083 Freddie Mac Plan A 
multifamily mortgages originated between 1975 and 1986. An important result in their study is 
that the prepayment is positively correlated with the value of the call option. When the call 
option is in the money, households are more likely to prepay their mortgages. Significant 
increases in the model with heterogeneity. However, the sensitivity of the prepayment with 
respect to an interest rate change for an in-the-money option is much lower that what is expected 
in the option price model. Therefore, the prepayment option is not exercised ruthlessly in the 
10 
 
 
multifamily mortgage market. Moreover, the survival time positively affects the prepayment 
hazard, and the seasonal effect for summer significantly lowers the prepayment hazard compared 
to winter. The authors also discuss the effect of the logarithms of housing and book values in the 
study. In the model without heterogeneity, the effect of the logarithms of housing value is 
insignificantly positive and the effect of the logarithms of book value is insignificantly negative. 
However, both effects become significant in the model with heterogeneity. Furthermore, the 
authors also mention the potential importance of incorporating the value of the default option in 
the prepayment model.   
Quigley and Van Order (1991) estimate the probability of default in different LTV level 
and in different geographic regions based on 300,000 thirty-year, fixed-rate conventional loans 
originated from 1976 through 1980 and bought by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac). The data is separated into 15 groups based on three loan-to-value 
(LTV) categories (LTV is less than 81 percent, between 81 and 90 percent, and greater than 90 
percent) and five geographic regions (Northeast, North-central, Southeast, Southwest and West). 
By using a proportional hazard model with the baseline hazard varies by age, the authors show 
that a mortgage institution lending loans with LTV above 90 percentage needs about two times 
of capital more than the one lending loans with LTV between 81 and 90 percentage. Holding the 
LTV constant, a nationally-diversified institution needs about one-half the capital less than the 
one located entirely in one region. Using the same dataset, Quigley and Van Order (1995) test 
the contingent claims approaches for “ruthless” default (the transactions costs, reputation costs 
and moving costs have no effect in the model) and estimate the relationship between the value of 
equity and the default risk. The results show that the probability of default increases as the value 
of negative equity increases. The loans with a higher value of negative equity are more likely to 
11 
 
 
default and loans with a lower value of negative equity do not default immediately. Moreover, by 
adding the transaction cost into the model, the authors present that it significantly affects the 
default decision and should be considered in the estimation.  
In responding to the fact the prepayment risk and the default risk should be analyzed 
simultaneously, Kau, Keenan, Muller and Epperson (1992, 1995) write a series of papers using  a 
generalized valuation model, which involves both risks for thirty-year fixed-rate single-family 
mortgages. The model, in the paper published in 1992, is based on the partial differential 
equation (PDE) introduced by Epperson et al. in 1985. However, the new PDE consider the 
probability of prepayment occurring at any time and the probability of default occurring only at 
the end of each month. The factors used in the 1992 study are separated into two groups. The 
first group is financial factors: interest rate, housing price volatility, and loan-to-value ratio. 
Nonfinancial factors are included in the second group: divorce and job change. This simulation 
shows that the lower housing price volatility and the lower loan-to-value ratio has a significant 
effect on the default decision, while the high loan-to-value ratio and high house price volatility 
have a significant effect on prepayment. When insurance is added to mortgages, the nonfinancial 
factors affected the prepayment and default decisions differently. This means borrowers prepay 
mortgages for nonfinancial reasons; however, they hardly default for nonfinancial reasons. In the 
paper published in 1995, the authors continue to develop the general valuation model under the 
assumption of perfect financial markets. The simulation is more general and considers as many 
of the features of the mortgage contract as possible. However, the general valuation models in 
both studies are not applied to the actual dataset.   
In more recent empirical studies, the Cox proportional hazard framework has become a 
popular method to construct competing risks models. The basic assumption is that borrowers 
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make the prepayment or default decision on the basis of market conditions to maximize net 
wealth. Deng, Quigley and Van Order (1996) use the competing risks model to analyze the 
thirty-year fixed-rate single-family mortgages. The dataset is from Freddie Mac and contains 
780,443 mortgages issued from 1976 to 1983 in 26 major metropolitan areas. The important 
explanatory variables used in this study include the value of the call option (calculated as the 
ratio of the present discounted value of the unpaid mortgage balance at the current quarterly 
market interest rate relative to the value discounted at the contract interest rate), the probability 
of negative equity, the income ratio (calculated as the ratio of housed hold reported income to the 
MSA median income level), the unemployment rate, and the annual divorce rate. The results 
show that the value of the call option has a significantly positive effect on the prepayment hazard. 
Similarly, a higher probability of negative equity positively affects the default hazard. However, 
a higher probability of negative equity decreases the prepayment hazard. Moreover, lower 
income borrowers are more likely to default than higher income borrowers. Furthermore, the 
higher the unemployment rate and divorce rate, the lower the prepayment hazard. In this study, 
the authors also use a simulation method to estimate the subsidy provided, and the program costs, 
of zero-downpayment mortgages. The estimation shows that the zero-downpayment loans cost 
much more than the loans with 5 and 10 percent down-payments.  
The competing risks model based on the Cox proportional hazard framework is 
developed further in later studies. A paper by Deng (1997), introduces a competing risks model 
in which a binomial mean-reverting interest rate model is added. This model can be used in 
situations where transactions costs in the mortgage termination are not zero and perfect 
information on future interest rate movement is not obtained. The dataset used in this paper is 
from Freddie Mac and contains 489,372 thirty-year fixed-rate single-family mortgages issued in 
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30 major metropolitan areas from 1976 to 1983. The study concludes that the probability of 
negative equity has a significantly positive effect on the default risk; however, its effect on the 
prepayment risk is significantly negative. Similarly, the call option is strongly correlated with the 
prepayment risk. Moreover, the initial loan-to-value ratio is positively and significantly 
associated with the default risk. Furthermore, higher unemployment rates increase the probability 
of default and decrease the probability of prepayment. When comparing the results from the 
competing risks model with and without a binomial mean-reverting interest rate model, the 
prepayment behavior becomes less sensitive to the value of the call option in the model with a 
binomial mean-reverting interest rate model. Moreover, in this model, the negative correlation 
between the prepayment and default functions becomes more significant.  
Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) introduce the unobserved heterogeneity into the 
competing risks model. The dataset is from Freddie Mac and contains 447,042 thirty-year fixed-
rate single-family mortgages issued in 30 major metropolitan areas. Their results are consistent 
with previous studies, where the value of the call option has a positive relationship with the 
prepayment risk and a higher probability of negative equity increases the default risk and 
decreases the prepayment risk. However, the marginal effect of the call option increases about 20 
percent in the model where unobserved heterogeneity is considered. Moreover, the higher 
original loan-to-value ratio causes a higher default risk and it only slightly increases the 
prepayment risk. The unemployment and divorce rates have a significantly positive effect on the 
default risk. When adding these rates into the model, the estimated heterogeneity variance 
declines. The results indicate that ignoring heterogeneity among mortgage borrowers may lead to 
downward biases in estimating the prepayment risk.  
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Wenyi Huang and Jan Ondrich (2002) use a bivariate Heckman-Singer nonparametric 
random effects distribution to control the unobserved heterogeneity. The primary goal of this 
study is to analyze the competing risks of prepayment and default in the multifamily mortgage 
market by a competing risks model based on the Cox proportional hazard model. The dataset 
contains 4006 FHA-insured multifamily mortgages originated from 1980 to 1995. The results 
indicate the value of the call option is positively associated with the prepayment risk. The 
unexpected growth in households and the rental price growth rate are negatively correlated with 
the claim risk. However, the vacancy rate has a significantly positive effect on the claim risk. 
Furthermore, mortgage size has a positive effect on both the prepayment risk and the default risk. 
When controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the effects of the unexpected growth in 
households, rental price growth rate, and vacancy rate on claim risk became much stronger. 
Moreover, the effect of mortgage size also was greater in the model controlling for heterogeneity. 
Therefore, heterogeneity among mortgage borrowers should be considered in estimating the 
competing risks. 
A working paper by Ken Lam, Robert M. Dunsky, and Austin Kelly used two different 
combinations of dependent variables to indicate the competing risks. The first combination is 
prepayment and foreclosure completion, and the other combination is prepayment and 90-day 
delinquency. The authors discuss the impact of down-payment underwriting standards on loan 
performance. The competing risks model is based on a multinomial logit. By controlling for 
many important personal specific characteristics, such as the credit score and debt-to-income, the 
authors argue the lifetime delinquency and foreclosure rates increase monotonically and 
nonlinearly with the original loan-to-value. 
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Another important topic on mortgage termination risks is the strategic default risk. The 
strategic default means that even though the borrowers have the ability to pay back the 
mortgages, they are willing to default since the value of the property falls below the unpaid 
principal balance. An example of the studies on the strategic mortgage default is by Bradley, 
Cutts and Liu (2015). Different from the previous literature which ambiguously distinguish the 
strategic default from other types of default and ignore the importance of negative equity as a 
necessary condition for strategic default, this paper use a unique dataset from CoreLogic loan-
level data and CoreLogic local market data, which contains both mortgage specific and 
individual specific characteristics, to accurately measure the strategic default based on the value 
of negative equity and the capability of payment. By using a logistic model, the authors analyze 
the effect of the local foreclosure rate and the local strategic default rate on borrower’s strategic 
default decision, by controlling individual characteristics, mortgage characteristics, and 
economic factors. The results show that the local foreclosure rate and the local strategic default 
rate are statistically significant and economically important determinants of strategic default 
indicating contagion.  
The paper by Chao Ma (2015) claims that there are two types of default generated by two 
mechanisms: illiquidity-triggered default and strategic default. The illiquidity-triggered default 
occurs when households do not have enough money to make their monthly mortgage payment 
and consequently are forced to default. Unemployment can be one of the reasons causes this type 
of default.  The strategic default (or ruthless default) is caused by the financial incentive to 
default. In this case, compared with prepayment or continuing to pay, default provides 
households higher utility. The author also argues that there are two types of prepayment, one is 
caused by the incentive to refinance and the other one is caused by moving. Unfortunately, in 
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mortgage loan performance datasets, prepayment (default) can be easily observed, but it is hard 
to distinguish two types of prepayment (default) by different mechanisms. To be able to 
separately estimate the probability of illiquidity-triggered default, the probability of strategic 
default, the probability of refinancing, and the probability of prepayment cause by moving, the 
author assumes that, at each period 𝑡 , the household firstly determines whether to choose 
illiquidity-triggered default and if illiquidity-triggered default does not occur, then the household 
decide whether to move and prepay the mortgages. If neither illiquidity nor move occurs in the 
previous two processes, the household will have the opportunity to make a choice among 
continuing to pay on the mortgage, refinance or strategic default. The author introduces a two 
stages estimation based on multinomial logit. In the first stage, the author analyzes the competing 
risks of prepayment and default by assuming the probability of default is the sum of the 
probability of illiquidity-triggered default and the probability of strategic default, and the 
probability of prepayment is the sum of the probability of refinancing and the probability of 
moving. In the second stage, the author presents a simulation based on the results in the first 
stage and uses the results of the simulation together with a multinomial logit model to estimate 
the probability of different types of prepayment and default. Based on 20,487 30-year fixed 
mortgages offered by the Ohio Housing Finance Agency, the author shows that the county level 
unemployment rate positively and significantly affects the probability of illiquidity-triggered 
default. The value of the default option (the difference of current home value and the unpaid 
balance) has a significant positive effect on the strategic default, and the value of the refinance 
option (the difference of the market value and the book value of the unpaid balance) has a 
significant positive effect on refinance.  
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This study does not separate the illiquidity-triggered default and the strategic default but 
involves both unemployment rate and the value of negative equity to analyze the default risk. 
Moreover, this study does not distinguish the prepayment caused by refinancing from the 
prepayment caused by moving but uses prepayment penalty and the value of the call option to 
explain the financial incentive to prepay. Future study can be done by separating different types 
of default and prepayment with a more complicated competing risks model. 
Follain and Giertz (2016) use an annual pool time series dataset which includes 384 
MSAs from 1980 to 2010 and a three-equation vector correction model to predict the probability 
of the housing price bubbles. The authors separate the dataset into 9 categories based on the 
population size (less than 500,000 residence, 500,000 to 1 million residence, and more than 1 
million residence) and three time periods (1980-1995, 1980-2000, and 1980-2007) and run 
regressions on each category. Based on the regression results, the authors predict the housing 
price from 2008 to 2010 and compare the predicted housing price with the actual housing price. 
The comparison shows two important results that the model systematically underestimated the 
sensitivity of the declines and both the predictions and the actual outcomes show dramatic 
variations among MSAs. Therefore, the authors claim that there is not a national housing market 
and the housing markets are heavily influenced by local characteristics. Methods that not allow 
for the variation across markets will cause estimation biases. 
Data Description and Explanatory Variables 
Data Description 
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The dataset used in this paper is a sample single-family loan-level dataset constructed by 
Freddie Mac. This sample dataset2 is randomly selected from 16 million thirty-year fixed-rate3 
single-family mortgages originated from January 1, 1999 through December 31, 20124. 50,000 
mortgages are selected from each year, which amounts to 700,000 mortgages.  
To be able to use the Case-Shiller indices for the housing value, the initial analysis in this 
chapter is restricted to the twenty MSAs for which they are available. Five of these MSAs have 
high simultaneous prepayment and default rates in the latter part of the sample period. Because 
the method in this paper involves the competing prepayment and default risks, the concentration 
is on these five MSAs: Phoenix, Miami, Tampa Bay, Metro Detroit and Las Vegas. Figures 1 
through 5 show the empirical prepayment rates and default rates in these MSAs. The calculations 
of the prepayment and default rates are explained in the Appendix A. 
[insert Figures 1 through 5 here] 
As the above figures show, the prepayment rates continue to increase from August 1999 
to July 2003, and then dramatically decrease until the end of 2008, and then slowly increase 
again. The default rates are low in each month from 1999 to 2007; however, after March 2008, 
the default rate substantially increases until March 2011. Thus, in the period from around 2008 to 
2011, the prepayment and default rates are simultaneously high for these five MSAs.  
                                                          
2 According to the General User Guide, the sampling method used in this dataset does not change across years, and 
each member of the subset has an equal probability of being chosen once from the larger population. A simple 
random sample is meant to be an unbiased representation of the larger population. 
3 Original sample dataset includes any loan with loan term greater than 300 months and less than 420 months. 
However, the dataset used in this paper contains only thirty-year (loan term is 360 months) fixed-rate single-family 
mortgages. 
4 The actual originations in the sample dataset range from January, 1999 through March, 2013. Some loans 
originated in 2013 are included in the 2012 sample dataset. 
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Figure 1. Monthly prepayment rate and default rate in Phoenix 
prepayment rate default rate
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Figure 2. Monthly prepayment rate and default rate in Miami
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Figure 3. Monthly prepayment rate and default rate in Tampa
prepayment rate default rate
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Figure 4. Monthly prepayment rate and default rate in Detroit 
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Figure 5. Monthly prepayment rate and default rate in Las Vegas
prepayment rate default rate
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Table 1 shows that a large percentage of mortgages in each MSA has a positive call 
option and negative equity simultaneously from Aug. 2009 to Jun. 2010. An average of 47.46 
percent of existing mortgages in Phoenix, 38.43 percent of existing mortgages in Miami, 39.93 
percent of existing mortgages in Tampa, 65.56 percent of existing mortgages in Detroit and 
62.02 percent of existing mortgages in Las Vegas with positive call option and negative equity 
simultaneously. Therefore, the prepayment and default risks in this period are to a large extent 
simultaneously high. The distribution of the negative equity and call-option for each MSA is 
shown in Figure 6 through Figure 23 5. Table 2 shows the estimated prepayment and default risks 
for each MSA from Aug. 2009 to Jun. 2010. The results support the argument that there is a 
competing risk for prepayment and default in the sample period. An average of 10.18 percent of 
existing mortgages in each MSA has a difference of predicted prepayment and default risks that 
is less than 0.1 percent. An average of 26.75 percent of existing mortgages in each MSA has a 
difference of predicted prepayment and default risks that is less than 0.25 percent. An average of 
51.60 percent of existing mortgages in each MSA has a difference of predicted prepayment and 
default risks that is less than 0.5 percent.  
[insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
[insert Figures 6 through 23 here] 
The findings indicate that 442 mortgages have been modified before the original maturity 
date. The modification changes the mortgage term, maturity date and contract rate. Therefore, 
these 442 mortgages will have different monthly payments and remaining balances. 
 
                                                          
5 For Phoenix and Miami, the distribution of call option and negative equity is shown for Aug. 2009, Jan. 2010 and 
Jun. 2010. For Tampa, Detroit and Las Vegas, the distribution of call option and negative equity is only shown for 
Aug. 2009, because the distributions for other time period are very similar.  
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Table 1.The percent of mortgages with positive call-option and negative equity in each MSA 
Time Phoenix Miami Tampa Detroit Las Vegas 
Aug. 2009 53.21% 40.52% 38.89% 67.52% 66.14% 
Sep. 2009 51.41% 38.80% 39.13% 64.50% 64.42% 
Oct. 2009 48.48% 39.10% 39.57% 60.50% 61.40% 
Nov. 2009 47.29% 38.54% 40.08% 60.95% 61.22% 
Dec. 2009 47.30% 38.94% 40.48% 63.26% 62.33% 
Jan. 2010 47.50% 38.71% 40.91% 65.43% 63.16% 
Feb. 2010 47.58% 38.26% 42.12% 67.01% 63.02% 
Mar. 2010 47.13% 38.77% 41.45% 69.97% 61.76% 
Apr. 2010 45.11% 38.71% 40.00% 69.01% 60.50% 
May. 2010 43.93% 36.80% 38.70% 67.95% 59.46% 
Jun. 2010 43.13% 35.56% 37.91% 65.10% 58.78% 
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Table 2.The percent of mortgages with the absolute difference of the predicted prepayment and default rates less than 0.1%, 0.1%-0.25% 
and 0.25%-0.5% 
 
 
Phoenix Miami Tampa Detroit Las Vegas 
 <0.1% 0.1%-
0.25% 
0.25%-
0.5% 
<0.1% 0.1%-
0.25% 
0.25%-
0.5% 
<0.1% 0.1%-
0.25% 
0.25%-
0.5% 
<0.1% 0.1%-
0.25% 
0.25%-
0.5% 
<0.1% 0.1%-
0.25% 
0.25%-
0.5% 
Aug. 
2009 
4.4% 12.7% 18.7% 13.3% 17.8% 28.6% 7.7% 14.4% 23.9% 13.6% 17.5% 27.8% 12.8% 19.5% 29.1% 
Sep. 
2009 
6.0% 15.8% 22.0% 15.5% 20.6% 27.3% 9.9% 16.0% 30.1% 15.6% 21.5% 26.0% 14.5% 21.6% 30.6% 
Oct. 
2009 
6.5% 15.0% 23.6% 15.9% 21.2% 25.2% 9.9% 17.4% 29.9% 14.9% 22.1% 24.9% 14.0% 22.5% 29.3% 
Nov. 
2009 
6.2% 14.8% 23.5% 15.3% 21.4% 26.3% 9.9% 17.8% 29.1% 15.0% 21.3% 23.8% 14.8% 21.4% 27.8% 
Dec. 
2009 
4.6% 12.0% 21.7% 13.9% 19.2% 26.4% 8.8% 15.3% 25.8% 11.1% 20.0% 24.1% 11.3% 21.7% 27.9% 
Jan. 
2010 
4.2% 9.7% 19.9% 11.7% 18.0% 27.4% 7.4% 13.9% 21.5% 10.0% 16.7% 24.1% 9.4% 21.0% 26.3% 
Feb. 
2010 
3.9% 9.4% 18.7% 11.0% 16.9% 28.0% 7.0% 12.8% 21.0% 10.2% 14.3% 24.7% 8.9% 19.9% 25.2% 
Mar. 
2010 
4.4% 10.7% 19.0% 11.9% 18.3% 26.3% 8.0% 13.2% 21.9% 12.5% 13.3% 24.8% 11.9% 18.2% 26.5% 
Apr. 
2010 
3.8% 11.0% 18.6% 12.4% 17.6% 27.4% 7.9% 13.1% 22.2% 12.8% 13.9% 24.3% 12.0% 17.4% 27.5% 
May. 
2010 
3.5% 10.6% 18.4% 12.2% 16.1% 29.7% 7.7% 13.0% 21.4% 11.7% 14.3% 23.7% 10.9% 18.4% 25.7% 
Jun. 
2010 
4.1% 11.6% 18.9% 12.3% 18.0% 28.7% 7.9% 13.8% 22.4% 12.4% 15.3% 23.9% 10.3% 20.5% 25.2% 
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Figure 6. The Distribution of Negative Equity on Aug. 2009 in Phoenix
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Figure 7. The Distribution of Call Option on Aug. 2009 in Phoenix
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Figure 8. The Distribution of Negative Equity on Jan. 2010 in Phoenix
Percent
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Figure 9. The Distribution of Call Option on Jan. 2010 in Phoenix
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Figure 10. The Distribution of Negative Equity on Jun. 2010 in Phoenix
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Figure 11. The Distribution of Call Option on Jun. 2010 in Phoenix
Percent
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Figure 12. The Distribution of Negative Equity on Aug. 2009 in Miami
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Figure 13. The Distribution of Call Option on Aug. 2009 in Miami
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Figure 14. The Distribution of Negative Equity on Jan. 2010 in Miami
Percent
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Figure 15. The Distribution of Call Option on Jan. 2010 in Miami
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Figure 16. The Distribution of Negative Equity on Jun. 2010 in Miami
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Figure 17. The Distribution of Call Option on Jun. 2010 in Miami
Percent
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Figure 18. The Distribution of Negative Equity on Aug. 2009 in Tampa
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Figure 19. The Distribution of Call Option on Aug. 2009 in Tampa
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Figure 20. The Distribution of Negative Equity on Aug. 2009 in Detroit
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29 
 
 
 
 
 
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
Figure 21. The Distribution of Call Option on Aug. 2009 in Detroit
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Figure 22. The Distribution of Negative Equity on Aug. 2009 in Las Vegas
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Figure 23. The Distribution of Call Option on Aug. 2009 in Las Vegas
Percent
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Two different methods are used to deal with this issue. In the first dataset, these 442 
mortgages are right censored one month before the modification date. In the second dataset, 
these 442 mortgages are simply deleted. In the end, the first dataset with right censored 
mortgages contains a total of 29,741 mortgages; the second dataset without modifications 
contains 29,299 mortgages. In total, both datasets contain 19,581 mortgages terminated by 
prepayment, 3,023 mortgages terminated by default and 6,695 mortgages continued without 
termination6. 
Tables 3 through 6 provide detailed information for the originations and the terminations 
of mortgages. Table 3 presents the number of mortgages originated per calendar year for the 
entire dataset (five MSAs); table 4 depicts the number of mortgages originated per calendar year 
for each MSA; table 5 shows the termination type by calendar year for the entire dataset (five 
MSAs) and table 6 depicts the termination type by calendar year for each MSA.  
[insert Tables 3 through 6 here] 
In table 3, findings indicate that about 82 percent of the mortgages in both datasets are 
originated between 1999 and 2008 and the average number of originations among these years is 
about 2425 per year. Starting from 2009, the number of originations dramatically decreases at an 
average rate of 29.7 percent for the right censored dataset and 29.2 percent for the dataset with 
modified mortgages deleted.  The average loan size (base year = 1999) increases from 1999 to 
2006 and then decreases from 2006 to 2011.  
 
                                                          
6 For termination type, the dataset offers seven different types: prepayment or matured, third party sale prior to 180 
days, short sale or short payoff prior to 180 days, deed-in-lieu of foreclosure prior to 180 days, repurchases prior to 
D180, REO acquisition prior to D180, didn’t pay for 180 days. Findings indicate mortgages belong to the type 
prepayment or matured are all prepayment (without any matured) and the last six types are treated as default. Thus, 
there are three different termination types at each point in time: prepayment, default and continue. 
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Table 3. Originations by Calendar Year for the Whole Sample 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages 
deleted 
  
 
 
 
Year Number Average Loan Size Number Average Loan Size 
 
 
1999 
 
2203 115629.1 
 
2197 115638.6 
2000 2423 118768.4 2413 118804.8 
2001 2479 126691.4 2472 126749.1 
2002 2490 128578 2485 128634.6 
2003 2628 132892.6 2613 132959.9 
2004 2336 139134.9 2311 138804.7 
2005 2794 154240 2743 153661 
2006 2509 161082 2392 160286.6 
2007 2314 155953.3 2193 155000.9 
2008 2293 152549.3 2215 151904.2 
2009 1449 150418.7 1443 150276.8 
2010 1339 138419.6 1338 138445.9 
2011 1511 131707.4 1511 131707.4 
2012 718 143266.2 718 143266.2 
2013 255 148025.5 255 148025.5 
 
Table 4. Originations by Calendar Year for Each MSA 
#1 dataset with right censored mortgages 
 
 
 AZ Phoenix FL Miami FL Tampa MI Detroit NV Las Vegas 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year No. Average 
Loan Size 
No. Average 
Loan Size 
No. Average 
Loan Size 
No. Average 
Loan Size 
No. Average 
Loan Size 
 
 
1999 915 119597.8 254 118854.3 388 101567 278 107604.3 368 124423.9 
2000 945 125451.9 279 115809.7 488 106097.6 325 112403.2 386 125922.7 
2001 1027 129501.3 255 123461.9 460 117196.3 419 122469.8 318 139503.4 
2002 895 132955.7 272 132788.9 585 119591.3 376 119756.1 362 138276.1 
2003 1029 135329.5 246 149643.4 542 122912 413 123983.2 398 139075.2 
2004 803 140274.8 365 151219.1 568 124550.3 228 115775 372 161403.6 
2005 1235 161346 333 154437.3 624 136256.5 243 131639.5 359 176167.2 
2006 1027 169705.1 288 178436.9 622 145265.1 215 112923.1 357 178835.7 
2007 989 165407.4 255 176094.3 520 137094.6 217 110361.5 333 171610.5 
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2008 1004 157466.1 322 176196.6 415 129070.6 180 112625.6 372 164320.8 
2009 777 153364.3 108 163982.8 249 145593.3 76 133537 239 145108.7 
2010 711 143328.1 73 158278.6 250 132023.3 62 116981.9 243 130141.8 
2011 813 136716 100 165341.6 278 122507.5 82 123859.4 238 113916.2 
2012 404 151563 54 171745.6 108 118868.7 41 144701 111 122422.1 
2013 160 149931.9 20 181505.9 32 144036.4 12 144699.4 31 121991.3 
 
 
#2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
 
 
 AZ Phoenix FL Miami FL Tampa MI Detroit NV Las Vegas 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year No. Average 
Loan Size 
No. Average 
Loan Size 
No. Average 
Loan Size 
No. Average 
Loan Size 
No. Average 
Loan Size 
 
 
1999 913 119584.9 253 118774.7 388 101567 275 107749.1 368 124423.9 
2000 940 125544.9 277 115825.1 487 106134.7 324 112427.7 385 125885.5 
2001 1026 129493.6 254 123570.3 459 117109.4 415 122797.9 318 139503.4 
2002 894 132990.5 272 132788.9 584 119651.8 373 119872.7 362 138276.1 
2003 1022 135391.7 245 149747.9 540 123045.2 409 124071.1 397 138983.1 
2004 802 140234.2 362 151047 561 124085.9 221 115375.6 365 160330.9 
2005 1215 160688 328 154094.5 615 136132.3 237 131495.2 348 174791.2 
2006 973 169032.6 276 177997 592 144856.8 208 111924 343 177184.6 
2007 936 164526.6 244 176243.4 498 136733 209 110452.2 306 169082.4 
2008 974 156713.8 308 176193.7 401 129215.7 173 112191 359 162496.6 
2009 774 153160.1 106 164571.2 248 145278.6 76 133537 239   145108.7 
2010 710 143384.7 73 158278.6 250 132023.3 62 116981.9 243 130141.8 
2011 813 136716 100 165341.6 278 122507.5 82 123859.4 238 113916.2 
2012 404 151563 54 171745.6 108 118868.7 41 144701 111 122422.1 
2013 160 149931.9 20 181505.9 32 144036.4 12 144699.4 31 121991.3 
 
 
 
Table 5. Defaults and Prepayments by Calendar Year for Whole Sample 
 Defaults Prepayments 
  
 
 
 
Year Number Average Loan Size Number Average Loan Size 
1999 0 0 40 112375 
2000 7 109878 217 116721.8 
2001 29 122389.8 1650 125209.8 
33 
 
 
2002 46 101183.2 2077 123492.4 
2003 35 105651.3 2935 123770 
2004 24 89848.46 1553 119489.5 
2005 20 103474.6 1566 127077.8 
2006 20 89373.96 1012 129852.5 
2007 52 125619.2 883 130372.3 
2008 200 151354 650 137238.8 
2009 699 157530.9 954 144798.4 
2010 833 146844.9 1082 149599 
2011 547 139796.4 968 144410.5 
2012 407 137479 2664 144001.1 
2013 104 134029.4 1330 131012.9 
 
Table 6. Defaults and Prepayments by Calendar Year for Each MSA 
 
 AZ Phoenix 
  
 
 Defaults Prepayments 
  
 
 
 
Year Number Average Loan Size Number Average Loan Size 
1999 0 0 14 121928.6 
2000 4 127707.3 102 119977 
2001 8 122527.7 738 128911.9 
2002 13 109561.2 822 127694 
2003 15 106660.2 1206 128003.4 
2004 9 93584.49 540 121895 
2005 3 128241.3 709 132905.6 
2006 2 69829.86 467 136315.2 
2007 7 126749.6 381 134845.1 
2008 64 171915.1 296 147852 
2009 248 156626.3 503 152297.6 
2010 314 157693.1 540 157700.2 
2011 221 148594.9 439 151223.2 
2012 151 146629.8 1355 152415.3 
2013 32 144148.1 632 132973.3 
 
 
 FL Miami 
  
 
 Defaults Prepayments 
  
 
 
 
Year Number Average Loan Size Number Average Loan Size 
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1999 0 0 6 117833.3 
2000 1 80300.81 24 116460.4 
2001 9 130863.4 127 117507.5 
2002 8 109623.5 219 121721.2 
2003 2 96428.8 290 122973.6 
2004 1 54680.78 211 122381.8 
2005 3 164353.7 159 132152.4 
2006 2 179739.6 119 131208.3 
2007 7 189665.2 125 133955.1 
2008 40 192094.2 80 131196.6 
2009 141 189507.2 66 157876.2 
2010 142 158330.5 82 164479.5 
2011 77 144195 89 150251.1 
2012 40 142386.5 204 162462.6 
2013 10 153114.4 122 143036.6 
 
 
 FL Tampa 
  
 
 Defaults Prepayments 
  
 
 
 
Year Number Average Loan Size Number Average Loan Size 
  
 
1999 0 0 8 112375 
2000 0 0 29 110292.7 
2001 2 109592.9 277 114658.1 
2002 6 91526.59 394 113140.4 
2003 4 115216.6 564 112492.2 
2004 3 95544.35 332 107199.2 
2005 4 86584.23 334 109376.4 
2006 2 101645.8 239 111991.2 
2007 15 130997.6 209 114966.5 
2008 43 127819.8 138 117257.7 
2009 123 141396.3 216 126808.7 
2010 125 124896.5 244 134280.3 
2011 98 124828.9 230 133242.1 
2012 99 115484.9 495 128496.4 
2013 29 125176.5 265 121368.3 
 
 
 MI Detroit 
  
 
 Defaults Prepayments 
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Year Number Average Loan Size Number Average Loan Size 
  
 
1999 0 0 10 100800 
2000 1 41601.63 30 119258 
2001 3 103791.8 281 123738.7 
2002 14 79642.02 336 120659.2 
2003 9 79778.86 397 119713.5 
2004 10 90223.29 185 113942.9 
2005 9 76868.98 104 112282.3 
2006 14 77503.47 50 113926 
2007 17 76631.93 62 109907.9 
2008 34 84206.89 55 146275.1 
2009 74 93270.67 67 131690 
2010 90 84237.92 104 139089.1 
2011 49 84947.49 95 131421.6 
2012 25 69195.95 293 111457.1 
2013 9 77316.03 99 110588.8 
 
 
 NV Las Vegas 
  
 
 Defaults Prepayments 
  
 
 
 
Year Number Average Loan Size Number Average Loan Size 
  
 
1999 0 0 2 87000 
2000 1 136414.6 32 109990.3 
2001 7 122964.4 227 132180.3 
2002 5 137799.2 306 129913.1 
2003 5 145231.7 478 130248.2 
2004 1 70555.85 285 130707.8 
2005 1 153548.4 260 136740.1 
2006 0 0 137 143616.7 
2007 6 174931.4 106 152416 
2008 19 169745.8 81 132328.2 
2009 113 179260.7 102 146061 
2010 162 167467.5 112 142777 
2011 102 158142.3 115 146950.5 
2012 92 162548.7 317 150445.5 
2013 24 144550.4 212 139842.9 
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Table 4 shows the originations for each MSA in both datasets. About 45.5 percent of the 
total mortgages originate in Phoenix. In 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2008, over 1,000 new 
mortgages are originated, and the number of originations gradually decreases starting in 2009. 
The average loan size in Phoenix reaches $169,705 (base year = 1999) in 2006 and decreases to 
$136.716 in 2011, then increases again in 2012.  
The number of originations in Miami continuously increases from 254 in 1999 to 365 in 
2004, and then gradually decreases to 255 in 2007. In 2008 the number of originations in Miami 
increases again to 322 and then after that year, the number drops below 110. The average loan 
size in Miami increases from 1999 to 2006, and then continuously decreases until 2010 before it 
increases again in 2011.   
In Tampa, the number of originations gradually increases from 388 in 1999 to 622 in 
2006. Starting from 2007, the number of originations in Tampa rapidly decreases at an average 
rate of 40 percent. The average loan size in Tampa increases from 1999 to 2006 and then 
decreases from 2007 to 2012, with the exception of 2009, in which loan size increases by 12.8 
percent.  
The number of originations in Detroit increases from 278 in 1999 to 413 in 2003, then 
continues to decrease after 2004. Furthermore, in Las Vegas, there are more than 300 
originations from 1999 to 2008. The number starts to decrease in 2009.  
Table 5 presents aggregate defaults and prepayments for each dataset. The defaults 
dramatically increase from seven in 2000 to 833 in 2010 and then slightly decrease from 2011 to 
2012. The average loan size of defaults peaks in 2009 at around $157,530 and then drops to an 
average of $139,537 from 2010 to 2013. The prepayments dramatically increase from 40 in 1999 
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to 2935 in 2003, decrease from 1553 in 2004 to 650 in 2008, and then increase again from 2009 
to 2012. The average loan size continued to increase slightly from 1999 to 2001, decreased 
slightly until 2004, then increased again until 2011.  
Table 6 outlines the defaults and prepayments by MSA. The defaults in each MSA are 
very low from 1999 to 2007 and then increase rapidly from 2008 to 2010. They decrease slightly 
from 2011. The number of prepayments, from 2001 to around 2005, is large; the number 
continuously drops from around 2006 until 2011 when it increases again from 2012.   
[insert Tables 7 through 8 here] 
Tables 7 and 8 discuss the defaults and prepayments by age month for the entire sample 
and for each individual MSA, respectively. Table 7 indicates a large percentage of the mortgages 
default between the age month 37 and the age month 48; at the same time, a large amount of 
mortgages are prepaid between the age month 13 and age month 24.  
Table 8 shows us that in Phoenix and Tampa, most mortgages that default do so between 
the age months 37 and 48. In Miami and Detroit, most mortgages that default do so between the 
age months 25 and 36 and between the age months 13 and 24, respectively. Furthermore, in Las 
Vegas, most mortgages that default do so between the age months 49 and 60. In all MSAs, most 
mortgages that are prepaid end between the age months 13 and 24. 
Explanatory Variables, Dependent Variables and Hypotheses 
Mortgage information offered by the Freddie Mac dataset includes: the credit score, 
number of house units, original debt-to-income ratio, original loan-to-value, contract rate, 
original mortgage term, termination date, termination type, and so on. Not all of this information 
can be directly used as explanatory variables. As in previous studies, this study uses an indicator  
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Table 7. Defaults and Prepayments by Age Month for the Whole Sample 
 Defaults Prepayments 
  
 
 
 
Age Month Number Average loan size Number Average loan size 
  
 
1--12 102 177833.3 3451 171847 
13--24 459 191100.5 5591 153252 
25--36 639 184141 3512 142263.9 
37--48 652 187654.2 2247 143191.8 
49--60 551 177887.5 1571 146731.1 
61--72 379 164556.6 1174 152181.9 
73--84 252 144808.1 952 148157.7 
85--96 126 131474.5 706 135873 
97--`108 54 98523.53 456 120477.7 
109--120 26 82647.07 271 109119.2 
121--132 15 85938.89 66 84126.88 
133--144 6 85825.33 28 77166.42 
145--156 3 43944.95 12 74496.54 
157--168 1 110295.6 16 76780.59 
 
 
Table 8. Defaults and Prepayments by Age Month for Each MSA 
 
 
 AZ Phoenix FL Miami FL Tampa MI Detroit NV Las Vegas 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age 
Month 
Default Prepay
ment 
Default Prepay
ment 
Default Prepay
ment 
Default Prepay
ment 
Default Prepay
ment 
 
 
1--12   14   1617   34  251    19  566  28  552     7   465  
13--24  156   2349   97  496    66  991  59  554    59   752  
25--36  242   1554  116  389   114  728  51  319   116   522  
37--48  287   1027   88  244   123  451  49  183   105   342  
49--60  215    719   73  150    93  338  51  127   119   237  
61--72  139    499   50  130    81  293  38  115    71   137  
73--84   73    419   28   85    59  246  43   87    49   115  
85--96   36    292   13   87    24  165  28   72    25    90  
97--`108   11    148    5   51    12  112  17   77     9    68  
109--120    3     91    1   27     6   53  10   69     6    31  
121--132    1     19    1    9     3   22   7    9     3     7  
133--144    0   11    3    3     1    6   0   4     2     2  
145--156    2      4    0   1     0   3   0   1     1     3  
157--168    1      5    0   3     0   3   0   2     0   3  
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for a prepayment penalty and the value of the call option to explain the prepayment risk. The 
unemployment rate, negative equity, a dummy for negative equity and original loan-to-value are 
used to explain the default risk. Other explanatory variables for the prepayment risk and the 
default risk are the debt-to-income ratio and the credit score, log mortgage size, current loan age 
in months, a dummy for house unit and time period dummies. Table 9 lists the summary statistics 
for important explanatory variables in each MSA. Tables 10 through 14 summarize the definition 
of explanatory variables in each MSA. 
[insert Table 9 through 14 here] 
The indicator for a prepayment penalty equals to one when there is an additional charge 
for borrowers to prepay their mortgages. Otherwise, the indicator equals to zero. Therefore, this a 
research posits the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the prepayment penalty indicator and the 
prepayment risk.  
The value of the call option is the difference between the market value of the mortgage 
and the book value of the mortgage measured as a percent of the market value of the mortgage. 
The calculation is presented in the Appendix A. The value of the call option is “in the money,” 
when the market value of the mortgage is larger than its book value. In this situation, borrowers 
are more likely to prepay their current mortgage and refinance because the value of the new 
mortgages against the housing equity would increase. Therefore, hypothesis 2 posits: 
 H2: A positive relationship exists between the value of the call option and the 
prepayment risk.  
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Table 9. Summary Statistics for Each MSA 
Phoenix: Prepayment and default are dependent variables 
Dataset Explanatory variables No. of 
observations 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
#1 dataset with right 
censored mortgages 
Call option 494949 0.0396204 0.0858311 -0.2811943 0.3463946 
The unemployment 
rate 
494949 
6.213542 2.397017 2.6 10.5 
Negative equity 494949 8.979612 22.57022 0 201.6359 
Original loan-to-value 12734 0.7350212 0.1562165 0.08 1 
Log loan size 12734 11.9329 0.5073528 9.472705 12.94084 
Loan age 494949 31.01697 26.23423 1 169 
The credit score 12699 0.7298035 0.0553845 0.496 0.84 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 
12508 
0.341563 0.1189343 0 0.65 
#2 dataset with 
modified mortgages 
deleted 
Call option 487503 .0396846 .0858345 -.2813612 .3463946 
The unemployment 
rate 487503 6.213595 2.39288 2.6 10.5 
Negative equity 487503 8.766227 22.24506 0 201.6359 
Original loan-to-value 12556 0.734686 0.156618 0.08 1 
Log loan size 12556 11.92892 0.50758 9.472705 12.94084 
Loan age 487503 31.10495 26.32927 1 169 
The credit score 12522 0.730355 0.055221 0.496 0.84 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 12331 0.340491 0.118921 0 0.65 
Phoenix: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables 
Dataset Explanatory variables No. of 
observations 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
#1 dataset with right 
censored mortgages 
Call option 486546 0.038343 0.085356 -0.28119 0.346395 
The unemployment 
rate 486546 6.188801 2.392581 2.6 10.5 
Negative equity 486546 8.635514 22.16521 0 201.6359 
Original loan-to-value 12698 0.734854 0.156323 0.08 1 
Log loan size 12698 11.93217 0.507398 9.472705 12.94084 
Loan age 486546 30.73576 26.12315 1 169 
The credit score 12663 0.729842 0.055362 0.496 0.84 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 12472 0.341376 0.118877 0 0.65 
#2 dataset with 
modified mortgages 
deleted 
Call option 479523 0.038459 0.085374 -0.28136 0.346395 
The unemployment 
rate 479523 6.190508 2.388777 2.6 10.5 
Negative equity 479523 8.435202 21.84729 0 201.6359 
Original loan-to-value 12522 0.734532 0.15672 0.08 1 
Log loan size 12522 11.92822 0.507627 9.472705 12.94084 
Loan age 479523 30.8299 26.21692 1 169 
The credit score 12488 0.730387 0.055197 0.496 0.84 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 12297 0.340302 0.118854 0 0.65 
 
Miami: Prepayment and default are dependent variables 
Dataset Explanatory variables No. of 
observations 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
#1 dataset with right Call option 150698 0.049442 0.088105 -0.2328 0.46051 
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censored mortgages The unemployment 
rate 150698 6.943224 2.77443 3.3 11.9 
Negative equity 150698 6.097388 18.07763 0 187.1141 
Original loan-to-value 3224 0.741331 0.175259 0.08 1 
Log loan size 3224 11.95617 0.514616 9.903487 13.02805 
Loan age 150698 35.7997 29.23231 1 169 
The credit score 3184 0.70726 0.055179 0.496 0.817 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 3155 0.349794 0.12597 0 0.65 
#2 dataset with 
modified mortgages 
deleted 
Call option 148637 0.049518 0.088076 -0.23296 0.46051 
The unemployment 
rate 148637 6.940274 2.771599 3.3 11.9 
Negative equity 148637 6.057282 18.00889 0 187.1141 
Original loan-to-value 3172 0.74134 0.175783 0.08 1 
Log loan size 3172 11.95256 0.51559 9.903487 13.02805 
Loan age 148637 35.90544 29.29226 1 169 
The credit score 3132 0.70795 0.055132 0.496 0.817 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 3104 0.348853 0.126003 0 0.65 
Miami: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables 
Dataset Explanatory variables No. of 
observations 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
#1 dataset with right 
censored mortgages 
Call option 147098 0.048015 0.087727 -0.2328 0.46051 
The unemployment 
rate 147098 6.891245 2.761292 3.3 11.9 
Negative equity 147098 5.755085 17.53271 0 167.8424 
Original loan-to-value 3211 0.740987 0.175413 0.08 1 
Log loan size 3211 11.95622 0.51491 9.903487 13.02805 
Loan age 147098 35.55935 29.21223 1 169 
The credit score 3171 0.707351 0.055221 0.496 0.817 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 3143 0.349634 0.125679 0 0.65 
#2 dataset with 
modified mortgages 
deleted 
Call option 145222 0.048162 0.087699 -0.23296 0.46051 
The unemployment 
rate 145222 6.890992 2.759121 3.3 11.9 
Negative equity 145222 5.722438 17.48247 0 167.8424 
Original loan-to-value 3160 0.741057 0.175953 0.08 1 
Log loan size 3160 11.95263 0.515812 9.903487 13.02805 
Loan age 145222 35.67159 29.26933 1 169 
The credit score 3120 0.708031 0.05517 0.496 0.817 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 3093 0.348652 0.125701 0 0.65 
 
Tampa: Prepayment and default are dependent variables 
Dataset Explanatory variables No. of 
observations 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
#1 dataset with right 
censored mortgages 
Call option 283421 0.045595 0.088259 -0.24649 0.328896 
The unemployment 
rate 283421 7.101306 3.128368 2.6 12.5 
Negative equity 283421 4.658355 13.12679 0 134.6386 
Original loan-to-value 6129 0.744368 0.153808 0.13 1 
Log loan size 6129 11.76994 0.529389 9.472705 12.94084 
Loan age 283421 34.73948 27.69508 1 169 
The credit score 6105 0.720715 0.057229 0.453 0.835 
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The debt-to-income 
ratio 5991 0.346508 0.121579 0 0.65 
#2 dataset with 
modified mortgages 
deleted 
Call option 279662 0.045752 0.088327 -0.24666 0.328896 
The unemployment 
rate 279662 7.098834 3.127134 2.6 12.5 
Negative equity 279662 4.60253 13.06438 0 134.6386 
Original loan-to-value 6041 0.743753 0.154406 0.13 1 
Log loan size 6041 11.76655 0.53047 9.472705 12.94084 
Loan age 279662 34.85329 27.77742 1 169 
The credit score 6017 0.721421 0.056994 0.482 0.835 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 5903 0.345092 0.121243 0 0.65 
Tampa: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables 
Dataset Explanatory variables No. of 
observations 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
#1 dataset with right 
censored mortgages 
Call option 278744 0.044472 0.087916 -0.24649 0.328896 
The unemployment 
rate 278744 7.06956 3.12483 2.6 12.5 
Negative equity 278744 4.536016 12.97167 0 134.6386 
Original loan-to-value 6112 0.744195 0.153928 0.13 1 
Log loan size 6112 11.76895 0.529016 9.472705 12.94084 
Loan age 278744 34.47394 27.64089 1 169 
The credit score 6088 0.720737 0.057233 0.453 0.835 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 5975 0.346474 0.121553 0 0.65 
#2 dataset with 
modified mortgages 
deleted 
Call option 275153 0.044653 0.087985 -0.24666 0.328896 
The unemployment 
rate 275153 7.068366 3.123925 2.6 12.5 
Negative equity 275153 4.482206 12.90979 0 134.6386 
Original loan-to-value 6024 0.743576 0.154528 0.13 1 
Log loan size 6024 11.76554 0.530089 9.472705 12.94084 
Loan age 275153 34.59042 27.72149 1 169 
The credit score 6000 0.721445 0.056998 0.482 0.835 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 5887 0.345054 0.121215 0 0.65 
 
Detroit: Prepayment and default are dependent variables 
Dataset Explanatory variables No. of 
observations 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
#1 dataset with right 
censored mortgages 
Call option 144368 0.04301 0.090517 -0.2796 0.367435 
The unemployment 
rate 144368 9.12082 3.289267 3 16.9 
Negative equity 144368 5.322262 12.39206 0 134.7806 
Original loan-to-value 3165 0.741652 0.14927 0.14 1 
Log loan size 3167 11.68306 0.517123 9.305651 12.94084 
Loan age 144368 38.32582 30.78718 1 169 
The credit score 3152 0.717175 0.058886 0.407 0.823 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 3108 0.334569 0.118309 0.01 0.65 
#2 dataset with 
modified mortgages 
deleted 
Call option 141824 0.043238 0.090613 -0.27977 0.367435 
The unemployment 
rate 141824 9.122959 3.291029 3 16.9 
Negative equity 141824 5.272115 12.27291 0 134.7806 
Original loan-to-value 3115 0.740562 0.149689 0.14 1 
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Log loan size 3117 11.68194 0.518284 9.305651 12.94084 
Loan age 141824 38.40756 30.85015 1 169 
The credit score 3102 0.717755 0.058541 0.493 0.823 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 3060 0.333967 0.118285 0.01 0.65 
Detroit: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables 
Dataset Explanatory variables No. of 
observations 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
#1 dataset with right 
censored mortgages 
Call option 140309 0.041293 0.089971 -0.2796 0.367435 
The unemployment 
rate 140309 9.085858 3.281992 3 16.9 
Negative equity 140309 5.216362 12.29911 0 134.7806 
Original loan-to-value 3150 0.741495 0.149455 0.14 1 
Log loan size 3152 11.68396 0.516829 9.305651 12.94084 
Loan age 140309 37.79644 30.58658 1 169 
The credit score 3137 0.717303 0.058849 0.407 0.823 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 3093 0.334265 0.118165 0.01 0.65 
#2 dataset with 
modified mortgages 
deleted 
Call option 138144 0.04152 0.090033 -0.27977 0.367435 
The unemployment 
rate 138144 9.088978 3.283736 3 16.9 
Negative equity 138144 5.164517 12.17531 0 134.7806 
Original loan-to-value 3101 0.740416 0.149857 0.14 1 
Log loan size 3103 11.68313 0.51814 9.305651 12.94084 
Loan age 138144 37.93369 30.6864 1 169 
The credit score 3088 0.717864 0.058506 0.493 0.823 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 3046 0.333667 0.118119 0.01 0.65 
 
Las Vegas: Prepayment and default are dependent variables 
Dataset Explanatory variables No. of 
observations 
Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
#1 dataset with right 
censored mortgages 
Call option 188697 0.041867 0.086761 -0.27907 0.327644 
The unemployment 
rate 188697 8.439248 3.889642 3.8 14.6 
Negative equity 188697 13.73526 29.78763 0 209.7891 
Original loan-to-value 4487 0.748908 0.153044 0.09 1 
Log loan size 4487 11.95056 0.478449 9.392662 12.94084 
Loan age 188697 32.49552 27.02609 1 170 
The credit score 4472 0.725283 0.05558 0.514 0.823 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 4398 0.35721 0.120773 0 0.65 
#2 dataset with 
modified mortgages 
deleted 
Call option 185452 0.042186 0.086851 -0.27923 0.327644 
The unemployment 
rate 185452 8.438328 3.891042 3.8 14.6 
Negative equity 185452 13.36946 29.33581 0 209.7891 
Original loan-to-value 4413 0.74845 0.153573 0.09 1 
Log loan size 4413 11.94304 0.476878 9.392662 12.94084 
Loan age 185452 32.60197 27.13556 1 170 
The credit score 4398 0.725793 0.055546 0.514 0.823 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 4324 0.356568 0.120729 0 0.65 
Las Vegas: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables 
Dataset Explanatory variables No. of Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
44 
 
 
observations 
#1 dataset with right 
censored mortgages 
Call option 185490 0.040767 0.086501 -0.27907 0.327644 
The unemployment 
rate 185490 8.395085 3.881563 3.8 14.6 
Negative equity 185490 13.20461 29.24027 0 209.7891 
Original loan-to-value 4473 0.748876 0.15304 0.09 1 
Log loan size 4473 11.94997 0.478825 9.392662 12.94084 
Loan age 185490 32.26378 26.98676 1 170 
The credit score 4458 0.725387 0.055541 0.514 0.823 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 4384 0.357224 0.120768 0 0.65 
#2 dataset with 
modified mortgages 
deleted 
Call option 182423 0.041106 0.086585 -0.27923 0.327644 
The unemployment 
rate 182423 8.39682 3.883443 3.8 14.6 
Negative equity 182423 12.86818 28.80553 0 209.7891 
Original loan-to-value 4402 0.748485 0.153552 0.09 1 
Log loan size 4402 11.94266 0.477281 9.392662 12.94084 
Loan age 182423 32.36745 27.09506 1 170 
The credit score 4387 0.725886 0.055514 0.514 0.823 
The debt-to-income 
ratio 4313 0.356587 0.120722 0 0.65 
 
 
Table 10. Explanatory Variables Definition for Phoenix 
Variable Name Variable Definition for Different Dependent Variables 
 Prepayment and default Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency 
Prepayment penalty A dummy variable, which equal to 1 when 
borrowers have to pay additional certain 
amount of principal to get prepayment, and 
equal to 0 otherwise.  
A dummy variable, which equal to 1 when 
borrowers have to pay additional certain 
amount of principal to get prepayment, and 
equal to 0 otherwise.  
Call option variables   
Call option part 1  Call option value below -0.0247799 for 
dataset which is right censored and Call option 
value below -0.0246538 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(-0.0247799 and -0.0246538 are 25th 
percentiles of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value below -0.0252991 for 
dataset which is right censored and Call option 
value below -0.0251161 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(-0.0252991 and -0.0251161 are 25th 
percentiles of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 2  Call option value is from -0.0247799  to 
0.0365862 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from -0.0246538 to 
0.0367869 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.0365862 and 0.0367869 are 50th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value is from -0.0252991 to 
0.0353509 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from -0.0251161 to 
0.0355266 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.0353509 and 0.0355266 are 50th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 3 Call option value is from 0.0365862 to 
0.1020157 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is 0.0367869 to 
0.1020334 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.1020157 and 0.1020334 are 75th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value is from 0.0353509 to 
0.1003149 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is 0.0355266 to 
0.1003559 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.1003149 and 0.1003559 are 75th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 4 Call option value above 0.1020157 for dataset Call option value above 0.1003149 for dataset 
45 
 
 
which is right censored and Call option value 
above 0.1020334 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
which is right censored and Call option value 
above 0.1003559 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
The unemployment rate 
variables 
  
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
The unemployment rate in Phoenix below 5.7 
(5.7 is 50th percentile of the unemployment 
rate in both datasets) 
The unemployment rate in Phoenix below 5.7 
(5.7 is 50th percentile of the unemployment 
rate in both datasets) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
The unemployment rate in Phoenix above 5.7 The unemployment rate in Phoenix above 5.7 
Negative equity 
variables 
  
Negative equity part 1 
 
Negative equity value below 18.36619 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value below 18.25616 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
18.36619 and 18.25616 are 25th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value below 18.02891 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value below 17.93523 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
18.02891 and 17.93523 are 25th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 2 Negative equity value is from 18.36619  to 
37.80385 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 18.25616 to 
37.61306 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
37.80385 and 37.61306 are 50th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value is from 18.02891 to 
37.33448 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 17.93523 to 
37.15196 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
37.33448 and 37.15196 are 50th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 3 Negative equity value is from 37.80385 to 
62.90972 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 37.61306 to 
62.59928 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
62.90972 and 62.59928 are 75th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value is from 37.33448 to 
62.50297 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 37.15196 to 
62.15913 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
62.50297 and 62.15913 are 75th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 4 Negative equity value above 62.90972 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value above 62.59928 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000) 
Negative equity value above 62.50297 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value above 62.15913 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
Equal to 1 if the equity less than zero in that 
month and 0 otherwise. 
Equal to 1 if the equity less than zero in that 
month and 0 otherwise. 
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
  
Original LTV part 1 Original loan-to-value below 0.65  
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.65 
is 25th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value below 0.65  
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.65 
is 25th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original LTV part 2 Original loan-to-value is from 0.65 to 0.78 
(0.78 is 50th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.65 to 0.78 
(0.78 is 50th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original LTV part 3 Original loan-to-value is from 0.78 to 0.80  
(0.80 is 75th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.78 to 0.80  
(0.80 is 75th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original LTV part 4 Original loan-to-value is from 0.80 to 0.95  
(0.95 is 95th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.80 to 0.95  
(0.95 is 95th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original LTV part 5 Original loan-to-value above 0.95 Original loan-to-value above 0.95 
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Log loan size variables   
Log loan size part 1 Log loan size value is taking log of loan size. 
Log loan size value below 11.56172 
(11.56172 is 25th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size value is taking log of loan size. 
Log loan size value below 11.56172 for 
dataset which is right censored and Log loan 
size value below 11.55215 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(11.56172 and 11.55215 are 25th percentiles of 
log loan size value in both datasets) 
Log loan size part 2 Log loan size value is from 11.56172 to 
11.91839  
(11.91839 is 50th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size value is from 11.56172 to 
11.91839 for dataset which is right censored 
and from 11.55215 to 11.91839 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(11.91839 is 50th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size part 3 Log loan size value is from 11.91839 to 
12.25486 for dataset which is right censored 
and to 12.24529 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(12.25486 and 12.24529 are 75th percentiles of 
log loan size value in two dataset respectively) 
Log loan size value is from 11.91839 to 
12.25009 for dataset which is right censored 
and from 11.91839 to 12.24529 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(12.25009 and 12.24529 are 75th percentiles of 
log loan size value in two dataset respectively) 
Log loan size part 4 Log loan size value above 12.25486 for 
dataset which is right censored and Log loan 
size value above 12.24529 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
Log loan size value above 12.25009 for 
dataset which is right censored and Log loan 
size value above 12.24529 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
Loan age variables   
Loan age part 1 Loan age value below 11  
(11 is 25th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value below 11  
(11 is 25th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age part 2 Loan age value is from 11 to 24  
(24 is 50th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value is from 11 to 23 
(23 is 50th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age part 3 Loan age value is from 24 to 45  
(45 is 75th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value is from 23 to 44  
(44 is 75th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age part 4 Loan age value above 45 Loan age value above 44 
The credit score 
variables 
  
The credit score part 1 The credit score value below 0.688  
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.688  is 25th percentiles of the credit score 
value in  both datasets) 
The credit score value below 0.689 for dataset 
which is right censored and The credit score 
value below 0.69 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.689 and 0.69 are 25th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score part 2 The credit score value is from 0.688  to 0.736 
for dataset which is right censored and to 
0.737 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.736  and 0.737 are 50th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score value is from 0.689  to 0.737 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.69 to 0.738 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.737 and 0.738 are 50th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score part 3 The credit score value is from 0.736 to 0.774 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.737 to 0.774 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.774 is 75th percentiles of the credit score 
value in both datasets) 
The credit score value is from 0.737 to 0.774 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.738 to 0.774 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.774 is 75th percentiles of the credit score 
value in both datasets) 
The credit score part 4 The credit score value above 0.774  
(The credit score value is divided by 1000)  
The credit score value above 0.774  
(The credit score value is divided by 1000)  
The debt-to-income ratio   
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variables 
DTI part 1 The debt-to-income ratio value below 0.25 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.25 is 25th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value below 0.25 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.25 is 25th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 2 The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.25 to 
0.34 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.34 is 50th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.25 to 
0.34 for dataset which is right censored and to 
0.33 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.34 and 0.33 are 50th percentiles of the 
debt-to-income ratio value in two dataset 
respectively) 
DTI part 3 The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.34 to 
0.42 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.42 is 75th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.34 to 
0.42 for dataset which is right censored and 
from 0.33 to 0.42 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
 (The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.42 is 75th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 4 The debt-to-income ratio value above 0.42 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100) 
The debt-to-income ratio value above 0.42 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
This is a dummy variable which equal to 1 if 
property unit larger than 1 and equal to 0 if 
property unit equal to 1 
This is a dummy variable which equal to 1 if 
property unit larger than 1 and equal to 0 if 
property unit equal to 1 
Time period variables   
Time period part 1 Time period starts from March 1999 to July 
2003 for prepayment and time period start 
from March 1999  to January 2008 for default 
Time period starts from March 1999 to July 
2003 for prepayment and time period start 
from March 1999  to January 2008 for default 
Time period part 2 Time period starts from July 2003 to 
November 2008 for prepayment and time 
period start from January 2008  to June 2010 
for default 
Time period starts from July 2003 to 
November 2008 for prepayment and time 
period start from January 2008  to June 2010 
for default 
Time period part 3 Time period starts from November 2008 to 
March 2013 for prepayment and time period 
start from June 2010 to March 2013 for 
default 
Time period starts from November 2008 to 
March 2013 for prepayment and time period 
start from June 2010 to March 2013 for 
default 
 
Table 11. Explanatory Variables Definition for Miami 
Variable Name Variable Definition for Different Dependent Variables 
 Prepayment and default Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency 
Prepayment penalty A dummy variable, which equal to 1 when 
borrowers have to pay additional certain 
amount of principal to get prepayment, and 
equal to 0 otherwise.  
A dummy variable, which equal to 1 when 
borrowers have to pay additional certain 
amount of principal to get prepayment, and 
equal to 0 otherwise.  
Call option variables   
Call option part 1  Call option value below -0.0164943 for 
dataset which is right censored and Call option 
value below -0.0160465 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(-0.0164943 and -0.0160465 are 25th 
percentiles of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value below -0.0176692 for 
dataset which is right censored and Call option 
value below -0.0174106 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(-0.0176692 and -0.0174106 are 25th 
percentiles of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 2  Call option value is from -0.0164943 to 
0.0484381 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from -0.0160465 to 
0.0486717 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
Call option value is from -0.0176692 to 
0.0466797 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from -0.0174106 to 
0.0469463 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
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(0.0484381 and 0.0486717 are 50th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
(0.0466797 and 0.0469463 are 50th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 3 Call option value is from 0.0484381 to 
0.1149434 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from 0.0486717 to 
0.1150138 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.1149434 and 0.1150138 are 75th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value is from 0.0466797 to 
0.1131345 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from 0.0469463 to 
0.113277 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.1131345 and 0.113277 are 75th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 4 Call option value above 0.1149434 for dataset 
which is right censored and Call option value 
above 0.1150138 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
Call option value above 0.1131345 for dataset 
which is right censored and Call option value 
above 0.113277 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
The unemployment rate 
variables 
  
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
The unemployment rate in Miami below 6.2 
for dataset which is right censored and below 
6.1 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(6.2 and 6.1 are 50th percentile of the 
unemployment rate in two dataset 
respectively) 
The unemployment rate in Miami below 6.1 
(6.1 is 50th percentile of the unemployment 
rate in both datasets) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
The unemployment rate in Miami above 6.2 
for dataset which is right censored and above 
6.1 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
The unemployment rate in Miami above 6.1 
Negative equity 
variables 
  
Negative equity part 1 
 
Negative equity value below 13.19394 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value below 13.18863 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
13.19394 and 13.18863 are 25th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value below 12.90738 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value below 12.92502 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
12.90738 and 12.92502 are 25th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 2 Negative equity value is from 13.19394 to 
30.56755 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 13.18863 to 
30.44288 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
30.56755 and 30.44288 are 50th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value is from 12.90738 to 
29.92025 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 12.92502 to 
29.80616 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
29.92025 and 29.80616 are 50th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 3 Negative equity value is from 30.56755 to 
53.85436 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 30.44288 to 
53.75649 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
53.85436 and 53.75649 are 75th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value is from 29.92025 to 
53.0423 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 29.80616 to 
53.07203 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
53.0423 and 53.07203 are 75th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 4 Negative equity value above 53.85436 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value above 53.75649 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000) 
Negative equity value above 53.0423 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value above 53.07203 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000) 
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The negative equity 
dummy 
Equal to 1 if the equity less than zero in that 
month and 0 otherwise. 
Equal to 1 if the equity less than zero in that 
month and 0 otherwise. 
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
  
Original LTV part 1 Original loan-to-value below 0.63  
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.63 
is 25th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value below 0.63  
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.63 
is 25th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original LTV part 2 Original loan-to-value is from 0.63 to 0.77 
(0.77 is 50th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.63 to 0.77 
(0.77 is 50th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original LTV part 3 Original loan-to-value is from 0.77 to 0.80  
(0.80 is 75th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.77 to 0.80  
(0.80 is 75th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original LTV part 4 Original loan-to-value is from 0.80 to 0.95  
(0.95 is 95th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.80 to 0.95  
(0.95 is 95th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original LTV part 5 Original loan-to-value above 0.95 Original loan-to-value above 0.95 
Log loan size variables   
Log loan size part 1 Log loan size value is taking log of loan size. 
Log loan size value below 11.60824 for 
dataset which is right censored and Log loan 
size value below 11.5991 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(11.60824 and 11.5991 are 25th percentiles of 
log loan size value in two dataset respectively) 
Log loan size value is taking log of loan size. 
Log loan size value below 11.5991 for dataset 
which is right censored and Log loan size 
value below 11.58989 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(11.5991 and 11.58989 are 25th percentiles of 
log loan size value in both datasets) 
Log loan size part 2 Log loan size value is from 11.60824 to 
11.95118 for dataset which is right censored 
and Log loan size value from 11.5991 to 
11.95118 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(11.95118 is 50th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size value is from 11.5991 to 
11.94471 for dataset which is right censored 
and from 11.58989 to 11.94471 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(11.94471 is 50th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size part 3 Log loan size value is from 11.95118 to 
12.30138  
(12.30138 is 75th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size value is from 11.94471 to 
12.29683 for dataset which is right censored 
and from 11.94471 to 12.28765 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(12.29683 and 12.28765 are 75th percentiles of 
log loan size value in two dataset respectively) 
Log loan size part 4 Log loan size value above 12.30138 Log loan size value above 12.29683 for 
dataset which is right censored and Log loan 
size value above 12.28765 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
Loan age variables   
Loan age part 1 Loan age value below 13  
(13 is 25th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value below 12 for dataset which is 
right censored and below 13 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted  
(12 and 13 are 25th percentiles of loan age 
value in two dataset respectively) 
Loan age part 2 Loan age value is from 13 to 28  
(28 is 50th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value from 12 to 28 for dataset 
which is right censored and from 13 to 28 for 
dataset in which modification mortgages are 
deleted  
 (28 is 50th percentiles of loan age value in 
both datasets) 
Loan age part 3 Loan age value is from 28 to 52 for dataset 
which is right censored and to 53 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(52 and 53 are 75th percentiles of loan age 
value in two dataset respectively) 
Loan age value is from 28 to 52  
(52 is 75th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age part 4 Loan age value above 52 for dataset which is Loan age value above 52 
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right censored and above 53 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
The credit score 
variables 
  
The credit score part 1 The credit score value below 0.671 for dataset 
which is right censored and below 0.672 for 
dataset in which modification mortgages are 
deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.671 and 0.672 are 25th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score value below 0.671 for dataset 
which is right censored and The credit score 
value below 0.672 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.671 and 0.672 are 25th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score part 2 The credit score value is from 0.671 to 0.71 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.672 to 0.711 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.71 and 0.711 are 50th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score value is from 0.671 to 0.711 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.672 to 0.712 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.711 and 0.712 are 50th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score part 3 The credit score value is from 0.71 to 0.753 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.711 to 0.754 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.753 and 0.754 are 75th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score value is from 0.711 to 0.753 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.712 to 0.754 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.753 and 0.754 are 75th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score part 4 The credit score value above 0.753 for dataset 
which is right censored and 0.754 for dataset 
in which modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000)  
The credit score value above 0.753 for dataset 
which is right censored and above 0.754 for 
dataset in which modification mortgages are 
deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000)  
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
  
DTI part 1 The debt-to-income ratio value below 0.25 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.25 is 25th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value below 0.25 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.25 is 25th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 2 The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.25 to 
0.35 for dataset which is right censored and to 
0.34 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.35 and 0.34 are 50th percentiles of the 
debt-to-income ratio value in two dataset 
respectively) 
The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.25 to 
0.34 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.34 is 50th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 3 The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.35 to 
0.43 for dataset which is right censored and 
from 0.34 to 0.43 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.43 is 75th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.34 to 
0.43  
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.43 is 75th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 4 The debt-to-income ratio value above 0.43 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100) 
The debt-to-income ratio value above 0.43 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
This is a dummy variable which equal to 1 if 
property unit larger than 1 and equal to 0 if 
property unit equal to 1 
This is a dummy variable which equal to 1 if 
property unit larger than 1 and equal to 0 if 
property unit equal to 1 
Time period variables   
Time period part 1 Time period starts from March 1999 to April 
2003 for prepayment and time period start 
from March 1999  to July 2008 for default 
Time period starts from March 1999 to April 
2003 for prepayment and time period start 
from March 1999  to July 2008 for default 
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Time period part 2 Time period starts from April 2003 to 
December 2008 for prepayment and time 
period start from July 2008 to February 2010 
for default 
Time period starts from April 2003 to 
December 2008 for prepayment and time 
period start from July 2008 to February 2010 
for default 
Time period part 3 Time period starts from December 2008 to 
March 2013 for prepayment and time period 
start from February 2010 to March 2013 for 
default 
Time period starts from December 2008 to 
March 2013 for prepayment and time period 
start from February 2010 to March 2013 for 
default 
 
Table 12. Explanatory Variables Definition for Tampa 
Variable Name Variable Definition for Different Dependent Variables 
 Prepayment and default Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency 
Prepayment penalty A dummy variable, which equal to 1 when 
borrowers have to pay additional certain 
amount of principal to get prepayment, and 
equal to 0 otherwise.  
A dummy variable, which equal to 1 when 
borrowers have to pay additional certain 
amount of principal to get prepayment, and 
equal to 0 otherwise.  
Call option variables   
Call option part 1  Call option value below -0.0206478 for 
dataset which is right censored and Call option 
value below -0.020901 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(-0.0206478 and -0.020901 are 25th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value below -0.0213842 for 
dataset which is right censored and Call option 
value below -0.0214279 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(-0.0213842 and -0.0214279 are 25th 
percentiles of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 2  Call option value is from -0.0206478 to 
0.0436119 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from -0.020901 to 
0.0438131 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.0436119 and 0.0438131 are 50th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value is from -0.0213842 to 
0.0422426 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from -0.0214279 to 
0.0425066 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.0422426 and 0.0425066 are 50th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 3 Call option value is from 0.0436119 to 
0.1110333 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from 0.0438131 to 
0.1111361 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.1110333 and 0.1111361 are 75th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value is from 0.0422426 to 
0.109703 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from 0.0425066 to 
0.1098711 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.109703 and 0.1098711 are 75th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 4 Call option value above 0.1110333 for dataset 
which is right censored and Call option value 
above 0.1111361 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
Call option value above 0.109703 for dataset 
which is right censored and Call option value 
above 0.1098711 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
The unemployment rate 
variables 
  
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
The unemployment rate in Tampa below 5.8 
(5.8 is 50th percentile of the unemployment 
rate in both datasets) 
The unemployment rate in Tampa below 5.8 
(5.8 is 50th percentile of the unemployment 
rate in both datasets) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
The unemployment rate in Tampa above 5.8 The unemployment rate in Tampa above 5.8 
Negative equity 
variables 
  
Negative equity part 1 
 
Negative equity value below 10.04659 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value below 10.05241 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
10.04659 and 10.05241 are 25th percentiles of 
Negative equity value below 9.953914 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value below 9.96664 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
9.953914 and 9.96664 are 25th percentiles of 
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negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 2 Negative equity value is from 10.04659 to 
22.00146 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 10.05241 to 
22.0039 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
22.00146 and 22.0039 are 50th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value is from 9.953914 to 
21.95684 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 9.96664 to 
21.95579 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
21.95684 and 21.95579 are 50th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 3 Negative equity value is from 22.00146 to 
37.18636 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 22.0039 to 
37.11626 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
37.18636 and 37.11626 are 75th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value is from 21.95684 to 
37.20905 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 21.95579 to 
37.14248 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
37.20905 and 37.14248 are 75th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 4 Negative equity value above 37.18636 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value above 37.11626 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000) 
Negative equity value above 37.20905 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value above 37.14248 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
Equal to 1 if the equity less than zero in that 
month and 0 otherwise. 
Equal to 1 if the equity less than zero in that 
month and 0 otherwise. 
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
  
Original LTV part 1 Original loan-to-value below 0.67  
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.67 
is 25th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value below 0.67 for dataset 
which is right censored and below 0.66 for 
dataset in which modification mortgages are 
deleted 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.67 
and 0.66 are 25th percentiles of original loan-
to-value in two dataset respectively) 
Original LTV part 2 Original loan-to-value is from 0.67 to 0.8 
(0.8 is 50th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.67 to 0.8 for 
dataset which is right censored and from 0.66 
to 0.8 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.8 is 50th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original LTV part 3 Original loan-to-value is from 0.8  to 0.95 
(0.80 is 75th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.8 to 0.95  
(0.95 is 75th percentiles of original loan-to-
value in both datasets) 
Original LTV part 4 Original loan-to-value above 0.95 Original loan-to-value above 0.95 
Log loan size variables   
Log loan size part 1 Log loan size value is taking log of loan size. 
Log loan size value below 11.40757 
(11.40757 is 25th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size value is taking log of loan size. 
Log loan size value below 11.40757 
(11.40757 is 25th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size part 2 Log loan size value is from 11.40757 to 
11.77529  
(11.77529 is 50th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size value is from 11.40757 to 
11.77529  
(11.77529 is 50th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size part 3 Log loan size value is from 11.77529 to 
12.11176  
(12.11176 is 75th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size value is from 11.77529 to 
12.11176  
(12.11176 is 75th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size part 4 Log loan size value above 12.11176 Log loan size value above 12.11176 
Loan age variables   
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Loan age part 1 Loan age value below 13  
(13 is 25th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value below 12  
(12 is 25th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age part 2 Loan age value is from 13 to 28  
(28 is 50th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value is from 12 to 27  
(27 is 50th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age part 3 Loan age value is from 28 to 51  
(51 is 75th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value is from 27 to 51  
(51 is 75th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age part 4 Loan age value above 51  Loan age value above 51  
The credit score 
variables 
  
The credit score part 1 The credit score value below 0.677 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.677 is 25th percentiles of the credit score 
value in both datasets) 
The credit score value below 0.677 for dataset 
which is right censored and The credit score 
value below 0.678 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.677 and 0.678 are 25th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score part 2 The credit score value is from 0.677 to 0.723 
for dataset which is right censored and 0.724 
for dataset in which modification mortgages 
are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.723 and 0.724 are 50th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score value is from 0.677 to 0.724 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.678 to 0.725 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.724 and 0.725 are 50th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score part 3 The credit score value is from 0.723 to 0.767 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.724 to 0.767 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.767 is 75th percentiles of the credit score 
value in both datasets) 
The credit score value is from 0.724 to 0.767 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.725 to 0.768 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.767 and 0.768 are 75th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score part 4 The credit score value above 0.767 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000)  
The credit score value above 0.767 for dataset 
which is right censored and above 0.768 for 
dataset in which modification mortgages are 
deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000)  
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
  
DTI part 1 The debt-to-income ratio value below 0.26 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.26 is 25th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value below 0.26 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.26 is 25th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 2 The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.26 to 
0.35 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.35 is 50th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.26 to 
0.35 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.35 is 50th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 3 The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.35 to 
0.43  
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.43 is 75th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.35 to 
0.43  
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.43 is 75th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 4 The debt-to-income ratio value above 0.43 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100) 
The debt-to-income ratio value above 0.43 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
This is a dummy variable which equal to 1 if 
property unit larger than 1 and equal to 0 if 
property unit equal to 1 
This is a dummy variable which equal to 1 if 
property unit larger than 1 and equal to 0 if 
property unit equal to 1 
Time period variables   
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Time period part 1 Time period starts from March 1999 to July 
2003 for prepayment and time period start 
from March 1999 to February 2008 for default 
Time period starts from March 1999 to July 
2003 for prepayment and time period start 
from March 1999 to February 2008 for default 
Time period part 2 Time period starts from July 2003 to 
November 2008 for prepayment and time 
period start from February 2008  to May 2009 
for default 
Time period starts from July 2003 to 
November 2008 for prepayment and time 
period start from February 2008  to May 2009 
for default 
Time period part 3 Time period starts from November 2008 to 
March 2013 for prepayment and time period 
start from May 2009 to March 2013 for 
default 
Time period starts from November 2008 to 
March 2013 for prepayment and time period 
start from May 2009 to March 2013 for 
default 
 
Table 13. Explanatory Variables Definition for Detroit 
Variable Name Variable Definition for Different Dependent Variables 
 Prepayment and default Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency 
Prepayment penalty A dummy variable, which equal to 1 when 
borrowers have to pay additional certain 
amount of principal to get prepayment, and 
equal to 0 otherwise.  
A dummy variable, which equal to 1 when 
borrowers have to pay additional certain 
amount of principal to get prepayment, and 
equal to 0 otherwise.  
Call option variables   
Call option part 1  Call option value below -0.0236173 for 
dataset which is right censored and Call option 
value below -0.023294 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(-0.0236173 and -0.023294 are 25th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value below -0.0249068 for 
dataset which is right censored and Call option 
value below -0.0246977 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(-0.0249068 and -0.0246977 are 25th 
percentiles of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 2  Call option value is from -0.0236173 to 
0.0383375 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from -0.023294 to 
0.0385326 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.0383375 and 0.0385326 are 50th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value is from -0.0249068 to 
0.0365674 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from -0.0246977 to 
0.0368146 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.0365674 and 0.0368146 are 50th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 3 Call option value is from 0.0383375 to 
0.1080026 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from 0.0385326 to 
0.108192 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.1080026 and 0.108192 are 75th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value is from 0.0365674 to 
0.1057105 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from 0.0368146 to 
0.1060208 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.1057105 and 0.1060208 are 75th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 4 Call option value above 0.1080026 for dataset 
which is right censored and Call option value 
above 0.108192 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
Call option value above 0.1057105 for dataset 
which is right censored and Call option value 
above 0.1060208 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
The unemployment rate 
variables 
  
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
The unemployment rate in Detroit below 
7.900001 
(7.900001 is 50th percentile of the 
unemployment rate in both datasets) 
The unemployment rate in Detroit below 
7.900001 
(7.900001 is 50th percentile of the 
unemployment rate in both datasets) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
The unemployment rate in Detroit above 
7.900001 
The unemployment rate in Detroit above 
7.900001 
Negative equity 
variables 
  
Negative equity part 1 
 
Negative equity value below 8.397582 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
Negative equity value below 8.39557 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
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equity value below 8.382367 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
8.397582 and 8.382367 are 25th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
equity value below 8.385215 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
8.39557 and 8.385215 are 25th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 2 Negative equity value is from 8.397582 to 
17.91852 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 8.382367 to 
17.83435 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
17.91852 and 17.83435 are 50th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value is from 8.39557 to 
17.92759 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 8.385215 to 
17.8463 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
17.92759 and 17.8463 are 50th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 3 Negative equity value is from 17.91852 to 
30.10155 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 17.83435 to 
29.93952 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
30.10155 and 29.93952 are 75th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value is from 17.92759 to 
30.06783 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 17.8463 to 
29.88266 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
30.06783 and 29.88266 are 75th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 4 Negative equity value above 30.10155 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value above 29.93952 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000) 
Negative equity value above 30.06783 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value above 29.88266 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
Equal to 1 if the equity less than zero in that 
month and 0 otherwise. 
Equal to 1 if the equity less than zero in that 
month and 0 otherwise. 
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
  
Original LTV part 1 Original loan-to-value below 0.66 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.66 
is 25th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value below 0.65 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.65 
is 25th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original LTV part 2 Original loan-to-value is from 0.66 to 0.77 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.77 
is 50th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.65 to 0.77 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.77 
is 50th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original LTV part 3 Original loan-to-value is from 0.77 to 0.80 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.80 
is 75th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.77 to 0.80 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.80 
is 75th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original LTV part 4 Original loan-to-value is from 0.80 to 0.95 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.95 
is 95th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.80 to 0.95 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.95 
is 95th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original LTV part 5 Original loan-to-value above 0.95 Original loan-to-value above 0.95 
Log loan size variables   
Log loan size part 1 Log loan size value is taking log of loan size. 
Log loan size value below 11.28978 
(11.28978 is 25th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size value is taking log of loan size. 
Log loan size value below 11.28978 
(11.28978 is 25th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size part 2 Log loan size value is from 11.28978 to 
11.63514 
(11.63514 is 50th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size value is from 11.28978 to 
11.63514 
(11.63514 is 50th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size part 3 Log loan size value is from 11.63514 to 
11.98293 
Log loan size value is from 11.63514 to 
11.98293 
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(11.98293 is 75th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
(11.98293 is 75th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
Log loan size part 4 Log loan size value above 11.98293 Log loan size value above 11.98293 
Loan age variables   
Loan age part 1 Loan age value below 13  
(13 is 25th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value below 13  
(13 is 25th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age part 2 Loan age value is from 13 to 31 
(31 is 50th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value is from 13 to 30 
(30 is 50th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age part 3 Loan age value is from 31 to 58 
(58 is 75th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value is from 30 to 57 
(57 is 75th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age part 4 Loan age value above 58 Loan age value above 57 
The credit score 
variables 
  
The credit score part 1 The credit score value below 0.674 for dataset 
which is right censored and The credit score 
value below 0.675 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.674 and 0.675 are 25th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score value below 0.676  
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.676 is 25th percentiles of the credit score 
value in both datasets) 
The credit score part 2 The credit score value is from 0.674 to 0.726 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.675 to 0.726 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.726 is 50th percentiles of the credit score 
value in both datasets) 
The credit score value is from 0.676 to 0.727 
for dataset which is right censored and to 
0.728 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.727 and 0.728 are 50th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score part 3 The credit score value is from 0.726 to 0.768 
for dataset which is right censored and to 
0.769 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.768 and 0.769 are 75th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score value is from 0.727 to 0.769 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.728 to 0.769 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.769 is 75th percentiles of the credit score 
value in both datasets) 
The credit score part 4 The credit score value above 0.768 for dataset 
which is right censored and above 0.769 for 
dataset in which modification mortgages are 
deleted 
 (The credit score value is divided by 1000)  
The credit score value above 0.769  
(The credit score value is divided by 1000)  
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
  
DTI part 1 The debt-to-income ratio value below 0.24 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.24 is 25th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value below 0.24 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.24 is 25th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 2 The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.24 to 
0.32 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.32 is 50th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.24 to 
0.32 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.32 is 50th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 3 The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.32 to 
0.41 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.41 is 75th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.32 to 
0.41 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.41 is 75th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 4 The debt-to-income ratio value above 0.41  
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100) 
The debt-to-income ratio value above 0.41  
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100) 
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The dummy for the 
number of units  
This is a dummy variable which equal to 1 if 
property unit larger than 1 and equal to 0 if 
property unit equal to 1 
This is a dummy variable which equal to 1 if 
property unit larger than 1 and equal to 0 if 
property unit equal to 1 
Time period variables   
Time period part 1 Time period starts from March 1999 to July 
2003 for prepayment and time period start 
from March 1999  to July 2008 for default 
Time period starts from March 1999 to July 
2003 for prepayment and time period start 
from March 1999  to July 2008 for default 
Time period part 2 Time period starts from July 2003 to 
November 2008 for prepayment and time 
period start from to July 2008 to January 2010 
for default 
Time period starts from July 2003 to 
November 2008 for prepayment and time 
period start from to July 2008 to January 2010 
for default 
Time period part 3 Time period starts from November 2008 to 
March 2013 for prepayment and time period 
start from January 2010 to March 2013 for 
default 
Time period starts from November 2008 to 
March 2013 for prepayment and time period 
start from January 2010 to March 2013 for 
default 
 
Table 14. Explanatory Variables Definition for Las Vegas 
Variable Name Variable Definition for Different Dependent Variables 
 Prepayment and default Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency 
Prepayment penalty A dummy variable, which equal to 1 when 
borrowers have to pay additional certain 
amount of principal to get prepayment, and 
equal to 0 otherwise.  
A dummy variable, which equal to 1 when 
borrowers have to pay additional certain 
amount of principal to get prepayment, and 
equal to 0 otherwise.  
Call option variables   
Call option part 1  Call option value below -0.0226132 for 
dataset which is right censored and Call option 
value below -0.0221891 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(-0.0226132 and -0.0221891 are 25th 
percentiles of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value below -0.0237949 for 
dataset which is right censored and Call option 
value below -0.0221891 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(-0.0237949 and -0.0221891 are 25th 
percentiles of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 2  Call option value is from -0.0226132 to 
0.0408946 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from -0.0221891 to 
0.0414338 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.0408946 and 0.0414338 are 50th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value is from -0.0237949 to 
0.0393865 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from -0.0221891 to 
0.0414338 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.0393865 and 0.0414338 are 50th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 3 Call option value is from 0.0408946 to 
0.1056783 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from 0.0414338 to 
0.1060248 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.1056783 and 0.1060248 are 75th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option value is from 0.0393865 to 
0.1041278 for dataset which is right censored 
and Call option value is from 0.0414338 to 
0.1060248 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(0.1041278 and 0.1060248 are 75th percentiles 
of Call option value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Call option part 4 Call option value above 0.1056783 for dataset 
which is right censored and Call option value 
above 0.1060248 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
Call option value above 0.1041278 for dataset 
which is right censored and Call option value 
above 0.1060248 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
The unemployment rate 
variables 
  
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
The unemployment rate in Las Vegas below 
6.300001 
(6.300001 is 50th percentile of the 
unemployment rate in both datasets) 
The unemployment rate in Las Vegas below 
6.2 
(6.2 is 50th percentile of the unemployment 
rate in both datasets) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
The unemployment rate in Las Vegas above 
6.300001 
The unemployment rate in Las Vegas above 
6.2 
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Negative equity 
variables 
  
Negative equity part 1 
 
Negative equity value below 21.45515 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value below 21.19559 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
21.45515 and 21.19559 are 25th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value below 20.99858 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value below 20.72638 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
20.99858 and 20.72638 are 25th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 2 Negative equity value is from 21.45515 to 
44.30557 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 21.19559 to 
43.88683 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
44.30557 and 43.88683 are 50th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value is from 20.99858 to 
43.57627 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 20.72638 to 
43.18412 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
43.57627 and 43.18412 are 50th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 3 Negative equity value is from 44.30557 to 
74.92264 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 43.88683 to 
74.37087 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
74.92264 and 74.37087 are 75th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity value is from 43.57627 to 
74.12209 for dataset which is right censored 
and Negative equity value is from 43.18412 to 
73.44044 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000; 
74.12209 and 73.44044 are 75th percentiles of 
negative equity value in two dataset 
respectively) 
Negative equity part 4 Negative equity value above 74.92264 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value above 74.37087 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000) 
Negative equity value above 74.12209 for 
dataset which is right censored and Negative 
equity value above 73.44044 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(Negative equity value is divided by 1000) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
Equal to 1 if the equity less than zero in that 
month and 0 otherwise. 
Equal to 1 if the equity less than zero in that 
month and 0 otherwise. 
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
  
Original LTV part 1 Original loan-to-value below 0.65 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.65 
is 25th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value below 0.65 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.65 
is 25th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original LTV part 2 Original loan-to-value is from 0.65 to 0.78 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.78 
is 50th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.65 to 0.78 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.78 
is 50th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original LTV part 3 Original loan-to-value is from 0.78 to 0.80 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.80 
is 75th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.78 to 0.80 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.80 
is 75th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original LTV part 4 Original loan-to-value is from 0.80 to 0.95 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.95 
is 95th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original loan-to-value is from 0.80 to 0.95 
(Original loan-to-value is divided by 100; 0.95 
is 95th percentiles of original loan-to-value in 
both datasets) 
Original LTV part 5 Original loan-to-value above 0.95 Original loan-to-value above 0.95 
Log loan size variables   
Log loan size part 1 Log loan size value is taking log of loan size. 
Log loan size value below 11.63514 for 
dataset which is right censored and Log loan 
size value below 11.62625 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(11.63514 and 11.62625 are 25th percentiles of 
Log loan size value is taking log of loan size. 
Log loan size value below 11.62625  
(11.62625 is 25th percentiles of log loan size 
value in both datasets) 
59 
 
 
log loan size value in both datasets) 
Log loan size part 2 Log loan size value is from 11.63514 to 
11.97035 for dataset which is right censored 
and from 11.62625 to 11.964 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(11.97035 and 11.964 are 50th percentiles of 
log loan size value in two dataset respectively) 
Log loan size value is from 11.62625 to 
11.97035 for dataset which is right censored 
and to 11.964 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(11.97035 and 11.964 are 50th percentiles of 
log loan size value in two dataset respectively) 
Log loan size part 3 Log loan size value is from 11.97035 to 
12.30138 for dataset which is right censored 
and from 11.964 to 12.28765 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(12.30138 and 12.28765 are 75th percentiles of 
log loan size value in two dataset respectively) 
Log loan size value is from 11.97035 to 
12.29683 for dataset which is right censored 
and from 11.964 to 12.28765 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(12.29683 and 12.28765 are 75th percentiles of 
log loan size value in two dataset respectively) 
Log loan size part 4 Log loan size value above 12.30138 for 
dataset which is right censored and Log loan 
size value above 12.28765 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
Log loan size value above 12.29683 for 
dataset which is right censored and Log loan 
size value above 12.28765 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
Loan age variables   
Loan age part 1 Loan age value below 11  
(11 is 25th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value below 11  
(11 is 25th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age part 2 Loan age value is from 11 to 25 
(25 is 50th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value is from 11 to 25 
(25 is 50th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age part 3 Loan age value is from 25 to 47 
(47 is 75th percentiles of loan age value in both 
datasets) 
Loan age value is from 25 to 46 for dataset 
which is right censored and to 47 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
(46 and 47 are 75th percentiles of loan age 
value in two dataset respectively) 
Loan age part 4 Loan age value above 47 Loan age value above 46 for dataset which is 
right censored and above 47 for dataset in 
which modification mortgages are deleted 
The credit score 
variables 
  
The credit score part 1 The credit score value below 0.684 for dataset 
which is right censored and The credit score 
value below 0.685 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.684 and 0.685 are 25th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score value below 0.684 for dataset 
which is right censored and The credit score 
value below 0.685 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.684 and 0.685 are 25th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score part 2 The credit score value is from 0.684 to 0.731 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.685 to 0.731 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.731 is 50th percentiles of the credit score 
value in both datasets) 
The credit score value is from 0.684 to 0.731 
for dataset which is right censored and from 
0.685 to 0.731 for dataset in which 
modification mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.731 is 50th percentiles of the credit score 
value in both datasets) 
The credit score part 3 The credit score value is from 0.731 to 0.771 
for dataset which is right censored and to 
0.772 for dataset in which modification 
mortgages are deleted 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.771 and 0.772 are 75th percentiles of the 
credit score value in two dataset respectively) 
The credit score value is from 0.731 to 0.772 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000; 
0.772 is 75th percentiles of the credit score 
value in both datasets) 
The credit score part 4 The credit score value above 0.771 for dataset 
which is right censored and above 0.772 for 
dataset in which modification mortgages are 
deleted 
 (The credit score value is divided by 1000)  
The credit score value above 0.772 
(The credit score value is divided by 1000)  
The debt-to-income ratio   
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variables 
DTI part 1 The debt-to-income ratio value below 0.27 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.27 is 25th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value below 0.27 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.27 is 25th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 2 The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.27 to 
0.36 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.36 is 50th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.27 to 
0.36 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.36 is 50th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 3 The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.36 to 
0.45 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.45 is 75th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
The debt-to-income ratio value is from 0.36 to 
0.45 
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100; 0.45 is 75th percentiles of the debt-to-
income ratio value in both datasets) 
DTI part 4 The debt-to-income ratio value above 0.45  
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100) 
The debt-to-income ratio value above 0.45  
(The debt-to-income ratio value is divided by 
100) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
This is a dummy variable which equal to 1 if 
property unit larger than 1 and equal to 0 if 
property unit equal to 1 
This is a dummy variable which equal to 1 if 
property unit larger than 1 and equal to 0 if 
property unit equal to 1 
Time period variables   
Time period part 1 Time period starts from March 1999 to August 
2003 for prepayment and time period start 
from March 1999  to April 2008 for default 
Time period starts from March 1999 to August 
2003 for prepayment and time period start 
from March 1999  to April 2008 for default 
Time period part 2 Time period starts from August 2003 to 
November 2008 for prepayment and time 
period start from April 2008 to June 2010 for 
default 
Time period starts from August 2003 to 
November 2008 for prepayment and time 
period start from April 2008 to June 2010 for 
default 
Time period part 3 Time period starts from November 2008 to 
March 2013 for prepayment and time period 
start from June 2010 to December 2011 for 
default 
Time period starts from November 2008 to 
March 2013 for prepayment and time period 
start from June 2010 to December 2011 for 
default 
Time period part 4 Time period start from December 2011 to 
March 2013 for default 
Time period start from December 2011 to 
March 2013 for default 
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Table 9 shows that, for Phoenix, the mean value of the call option is about 0.039; for 
Miami, the mean value of the call option is about 0.049; for Tampa, the mean value of the call 
option is about 0.044; for Detroit, the mean value of the call option is about 0.042; and for Las 
Vegas, the mean value of the call option is about 0.041. To capture the nonlinear relationship 
between the value of the call option and prepayment, a linear spline is used. The knots of the 
linear spline are from the first, second and third quartile of the value of the call option in each 
MSA. For example, with Phoenix, the knots are -0.025, 0.037 and 0.102 for both datasets. For 
Miami, the knots are -0.017, 0.048 and 0.115 for the dataset with right censored mortgages and 
are -0.016, 0.049 and 0.115 for the dataset with modified mortgages deleted. 
The monthly unemployment rates are merged into the individual MSA dataset to explain 
the default risk. The unemployment status of the households directly affects their ability to keep 
the mortgages. Therefore, hypothesis 3 argues: 
H3: More defaults occur in months with a higher unemployment rate.  
For Phoenix, the mean value of the unemployment rate is about 6.202; for Miami, the 
mean value is about 6.916; for Tampa, the mean value is about 7.085; for Detroit, the mean value 
is about 9.105; for Las Vegas, the mean value is about 8.417, respectively. This indicates the 
unemployment rate in Detroit is much higher than that in other MSAs. A linear spline is used to 
capture the nonlinear relationship and the knot is the second quartile of the unemployment rate. 
For example, for Phoenix, the knot is 5.7 for both datasets. For Miami, the knot is 6.2 for the 
dataset with right censored mortgage and is 6.1 for the dataset with modified mortgages deleted. 
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Three financial explanatory variables are used to analyze the default risk. They are 
negative equity, a dummy for negative equity and original loan-to-value. Their definitions are 
presented first followed by a discussion regarding how these explanatory variables are used.  
Negative equity is the difference between the market value of a property and the 
remaining balance of the mortgage. The calculation process is presented in the Appendix A.  
When the current housing value is less than the remaining balance (or the value) of the mortgage, 
so called the put option is “in the money,” households have more incentive to default. Therefore, 
hypothesis 4 suggests: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between negative equity and default risk.  
The mean value of negative equity is calculated conditional on the negative equity 
dummy equal to one. For Phoenix, the mean value is about 8.704; for Miami, the mean value is 
about 5.908; for Tampa, the mean value is about 4.570; for Detroit, the mean value is about 
5.244; for Las Vegas, the mean value is about 13.294. Among all MSAs, Las Vegas has the 
highest negative equity. A linear spline is used for negative equity and the knots are from the 
first, second and third quartile of the non-zero negative equity value. For example, with Phoenix, 
the knots are 18.366, 37.804 and 62.910 for the dataset with right censored mortgages, and are 
18.256, 37.613 and 62.599 for the dataset with modified mortgages deleted. For Miami, the knots 
are 13.194, 30.568 and 53.854 for the dataset with right censored mortgages, and are 13.189, 
30.443 and 53.756 for the dataset with modified mortgages deleted. 
The dummy variable for negative equity equals to one if the equity in a month is negative. 
Otherwise the variable equals to zero. The conjecture will be: 
H5: There is a positive coefficient for the negative equity dummy.  
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The effect of original loan-to-value on the default risk is shown to be positive in previous 
studies (eg. Deng et al 2000); therefore, the conjecture is: 
H6: The original loan-to-value positively affects the default risk. 
For Phoenix, the mean value of original loan-to-value is about 0.735; for Miami; the 
mean value is about 0.741; for Tampa, the mean value is about 0.744; for Detroit, the mean value 
is about 0.741; for Las Vegas, the mean value is about 0.749. Original loan-to-value in this 
paper’s model is separated by four knots, which are the 25th, the 50th, the 75th, and the 95th 
percentile of its value. For example, with Phoenix, the knots are 0.65, 0.78, 0.80 and 0.95 for 
both datasets. For Miami, the knots are 0.63, 0.77, 0.80 and 0.95 for both datasets. 
These three explanatory variables are combined into seven groups7 to explain the default 
risk; the best three combinations in each MSA are listed in the results part.  
This paper also enquires about the effect of the credit score and the debt-to-income ratio 
on the competing risks of prepayment and default. Theoretically, the households with higher 
credit score are less likely to default. Therefore, the conjecture is: 
H7: The effect of the credit score on the default risk is negative. 
However, whether or not the credit score affects prepayment risk is ambiguous. 
Accordingly, two estimations to explain the effect of the credit score on the prepayment and 
default risks are run. One estimation considers how the credit score affects both termination risks 
and the other estimation considers how the credit score affects only default, and the effect on 
prepayment is constrained to be zero. A linear spline for the credit score is used in both models 
                                                          
7 The seven groups are: negative equity only, the negative equity dummy only, original loan-to-value only, negative 
equity and the negative equity dummy, negative equity and original loan-to-value, the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value, and negative equity, the negative equity dummy together with original loan-to-value. 
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and the knots are the first, second and third quartile of the credit score. For example, for Phoenix, 
the knots are 0.688, 0.736 and 0.774 for the dataset with right censored mortgages, and are 0.688, 
0.737 and 0.774 for the dataset with modified mortgages deleted. For Miami, the knots are 0.671, 
0.71 and 0.753 for the dataset with right censored mortgages, and are 0.672, 0.711 and 0.754 for 
the dataset with modified mortgages deleted. Table 9 shows the mean value of the credit score in 
each MSA. For Phoenix, the mean value of the credit score is about 0.730; for Miami, the mean 
value of the credit score is about 0.708; for Tampa, the mean value is about 0.721; for Detroit, 
the mean value is about 0.718; for Las Vegas, it is about 0.726. 
The debt-to-income ratio is an important measure of the ability to manage the payments. 
A large debt-to-income ratio indicates households spend a large part of their income to pay back 
the debt and they use a small amount of money to purchase other utilities. Therefore, the default 
risk is higher for households who have a larger debt-to-income ratio. The conjecture is:  
H8: The relationship between the debt-to-income ratio and the default risk is positive.  
However, whether the smaller debt-to-income ratio will lead to a larger possibility of 
prepayment is ambiguous. A linear spline is used to analyze the nonlinear relationship between 
the debt-to-income ratio and the termination risks. The knots form the first, second and third 
quartile of the ratio. For example, for Phoenix, the knots are 0.25, 0.34 and 0.42 for both datasets. 
For Miami, the knots are 0.25, 0.35 and 0.43 for the dataset with right censored mortgages and 
are 0.25, 0.34 and 0.43 for the dataset with modified mortgages deleted. Table 9 shows the mean 
value of the debt-to-income ratio. For Phoenix, the mean value of the debt-to-income ratio is 
about 0.341; for Miami, the mean value is about 0.349; for Tampa, the mean value is about 0.346; 
for Detroit, the mean value is about 0.334; for Las Vegas, it is about 0.357. 
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In this paper, the value for log loan size, loan age month8 and The dummy for the number 
of units (the dummy variable equals to one if house units are more than one and equals to zero 
otherwise) are controlled. A linear spline for log loan size and loan age month is also used in 
both models and the knots come from the first, second and third quartile. The mean value, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of these expletory variables are listed in table 
9. 
In this study, the explanatory variables are separated into six different groups. These six 
groups come from the effect of the credit score on both termination risks and only on the default 
risk, together with the best three combinations of negative equity, the negative equity dummy 
and original loan-to-value. To make the analysis more comprehensive, two different 
combinations of dependent variables are analyzed. The first combination contains the 
prepayment and the default and the second contains the prepayment and the 90-days-
delinquincy 9 . Here, 90-days-delinquency is a commonly used benchmark in the mortgage 
industry as an early warning indicator of default. 
The econometric model and results for each MSA are introduced in the following section.        
Econometric Methodology 
The single-family mortgage data is monthly, therefore a discrete-time model is used to 
analyze the competing risks of prepayment and default.  
Let 𝑇𝑖 denote the termination month for mortgage 𝑖. No termination month can exceed 
the number of months in the term of a mortgage or a censoring month, in cases where the 
                                                          
8 Here, it is assumed mortgages start from the first day of first payment month and the first payment month is treated 
as loan age 1, the month after the first payment month is loan age 2, and so on. Therefore, a variable named Loan 
Age is created. This variable calculates the number of months mortgages survive on the market. 
9 Notice that not all loans in the status of 90-days-delinquency eventually default. 
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observation is no longer recorded but no default or prepayment has occurred (the observation can 
be censored, for example, if the mortgages has been renegotiated without prepayment). Let 𝑘𝑖 
denote the minimum of the number of months in the term of the mortgage and the censoring 
month. Therefore,  
𝑇𝑖 = min⁡(𝑇𝑖
𝐷 , 𝑇𝑖
𝑃, 𝑘𝑖),                                                      1.1       
        
where 𝑇𝑖
𝐷 denotes the random termination month of default for mortgage 𝑖, and 𝑇𝑖
𝑝denotes the 
random termination month of prepayment for mortgage 𝑖 . Let 𝑍𝑖(𝑡)  be the d-dimensional 
covariate vector that influences the termination decision for the mortgagor at time 𝑡. Finally, let 
𝛿𝐷𝑖(𝑡) be the indicator for whether the mortgage defaults at month 𝑡 , and let 𝛿𝑃𝑖(𝑡)  be the 
indicator for whether the mortgage prepays at month 𝑡.  
The conditional probability of a default at time 𝑡 (survival past time 𝑡 − 1) for mortgage 𝑖 
is defined to be: 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑝𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) = Pr (𝑇𝑖
𝐷 < 𝑡|𝑇𝑖
𝐷 ≥ 𝑡 − 1, 𝑍𝑖(𝑡)) ,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
=
exp⁡(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝐷)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑃)
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡1.2 
where 𝛼𝐷 and 𝛽𝐷 are default parameters. The conditional probability of a prepayment at time 𝑡 
(survival past time 𝑡 − 1) is given by:  
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑝𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) = Pr⁡(𝑇𝑖
𝑃 < 𝑡/𝑇𝑖
𝑃 ≥ 𝑡 − 1, 𝑍𝑖(𝑡)),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 
=
exp⁡(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝑃)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑃)
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡1.3 
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where 𝛼𝑃 and 𝛽𝑃 are prepayment parameters. The conditional probability of continuing with the 
mortgage at time 𝑡 (survival past time 𝑡 − 1) 𝑖 is defined to be: 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑝𝑖
𝐶(𝑡) =
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑃)
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡1.4 
where 𝛼𝐷 , 𝛽𝐷, 𝛼𝑃and 𝛽𝑃 are the parameters vector to be estimated. 
Note that a default event and a prepayment event cannot be both observed in the same 
time period for any observations, since once one of the events occurs the observation ends. The 
likelihood contribution for mortgage 𝑖 is now given by: 
𝐿𝑖 =∏(𝑝𝑖
𝐷(𝑡)𝛿𝐷𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇𝑖
𝑡=1
× 𝑝𝑖
𝑃(𝑡)𝛿𝑃𝑖(𝑡) × 𝑝𝑖
𝐶(𝑡)1−𝛿𝐷𝑖(𝑡)−𝛿𝑃𝑖(𝑡)),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡1.5 
Thus, the likelihood function for the sample is the product of likelihood contribution across all 
mortgages in the sample. This model is also used to analyze the competing risks of the 
prepayment and the 90-days-delinquency.   
        Each model is then evaluated using two different approaches. The first evaluation is how 
well models can predict the dependent variable. For this the Pseudo R-square is used as a 
measure of predictive power. The other evaluation is to assess the fitness of models; for this, the 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is used.  
The Pseudo R-square will be calculated as: 
𝑅2𝑀𝑐𝐹 = 1 −⁡
ln(𝐿𝑀)
ln(𝐿0)
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡1.6 
and is also called McFadden’s R-square. ln⁡(𝐿M) is the estimated likelihood for the model with 
predictors and ln⁡(𝐿0) is the estimated likelihood for the model without predictors.  
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The formula for the BIC used in this paper is: 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 𝐿𝐿𝐻 −
1
2
× ln(𝑁) × 𝑝⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡1.7 
in which 𝐿𝐿𝐻 is the log likelihood of a model, 𝑁 is the number of mortgages used in the model 
and 𝑝 is the number of parameters estimated, including the constant. Thus, the larger the BIC is, 
the better the model fits.  
Results for Five MSAs and the Evaluation of the Models 
In this section, the important results for each MSA are presented. This paper firstly 
explains the results for Phoenix in detail and then compares its results with those of other four 
MSAs to conclude that there is no national housing market.  
Results for Phoenix 
For Phoenix, twenty-four models are estimated. The estimations comprise two sets of 
dependent variables, the prepayment and the default being the first, and the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency being the second. For both groups of dependent variables, there are two 
datasets. The first contains mortgages that are right censored one month before the modification 
and the second deletes all mortgages modified at any point in time.  For each of these four cases, 
the best three specifications are chosen using BIC. For each of these models, two estimations are 
also run. The first estimation includes the effect of the credit score on both termination risks and 
the second includes the effect of the credit score only on the default/90-days-delinquency risk. 
Therefore, a total of twenty-four results are presented for Phoenix.  
For Phoenix, when the prepayment and the default are used as dependent variables, the 
best specification includes negative equity, the negative equity dummy and original loan-to-value. 
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The second best specification includes negative equity and the negative equity dummy, and the 
third best specification includes the negative equity dummy and original loan-to-value. In the 
case where the prepayment and the 90-days-delinquency are used as the dependent variable, the 
best specification includes negative equity and the negative equity dummy. The second best 
includes negative equity and the third includes negative equity, the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value. 
Tables 15 through 24 list the results for Phoenix. The results are separated into two 
groups based on which combination of dependent variables is used. 
Group 1: Prepayment and default are dependent variables 
The first group of models includes negative equity, the negative equity dummy, and 
original loan-to-value as explanatory variables. The coefficients are listed in table 15 and the 
odds ratios are listed in table 16. The following explanations are based on the dataset with right 
censored mortgages. The results of the model with credit score for both termination risks are 
introduced first. They are then compared with the results of the model with the credit score only 
for the default risk. The results for the dataset with modified mortgages deleted can be found in 
tables 15 and 16.   
[insert Table 15 and 16 are here] 
In the model with the credit score used to explain both termination risks, the effect of the 
indicator for a prepayment penalty supports H1. The odds for mortgages with a prepayment 
penalty are only 0.444 times as high as the same odds for mortgages without a prepayment 
penalty.   
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Table 15. Coefficients for Phoenix: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, negative equity, original LTV and the 
negative equity dummy are explanatory variables 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
  
 
 
 
 The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
default 
The credit score only for 
default 
The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
default 
The credit score only for 
default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.813 -- -0.774 -- -0.816 -- -0.781 -- 
 (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.232)  
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  5.365 -- 5.348 -- 5.418 -- 5.414 -- 
 (0.884)  (0.883)  (0.885)  (0.884)  
Call option part 2 7.492 -- 7.337 -- 7.558 -- 7.406 -- 
 (0.892)  (0.892)  (0.891)  (0.890)  
Call option part 3 7.927 -- 7.542 -- 8.000 -- 7.638 -- 
 (0.674)  (0.673)  (0.676)  (0.675)  
Call option part 4 1.892 -- 1.314 -- 2.001 -- 1.451 -- 
 (0.427)  (0.425)  (0.428)  (0.425)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
        
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.271 -- 0.272 -- 0.279 -- 0.279 
  (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.104) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.111 -- 0.111 -- 0.112 -- 0.112 
  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.058) 
Negative equity variables         
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.012 -- 0.012 -- 0.012 -- 0.012 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.019 -- 0.019 -- 0.019 -- 0.019 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.013 -- 0.013 -- 0.014 -- 0.014 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -0.000 -- -0.000 -- 0.001 -- 0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 0.934 -- 0.934 -- 0.938 -- 0.937 
  (0.211)  (0.211)  (0.212)  (0.212) 
Original loan-to-value 
variables  
        
Original LTV part 1 -- 3.230 -- 3.230 -- 3.327 -- 3.327 
  (1.172)  (1.172)  (1.176)  (1.176) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 1.738 -- 1.738 -- 1.664 -- 1.665 
  (1.227)  (1.227)  (1.228)  (1.228) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -6.256 -- -6.256 -- -8.057 -- -8.058 
  (5.353)  (5.354)  (5.355)  (5.356) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 3.369 -- 3.370 -- 3.578 -- 3.578 
  (0.754)  (0.754)  (0.753)  (0.753) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 2.420 -- 2.416 -- 2.359 -- 2.352 
  (4.562)  (4.562)  (4.585)  (4.585) 
Log loan size variables         
Log loan size part 1 0.755 0.349 0.667 0.349 0.756 0.348 0.671 0.348 
 (0.079) (0.371) (0.078) (0.371) (0.079) (0.372) (0.078) (0.372) 
Log loan size part 2 0.840 -0.459 0.809 -0.459 0.846 -0.421 0.817 -0.420 
 (0.124) (0.427) (0.124) (0.427) (0.124) (0.429) (0.124) (0.429) 
Log loan size part 3 0.209 -0.134 0.198 -0.134 0.198 -0.133 0.188 -0.133 
 (0.132) (0.375) (0.132) (0.375) (0.136) (0.387) (0.136) (0.387) 
Log loan size part 4 0.990 -0.030 1.001 -0.028 1.008 -0.052 1.018 -0.050 
 (0.095) (0.268) (0.095) (0.268) (0.093) (0.265) (0.093) (0.265) 
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Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 0.140 0.419 0.140 0.419 0.140 0.418 0.140 0.418 
 (0.008) (0.116) (0.008) (0.116) (0.008) (0.116) (0.008) (0.116) 
Loan age part 2 0.003 0.077 0.003 0.077 0.003 0.078 0.003 0.078 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) 
Loan age part 3 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
Loan age part 4 0.006 -0.006 0.005 -0.006 0.006 -0.006 0.005 -0.006 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score 
variables 
        
The credit score part 1 1.801 -7.953 -- -7.980 1.764 -8.166 -- -8.193 
 (0.682) (1.481)  (1.481) (0.679) (1.475)  (1.475) 
The credit score part 2 3.445 -5.924 -- -5.986 3.194 -6.380 -- -6.439 
 (0.939) (2.484)  (2.484) (0.917) (2.429)  (2.429) 
The credit score part 3 0.993 -2.714 -- -2.732 0.921 -2.636 -- -2.653 
 (1.232) (3.907)  (3.907) (1.264) (4.015)  (4.015) 
The credit score part 4 6.919 -20.685 -- -20.819 6.804 -20.754 -- -20.887 
 (1.662) (6.741)  (6.741) (1.666) (6.759)  (6.759) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
        
DTI part 1 -0.870 1.154 -1.097 1.149 -0.863 1.184 -1.077 1.180 
 (0.376) (1.561) (0.374) (1.561) (0.376) (1.562) (0.374) (1.562) 
DTI part 2 0.947 2.779 0.671 2.775 0.989 2.944 0.724 2.940 
 (0.504) (1.580) (0.503) (1.580) (0.504) (1.582) (0.503) (1.582) 
DTI part 3 -0.665 0.744 -0.832 0.740 -0.561 0.898 -0.722 0.894 
 (0.548) (1.448) (0.547) (1.448) (0.548) (1.451) (0.547) (1.451) 
DTI part 4 0.320 0.648 0.410 0.650 0.284 0.686 0.376 0.688 
 (0.349) (0.762) (0.348) (0.762) (0.349) (0.761) (0.348) (0.761) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.548 -0.531 -0.498 -0.530 -0.551 -0.558 -0.503 -0.558 
 (0.227) (0.712) (0.227) (0.712) (0.227) (0.712) (0.227) (0.712) 
Time period variables         
Time period part 1 0.023 -0.004 0.023 -0.004 0.022 -0.003 0.023 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.036 -0.037 0.036 -0.037 0.034 -0.036 0.034 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Time period part 3 0.017 0.004 0.019 0.004 0.016 0.004 0.018 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 12,734  Number of mortgages 12,556   
 
 
Table 16. Odds ratios for Phoenix: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, negative equity, original LTV and the 
negative equity dummy are explanatory variables 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
  
 
 
 
 The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
default 
The credit score only for 
default 
The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
default 
The credit score only for 
default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 0.444 -- 0.461 -- 0.442 -- 0.458 -- 
 (0.103)  (0.107)  (0.102)  (0.106)  
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  213.758 -- 210.201 -- 225.394 -- 224.591 -- 
 (189.015)  (185.706)  (199.393)  (198.510)  
Call option part 2 1,794.485 -- 1,536.113 -- 1,916.514 -- 1,645.261 -- 
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 (1,600.797)  (1,369.525)  (1,706.949)  (1,464.498)  
Call option part 3 2,770.925 -- 1,885.200 -- 2,980.178 -- 2,074.706 -- 
 (1,868.153)  (1,268.629)  (2,014.044)  (1,399.589)  
Call option part 4 6.634 -- 3.723 -- 7.400 -- 4.267 -- 
 (2.834)  (1.582)  (3.164)  (1.815)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
        
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.312 -- 1.312 -- 1.322 -- 1.322 
  (0.137)  (0.137)  (0.138)  (0.138) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 1.117 -- 1.117 -- 1.119 -- 1.119 
  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.065) 
Negative equity variables         
Negative equity part 1 -- 1.012 -- 1.012 -- 1.012 -- 1.012 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 1.019 -- 1.019 -- 1.020 -- 1.020 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 1.014 -- 1.014 -- 1.014 -- 1.014 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 1.000 -- 1.000 -- 1.001 -- 1.001 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 2.545 -- 2.544 -- 2.554 -- 2.553 
  (0.537)  (0.537)  (0.541)  (0.541) 
Original loan-to-value 
variables  
        
Original LTV part 1 -- 25.280 -- 25.273 -- 27.850 -- 27.842 
  (29.621)  (29.614)  (32.759)  (32.751) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 5.684 -- 5.687 -- 5.282 -- 5.285 
  (6.976)  (6.980)  (6.487)  (6.491) 
Original LTV part 3 -- 0.002 -- 0.002 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 29.059 -- 29.070 -- 35.795 -- 35.808 
  (21.914)  (21.922)  (26.959)  (26.969) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 11.248 -- 11.196 -- 10.578 -- 10.511 
  (51.313)  (51.075)  (48.503)  (48.193) 
Log loan size variables         
Log loan size part 1 2.128 1.418 1.949 1.418 2.130 1.416 1.956 1.416 
 (0.168) (0.526) (0.152) (0.526) (0.168) (0.526) (0.153) (0.526) 
Log loan size part 2 2.317 0.632 2.246 0.632 2.330 0.657 2.264 0.657 
 (0.287) (0.270) (0.278) (0.270) (0.290) (0.282) (0.281) (0.282) 
Log loan size part 3 1.232 0.875 1.219 0.875 1.219 0.875 1.206 0.875 
 (0.163) (0.328) (0.161) (0.328) (0.166) (0.338) (0.164) (0.338) 
Log loan size part 4 2.691 0.971 2.722 0.972 2.739 0.950 2.768 0.951 
 (0.255) (0.260) (0.258) (0.261) (0.256) (0.252) (0.258) (0.252) 
Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 1.151 1.520 1.151 1.520 1.150 1.519 1.150 1.519 
 (0.009) (0.176) (0.009) (0.176) (0.009) (0.176) (0.009) (0.176) 
Loan age part 2 1.003 1.080 1.003 1.080 1.003 1.081 1.003 1.081 
 (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) 
Loan age part 3 0.998 0.994 0.997 0.994 0.998 0.993 0.997 0.993 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
Loan age part 4 1.006 0.994 1.005 0.994 1.006 0.994 1.005 0.994 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score variables         
The credit score part 1 6.056 0.000 -- 0.000 5.833 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (4.128) (0.001)  (0.001) (3.963) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The credit score part 2 31.343 0.003 -- 0.003 24.393 0.002 -- 0.002 
 (29.425) (0.007)  (0.006) (22.369) (0.004)  (0.004) 
The credit score part 3 2.700 0.066 -- 0.065 2.512 0.072 -- 0.070 
 (3.326) (0.259)  (0.254) (3.174) (0.288)  (0.283) 
The credit score part 4 1,011.740 0.000 -- 0.000 901.847 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (1,681.227) (0.000)  (0.000) (1,502.466) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
        
DTI part 1 0.419 3.171 0.334 3.155 0.422 3.269 0.341 3.253 
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 (0.157) (4.951) (0.125) (4.926) (0.158) (5.107) (0.127) (5.083) 
DTI part 2 2.578 16.107 1.957 16.038 2.687 18.995 2.063 18.916 
 (1.298) (25.450) (0.985) (25.341) (1.354) (30.050) (1.039) (29.925) 
DTI part 3 0.514 2.104 0.435 2.097 0.571 2.454 0.486 2.446 
 (0.282) (3.046) (0.238) (3.035) (0.313) (3.562) (0.266) (3.549) 
DTI part 4 1.377 1.911 1.507 1.915 1.328 1.986 1.457 1.990 
 (0.481) (1.456) (0.525) (1.458) (0.463) (1.511) (0.507) (1.515) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.578 0.588 0.608 0.588 0.577 0.572 0.605 0.572 
 (0.131) (0.419) (0.138) (0.419) (0.131) (0.407) (0.137) (0.407) 
Time period variables         
Time period part 1 1.023 0.996 1.024 0.996 1.023 0.997 1.023 0.997 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 0.963 1.036 0.964 1.036 0.964 1.034 0.965 1.034 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Time period part 3 1.017 1.004 1.020 1.004 1.016 1.004 1.018 1.004 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 12,734  Number of mortgages 12,556   
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The effect of the value of the call option supports H2. Because the range for any spline 
segment is less than one, it is meaningless to discuss a unit increase in the call option. Therefore, 
the odds ratios for the value of the call option are not discussed. Instead, this paper directly looks 
at the multinomial logit coefficients. This holds true throughout the paper whenever any 
explanatory variable has a spline segment less than one. When the value of the call option is 
below -0.025, the coefficient is 5.365 (the standard error is 0.884). When the value of the call 
option ranges between -0.025 and 0.037, the coefficient increases to 7.492 (the standard error is 
0.892). When the value of the call option ranges between 0.037 and 0.102, the coefficient again 
increases to 7.927 (the standard error is 0.674). However, when the value of the call option is 
above 0.102, the coefficient drops to 1.892 (the standard error is 0.427). The significantly 
positive effect supports the argument that when the value of the call option is “in the money,” 
households have more incentive to prepay their mortgages.  
The effect of the monthly unemployment rate supports H3. When the unemployment rate 
is below 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.312 times with a 1 percent 
increase in the unemployment rate. When the rate is above 5.700, the odds of default relative to 
continuity increase by 1.117 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. 
The effect of negative equity is consistent with H4 and it supports the argument that 
when the put option is “in the money,” households have more incentive to default their 
mortgages. When negative equity is below 18.366, the odds of default relative to continuity 
increase by 1.012 times with a 1 unit increase in negative equity. When negative equity ranges 
between 18.366 and 37.804, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.019 times 
with a 1 unit increase in negative equity. When the range is between 37.804 and 62.910, the odds 
of default relative to continuity increase by 1.014 times with a 1 unit increase in negative equity. 
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However, when the negative equity is above 62.910, the odds of default relative to continuity 
will not change with a 1 unit increase.  
Another important variable to evaluate the effect of negative equity is the negative equity 
dummy. The results support H5. The odds for mortgages with negative equity being defaulted 
instead of continued are 2.545 times as high as the same odds for mortgages with non-negative 
equity.  
The results of original loan-to-value partially support H6. However, when its value 
ranges between 0.780 and 0.800, the effect becomes insignificantly negative. When original 
loan-to-value is below 0.650, the coefficient is 3.230 and the standard error is 1.172. In ranges 
between 0.650 and 0.780, the coefficient drops to 1.738 and the standard error is 1.227. When 
value ranges are between 0.780 and 0.800, the coefficient becomes insignificantly negative, 
which is -6.256 and the standard error is 5.353. In ranges between 0.800 and 0.950, the 
coefficient becomes significantly positive again, which is 3.369 and the standard error is 0.754. 
Finally, when original loan-to-value is above 0.950, the coefficient drops to 2.420 and the 
standard error is 4.562.  
Consistent with the results in previous studies, H7 is held with the results in this paper. 
Moreover, the results of this study indicate the credit score has a strongly positive effect on the 
prepayment decision. The coefficient is 1.801 for prepayment (the standard error is 0.376) and is 
-7.953 for default (the standard error is 1.481) when the credit score is below 0.688. The 
coefficient increases to 3.445 for prepayment (the standard error is 0.939) and to -5.924 for 
default (the standard error is 2.484) when the credit score ranges between 0.688 and 0.736.  
However, the coefficient decreases to 0.993 for prepayment (the standard error is 1.232) and 
increases to -2.714 for default (the standard error is 3.907) when the credit score ranges between 
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0.736 and 0.774. The coefficient dramatically increases to 6.919 for prepayment (the standard 
error is 1.662) and drops to -20.685 for default (the standard error is 6.741) when the credit score 
is above 0.744. These results indicate both termination risks are sensitive to the high-level credit 
score. The households with high credit scores are more likely to prepay and less likely to default.   
The effect of the debt-to-income ratio is consistent with H8. However, for the 
prepayment risk, the effect of the debt-to-income ratio is inconsistent and its effect on default is 
insignificant. When the debt-to-income ratio ranges below 0.250 and between 0.340 and 0.420, 
its effect on the prepayment risk is insignificantly negative. When the debt-to-income ratio 
ranges between 0.250 and 0.340 and above 0.420, its effect on the prepayment risk becomes 
insignificantly positive. For the default risk, when the debt-to-income ratio is below 0.250, the 
coefficient is 1.154 and the standard error is 1.561. When the ratio ranges between 0.250 and 
0.340, the coefficient increases to 2.779 and the standard error is 1.580. When the debt-to-
income ratio ranges between 0.340 and 0.420, the coefficient drops to 0.774 and the standard 
error is 1.448, and the coefficient further decreases to 0.648 and the standard error is 0.762 when 
the debt-to-income ratio ranges above 0.420.   
The dummy for the number of units has a negative effect on both prepayment and default, 
and the effect is significant for prepayment. The odds for mortgages covering more than one 
house unit being prepaid instead of continued are about 0.578 times as high as the same odds for 
mortgages covering only one house unit. Moreover, the odds for mortgages covering more than 
one house unit being defaulted instead of continued are about 0.588 times as high as the same 
odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. The results show the mortgages for larger 
houses are less likely to be prepaid or defaulted than the mortgages for smaller houses. 
77 
 
 
Log loan size has a significantly positive effect on the prepayment; however, the effect is 
insignificant when the log loan size ranges between $149,941 and $210,029. On the other hand, 
its effect on the default is insignificant. The odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 
2.128 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size when it is below $105,030. In this range, the 
odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.418 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan 
size. When ranges are between $105,030 and $149,941, the odds of prepayment relative to 
continuity increase by 2.317 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. In this range, the odds 
of default relative to continuity decrease by 0.632 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
However, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 1.232 times with a 1 unit 
increase in log loan size when ranges are between $149,941 and $210,029. In this range, the odds 
of default relative to continuity decrease by 0.875 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
Furthermore, when size is above $210,029, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity 
increase by 2.691 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. In this range, the odds of default 
relative to continuity decrease by 0.971 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
Generally, loan age has a strongly positive relationship with the prepayment, but its effect 
is insignificantly negative when its value is between 24 and 45 months. When the loan age is 
below 24 months, the effect of loan age on the default decision is significantly positive. However, 
when loan age is above 24 months, its effect on default becomes significantly negative. When 
loan age is below 11 months, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 1.151 
times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. In this range, the odds of default relative to continuity 
increase by 1.520 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. When ranges are between 11 and 24 
months, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 1.003 times with a 1 unit 
increase in loan age. In this range, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.080 
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times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. When loan age ranges between 24 and 45 months, the 
odds of prepayment relative to continuity rapidly decrease by 0.998 times with a 1 unit increase 
in loan age. In this range, the odds of default relative to continuity decrease by 0.994 times with 
a 1 unit increase in loan age. When loan age is above 45 months, the odds of prepayment relative 
to continuity increase again by 1.006 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age, and the odds ratio 
for default remains the same as 0.994 in this range. 
The time period in each model is also controlled. The results show mortgages are more 
likely to be prepaid from March 1999 to July 2003 and are less likely to be prepaid from July 
2003 to November 2008. Prepayment increases again after November 2008. On the other hand, 
before January 2008, mortgages are less likely to default. However, starting from January 2010, 
mortgages become more likely to default. 
It is also important to note that the strongly negative effect of the credit score still holds 
in the model where the credit score explains only the default risk. However, comparing the 
multinomial logit coefficients of the credit score in this model with those in the previous model, 
results indicate the coefficients in this model are smaller than those in the previous model but the 
standard errors do not change. When the credit score is below 0.688, the coefficient is -7.980 and 
the standard error is 1.481. With ranges between 0.688 and 0.736, the coefficient increases to -
5.986 and the standard error is 2.484. When the credit score ranges are between 0.736 and 0.774, 
the coefficient increases to -2.732 and the standard error is 3.907. However, when the credit 
score is above 0.744, the coefficient dramatically drops to -20.819 and the standard error is 6.741. 
This result indicates households with high credit scores are much less likely to default.   
Comparing the results of other explanatory variables in this model with those in the 
previous model, findings indicate the effect of the unemployment rate, negative equity, negative 
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equity dummy, original loan-to-value, loan age, and time period remains the same. The value of 
the prepayment penalty dummy supports H1, but the odds ratios slightly increase in this model. 
The effect of the value of the call option supports H2. However, the coefficients in this model are 
smaller than that in the previous model. H8 is not rejected in this model and the effect of the 
debt-to-income ratio is still not significant for both prepayment and default. The dummy for the 
number of units still has a negative effect on both the prepayment and the default, and its effect 
for prepayment is stronger than that in the previous model. Comparing the odds ratios of log loan 
size in this model with those in the previous model, findings indicate the effect of log loan size 
on the default risk does not change between these two models. When the log loan size is below 
$210029, the odds ratios in this model are smaller than those in the previous model. However, 
when log loan size is above $210029, the odds ratio in this model is larger than that in the 
previous model. 
The second group of models includes negative equity and negative equity dummy as 
explanatory variables. Table 17 contains the coefficients and table 18 contains the odds ratios. 
The following explanations are based on the dataset with right censored mortgages and the 
results for the dataset with modified mortgages deleted, which can be found in tables 17 and 18. 
Comparing the results of this model with the results of the model using negative equity, negative 
equity dummy and original loan-to-value as explanatory variables, results indicate the 
significance and coefficients of all explanatory variables for the prepayment risk are the same. 
Therefore, the discussion below only includes the results for the default risk. The results of the 
model with the credit score for both termination risks are discussed first and then are compared 
with the results of the model with the credit score only for the default risk.  
 [insert Tables 17 and 18 are here] 
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Table 17. Coefficients for Phoenix: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, negative equity and the negative equity dummy are 
explanatory variables 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
  
 
 
 
 The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
default 
The credit score only for 
default 
The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
default 
The credit score only for 
default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.813 -- -0.774 -- -0.816 -- -0.781 -- 
 (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.232)  
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  5.365 -- 5.348 -- 5.418 -- 5.415 -- 
 (0.884)  (0.883)  (0.885)  (0.884)  
Call option part 2 7.491 -- 7.336 -- 7.557 -- 7.404 -- 
 (0.892)  (0.892)  (0.891)  (0.890)  
Call option part 3 7.929 -- 7.543 -- 8.001 -- 7.639 -- 
 (0.674)  (0.673)  (0.676)  (0.675)  
Call option part 4 1.890 -- 1.312 -- 1.999 -- 1.449 -- 
 (0.427)  (0.425)  (0.428)  (0.425)  
The unemployment 
rate variables 
        
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.242 -- 0.242 -- 0.251 -- 0.251 
  (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.104) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.094 -- 0.094 -- 0.097 -- 0.097 
  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.058) 
Negative equity 
variables 
        
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.014 -- 0.014 -- 0.014 -- 0.014 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.023 -- 0.023 -- 0.024 -- 0.024 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.015 -- 0.015 -- 0.015 -- 0.015 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 0.004 -- 0.004 -- 0.005 -- 0.005 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 1.022 -- 1.022 -- 1.028 -- 1.028 
  (0.211)  (0.211)  (0.212)  (0.212) 
Log loan size variables         
Log loan size part 1 0.755 0.587 0.667 0.587 0.756 0.582 0.671 0.582 
 (0.079) (0.366) (0.078) (0.366) (0.079) (0.366) (0.078) (0.366) 
Log loan size part 2 0.840 -0.579 0.809 -0.578 0.846 -0.545 0.817 -0.544 
 (0.124) (0.425) (0.124) (0.425) (0.124) (0.427) (0.124) (0.427) 
Log loan size part 3 0.209 -0.124 0.198 -0.124 0.198 -0.113 0.188 -0.113 
 (0.132) (0.377) (0.132) (0.377) (0.136) (0.388) (0.136) (0.388) 
Log loan size part 4 0.990 -0.288 1.001 -0.286 1.008 -0.296 1.018 -0.295 
 (0.095) (0.269) (0.095) (0.269) (0.093) (0.265) (0.093) (0.265) 
Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 0.140 0.423 0.140 0.423 0.140 0.422 0.140 0.422 
 (0.008) (0.116) (0.008) (0.116) (0.008) (0.116) (0.008) (0.116) 
Loan age part 2 0.003 0.074 0.003 0.074 0.003 0.074 0.003 0.074 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) 
Loan age part 3 -0.002 -0.012 -0.003 -0.012 -0.002 -0.012 -0.003 -0.012 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
Loan age part 4 0.006 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score         
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variables 
The credit score part 1 1.801 -7.481 -- -7.508 1.764 -7.743 -- -7.771 
 (0.682) (1.471)  (1.471) (0.679) (1.464)  (1.464) 
The credit score part 2 3.445 -6.706 -- -6.768 3.194 -7.185 -- -7.244 
 (0.939) (2.475)  (2.475) (0.917) (2.419)  (2.419) 
The credit score part 3 0.993 -2.566 -- -2.584 0.921 -2.431 -- -2.448 
 (1.232) (3.898)  (3.898) (1.264) (4.007)  (4.007) 
The credit score part 4 6.919 -21.403 -- -21.534 6.804 -21.545 -- -21.675 
 (1.662) (6.728)  (6.728) (1.666) (6.750)  (6.750) 
The debt-to-income 
ratio variables 
        
DTI part 1 -0.870 1.291 -1.097 1.286 -0.863 1.332 -1.077 1.327 
 (0.376) (1.566) (0.374) (1.566) (0.376) (1.568) (0.374) (1.568) 
DTI part 2 0.947 2.996 0.671 2.992 0.989 3.124 0.724 3.119 
 (0.504) (1.582) (0.503) (1.582) (0.504) (1.584) (0.503) (1.584) 
DTI part 3 -0.666 0.783 -0.832 0.779 -0.561 0.919 -0.722 0.915 
 (0.548) (1.447) (0.547) (1.447) (0.548) (1.449) (0.547) (1.449) 
DTI part 4 0.320 0.781 0.410 0.783 0.284 0.859 0.377 0.861 
 (0.349) (0.757) (0.348) (0.757) (0.349) (0.756) (0.348) (0.756) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.548 -0.625 -0.498 -0.625 -0.551 -0.646 -0.503 -0.646 
 (0.227) (0.711) (0.227) (0.711) (0.227) (0.711) (0.227) (0.711) 
Time period variables         
Time period part 1 0.023 -0.008 0.023 -0.008 0.022 -0.007 0.023 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.037 -0.037 0.037 -0.037 0.035 -0.036 0.035 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Time period part 3 0.017 0.004 0.019 0.004 0.016 0.004 0.018 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 12,734  Number of mortgages 12,556   
Table 18. Odds ratios for Phoenix: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, negative equity and the negative equity dummy are 
explanatory variables 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
  
 
 
 
 The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
default 
The credit score only for 
default 
The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
default 
The credit score only for 
default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 0.444 -- 0.461 -- 0.442 -- 0.458 -- 
 (0.103)  (0.107)  (0.102)  (0.106)  
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  213.802 -- 210.244 -- 225.445 -- 224.642 -- 
 (189.055)  (185.745)  (199.439)  (198.555)  
Call option part 2 1,792.521 -- 1,534.332 -- 1,914.403 -- 1,643.356 -- 
 (1,599.044)  (1,367.936)  (1,705.068)  (1,462.802)  
Call option part 3 2,775.324 -- 1,888.352 -- 2,984.801 -- 2,078.085 -- 
 (1,871.113)  (1,270.746)  (2,017.162)  (1,401.864)  
Call option part 4 6.620 -- 3.715 -- 7.384 -- 4.258 -- 
 (2.828)  (1.578)  (3.158)  (1.811)  
The unemployment 
rate variables 
        
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.274 -- 1.274 -- 1.285 -- 1.285 
  (0.133)  (0.133)  (0.134)  (0.134) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 1.099 -- 1.099 -- 1.102 -- 1.102 
  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.064) 
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Negative equity 
variables 
        
Negative equity part 1 -- 1.014 -- 1.014 -- 1.014 -- 1.014 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 1.024 -- 1.024 -- 1.024 -- 1.024 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 1.015 -- 1.015 -- 1.015 -- 1.015 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 1.004 -- 1.004 -- 1.005 -- 1.005 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 2.779 -- 2.778 -- 2.795 -- 2.794 
  (0.586)  (0.586)  (0.591)  (0.591) 
Log loan size variables         
Log loan size part 1 2.128 1.799 1.949 1.798 2.130 1.790 1.956 1.789 
 (0.168) (0.658) (0.152) (0.658) (0.168) (0.655) (0.153) (0.655) 
Log loan size part 2 2.317 0.560 2.246 0.561 2.330 0.580 2.264 0.580 
 (0.287) (0.238) (0.278) (0.239) (0.290) (0.248) (0.281) (0.248) 
Log loan size part 3 1.232 0.884 1.219 0.884 1.219 0.893 1.206 0.893 
 (0.163) (0.333) (0.161) (0.333) (0.166) (0.347) (0.164) (0.347) 
Log loan size part 4 2.692 0.750 2.722 0.751 2.739 0.743 2.768 0.745 
 (0.255) (0.201) (0.258) (0.202) (0.256) (0.197) (0.258) (0.198) 
Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 1.151 1.527 1.151 1.527 1.150 1.525 1.150 1.525 
 (0.009) (0.177) (0.009) (0.177) (0.009) (0.177) (0.009) (0.177) 
Loan age part 2 1.003 1.076 1.003 1.076 1.003 1.077 1.003 1.077 
 (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) 
Loan age part 3 0.998 0.988 0.997 0.988 0.998 0.988 0.997 0.988 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
Loan age part 4 1.006 0.997 1.005 0.997 1.006 0.997 1.005 0.997 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score 
variables 
        
The credit score part 1 6.057 0.001 -- 0.001 5.834 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (4.129) (0.001)  (0.001) (3.963) (0.001)  (0.001) 
The credit score part 2 31.347 0.001 -- 0.001 24.394 0.001 -- 0.001 
 (29.429) (0.003)  (0.003) (22.371) (0.002)  (0.002) 
The credit score part 3 2.700 0.077 -- 0.075 2.512 0.088 -- 0.086 
 (3.326) (0.299)  (0.294) (3.174) (0.352)  (0.346) 
The credit score part 4 1,011.395 0.000 -- 0.000 901.466 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (1,680.652) (0.000)  (0.000) (1,501.828) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The debt-to-income 
ratio variables 
        
DTI part 1 0.419 3.637 0.334 3.618 0.422 3.787 0.341 3.769 
 (0.157) (5.697) (0.125) (5.668) (0.158) (5.937) (0.127) (5.908) 
DTI part 2 2.578 20.010 1.957 19.924 2.688 22.728 2.063 22.633 
 (1.298) (31.665) (0.985) (31.528) (1.354) (36.003) (1.039) (35.851) 
DTI part 3 0.514 2.188 0.435 2.180 0.571 2.506 0.486 2.497 
 (0.282) (3.166) (0.238) (3.155) (0.313) (3.632) (0.266) (3.619) 
DTI part 4 1.377 2.183 1.507 2.188 1.328 2.361 1.457 2.366 
 (0.481) (1.654) (0.525) (1.657) (0.463) (1.785) (0.507) (1.789) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.578 0.535 0.608 0.535 0.577 0.524 0.605 0.524 
 (0.131) (0.381) (0.138) (0.381) (0.131) (0.373) (0.137) (0.373) 
Time period variables         
Time period part 1 1.023 0.992 1.024 0.992 1.023 0.993 1.023 0.993 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 0.963 1.038 0.964 1.038 0.964 1.036 0.965 1.036 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Time period part 3 1.017 1.004 1.020 1.004 1.016 1.004 1.018 1.004 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) 
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The third column in table 17 shows that the effect of the monthly unemployment rate 
supports H3. When the unemployment rate is below 5.700, the odds of default relative to 
continuity increase by 1.274 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. When the 
rate is above 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity will increase by 1.099 times with a 
1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. 
The effect of negative equity is consistent with H4, which supports the argument that 
when the put option is “in the money,” households have more incentive to default their 
mortgages. When negative equity is below 18.366, the odds of default relative to continuity 
increase by 1.014 times with a 1 unit increase in negative equity, and when its value ranges 
between 18.366 and 37.804, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.024 times 
with a 1 unit increase in negative equity. When the negative equity ranges between 37.804 and 
62.910, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.015 times with a 1 unit increase in 
negative equity, and when its value is above 62.910, the odds of default relative to continuity 
increase by 1.004 times with a 1 unit increase in negative equity.  
The results of the negative equity dummy support H5. The odds for mortgages with 
negative equity being defaulted instead of continued are 2.779 times as high as the same odds for 
mortgages with non-negative equity.  
The results of the credit score support H7. The coefficient is -7.481 (the standard error is 
1.471) when the credit score is below 0.688 and the coefficient increases to -6.706 (the standard 
error is 2.475) when the credit score ranges between 0.688 and 0.736. The coefficient further 
increases to -2.566 (the standard error is 3.898) when the score ranges between 0.736 and 0.774 
and the coefficient dramatically drops to -21.403 (the standard error is 6.728) when the credit 
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score is above 0.744. These results indicate households with high credit scores are much less 
likely to default.   
The effect of the debt-to-income ratio on the default risk supports H8 but the results are 
not significant. The dummy for the number of units has a negative effect on the default risk. The 
odds for mortgages covering more than one house unit being defaulted instead of continued are 
about 0.535 times as high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. These 
results indicate mortgages for larger houses are less likely to default. 
Log loan size has an insignificantly negative effect on the default. However, when log 
loan size is below $105,030, its effect becomes insignificantly positive and the odds of default 
relative to continuity increase by 1.799 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. When size 
ranges between $105,030 and $149,941, the odds of default relative to continuity decrease by 
0.560 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size, and when its value ranges between $149,941 
and $210,029, the odds of default relative to continuity decrease by 0.884 times with a 1 unit 
increase in log loan size. When log loan size is above $210,029, the odds of default relative to 
continuity decrease by 0.750 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
Loan age has a significantly positive effect on the default risk when the age is below 24 
months, and its effect becomes significantly negative when the age is above 24 months. When 
loan age is below 11 months, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.527 times 
with a 1 unit increase in loan age. When loan age ranges between 11 and 24 months, the odds of 
default relative to continuity increase by 1.076 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. When 
ranges are between 24 and 45 months, the odds of default relative to continuity decrease by 
0.988 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age, and when the age is above 45 months, the odds of 
default relative to continuity decrease by 0.997 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age.  
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H7 is still held with the results in the model using the credit score to explain only the 
default risk. Comparing the coefficients of the credit score for the default risk in this model with 
those in the model with the credit score used for both termination risks, findings indicate the 
coefficients in this model are smaller than those in the previous model; however, the standard 
errors do not change. When the credit score is below 0.688, the coefficient is -7.508 and the 
standard error is 1.471. When the range is between 0.688 and 0.736, the coefficient increases to -
6.768 and the standard error is 2.475. When the credit score ranges between 0.736 and 0.774, the 
coefficient increases to -2.584 and the standard error is 3.898. However, when the credit score is 
above 0.744, the coefficient dramatically drops to -21.534 and the standard error is 6.728. This 
result indicates households with high credit scores are much less likely to default.   
The results of other explanatory variables are compared with those in the model with the 
credit score used for both termination risks. The findings indicate the effect of the unemployment 
rate, negative equity, negative equity dummy, log loan size, loan age, unit dummy and time 
period remains the same. However, the coefficients of the debt-to-income ratio slightly decrease.  
The third group of models includes the negative equity dummy and original loan-to-value 
as explanatory variables. Table 19 contains the coefficients and table 20 contains the odds ratios. 
The following explanations are based on the dataset with right censored mortgages and the 
results for the dataset with modified mortgages deleted can be found in tables 19 and 20. The 
results of this model are compared with the results of the model using negative equity, negative 
equity dummy and original loan-to-value as explanatory variables, and findings indicate the 
significance and the coefficients of all explanatory variables for the prepayment risk are the same. 
Therefore, only the results for the default risk are discussed. The results of the model with the 
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credit score for both termination risks is first discussed and then these results are compared with 
the results of the model with the credit score only for the default risk.  
 [insert Tables 19 and 20 are here] 
The effect of the monthly unemployment rate supports H3. When the unemployment rate 
is below 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.351 times with a 1 percent 
increase in the unemployment rate. When the rate is above 5.700, the odds of default relative to 
continuity increase by 1.155 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. 
The effect of the negative equity dummy supports H5. The odds for mortgages with 
negative equity being defaulted instead of continued are 3.947 times as high as the same odds for 
mortgages with non-negative equity.  
H6 is partially supported in this model. When original loan-to-value is below 0.650, the 
coefficient is 3.213 (the standard error is 1.204), and when it ranges between 0.650 and 0.780, 
the coefficient increases to 3.465 (the standard error is 1.195). However, when original loan-to-
value ranges between 0.780 and 0.800, the coefficient becomes insignificantly negative, which is 
-7.657 (the standard error is 5.314) and in ranges between 0.800 and 0.950, the coefficient 
becomes significantly positive again, which is 3.457 (the standard error is 0.747). When original 
loan-to-value is above 0.950, the coefficient increases to 5.414 and the standard error is 4.562. 
Furthermore, when original loan-to-value is kept in the model and negative equity is deleted, the 
absolute value of the coefficients of original loan-to-value increases. 
The effect of the credit score supports H7. The coefficient is -7.904 (the standard error is 
1.467) when the credit score is below 0.688 and the coefficient increases to -6.151 (the standard 
error is 2.475) when the score ranges between 0.688 and 0.736. The coefficient further increases  
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Table 19. Coefficients for Phoenix: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, the negative equity dummy and original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
  
 
 
 
 The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
default 
The credit score only for 
default 
The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
default 
The credit score only for 
default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.813 -- -0.774 -- -0.816 -- -0.781 -- 
 (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.232)  
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  5.364 -- 5.348 -- 5.417 -- 5.414 -- 
 (0.884)  (0.883)  (0.885)  (0.884)  
Call option part 2 7.494 -- 7.338 -- 7.560 -- 7.407 -- 
 (0.892)  (0.892)  (0.891)  (0.890)  
Call option part 3 7.924 -- 7.538 -- 7.996 -- 7.634 -- 
 (0.674)  (0.673)  (0.676)  (0.675)  
Call option part 4 1.892 -- 1.315 -- 2.001 -- 1.451 -- 
 (0.427)  (0.425)  (0.428)  (0.425)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
        
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.301 -- 0.301 -- 0.307 -- 0.308 
  (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.104)  (0.104) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.144 -- 0.144 -- 0.147 -- 0.147 
  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057) 
The negative equity 
dummy  
-- 1.373 -- 1.373 -- 1.385 -- 1.384 
  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.105) 
Original loan-to-value 
variables  
        
Original LTV part 1 -- 3.213 -- 3.213 -- 3.281 -- 3.281 
  (1.204)  (1.204)  (1.209)  (1.209) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 3.465 -- 3.465 -- 3.444 -- 3.444 
  (1.195)  (1.195)  (1.196)  (1.196) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -7.657 -- -7.657 -- -9.227 -- -9.228 
  (5.314)  (5.314)  (5.316)  (5.316) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 3.457 -- 3.457 -- 3.701 -- 3.701 
  (0.747)  (0.747)  (0.748)  (0.748) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 5.414 -- 5.409 -- 5.807 -- 5.800 
  (4.536)  (4.536)  (4.553)  (4.553) 
Log loan size variables         
Log loan size part 1 0.755 0.241 0.667 0.241 0.756 0.238 0.671 0.237 
 (0.079) (0.374) (0.078) (0.374) (0.079) (0.374) (0.078) (0.374) 
Log loan size part 2 0.840 -0.158 0.809 -0.157 0.846 -0.121 0.817 -0.121 
 (0.124) (0.421) (0.124) (0.421) (0.124) (0.423) (0.124) (0.423) 
Log loan size part 3 0.209 0.540 0.198 0.540 0.198 0.570 0.188 0.570 
 (0.132) (0.346) (0.132) (0.346) (0.136) (0.357) (0.136) (0.357) 
Log loan size part 4 0.990 0.095 1.001 0.096 1.008 0.147 1.018 0.149 
 (0.095) (0.222) (0.095) (0.222) (0.093) (0.219) (0.093) (0.219) 
Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 0.140 0.417 0.140 0.417 0.140 0.416 0.140 0.417 
 (0.008) (0.116) (0.008) (0.116) (0.008) (0.116) (0.008) (0.116) 
Loan age part 2 0.003 0.083 0.003 0.083 0.003 0.084 0.003 0.084 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017)  
Loan age part 3 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
Loan age part 4 0.006 -0.009 0.005 -0.009 0.006 -0.009 0.005 -0.009 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score         
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variables 
The credit score part 1 1.801 -7.904 -- -7.932 1.763 -8.099 -- -8.126 
 (0.682) (1.467)  (1.467) (0.679) (1.460)  (1.460) 
The credit score part 2 3.445 -6.151 -- -6.212 3.194 -6.586 -- -6.645 
 (0.939) (2.475)  (2.475) (0.917) (2.420)  (2.420) 
The credit score part 3 0.993 -3.126 -- -3.143 0.921 -3.104 -- -3.121 
 (1.232) (3.913)  (3.912) (1.264) (4.020)  (4.020) 
The credit score part 4 6.919 -20.290 -- -20.425 6.804 -20.314 -- -20.448 
 (1.662) (6.783)  (6.783) (1.666) (6.804)  (6.804) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
        
DTI part 1 -0.870 1.033 -1.097 1.028 -0.863 1.051 -1.077 1.046 
 (0.376) (1.571) (0.374) (1.571) (0.376) (1.572) (0.374) (1.572) 
DTI part 2 0.947 3.232 0.671 3.228 0.989 3.444 0.724 3.440 
 (0.504) (1.582) (0.503) (1.582) (0.504) (1.584) (0.503) (1.584) 
DTI part 3 -0.665 0.565 -0.832 0.561 -0.560 0.677 -0.722 0.674 
 (0.548) (1.447) (0.547) (1.447) (0.548) (1.450) (0.547) (1.450) 
DTI part 4 0.320 0.653 0.410 0.655 0.284 0.692 0.377 0.694 
 (0.349) (0.761) (0.348) (0.761) (0.349) (0.761) (0.348) (0.761) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.548 -0.461 -0.498 -0.461 -0.551 -0.486 -0.503 -0.486 
 (0.227) (0.711) (0.227) (0.711) (0.227) (0.711) (0.227) (0.711) 
Time period variables         
Time period part 1 0.023 -0.005 0.023 -0.005 0.022 -0.004 0.023 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.033 -0.037 0.033 -0.037 0.031 -0.036 0.031 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Time period part 3 0.017 0.005 0.019 0.005 0.016 0.005 0.018 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) 
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Table 20. Odds ratios for Phoenix: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, the negative equity dummy and original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
  
 
 
 
 The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
default 
The credit score only for 
default 
The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
default 
The credit score only for 
default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 0.444 -- 0.461 -- 0.442 -- 0.458 -- 
 (0.103)  (0.107)  (0.102)  (0.106)  
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  213.659 -- 210.101 -- 225.273 -- 224.466 -- 
 (188.926)  (185.616)  (199.284)  (198.397)  
Call option part 2 1,796.933 -- 1,538.343 -- 1,919.442 -- 1,647.935 -- 
 (1,602.983)  (1,371.515)  (1,709.560)  (1,466.880)  
Call option part 3 2,761.841 -- 1,878.719 -- 2,968.970 -- 2,066.528 -- 
 (1,862.038)  (1,264.273)  (2,006.480)  (1,394.078)  
Call option part 4 6.634 -- 3.723 -- 7.399 -- 4.267 -- 
 (2.834)  (1.582)  (3.164)  (1.815)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
        
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.351 -- 1.351 -- 1.360 -- 1.360 
  (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.141)  (0.141) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 1.155 -- 1.155 -- 1.159 -- 1.159 
  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.066) 
The negative equity 
dummy  
-- 3.947 -- 3.946 -- 3.993 -- 3.992 
89 
 
 
  (0.415)  (0.415)  (0.420)  (0.420) 
Original loan-to-value 
variables  
        
Original LTV part 1 -- 24.859 -- 24.849 -- 26.607 -- 26.597 
  (29.924)  (29.913)  (32.160)  (32.149) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 31.965 -- 31.970 -- 31.320 -- 31.327 
  (38.205)  (38.212)  (37.461)  (37.469) 
Original LTV part 3 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 31.709 -- 31.719 -- 40.469 -- 40.480 
  (23.674)  (23.681)  (30.278)  (30.286) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 224.510 -- 223.355 -- 332.720 -- 330.394 
  (1,018.4
60) 
 (1,013.2
12) 
 (1,514.94
4) 
 (1,504.33
7) 
Log loan size variables         
Log loan size part 1 2.128 1.273 1.949 1.273 2.130 1.268 1.956 1.268 
 (0.168) (0.476) (0.152) (0.475) (0.168) (0.475) (0.153) (0.475) 
Log loan size part 2 2.317 0.854 2.246 0.854 2.330 0.886 2.264 0.886 
 (0.287) (0.359) (0.278) (0.360) (0.290) (0.375) (0.281) (0.375) 
Log loan size part 3 1.232 1.716 1.219 1.716 1.219 1.768 1.206 1.768 
 (0.163) (0.594) (0.161) (0.594) (0.166) (0.632) (0.164) (0.632) 
Log loan size part 4 2.691 1.099 2.722 1.101 2.739 1.159 2.768 1.160 
 (0.255) (0.244) (0.258) (0.244) (0.256) (0.254) (0.258) (0.255) 
Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 1.151 1.518 1.151 1.518 1.150 1.517 1.150 1.517 
 (0.009) (0.177) (0.009) (0.177) (0.009) (0.176) (0.009) (0.177) 
Loan age part 2 1.003 1.087 1.003 1.087 1.003 1.088 1.003 1.088 
 (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) 
Loan age part 3 0.998 1.001 0.997 1.001 0.998 1.000 0.997 1.000 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
Loan age part 4 1.006 0.991 1.005 0.991 1.006 0.991 1.005 0.991 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score 
variables 
        
The credit score part 1 6.054 0.000 -- 0.000 5.831 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (4.127) (0.001)  (0.001) (3.961) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The credit score part 2 31.335 0.002 -- 0.002 24.386 0.001 -- 0.001 
 (29.418) (0.005)  (0.005) (22.363) (0.003)  (0.003) 
The credit score part 3 2.701 0.044 -- 0.043 2.512 0.045 -- 0.044 
 (3.327) (0.172)  (0.169) (3.175) (0.180)  (0.177) 
The credit score part 4 1,011.621 0.000 -- 0.000 901.739 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (1,681.017) (0.000)  (0.000) (1,502.275) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
        
DTI part 1 0.419 2.810 0.334 2.796 0.422 2.859 0.341 2.846 
 (0.157) (4.414) (0.125) (4.392) (0.158) (4.495) (0.127) (4.474) 
DTI part 2 2.578 25.328 1.957 25.220 2.687 31.318 2.063 31.186 
 (1.298) (40.066) (0.985) (39.893) (1.354) (49.604) (1.039) (49.395) 
DTI part 3 0.514 1.759 0.435 1.753 0.571 1.969 0.486 1.962 
 (0.282) (2.545) (0.238) (2.536) (0.313) (2.854) (0.266) (2.844) 
DTI part 4 1.377 1.922 1.507 1.926 1.328 1.998 1.457 2.003 
 (0.481) (1.463) (0.525) (1.466) (0.463) (1.520) (0.507) (1.523) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.578 0.631 0.608 0.631 0.577 0.615 0.605 0.615 
 (0.131) (0.449) (0.138) (0.449) (0.131) (0.438) (0.137) (0.438) 
Time period variables         
Time period part 1 1.023 0.995 1.024 0.995 1.023 0.996 1.023 0.996 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 0.963 1.034 0.964 1.034 0.964 1.032 0.965 1.032 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Time period part 3 1.017 1.005 1.020 1.005 1.016 1.005 1.018 1.005 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 12,734  Number of mortgages 12,556   
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to -3.126 (the standard error is 3.913) when the credit score ranges between 0.736 and 0.774 and 
it drops dramatically to -20.290 (the standard error is 6.783) when the score is above 0.744. 
These results indicate households with high credit scores are much less likely to default.   
The effect of the debt-to-income ratio on the default risk is consistent with H8 but the 
results are not significant. The dummy for the number of units has a negative effect on the 
default risk. The odds for mortgages covering more than one house unit being defaulted instead 
of continued are about 0.631 times as high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one 
house unit. The results show mortgages for larger houses are less likely to default. 
Different from the previous results, the effect of log loan size on the default risk becomes 
insignificant. The difference of the results among models indicates the effect of the log loan size 
is sensitive to the combination of the explanatory variables chosen.  
Loan age has a significantly positive effect on the default risk when the age is below 45 
months, and its effect becomes significantly negative when the age is above 45 months. When 
loan age is below 11 months, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.518 times 
with a 1 unit increase in loan age. When the age ranges between 11 and 24 months, the odds of 
default relative to continuity increase by 1.087 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age, and when 
the value ranges between 24 and 45 months, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 
1.001 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. However, when loan age is above 45 months, the 
odds of default relative to continuity decrease by 0.991 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age.  
H7 is still held with the results in the model using the credit score to explain only the 
default risk. Comparing the coefficients of the credit score in this model with those in the model 
with the credit score used for both termination risks, findings indicate the coefficients in this 
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model are smaller than those in the previous model. However, the standard errors do not change. 
When the credit score is below 0.688, the coefficient is -7.932 (the standard error is 1.467), and 
when the score ranges between 0.688 and 0.736, the coefficient increases to -6.212 (the standard 
error is 2.475). When the credit score ranges between 0.736 and 0.774, the coefficient increases 
to -3.143 (the standard error is 3.912), and when the credit score is above 0.744, the coefficient 
dramatically drops to -20.425 (the standard error is 6.783). This result indicates households with 
high credit scores are much less likely to default.   
The results of other explanatory variables for the default risk in this model are compared 
with those in the model with the credit score only used for both termination risks, and findings 
indicate the effect of the unemployment rate, negative equity dummy, original loan-to-value, log 
loan size, loan age, unit dummy and time period remains the same. However, the coefficients of 
the debt-to-income ratio slightly decrease.  
Group 2: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables 
The first group of models includes negative equity and the negative equity dummy as 
explanatory variables. The coefficients are listed in table 21 and the odds ratios are listed in table 
22. The following explanations are based on the dataset with right censored mortgages. The 
results for the dataset with modified mortgages deleted can be found in tables 21 and 22.  The 
results of the model with credit score for both termination risks is first introduced followed by a 
comparison of the results of the model with the credit score only for the 90-days-delinquency 
risk.  
 [insert Tables 21 and 22 are here]         
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Table 21. Coefficients for Phoenix: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, negative equity and the negative equity 
dummy are explanatory variables 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
  
 
 
 
 The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score only for 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score only for 
90-days-delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.819 -- -0.785 -- -0.823 -- -0.792 -- 
 (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.232)  
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  5.402 -- 5.391 -- 5.446 -- 5.448 -- 
 (0.893)  (0.892)  (0.893)  (0.892)  
Call option part 2 7.349 -- 7.214 -- 7.424 -- 7.291 -- 
 (0.911)  (0.910)  (0.910)  (0.910)  
Call option part 3 8.383 -- 8.043 -- 8.438 -- 8.115 -- 
 (0.683)  (0.682)  (0.684)  (0.683)  
Call option part 4 2.177 -- 1.668 -- 2.285 -- 1.798 -- 
 (0.424)  (0.422)  (0.424)  (0.423)  
The unemployment 
rate variables 
        
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.295 -- 0.295 -- 0.288 -- 0.289 
  (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.079) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.177 -- 0.177 -- 0.187 -- 0.187 
  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
Negative equity 
variables 
        
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.014 -- 0.014 -- 0.019 -- 0.019 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.022 -- 0.022 -- 0.023 -- 0.023 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.018 -- 0.018 -- 0.018 -- 0.018 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 0.003 -- 0.003 -- 0.004 -- 0.004 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 0.849 -- 0.849 -- 0.859 -- 0.858 
  (0.197)  (0.197)  (0.211)  (0.211) 
Log loan size variables         
Log loan size part 1 0.786 0.325 0.704 0.325 0.787 0.368 0.707 0.368 
 (0.079) (0.308) (0.079) (0.308) (0.080) (0.324) (0.080) (0.324) 
Log loan size part 2 0.836 -0.041 0.808 -0.040 0.838 -0.294 0.811 -0.293 
 (0.125) (0.383) (0.124) (0.383) (0.121) (0.391) (0.121) (0.391) 
Log loan size part 3 0.219 -0.552 0.209 -0.552 0.218 -0.453 0.208 -0.453 
 (0.135) (0.347) (0.135) (0.347) (0.136) (0.370) (0.136) (0.370) 
Log loan size part 4 0.982 -0.229 0.990 -0.227 1.004 -0.279 1.012 -0.277 
 (0.094) (0.246) (0.094) (0.246) (0.094) (0.259) (0.093) (0.259) 
Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 0.140 0.244 0.140 0.244 0.139 0.232 0.139 0.232 
 (0.008) (0.048) (0.008) (0.048) (0.008) (0.048) (0.008) (0.048) 
Loan age part 2 0.003 0.037 0.003 0.037 0.003 0.033 0.003 0.033 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) 
Loan age part 3 -0.002 -0.010 -0.003 -0.010 -0.002 -0.010 -0.003 -0.010 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Loan age part 4 0.006 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
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The credit score 
variables 
        
The credit score part 1 1.347 -8.144 -- -8.166 1.338 -8.264 -- -8.287 
 (0.675) (1.270)  (1.270) (0.665) (1.329)  (1.329) 
The credit score part 2 3.455 -9.572 -- -9.632 3.227 -9.459 -- -9.516 
 (0.939) (2.291)  (2.291) (0.937)  (2.409)  (2.409) 
The credit score part 3 0.983 -5.221 -- -5.238 0.946 -3.513 -- -3.530 
 (1.269) (3.874)  (3.874) (1.306) (4.134)  (4.134) 
The credit score part 4 6.571 -21.612 -- -21.727 6.456 -21.387 -- -21.502 
 (1.668) (6.631)  (6.631) (1.673) (6.778)  (6.778) 
The debt-to-income 
ratio variables 
        
DTI part 1 -0.884 2.441 -1.091 2.436 -0.886 2.173 -1.074 2.168 
 (0.376) (1.536) (0.374) (1.536) (0.380) (1.570) (0.378) (1.570) 
DTI part 2 1.038 3.672 0.785 3.668 1.159 2.972 0.884 2.968 
 (0.505) (1.474) (0.505) (1.474) (0.567) (1.738) (0.566) (1.738) 
DTI part 3 -0.679 1.063 -0.851 1.059 -0.424 1.850 -0.576 1.846 
 (0.550) (1.325) (0.549) (1.325) (0.486) (1.241) (0.485) (1.241) 
DTI part 4 0.354 0.675 0.435 0.678 0.298 0.596 0.378 0.598 
 (0.351) (0.695) (0.350) (0.695) (0.347) (0.728) (0.346) (0.728) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.610 -0.087 -0.567 -0.087 -0.613 -0.298 -0.573 -0.299 
 (0.233) (0.505) (0.232) (0.505) (0.233) (0.582) (0.232) (0.582) 
Time period variables         
Time period part 1 0.022 -0.001 0.023 -0.001 0.022 -0.001 0.023 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.003 -0.036 0.003 -0.036 -0.003 -0.035 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Time period part 3 0.016 0.007 0.019 0.007 0.015 0.011 0.018 0.011 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 12,698  Number of mortgages 12,522   
Table 22. Odds ratios for Phoenix: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, negative equity and the negative equity dummy 
are explanatory variables 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
  
 
 
 
 The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score only for 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score only for 
90-days-delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 0.441 -- 0.456 -- 0.439 -- 0.453 -- 
 (0.102)  (0.106)  (0.102)  (0.105)  
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  221.743 -- 219.452 -- 231.808 -- 232.186 -- 
 (197.936)  (195.743)  (206.889)  (207.069)  
Call option part 2 1,555.246 -- 1,358.696 -- 1,675.123 -- 1,466.666 -- 
 (1,416.409)  (1,236.804)  (1,525.158)  (1,334.700)  
Call option part 3 4,373.069 -- 3,111.915 -- 4,618.155 -- 3,345.874 -- 
 (2,985.586)  (2,121.109)  (3,158.802)  (2,284.934)  
Call option part 4 8.823 -- 5.299 -- 9.829 -- 6.039 -- 
 (3.740)  (2.237)  (4.172)  (2.553)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
        
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.343 -- 1.344 -- 1.334 -- 1.335 
  (0.102)  (0.102)  (0.106)  (0.106) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 1.194 -- 1.194 -- 1.206 -- 1.206 
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  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.065)  (0.065) 
Negative equity 
variables 
        
Negative equity part 1 -- 1.014 -- 1.014 -- 1.020 -- 1.020 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 1.023 -- 1.023 -- 1.023 -- 1.023 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 1.018 -- 1.018 -- 1.018 -- 1.018 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 1.003 -- 1.003 -- 1.004 -- 1.004 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 2.337 -- 2.337 -- 2.360 -- 2.359 
  (0.461)  (0.461)  (0.497)  (0.497) 
Log loan size variables         
Log loan size part 1 2.195 1.384 2.022 1.383 2.196 1.445 2.028 1.445 
 (0.174) (0.427) (0.159) (0.427) (0.176) (0.468) (0.161) (0.468) 
Log loan size part 2 2.308 0.960 2.245 0.961 2.311 0.745 2.250 0.746 
 (0.287) (0.368) (0.279) (0.368) (0.281) (0.291) (0.273) (0.291) 
Log loan size part 3 1.245 0.576 1.232 0.576 1.244 0.636 1.231 0.636 
 (0.168) (0.200) (0.166) (0.200) (0.169) (0.235) (0.168) (0.236) 
Log loan size part 4 2.670 0.795 2.691 0.797 2.730 0.757 2.752 0.758 
 (0.252) (0.196) (0.253) (0.196) (0.255) (0.196) (0.257) (0.196) 
Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 1.150 1.276 1.150 1.276 1.149 1.261 1.149 1.261 
 (0.009) (0.061) (0.009) (0.061) (0.009) (0.061) (0.009) (0.061) 
Loan age part 2 1.003 1.037 1.003 1.037 1.003 1.034 1.003 1.034 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.015) 
Loan age part 3 0.998 0.990 0.997 0.990 0.998 0.990 0.997 0.990 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Loan age part 4 1.006 0.997 1.005 0.997 1.006 0.997 1.005 0.997 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score 
variables 
        
The credit score part 1 3.848 0.000 -- 0.000 3.810 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (2.599) (0.000)  (0.000) (2.535) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The credit score part 2 31.674 0.000 -- 0.000 25.200 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (29.752) (0.000)  (0.000) (23.610) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The credit score part 3 2.673 0.005 -- 0.005 2.575 0.030 -- 0.029 
 (3.392) (0.021)  (0.021) (3.364) (0.123)  (0.121) 
The credit score part 4 713.742 0.000 -- 0.000 636.691 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (1,190.462) (0.000)  (0.000) (1,064.963) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The debt-to-income 
ratio variables 
        
DTI part 1 0.413 11.481 0.336 11.424 0.412 8.781 0.342 8.741 
 (0.155) (17.630) (0.126) (17.542) (0.157) (13.789) (0.129) (13.726) 
DTI part 2 2.823 39.318 2.192 39.188 3.187 19.528 2.421 19.456 
 (1.425) (57.947) (1.106) (57.754) (1.807) (33.949) (1.371) (33.823) 
DTI part 3 0.507 2.894 0.427 2.882 0.654 6.359 0.562 6.336 
 (0.279) (3.834) (0.234) (3.818) (0.318) (7.888) (0.273) (7.860) 
DTI part 4 1.425 1.965 1.545 1.969 1.347 1.815 1.459 1.819 
 (0.500) (1.365) (0.540) (1.368) (0.467) (1.322) (0.505) (1.325) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.543 0.916 0.567 0.916 0.542 0.742 0.564 0.742 
 (0.126) (0.463) (0.132) (0.463) (0.126) (0.432) (0.131) (0.432) 
Time period variables         
Time period part 1 1.023 0.999 1.023 0.999 1.022 0.999 1.023 0.999 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 0.964 1.003 0.964 1.003 0.964 0.997 0.965 0.997 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Time period part 3 1.017 1.007 1.019 1.007 1.016 1.011 1.018 1.011 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) 
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In the model with the credit score used to explain both termination risks, the result of the 
indicator for a prepayment penalty supports H1. The odds for mortgages with a prepayment 
penalty are only 0.441 times as high as the same odds for mortgages without a prepayment 
penalty.   
The effect of the value of the call option supports H2. When the value of the call option is 
below -0.025, the coefficient is 5.402 (the standard error is 0.893). When the value ranges 
between -0.025 and 0.035, the coefficient increases to 7.349 (the standard error is 0.911) and 
with ranges between 0.035 and 0.100, the coefficient again increases to 8.383 (the standard error 
is 0.683). However, when the value of the call option is above 0.100, the coefficient drops to 
2.177 (the standard error is 0.424). The significantly positive effect supports the argument that 
when the value of the call option is “in the money,” households have more incentive to prepay 
their mortgages.  
The monthly unemployment rate has a significantly positive effect on the 90-days-
delinquency decision. When the unemployment rate is below 5.700, the odds of delinquency 
relative to continuity increase by 1.343 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. 
When the unemployment rate is above 5.700, the odds of the delinquency relative to continuity 
increase by 1.194 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. The effect of the 
unemployment rate on the 90-days-delinquency is very similar to its effect on the default. 
The value of negative equity has a significantly positive relationship with the 90-days-
delinquency risk. When negative equity is below 18.029, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency 
relative to continuity increase by 1.014 times with a 1 unit increase in negative equity. When 
ranges are between 18.029 and 37.334, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity 
increase by 1.023 times with a 1 unit increase in negative equity and in ranges between 37.334 
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and 62.503, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity increase by 1.018 times 
with a 1 unit increase in negative equity. However, when the negative equity is above 62.503, the 
odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity increase 1.003 times with a 1 unit increase 
in negative equity.  
Another important variable to evaluate the effect of negative equity is the negative equity 
dummy. The result indicates the negative equity dummy is significantly and positively correlated 
with the 90-days-delinquency decision. The odds for mortgages with negative equity being 
delinquent instead of continued are 2.337 times as high as the same odds for mortgages with 
non-negative equity. Overall, the effect of negative equity on the 90-days-delinquency is very 
similar with that on the default. However, the effect of the negative equity dummy on the 
delinquency is slightly less than that on the default.  
The relationship between the credit score and the 90-days-delinquency decision is 
strongly negative. Moreover, the credit score has a strongly positive effect on the prepayment 
decision. The coefficient is 1.347 for prepayment (the standard error is 0.675) and is -8.144 for 
the 90-days-delinquency (the standard error is 1.270) when the credit score is below 0.689. The 
coefficient increases to 3.455 for prepayment (the standard error is 0.939) and decreases to -
9.572 for the 90-days-delinquency (the standard error is 2.291) when the credit score ranges 
between 0.689 and 0.737. The coefficient decreases to 0.983 for prepayment (the standard error 
is 1.269) and increases to -5.221 for the 90-days-delinquency (the standard error is 3.874) when 
the score ranges between 0.737 and 0.774. The coefficient dramatically increases to 6.571 for 
prepayment (the standard error is 1.668) and drops to -21.612 for the 90-days-delinquency (the 
standard error is 6.631) when the credit score is above 0.744. The results indicate both 
termination risks are sensitive to the high-level credit score. Therefore, households with high 
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credit scores are more likely to prepay and less likely to be delinquent. Comparing the results of 
credit score in this model with those in the model using prepayment and default as dependent 
variables, the coefficients and the standard errors for the prepayment are very similar between 
the two models. However, the coefficients for the 90-days-delinquency are smaller than those for 
the default.  
For the 90-days-delinquency risk, the debt-to-income ratio has a significantly positive 
effect. However, for the prepayment risk, the effect of the debt-to-income ratio is inconsistent. 
When the debt-to-income ratio ranges below 0.250 and between 0.340 and 0.420, its effect on 
the prepayment risk is negative. When the ratio ranges between 0.250 and 0.340 and above 0.420, 
its effect on the prepayment risk becomes positive. For the 90-days-delinquency risk, when the 
debt-to-income ratio is below 0.250, the coefficient is 2.441 and the standard error is 1.536. 
When the ratio ranges between 0.250 and 0.340, the coefficient increases to 3.672 and the 
standard error is 1.474. When the debt-to-income ratio ranges between 0.340 and 0.420, the 
coefficient drops to 0.675 and the standard error is 1.325, and when the ranges are above 0.420, 
the coefficient further decreases to 0.675 and the standard error is 0.695. The coefficients of the 
debt-to-income ratio for the 90-days-delinquency is slightly larger than those for the default.  
The dummy for the number of units has a negative effect on both prepayment and the 90-
days-delinquency, and the effect is significant for prepayment. The odds for mortgages covering 
more than one house unit being prepaid instead of continued are about 0.543 times as high as the 
same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. Moreover, The odds for mortgages 
covering more than one house unit being delinquent instead of continued are about 0.916 times 
as high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. The results show 
mortgages for larger houses are less likely to be prepaid or delinquent. The odds ratio for the 
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prepayment is very similar between the models using different dependent variables. However, 
the odds ratio for the 90-days-delinquency is larger than that for the default.  
Log loan size has a significantly positive effect on the prepayment; however, the effect is 
insignificant when loan size ranges between $149,941 and $210,029. On the other hand, its effect 
on 90-days-delinquency is insignificant. Furthermore, for size below $105,030, the odds of 
prepayment relative to continuity increase by 2.195 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
In this range, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity increase by 1.384 times 
with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. When size ranges between $105,030 and $149,941, the 
odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 2.308 times with a 1 unit increase in log 
loan size. In this range, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity decrease by 
0.960 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. When size ranges between $149,941 and 
$210,029, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 1.245 times with a 1 unit 
increase in log loan size. In this range, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity 
decrease by 0.576 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. When log loan size is above 
$210,029, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 2.670 times with a 1 unit 
increase in log loan size. In this range, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity 
decrease by 0.795 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
Loan age has a strongly positive relationship with the prepayment, but its effect is 
insignificantly negative when its value is between 23 and 44 months. When loan age is below 23 
months, the effect of loan age on the 90-days-delinquency decision is significantly positive. 
However, when loan age is above 23 months, its effect on the 90-days-delinquency becomes 
significantly negative. When loan age is below 11 months, the odds of prepayment relative to 
continuity increase by 1.150 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. In this range, the odds of 
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the 90-days-delinquency instead of the continuity increase by 1.276 times with a 1 unit increase 
in loan age. When loan age ranges between 11 and 23 months, the odds of prepayment relative to 
continuity increase by 1.003 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. In this range, the odds of 
the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity increase by 1.037 times with a 1 unit increase in 
loan age. With age ranges between 23 and 44 months, the odds of prepayment relative to 
continuity rapidly decrease by 0.998 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. In this range, the 
odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity decrease by 0.990 times with a 1 unit 
increase in loan age. However, when loan age is above 44 months, the odds of prepayment 
relative to continuity increase again by 1.006 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age and the 
odds ratio for the 90-days-delinquency remains the same as 0.997 in this range. 
The time period in each model is also controlled. The results show mortgages are more 
likely to be prepaid from March 1999 to July 2003 and are less likely to be prepaid from July 
2003 to November 2008. Prepayment increases again after November 2008. On the other hand, 
before January 2008, mortgages are less likely to be delinquent. However, starting from January 
2010, mortgages become more likely to be delinquent. 
The strongly negative effect of the credit score is still held in the model with the credit 
score explains only the 90-days-delinquency risk. Comparing the multinomial logit coefficients 
of the credit score for the 90-days-delinquency risk in this model with those in the previous 
model, results indicate the coefficients in this model are smaller than those in the previous model. 
However, the standard errors do not change. When the credit score is below 0.689, the 
coefficient is -8.144 and the standard error is 1.270.  When the score ranges between 0.689 and 
0.737, the coefficient decreases to -9.632 and the standard error is 2.491 and with ranges 
between 0.737 and 0.774, the coefficient increases to -5.238 and the standard error is 3.874. 
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However, when the credit score is above 0.744, the coefficient dramatically drops to -21.727 and 
the standard error is 6.631. These results indicate households with the higher credit scores are 
much less likely to have 90-days-delinquency.   
Comparing the results of other explanatory variables in this model with those in the 
previous model, findings indicate the effect of the unemployment rate, negative equity, negative 
equity dummy, loan age, and time period on both termination risks remains the same. This also 
holds true for the effect of the log loan size and unit dummy on the 90-days-delinquency risk. 
The effect of the prepayment penalty still significantly negative, with the odds ratio slightly 
increase. The effect of the value of the call option is strongly positive, but the coefficients in this 
model are smaller than that in the previous model. The relationship between the debt-to-income 
ratio and the 90-days-delinquency risk is still positive. However, the coefficients in this model 
decrease about 0.004 with the same standard errors when the debt-to-income ratio is below 0.42 
and increase about 0.003 with the same standard errors when the ratio is above 0.42. For the 
prepayment risk, the effect of the debt-to-income ratio is still inconsistent and the coefficients 
change considerably. The dummy for the number of units still has a significantly negative effect 
on the prepayment and the effect is stronger than that in the previous model. The effect of log 
loan size in most ranges is still significantly positive on the prepayment risk. Comparing the odds 
ratios in this model with those in the previous model, results indicate the odds ratios in this 
model are larger.  
The second group of models includes negative equity as explanatory variables. Table 23 
contains the coefficients and table 24 contains the odds ratios. The following explanations are 
based on the dataset with right censored mortgages and the results for the dataset with modified 
mortgages deleted can be found in tables 23 and 24. Comparing the results of this model with the 
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results of the model using negative equity and the negative equity dummy, findings suggest the 
significance and the coefficients of all explanatory variables for the prepayment risk are the same. 
Therefore, the discussion below only focuses on the results for the 90-days-delinquency risk. The 
results of the model with the credit score for both termination risks is discussed first and then 
compared with the results of the model with the credit score only for the 90-days-delinquency 
risk.  
 [insert Tables 23 and 24 are here] 
The third column in table 17 shows the monthly unemployment rate has a significantly 
positive effect on the 90-days-delinquency decision. When the unemployment rate is below 
5.700, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity increase by 1.372 times with a 
1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. When the rate is above 5.700, the odds of the 90-
days-delinquency relative to continuity increase by 1.192 times with a 1 percent increase in the 
unemployment rate. 
When the negative equity dummy is deleted from the model, the effect of negative equity 
is still significantly positive and most of the coefficients keep the same as those in the first model. 
However, when negative equity is below 37.334, the coefficients slightly change. The odds of 
the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity increase by 1.065 times with a 1 unit increase in 
negative equity when negative equity is below 18.029, and the odds of the 90-days-delinquency 
relative to continuity increased by 1.014 times with a 1 unit increase in negative equity when its 
value ranges between 18.029 and 37.334.  
The significantly negative effect of the credit score on the 90-days-delinquency risk still 
holds, but the coefficients are smaller in most ranges. The coefficient is -8.055 (the standard  
102 
 
 
Table 23. Coefficients for Phoenix: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, negative equity is one of 
explanatory variables 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
  
 
 
 
 The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 90-
days-delinquency 
The credit score only for 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score only for 
90-days-delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquenc
y 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.819 -- -0.785 -- -0.823 -- -0.792 -- 
 (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.232)  
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  5.401 -- 5.391 -- 5.446 -- 5.447 -- 
 (0.893)  (0.892)  (0.893)  (0.892)  
Call option part 2 7.349 -- 7.214 -- 7.424 -- 7.291 -- 
 (0.911)  (0.910)  (0.910)  (0.910)  
Call option part 3 8.383 -- 8.043 -- 8.438 -- 8.115 -- 
 (0.683)  (0.682)  (0.684)  (0.683)  
Call option part 4 2.177 -- 1.667 -- 2.285 -- 1.798 -- 
 (0.424)  (0.422)  (0.424)  (0.423)  
The unemployment 
rate variables 
        
The unemployment 
rate part 1 
-- 0.316 -- 0.316 -- 0.309 -- 0.309 
  (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.079) 
The unemployment 
rate part 2 
-- 0.176 -- 0.176 -- 0.187 -- 0.187 
  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
Negative equity 
variables 
        
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.063 -- 0.063 -- 0.069 -- 0.069 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.014 -- 0.014 -- 0.015 -- 0.015 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.019 -- 0.019 -- 0.019 -- 0.019 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 0.003 -- 0.003 -- 0.004 -- 0.004 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Log loan size 
variables 
        
Log loan size part 1 0.786 0.369 0.704 0.368 0.787 0.413 0.707 0.413 
 (0.079) (0.308) (0.079) (0.308) (0.080) (0.324) (0.080) (0.324) 
Log loan size part 2 0.836 -0.024 0.809 -0.023 0.838 -0.279 0.811 -0.278 
 (0.125) (0.384) (0.124) (0.384) (0.121) (0.391) (0.121) (0.391) 
Log loan size part 3 0.219 -0.589 0.209 -0.589 0.218 -0.490 0.208 -0.490 
 (0.135) (0.348) (0.135) (0.348) (0.136) (0.371) (0.136) (0.371) 
Log loan size part 4 0.982 -0.233 0.990 -0.231 1.004 -0.282 1.012 -0.281 
 (0.094) (0.246) (0.094) (0.246) (0.094) (0.259) (0.093) (0.259) 
Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 0.140 0.246 0.140 0.246 0.139 0.234 0.139 0.234 
 (0.008) (0.048) (0.008) (0.048) (0.008) (0.048) (0.008) (0.048) 
Loan age part 2 0.003 0.037 0.003 0.037 0.003 0.034 0.003 0.034 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) 
Loan age part 3 -0.002 -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 -0.002 -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Loan age part 4 0.006 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.005 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score         
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variables 
The credit score part 1 1.347 -8.055 -- -8.077 1.338 -8.182 -- -8.205 
 (0.675) (1.269)  (1.269) (0.665) (1.328)  (1.328) 
The credit score part 2 3.455 -9.720 -- -9.780 3.227 -9.610 -- -9.668 
 (0.939) (2.290)  (2.290) (0.937) (2.408)  (2.408) 
The credit score part 3 0.983 -5.303 -- -5.320 0.946 -3.579 -- -3.595 
 (1.269) (3.871)  (3.871) (1.306) (4.131)  (4.131) 
The credit score part 4 6.570 -21.989 -- -22.104 6.456 -21.765 -- -21.880 
 (1.668) (6.625)  (6.625) (1.673) (6.773)  (6.773) 
The debt-to-income 
ratio variables 
        
DTI part 1 -0.884 2.457 -1.091 2.452 -0.886 2.187 -1.074 2.182 
 (0.376) (1.535) (0.374) (1.535) (0.380) (1.570) (0.378) (1.570) 
DTI part 2 1.038 3.665 0.785 3.662 1.159 2.967 0.884 2.964 
 (0.505) (1.472) (0.505) (1.472) (0.567) (1.737) (0.566) (1.737) 
DTI part 3 -0.678 1.131 -0.851 1.127 -0.424 1.905 -0.576 1.902 
 (0.550) (1.324) (0.549) (1.324) (0.486) (1.240) (0.485) (1.240) 
DTI part 4 0.354 0.742 0.435 0.744 0.298 0.666 0.378 0.668 
 (0.351) (0.694) (0.350) (0.694) (0.347) (0.728) (0.346) (0.728) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.610 -0.097 -0.567 -0.097 -0.613 -0.305 -0.573 -0.306 
 (0.233) (0.505) (0.232) (0.505) (0.233) (0.582) (0.232) (0.582) 
Time period 
variables 
        
Time period part 1 0.022 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.023 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.003 -0.036 0.003 -0.036 -0.003 -0.035 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Time period part 3 0.016 0.006 0.019 0.006 0.015 0.010 0.018 0.010 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 12,698  Number of mortgages 12,522   
Table 24. Odds ratios for Phoenix: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, negative equity is one of 
explanatory variables 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
  
 
 
 
 The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 90-
days-delinquency 
The credit score only for 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score only for 
90-days-delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquenc
y 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 0.441 -- 0.456 -- 0.439 -- 0.453 -- 
 (0.102)  (0.106)  (0.102)  (0.105)  
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  221.732 -- 219.441 -- 231.798 -- 232.176 -- 
 (197.927)  (195.733)  (206.880)  (207.060)  
Call option part 2 1,555.223 -- 1,358.698 -- 1,675.090 -- 1,466.657 -- 
 (1,416.388)  (1,236.806)  (1,525.127)  (1,334.691)  
Call option part 3 4,372.500 -- 3,111.618 -- 4,617.703 -- 3,345.660 -- 
 (2,985.200)  (2,120.909)  (3,158.495)  (2,284.790)  
Call option part 4 8.819 -- 5.297 -- 9.824 -- 6.036 -- 
 (3.739)  (2.236)  (4.170)  (2.551)  
The unemployment 
rate variables 
        
The unemployment 
rate part 1 
-- 1.372 -- 1.372 -- 1.363 -- 1.363 
  (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.107)  (0.108) 
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The unemployment 
rate part 2 
-- 1.192 -- 1.192 -- 1.205 -- 1.205 
  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.065)  (0.065) 
Negative equity 
variables 
        
Negative equity part 1 -- 1.065 -- 1.065 -- 1.071 -- 1.071 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 1.014 -- 1.014 -- 1.015 -- 1.015 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 1.019 -- 1.019 -- 1.020 -- 1.020 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 1.003 -- 1.003 -- 1.004 -- 1.004 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Log loan size 
variables 
        
Log loan size part 1 2.195 1.446 2.022 1.445 2.196 1.511 2.028 1.511 
 (0.174) (0.446) (0.159) (0.446) (0.176) (0.489) (0.161) (0.489) 
Log loan size part 2 2.308 0.976 2.245 0.977 2.311 0.756 2.250 0.757 
 (0.287) (0.375) (0.279) (0.375) (0.281) (0.296) (0.273) (0.296) 
Log loan size part 3 1.245 0.555 1.232 0.555 1.244 0.613 1.231 0.613 
 (0.168) (0.193) (0.166) (0.193) (0.169) (0.227) (0.168) (0.227) 
Log loan size part 4 2.670 0.792 2.691 0.794 2.730 0.754 2.752 0.755 
 (0.252) (0.195) (0.253) (0.195) (0.255) (0.195) (0.257) (0.195) 
Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 1.150 1.279 1.150 1.279 1.149 1.264 1.149 1.264 
 (0.009) (0.061) (0.009) (0.061) (0.009) (0.061) (0.009) (0.061) 
Loan age part 2 1.003 1.038 1.003 1.038 1.003 1.035 1.003 1.035 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.015) 
Loan age part 3 0.998 0.991 0.997 0.991 0.998 0.991 0.997 0.991 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Loan age part 4 1.006 0.997 1.005 0.997 1.006 0.997 1.005 0.997 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score 
variables 
        
The credit score part 1 3.847 0.000 -- 0.000 3.810 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (2.599) (0.000)  (0.000) (2.535) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The credit score part 2 31.666 0.000 -- 0.000 25.194 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (29.745) (0.000)  (0.000) (23.605) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The credit score part 3 2.673 0.005 -- 0.005 2.575 0.028 -- 0.027 
 (3.392) (0.019)  (0.019) (3.364) (0.115)  (0.113) 
The credit score part 4 713.723 0.000 -- 0.000 636.666 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (1,190.432) (0.000)  (0.000) (1,064.923) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The debt-to-income 
ratio variables 
        
DTI part 1 0.413 11.670 0.336 11.611 0.412 8.904 0.342 8.863 
 (0.155) (17.916) (0.126) (17.826) (0.157) (13.980) (0.129) (13.915) 
DTI part 2 2.823 39.066 2.192 38.936 3.187 19.439 2.421 19.367 
 (1.425) (57.517) (1.106) (57.326) (1.807) (33.757) (1.372) (33.632) 
DTI part 3 0.507 3.099 0.427 3.086 0.654 6.720 0.562 6.696 
 (0.279) (4.104) (0.235) (4.088) (0.318) (8.335) (0.273) (8.305) 
DTI part 4 1.425 2.100 1.545 2.104 1.347 1.947 1.459 1.951 
 (0.500) (1.457) (0.540) (1.460) (0.467) (1.417) (0.505) (1.420) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.543 0.908 0.567 0.908 0.542 0.737 0.564 0.737 
 (0.126) (0.459) (0.132) (0.459) (0.126) (0.429) (0.131) (0.429) 
Time period 
variables 
        
Time period part 1 1.023 1.000 1.023 1.000 1.022 1.000 1.023 1.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 0.964 1.003 0.964 1.003 0.964 0.997 0.965 0.997 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Time period part 3 1.017 1.006 1.019 1.006 1.016 1.010 1.018 1.010 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 12,698  Number of mortgages 12,522   
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error is 1.269) when the credit score is below 0.689 and the coefficient decreases to -9.720 (the 
standard error is 2.290) when the credit score ranges between 0.689 and 0.737. The coefficient 
further increases to -5.303 (the standard error is 3.871) when the credit score ranges between 
0.737 and 0.774 and the coefficient dramatically drops to -21.989 (the standard error is 6.625) 
when the credit score is above 0.744. The results indicate households with the higher credit 
scores are much less likely to have 90-days-delinquency.   
The effect of the debt-to-income ratio on the 90-days-delinquency risk is positive, but it 
is only significant when the debt-to-income ratio ranges between 0.250 and 0.340. When the 
ratio is below 0.250, the coefficient is 2.457 (the standard error is 1.535), and when the ratio 
ranges between 0.250 and 0.340, the coefficient increases to 3.665 (the standard error is 1.472). 
When the debt-to-income ratio ranges between 0.340 and 0.420, the coefficient drops to 1.131 
(the standard error is 1.324), and when the ratio is above 0.420, the coefficient further decreases 
to 0.742 (the standard error is 0.694).   
The dummy for the number of units has a negative effect on the 90-days-delinquency risk. 
The odds for mortgages covering more than one house unit being delinquent instead of continued 
are about 0.908 times as high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. The 
results show mortgages for larger houses are less likely to be delinquent than mortgages for 
smaller houses. 
Log loan size has a negative effect on 90-days-delinquency. However, when loan size is 
below $105,030, its effect becomes insignificantly positive. When loan size is below $105,030, 
the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity increase by 1.446 times with a 1 unit 
increase in log loan size. When size ranges between $105,030 and $149,941, the odds of the 90-
days-delinquency relative to continuity decrease by 0.976 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan 
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size, and when its value ranges between $149,941 and $210,029, the odds of the 90-days-
delinquency relative to continuity decrease by 0.555 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size 
when the size is above $210,029, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity 
decrease by 0.792 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
Loan age has a significantly positive effect on the 90-days-delinquency risk when the age 
is below 23 months, and its effect becomes significantly negative when the age is above 23 
months. When loan age is below 11, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity 
increase by 1.279 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. When age ranges between 11 and 23 
months, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity increase by 1.038 times with a 
1 unit increase in loan age, and when it ranges between 23 and 44 months, the odds of the 90-
days-delinquency relative to continuity decrease by 0.991 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. 
When loan age is above 44 months, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity 
decrease by 0.997 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age.  
The strongly negative effect of the credit score still holds in the model with the credit 
score explains only the 90-days-delinquency risk. Comparing the coefficients of the credit score 
for the default risk in this model with those in the model with the credit score used for both 
termination risks, findings indicate the coefficients in this model are smaller than those in the 
previous model. However, the standard errors do not change. When the credit score is below 
0.689, the coefficient is -8.077 (the standard error is 1.269), and when the score ranges between 
0.689 and 0.737, the coefficient decreases to -9.780 (the standard error is 2.290). When the credit 
score ranges between 0.737 and 0.774, the coefficient increases to -5.320 (the standard error is 
3.871), and when the score is above 0.744, the coefficient dramatically drops to -22.104 (the 
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standard error is 6.625). This result indicates households with high credit scores are much less 
likely to default.   
The results of the other explanatory variables for the 90-days-delinquency risk in this 
model are compared with those in the model with the credit score used for both termination risks, 
and findings indicate the effect of the unemployment rate, negative equity, negative equity 
dummy, log loan size, loan age, unit dummy and time period remains the same. However, the 
coefficients of the debt-to-income ratio slightly decrease. When the debt-to-income ratio is 
below 0.42, the coefficients in this model decrease about 0.004 with the same standard errors, 
and when the ratio is above 0.42 the coefficient increases about 0.002 with the same standard 
errors. 
The third group of models includes negative equity, negative equity dummy, and original 
loan-to-value as explanatory variables. Table 25 contains the coefficients and table 26 contains 
the odds ratios. The following explanations are based on the dataset with right censored 
mortgages and the results for the dataset with modified mortgages deleted can be found in tables 
25 and 26. The results of this model are compared with the results of the model using negative 
equity and negative equity dummy as explanatory variables, and findings indicate the 
significance and coefficients of all explanatory variables for the prepayment risk are the same. 
Therefore, only the results for the 90-days-delinquency risk are discussed. The results of the 
model with the credit score for both termination risks are reviewed and then compared with the 
results of the model with the credit score only for the 90-days-delinquency risk.  
 [insert Tables 25 and 26 are here] 
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Table 25. Coefficients for Phoenix: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, negative equity, the negative 
equity dummy and original loan-to-value are explanatory variables 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
  
 
 
 
 The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score only for 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score only for 
90-days-delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.819 -- -0.785 -- -0.823 -- -0.792 -- 
 (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.232)  (0.232)  
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  5.401 -- 5.391 -- 5.446 -- 5.447 -- 
 (0.893)  (0.892)  (0.892)  (0.892)  
Call option part 2 7.350 -- 7.215 -- 7.424 -- 7.292 -- 
 (0.911)  (0.910)  (0.910)  (0.910)  
Call option part 3 8.382 -- 8.042 -- 8.437 -- 8.115 -- 
 (0.683)  (0.682)  (0.684)  (0.683)  
Call option part 4 2.179 -- 1.670 -- 2.287 -- 1.800 -- 
 (0.424)  (0.422)  (0.425)  (0.423)  
The unemployment 
rate variables 
        
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.308 -- 0.308 -- 0.302 -- 0.302 
  (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.079)  (0.079) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.189 -- 0.189 -- 0.200 -- 0.200 
  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
Negative equity 
variables 
        
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.013 -- 0.013 -- 0.018 -- 0.018 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.020 -- 0.020 -- 0.020 -- 0.020 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.018 -- 0.018 -- 0.018 -- 0.018 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -0.000 -- -0.000 -- 0.001 -- 0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 0.780 -- 0.780 -- 0.782 -- 0.782 
  (0.197)  (0.197)  (0.211)  (0.211) 
Original loan-to-value 
variables  
        
Original LTV part 1 -- 2.295 -- 2.295 -- 2.644 -- 2.644 
  (0.910)  (0.910)  (0.998)  (0.998) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 0.560 -- 0.561 -- 0.622 -- 0.623 
  (1.103)  (1.103)  (1.174)  (1.174) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -7.434 -- -7.433 -- -5.996 -- -5.995 
  (4.980)  (4.980)  (5.240)  (5.240) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 3.362 -- 3.362 -- 3.446 -- 3.447 
  (0.699)  (0.699)  (0.725)  (0.725) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 2.522 -- 2.517 -- 1.460 -- 1.453 
  (4.248)  (4.248)  (4.554)  (4.554) 
Log loan size variables         
Log loan size part 1 0.786 0.134 0.704 0.134 0.787 0.149 0.707 0.149 
 (0.079) (0.313) (0.079) (0.313) (0.080) (0.329) (0.080) (0.329) 
Log loan size part 2 0.836 0.009 0.809 0.010 0.838 -0.227 0.811 -0.226 
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 (0.125) (0.384) (0.124) (0.384) (0.121) (0.392) (0.121) (0.392) 
Log loan size part 3 0.219 -0.536 0.209 -0.536 0.218 -0.446 0.208 -0.446 
 (0.135) (0.347) (0.135) (0.347) (0.136) (0.369) (0.136) (0.369) 
Log loan size part 4 0.982 -0.057 0.990 -0.055 1.004 -0.090 1.012 -0.089 
 (0.094) (0.245) (0.094) (0.245) (0.094) (0.258) (0.093) (0.258) 
Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 0.140 0.240 0.140 0.240 0.139 0.228 0.139 0.228 
 (0.008) (0.048) (0.008) (0.048) (0.008) (0.048) (0.008) (0.048) 
Loan age part 2 0.003 0.040 0.003 0.040 0.003 0.037 0.003 0.037 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) 
Loan age part 3 -0.002 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Loan age part 4 0.006 -0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.006 -0.005 0.005 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score 
variables 
        
The credit score part 1 1.347 -8.436 -- -8.458 1.337 -8.552 -- -8.576 
 (0.675) (1.281)  (1.281) (0.665) (1.339)  (1.339) 
The credit score part 2 3.455 -8.847 -- -8.907 3.227 -8.743 -- -8.801 
 (0.939) (2.299)  (2.299) (0.937) (2.417)  (2.417) 
The credit score part 3 0.983 -5.198 -- -5.214 0.946 -3.544 -- -3.561 
 (1.269) (3.878)  (3.878) (1.306) (4.138)  (4.138) 
The credit score part 4 6.571 -21.038 -- -21.155 6.457 -20.798 -- -20.915 
 (1.668) (6.626)  (6.626) (1.673) (6.776)  (6.776) 
The debt-to-income 
ratio variables 
        
DTI part 1 -0.884 2.364 -1.091 2.359 -0.886 2.048 -1.074 2.044 
 (0.376) (1.534) (0.374) (1.534) (0.380) (1.568) (0.378) (1.568) 
DTI part 2 1.038 3.426 0.785 3.423 1.159 2.770 0.884 2.766 
 (0.505) (1.471) (0.505) (1.471) (0.567) (1.737) (0.566) (1.737) 
DTI part 3 -0.678 1.129 -0.851 1.125 -0.424 1.876 -0.576 1.873 
 (0.550) (1.325) (0.549) (1.325) (0.486) (1.243) (0.485) (1.243) 
DTI part 4 0.354 0.546 0.435 0.548 0.297 0.429 0.377 0.431 
 (0.351) (0.698) (0.350) (0.698) (0.347) (0.733) (0.346) (0.733) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.611 -0.028 -0.567 -0.028 -0.613 -0.228 -0.573 -0.228 
 (0.233) (0.506) (0.232) (0.506) (0.233) (0.583) (0.232) (0.583) 
Time period variables         
Time period part 1 0.022 0.002 0.023 0.002 0.022 0.002 0.023 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.002 -0.036 0.002 -0.036 -0.004 -0.035 -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Time period part 3 0.016 0.007 0.019 0.007 0.015 0.011 0.018 0.011 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 12,698  Number of mortgages 12,522   
 
Table 26. Odds ratios for Phoenix: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, negative equity, the negative 
equity dummy and original loan-to-value are explanatory variables 
 #1 dataset with right censored mortgages #2 dataset with modified mortgages deleted 
  
 
 
 
 The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score only for 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score for both 
the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score only for 
90-days-delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquen
cy 
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Prepayment penalty 0.441 -- 0.456 -- 0.439 -- 0.453 -- 
 (0.102)  (0.106)  (0.102)  (0.105)  
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  221.725 -- 219.437 -- 231.779 -- 232.157 -- 
 (197.920)  (195.729)  (206.862)  (207.043)  
Call option part 2 1,556.495 -- 1,359.846 -- 1,676.561 -- 1,467.991 -- 
 (1,417.547)  (1,237.852)  (1,526.468)  (1,335.906)  
Call option part 3 4,369.498 -- 3,109.269 -- 4,614.286 -- 3,342.926 -- 
 (2,983.157)  (2,119.312)  (3,156.165)  (2,282.928)  
Call option part 4 8.840 -- 5.310 -- 9.847 -- 6.050 -- 
 (3.748)  (2.242)  (4.180)  (2.557)  
The unemployment 
rate variables 
        
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.361 -- 1.361 -- 1.353 -- 1.353 
  (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.107)  (0.107) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 1.207 -- 1.207 -- 1.221 -- 1.221 
  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.066)  (0.066) 
Negative equity 
variables 
        
Negative equity part 1 -- 1.013 -- 1.013 -- 1.018 -- 1.018 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 1.020 -- 1.020 -- 1.020 -- 1.020 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 1.018 -- 1.018 -- 1.018 -- 1.018 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 1.000 -- 1.000 -- 1.001 -- 1.001 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 2.182 -- 2.181 -- 2.186 -- 2.185 
  (0.431)  (0.430)  (0.461)  (0.461) 
Original loan-to-value 
variables  
        
Original LTV part 1 -- 9.925 -- 9.922 -- 14.074 -- 14.070 
  (9.035)  (9.033)  (14.050)  (14.046) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 1.751 -- 1.752 -- 1.863 -- 1.864 
  (1.932)  (1.933)  (2.186)  (2.187) 
Original LTV part 3 -- 0.001 -- 0.001 -- 0.002 -- 0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 28.841 -- 28.861 -- 31.376 -- 31.395 
  (20.174)  (20.187)  (22.733)  (22.746) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 12.451 -- 12.390 -- 4.305 -- 4.278 
  (52.893)  (52.633)  (19.605)  (19.480) 
Log loan size variables         
Log loan size part 1 2.195 1.143 2.023 1.143 2.196 1.161 2.028 1.161 
 (0.174) (0.358) (0.159) (0.357) (0.176) (0.381) (0.161) (0.381) 
Log loan size part 2 2.308 1.009 2.245 1.010 2.311 0.797 2.250 0.798 
 (0.287) (0.388) (0.279) (0.388) (0.281) (0.312) (0.273) (0.312) 
Log loan size part 3 1.245 0.585 1.232 0.585 1.244 0.640 1.231 0.640 
 (0.168) (0.203) (0.166) (0.203) (0.169) (0.237) (0.168) (0.237) 
Log loan size part 4 2.670 0.945 2.691 0.946 2.730 0.914 2.751 0.915 
 (0.252) (0.232) (0.253) (0.232) (0.255) (0.236) (0.257) (0.236) 
Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 1.150 1.271 1.150 1.272 1.149 1.256 1.149 1.256 
 (0.009) (0.061) (0.009) (0.061) (0.009) (0.061) (0.009) (0.061) 
Loan age part 2 1.003 1.040 1.003 1.040 1.003 1.037 1.003 1.037 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.015) 
Loan age part 3 0.998 0.993 0.997 0.993 0.998 0.994 0.997 0.994 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Loan age part 4 1.006 0.995 1.005 0.995 1.006 0.995 1.005 0.995 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score 
variables 
        
The credit score part 1 3.846 0.000 -- 0.000 3.809 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (2.598) (0.000)  (0.000) (2.534) (0.000)  (0.000) 
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The credit score part 2 31.669 0.000 -- 0.000 25.198 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (29.747) (0.000)  (0.000) (23.608) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The credit score part 3 2.673 0.006 -- 0.005 2.575 0.029 -- 0.028 
 (3.391) (0.021)  (0.021) (3.363) (0.120)  (0.118) 
The credit score part 4 714.151 0.000 -- 0.000 637.075 0.000 -- 0.000 
 (1,191.148) (0.000)  (0.000) (1,065.610) (0.000)  (0.000) 
The debt-to-income 
ratio variables 
        
DTI part 1 0.413 10.633 0.336 10.581 0.412 7.756 0.342 7.721 
 (0.155) (16.314) (0.126) (16.234) (0.157) (12.159) (0.129) (12.105) 
DTI part 2 2.823 30.749 2.192 30.649 3.187 15.960 2.421 15.901 
 (1.425) (45.240) (1.106) (45.094) (1.807) (27.725) (1.372) (27.623) 
DTI part 3 0.507 3.093 0.427 3.081 0.655 6.528 0.562 6.505 
 (0.279) (4.098) (0.235) (4.082) (0.318) (8.112) (0.273) (8.084) 
DTI part 4 1.424 1.727 1.545 1.731 1.346 1.536 1.458 1.539 
 (0.499) (1.206) (0.540) (1.209) (0.467) (1.126) (0.505) (1.129) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.543 0.972 0.567 0.972 0.542 0.796 0.564 0.796 
 (0.126) (0.491) (0.132) (0.491) (0.126) (0.464) (0.131) (0.464) 
Time period variables         
Time period part 1 1.023 1.002 1.023 1.002 1.022 1.002 1.023 1.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 0.964 1.002 0.964 1.002 0.964 0.996 0.965 0.996 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Time period part 3 1.017 1.007 1.019 1.007 1.016 1.011 1.018 1.011 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.009) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 12,698  Number of mortgages 12,522   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
 
 
The monthly unemployment rate has a significantly positive effect on the 90-days-
delinquency decision. When the unemployment rate is below 5.700, the odds of the 90-days-
delinquency relative to continuity increase by 1.361 times with a 1 percent increase in the 
unemployment rate. When the rate is above 5.700, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative 
to continuity increase by 1.207 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. 
When original loan-to-value is added into the model, the effect of negative equity is still 
significantly positive in most ranges. However, when negative equity is above 62.503, the effect 
becomes insignificantly negative. The odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity 
increase by 1.013 times with a 1 unit increase in negative equity when negative equity is below 
18.029, and the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity increase by 1.020 times 
with a 1 unit increase in negative equity when its value ranges between 18.029 and 37.334. The 
odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity increase by 1.018 times with a 1 unit 
increase in negative equity when negative equity ranges between 37.334 and 62.503, and the 
odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity will not change with a 1 unit increase in 
negative equity when its value is above 62.503. 
The negative equity dummy is significantly and positively correlated with the 90-days-
delinquency decision. The odds for mortgages with negative equity being delinquent instead of 
continued are 2.182 times as high as the same odds for mortgages with non-negative equity.  
In most ranges, the effect of original loan-to-value is significantly positive. However, 
when its value ranges between 0.780 and 0.800, the effect becomes insignificantly negative. 
When original loan-to-value is below 0.650, the coefficient is 2.295 (the standard error is 0.901), 
and when the value ranges between 0.650 and 0.780, the coefficient decreases to 0.560 (the 
standard error is 1.103). In ranges between 0.780 and 0.800, the coefficient becomes 
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insignificantly negative, which is -7.434 (the standard error is 4.980), and when ranges are 
between 0.800 and 0.950, the coefficient becomes significantly positive again, which is 3.362 
(the standard error is 0.699). When original loan-to-value is above 0.950, the coefficient 
decreases slightly to 2.522 (the standard error is 4.248).  
The relationship between the credit score and the 90-days-delinquency is significantly 
negative. The coefficient is -8.436 (the standard error is 1.281) when the credit score is below 
0.689 and the coefficient decreases to -8.847 (the standard error is 2.299) when the score ranges 
between 0.689 and 0.737.  The coefficient increases to -5.198 (the standard error is 3.878) when 
it ranges between 0.737 and 0.774 and the coefficient dramatically drops to -21.038 (the standard 
error is 6.626) when the credit score is above 0.744. The results indicate households with high 
credit scores are much less likely to have 90-days-delinquency.   
The effect of the debt-to-income ratio on the 90-days-delinquency risk is positive but it is 
only significant when the debt-to-income ratio ranges between 0.250 and 0.340. The dummy for 
the number of units has a negative effect on the 90-days-delinquency risk. The odds for 
mortgages covering more than one house unit being delinquent instead of continued are about 
0.972 times as high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. The results 
show mortgages for larger houses are less likely to be delinquent than mortgages for smaller 
houses. 
The effect of log loan size on 90-days-delinquency risk become insignificantly positive 
when its value is below $149,941, and the effect becomes insignificantly negative when its value 
is above $149,941.  
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Loan age has a significantly positive effect on the 90-days-delinquency risk when the age 
is below 23 months, and its effect becomes significantly negative when the age is above 23 
months. When loan age is below 11 months, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to 
continuity increase by 1.271 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. When age ranges between 
11 and 23 months, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity increase by 1.040 
times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. When loan age ranges between 23 and 44 months, the 
odds of the 90-days-delinquency relative to continuity decrease by 0.993 times with a 1 unit 
increase in loan age, and when age is above 44 months, the odds of the 90-days-delinquency 
relative to continuity decrease by 0.995 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age.  
The strongly negative effect of the credit score still holds in the model with the credit 
score explains only the 90-days-delinquency risk. Comparing the coefficients of the credit score 
for the default risk in this model with those in the model with the credit score used for both 
termination risks, findings indicate the coefficients in this model are smaller than those in the 
previous model. However, the standard errors do not change. When the credit score is below 
0.689, the coefficient is -8.907 (the standard error is 2.299), and when the score ranges between 
0.689 and 0.737, the coefficient decreases to -8.907 (the standard error is 2.299). When the credit 
score ranges between 0.737 and 0.774, the coefficient increases to -5.214 (the standard error is 
3.878), and when it is above 0.744, the coefficient dramatically drops to -21.155 (the standard 
error is 6.626). This result indicates households with high credit scores are much less likely to 
default.   
The results of other explanatory variables for the 90-days-delinquency risk in this model 
are compared with those in the model with the credit score used for both termination risks, and 
findings show the effect of the unemployment rate, negative equity dummy, original loan-to-
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value, log loan size, loan age, unit dummy and time period remains the same. However, the 
coefficients of the debt-to-income ratio slightly decrease. When the debt-to-income ratio is 
below 0.42, the coefficients in this model decrease about 0.004 with the same standard errors, 
and when the ratio is above 0.42 the coefficient increases about 0.002 with the same standard 
errors. 
Table 27 contains the Pseudo R-square and the BIC for these twenty-four models. The 
evaluation is separated into two groups based on the two combinations of the dependent 
variables. This discussion only focuses on the dataset with right censored mortgages and the 
evaluation for the dataset with modified mortgages deleted can be found in table 27. In the case 
where prepayment and default are used as dependent variables, the upper part of column 2 in 
table 27 indicates that when the credit score is used in both termination risks, the Pseudo R-
squares are the same among models with the different specifications. This means the predictive 
power is the same among models. The upper part of column 4 in table 27 shows when the credit 
score is used for explaining only the default risk, the Pseudo R-squares are the same among 
models with the different specifications. However, comparing the BIC among models with 
different specifications, findings indicate the models containing negative equity, the negative 
equity dummy and original loan-to-value as explanatory variables have the largest BIC. This 
means that this model fits the data better. In the case where prepayment and 90-days-delinquency 
are used as dependent variables, the lower part of column 2 in table 27 indicates when the credit 
score is used in both termination risks, the Pseudo R-squares are the same among models with 
the different specifications. This means the predictive power is the same among models. The 
lower part of column 4 in table 27 shows when the credit score is used for explaining only the 
90-days-delinquency risk, the Pseudo R-squares are the same among models with the different 
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specifications. However, comparing the BIC among models with the different specifications, 
results indicate the models containing negative equity and negative equity dummy as explanatory 
variables have the largest BIC. This means this model fits the data better.  
[insert Table 27 is here] 
Since the samples size in Phoenix is the largest and the effect of the explanatory variables 
supports most of the hypothesis made in the previous literature, this paper only explains the 
results for Phoenix in detail. The results for Miami, Tampa, Detroit and Las Vegas are briefly 
explained and the detail information of results can be found in table 28 through table 47. The 
important results for these four MSAs are compared with the results for Phoenix and the 
comparison is presented in the following section.  
The Comparison Results for Miami, Tampa, Detroit and Las Vegas 
Table 28 through table 47 presents the estimated results for Miami, Tampa, Detroit and 
Las Vegas. For these MSAs, six results are listed in detail including two sets of dependent 
variables: prepayment and default, and prepayment and 90-days-delinquency. For these two sets 
of dependent variables, the best three specifications10 are estimated based on the dataset with  
                                                          
10 For Miami, when the prepayment and the default are used as dependent variables, the best specification includes the negative 
equity dummy and original loan-to-value. The second best includes negative equity and original loan-to-value, and the third best 
includes the negative equity dummy. In the case when the prepayment and the 90-days-delinquency are used as dependent 
variables, the best specification includes the negative equity dummy and original loan-to-value. The second best includes the 
negative equity dummy and the third best includes negative equity and original loan-to-value.  
In Tampa, for both sets of dependent variables, the best specification includes the negative equity dummy and the second best 
includes the negative equity dummy and original loan-to-value. The third best specification is different for models using a 
different set of dependent variables.  When the prepayment and the default are used, the third best specification includes negative 
equity and the negative equity dummy. When the prepayment and the 90-days-delinquency are used, the third best specification 
includes the value of negative equity.  
In Detroit, for two sets of dependent variables, the best specification includes original loan-to-value, the second best includes the 
negative equity dummy and original loan-to-value, and the third best includes negative equity and original loan-to-value.  
In Las Vegas, the best specification includes negative equity, the second best includes negative equity and the negative equity 
dummy, and the third best includes negative equity and original loan-to-value. These specifications are used for two sets of 
dependent variables. 
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Table 27. Results comparison in Phoenix 
  Prepayment and Default are Dependent Variables 
   
 
  Right censored dataset Deleting modification dataset 
   
 
 
 
  The credit score for 
prepayment and 
default 
The credit score for 
default 
The credit score for 
prepayment and 
default 
The credit score for 
default 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Certain explanatory 
variables 
Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC 
 
 
1 negative equity, original 
LTV and the negative 
equity dummy 
0.9154 
 
-45021.5 
 
0.9153 
 
-45078 
 
0.9144 -44899.4 
 
0.9142 -44949.9 
 
2 negative equity and the 
negative equity dummy 
0.9154 
 
-45021.9 
 
0.9153 
 
-45078.5 
 
0.9143 -44900.4 
 
0.9142 -44950.9 
 
3 original LTV and the 
negative equity dummy 
0.9154 
 
-45023.7 
 
0.9153 
 
-45080.2 
 
0.9143 -44903.1 
 
0.9142 -44953.6 
 
 
 
  Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are Dependent Variables 
   
 
  Right censored dataset Deleting modification dataset 
   
 
 
 
  The credit score for 
prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency 
The credit score for 
90-days-
delinquency 
The credit score for 
prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency 
The credit score for 
90-days-
delinquency 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Certain explanatory 
variables 
Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC 
 
 
1 negative equity and the 
negative equity dummy  
0.9126 -45741.6 
 
0.9124 -45789.4 
 
0.9126 -45073.9 
 
0.9124 -45116.6 
 
2 negative equity 0.9125 -45745 
 
0.9124 -45792.8 
 
0.9126 -45076.4 
 
0.9124 -45119.1 
 
3 negative equity, original 
LTV and the negative 
equity dummy 
0.9126 -45745.6 
 
 
0.9125 -45793.4 
 
0.9126 -45077.2 
 
0.9125 -45119.9 
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mortgages being right censored one month before the modification date. Moreover, after 
comparing the BIC, the models with the credit score only for the default/90-days-delinquency 
risk are presented for Miami and Las Vegas and the models with the credit score for both 
termination risks are presented for Tampa and Detroit.  
[insert Tables 28 through 47 here] 
The important results for each MSAs show that for Miami, Tampa, and Las Vegas, the 
negative coefficient of the indicator for a prepayment penalty support H1 that the mortgages with 
a prepayment penalty are less likely to be prepaid compared with those without any penalty. 
However, the coefficient is insignificant for Detroit. This means that the prepayment penalty is 
not a determinant factor for the prepayment risk in Detroit. 
  For all MSAs, the significantly positive coefficients of the value of the call option 
support H2 that when the value of the call option is “in the money,” households have more 
incentive to prepay their mortgages.  
For Miami and Tampa, the positive effect of the unemployment rate supports H3 that the 
months with a higher unemployment rate have a higher default (delinquency) risk. For Detroit 
and Las Vegas, when the unemployment rate is below the second quartile, its effect is positive 
which supports H3. However, when the unemployment rate is above the second quartile, its 
effect becomes insignificantly negative which conflict with H3. 
For Miami, Tampa, and Las Vegas, the positive effect of the value of negative equity and 
the negative equity dummy supports the argument that when the value of the put option is “in the 
money,” households have more incentive to default (to be delinquent). However, the effect of the 
negative equity dummy is more significant compared with the effect of the value of negative  
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Table 28. Coefficients for Miami: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, the credit score only for default 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
negative equity and original 
loan-to-value are explanatory 
variables 
the negative equity dummy is one of 
explanatory variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.578 -- -0.578 -- -0.578 -- 
 (0.416)  (0.416)  (0.416)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 4.932 -- 4.932 -- 4.931 -- 
 (1.692)  (1.692)  (1.692)  
Call option part 2 0.993 -- 0.992 -- 0.992 -- 
 (1.765)  (1.765)  (1.765)  
Call option part 3 8.381 -- 8.384 -- 8.381 -- 
 (1.440)  (1.440)  (1.440)  
Call option part 4 3.486 -- 3.488 -- 3.482 -- 
 (0.935)  (0.935)  (0.935)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.486 -- 0.478 -- 0.429 
  (0.132)  (0.132)  (0.132) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.135 -- 0.115 -- 0.121 
  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.087) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- -- -- 0.061 -- -- 
    (0.017)   
Negative equity part 2 -- -- -- -0.004 -- -- 
    (0.016)   
Negative equity part 3 -- -- -- 0.020 -- -- 
    (0.010)   
Negative equity part 4 -- -- -- 0.002 -- -- 
    (0.004)   
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 0.907 -- -- -- 1.375 
  (0.136)    (0.121) 
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- 3.250 -- 3.872 -- -- 
  (1.528)  (1.528)   
Original LTV part 2 -- 2.306 -- 1.443 -- -- 
  (1.924)  (1.949)   
Original LTV part 3 -- 5.332 -- 5.216 -- -- 
  (5.891)  (5.908)   
Original LTV part 4 -- 2.539 -- 2.069 -- -- 
  (1.022)  (1.040)   
Original LTV part 5 -- 14.002 -- 12.967 -- -- 
  (6.101)  (6.155)   
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 0.644 0.630 0.644 0.720 0.644 0.709 
 (0.145) (0.600) (0.145) (0.600) (0.145) (0.592) 
Log loan size part 2 0.084 -0.390 0.084 -0.547 0.084 -0.002 
 (0.269) (0.666) (0.269) (0.677) (0.269) (0.662) 
Log loan size part 3 0.914 0.649 0.914 0.302 0.914 0.623 
 (0.283) (0.530) (0.283) (0.548) (0.283) (0.524) 
Log loan size part 4 0.060 0.326 0.060 0.041 0.060 0.323 
 (0.255) (0.344) (0.255) (0.387) (0.255) (0.340) 
Loan age variables       
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Loan age part 1 0.125 0.168 0.125 0.172 0.125 0.166 
 (0.014) (0.047) (0.014) (0.047) (0.014) (0.047) 
Loan age part 2 0.019 0.004 0.019 -0.005 0.019 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.014) 
Loan age part 3 -0.001 -0.022 -0.001 -0.021 -0.001 -0.022 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Loan age part 4 0.003 -0.018 0.003 -0.016 0.003 -0.008 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 -- -9.114 -- -9.129 -- -7.377 
  (2.710)  (2.723)  (2.657) 
The credit score part 2 -- -5.223 -- -5.018 -- -5.890 
  (4.596)  (4.630)  (4.567) 
The credit score part 3 -- -7.645 -- -7.875 -- -7.723 
  (5.042)  (5.064)  (4.998) 
The credit score part 4 -- -20.745 -- -21.235 -- -20.816 
  (7.021)  (7.021)  (6.992) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 -0.044 2.753 -0.044 2.631 -0.044 3.533 
 (0.738) (2.237) (0.738) (2.225) (0.738) (2.253) 
DTI part 2 0.265 -0.715 0.265 -0.620 0.266 -0.350 
 (0.949) (1.992) (0.949) (1.994) (0.949) (2.011) 
DTI part 3 -1.812 1.516 -1.812 1.423 -1.812 1.242 
 (1.204) (2.272) (1.204) (2.287) (1.204) (2.283) 
DTI part 4 0.999 -2.069 0.999 -1.790 0.999 -2.023 
 (0.722) (1.213) (0.722) (1.221) (0.722) (1.209) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.451 -0.040 -0.451 -0.040 -0.451 -0.107 
 (0.213) (0.388) (0.213) (0.389) (0.213) (0.388) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 0.031 0.014 0.031 0.015 0.031 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.047 -0.037 0.052 -0.037 0.048 
 (0.002) (0.025) (0.002) (0.025) (0.002) (0.025) 
Time period part 3 0.014 -0.014 0.014 -0.016 0.014 -0.018 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 3224 
 
 
Table 29. Odds ratio for Miami: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, the credit score only for default 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
negative equity and original 
loan-to-value are explanatory 
variables 
the negative equity dummy is one of 
explanatory variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 0.561 -- 0.561 -- 0.561 -- 
 (0.233)  (0.233)  (0.233)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 138.593 -- 138.669 -- 138.530 -- 
 (234.520)  (234.651)  (234.414)  
Call option part 2 2.700 -- 2.697 -- 2.697 -- 
 (4.765)  (4.761)  (4.759)  
Call option part 3 4,364.551 -- 4,375.890 -- 4,363.658 -- 
 (6,286.386)  (6,302.792)  (6,285.026)  
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Call option part 4 32.663 -- 32.714 -- 32.510 -- 
 (30.548)  (30.597)  (30.402)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.626 -- 1.613 -- 1.536 
  (0.215)  (0.213)  (0.204) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 1.144 -- 1.122 -- 1.129 
  (0.100)  (0.099)  (0.098) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- -- -- 1.063 -- -- 
    (0.018)   
Negative equity part 2 -- -- -- 0.996 -- -- 
    (0.016)   
Negative equity part 3 -- -- -- 1.020 -- -- 
    (0.010)   
Negative equity part 4 -- -- -- 1.002 -- -- 
    (0.004)   
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 2.477 -- -- -- 3.955 
  (0.338)    (0.480) 
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- 25.801 -- 48.028 -- -- 
  (39.427)  (73.405)   
Original LTV part 2 -- 10.038 -- 4.235 -- -- 
  (19.314)  (8.251)   
Original LTV part 3 -- 206.814 -- 184.241 -- -- 
  (1,218.385)  (1,088.523)   
Original LTV part 4 -- 12.670 -- 7.918 -- -- 
  (12.943)  (8.238)   
Original LTV part 5 -- 1204641.781 -- 428,193.827 -- -- 
  (7349619.485)  (2635361.371)   
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 1.905 1.877 1.905 2.055 1.904 2.032 
 (0.277) (1.126) (0.277) (1.234) (0.277) (1.203) 
Log loan size part 2 1.087 0.677 1.087 0.578 1.088 0.998 
 (0.293) (0.451) (0.293) (0.392) (0.293) (0.661) 
Log loan size part 3 2.494 1.913 2.494 1.352 2.493 1.865 
 (0.706) (1.014) (0.706) (0.740) (0.706) (0.977) 
Log loan size part 4 1.062 1.386 1.062 1.042 1.062 1.381 
 (0.271) (0.477) (0.271) (0.403) (0.271) (0.469) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 1.133 1.183 1.133 1.188 1.133 1.181 
 (0.016) (0.056) (0.016) (0.056) (0.016) (0.056) 
Loan age part 2 1.019 1.004 1.019 0.995 1.019 0.995 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.014) 
Loan age part 3 0.999 0.979 0.999 0.979 0.999 0.978 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Loan age part 4 1.003 0.983 1.003 0.985 1.003 0.992 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
The credit score part 2 -- 0.005 -- 0.007 -- 0.003 
  (0.025)  (0.031)  (0.013) 
The credit score part 3 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
The credit score part 4 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 0.957 15.694 0.957 13.881 0.957 34.226 
 (0.706) (35.114) (0.706) (30.881) (0.706) (77.105) 
DTI part 2 1.304 0.489 1.304 0.538 1.304 0.705 
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 (1.237) (0.975) (1.238) (1.073) (1.238) (1.417) 
DTI part 3 0.163 4.555 0.163 4.148 0.163 3.461 
 (0.197) (10.350) (0.197) (9.489) (0.197) (7.900) 
DTI part 4 2.715 0.126 2.715 0.167 2.717 0.132 
 (1.959) (0.153) (1.959) (0.204) (1.960) (0.160) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.637 0.961 0.637 0.961 0.637 0.898 
 (0.136) (0.373) (0.136) (0.373) (0.136) (0.348) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 1.032 1.014 1.032 1.015 1.032 1.007 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Time period part 2 0.963 1.048 0.963 1.054 0.963 1.049 
 (0.002) (0.026) (0.002) (0.026) (0.002) (0.026) 
Time period part 3 1.014 0.986 1.014 0.984 1.014 0.983 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 3224 
 
 
Table 30. Coefficients for Miami: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, the credit score only for 90-days-delinquency 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
the negative equity dummy is one 
of explanatory variables 
negative equity and original loan-
to-value are explanatory variables 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.567 -- -0.567 -- -0.567 -- 
 (0.416)  (0.416)  (0.416)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 5.255 -- 5.254 -- 5.255 -- 
 (1.740)  (1.740)  (1.740)  
Call option part 2 1.038 -- 1.037 -- 1.038 -- 
 (1.804)  (1.804)  (1.804)  
Call option part 3 8.678 -- 8.677 -- 8.679 -- 
 (1.454)  (1.454)  (1.454)  
Call option part 4 3.673 -- 3.669 -- 3.675 -- 
 (0.929)  (0.929)  (0.929)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.588 -- 0.540 -- 0.583 
  (0.108)  (0.108)  (0.108) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.126 -- 0.110 -- 0.109 
  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.081) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- -- -- -- -- 0.053 
      (0.016) 
Negative equity part 2 -- -- -- -- -- -0.006 
      (0.016) 
Negative equity part 3 -- -- -- -- -- 0.025 
      (0.010) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -- -- -- -- -0.003 
      (0.004) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 0.802 -- 1.219 -- -- 
  (0.123)  (0.109)   
Original loan-to-value       
123 
 
 
variables 
Original LTV part 1 -- 2.252 -- -- -- 2.761 
  (1.258)    (1.261) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 2.616 -- -- -- 1.924 
  (1.738)    (1.755) 
Original LTV part 3 -- 4.775 -- -- -- 4.873 
  (5.427)    (5.445) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 2.306 -- -- -- 2.088 
  (0.958)    (0.971) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 10.537 -- -- -- 9.110 
  (6.095)    (6.134) 
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 0.646 0.559 0.646 0.594 0.646 0.642 
 (0.147) (0.553) (0.147) (0.545) (0.147) (0.554) 
Log loan size part 2 0.089 0.164 0.090 0.515 0.089 0.013 
 (0.269) (0.624) (0.269) (0.620) (0.269) (0.633) 
Log loan size part 3 0.923 0.276 0.923 0.283 0.923 -0.050 
 (0.282) (0.487) (0.282) (0.482) (0.282) (0.500) 
Log loan size part 4 0.068 0.430 0.068 0.424 0.068 0.325 
 (0.253) (0.317) (0.253) (0.313) (0.253) (0.345) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 0.134 0.092 0.134 0.088 0.134 0.096 
 (0.016) (0.034) (0.016) (0.033) (0.016) (0.033) 
Loan age part 2 0.022 0.002 0.022 -0.006 0.022 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) 
Loan age part 3 -0.001 -0.026 -0.001 -0.024 -0.001 -0.024 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Loan age part 4 0.003 -0.014 0.003 -0.006 0.003 -0.013 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 -- -10.230 -- -8.606 -- -9.997 
  (2.397)  (2.350)  (2.411) 
The credit score part 2 -- -5.342 -- -5.992 -- -5.550 
  (4.127)  (4.104)  (4.162) 
The credit score part 3 -- -11.579 -- -11.670 -- -11.418 
  (4.914)  (4.882)  (4.930) 
The credit score part 4 -- -19.880 -- -19.826 -- -20.752 
  (6.819)  (6.789)  (6.822) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 0.008 3.494 0.008 4.181 0.008 3.381 
 (0.746) (2.192) (0.746) (2.208) (0.746) (2.186) 
DTI part 2 0.160 -0.514 0.160 -0.062 0.160 -0.361 
 (1.064) (2.103) (1.064) (2.125) (1.064) (2.105) 
DTI part 3 -1.403 2.386 -1.403 2.161 -1.404 2.297 
 (1.075) (1.880) (1.075) (1.888) (1.075) (1.894) 
DTI part 4 0.823 -2.646 0.824 -2.713 0.823 -2.332 
 (0.719) (1.135) (0.719) (1.131) (0.719) (1.141) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.458 -0.151 -0.458 -0.219 -0.458 -0.171 
 (0.213) (0.387) (0.213) (0.387) (0.213) (0.387) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 0.030 0.022 0.030 0.015 0.030 0.023 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.015 -0.037 0.016 -0.037 0.020 
 (0.002) (0.024) (0.002) (0.024) (0.002) (0.024) 
Time period part 3 0.014 -0.021 0.014 -0.025 0.014 -0.023 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 3211 
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Table 31. Odds ratios for Miami: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, the credit score only for 90-days-delinquency 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
the negative equity dummy is one 
of explanatory variables 
negative equity and original loan-
to-value are explanatory variables 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 0.567 -- 0.567 -- 0.567 -- 
 (0.236)  (0.236)  (0.236)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 191.452 -- 191.372 -- 191.551 -- 
 (333.035)  (332.897)  (333.210)  
Call option part 2 2.823 -- 2.820 -- 2.822 -- 
 (5.092)  (5.086)  (5.090)  
Call option part 3 5,871.224 -- 5,867.609 -- 5,880.645 -- 
 (8,537.001)  (8,531.650)  (8,550.805)  
Call option part 4 39.384 -- 39.195 -- 39.458 -- 
 (36.580)  (36.401)  (36.651)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.800 -- 1.717 -- 1.792 
  (0.194)  (0.185)  (0.193) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 1.135 -- 1.116 -- 1.115 
  (0.092)  (0.090)  (0.091) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- -- -- -- -- 1.054 
      (0.017) 
Negative equity part 2 -- -- -- -- -- 0.994 
      (0.016) 
Negative equity part 3 -- -- -- -- -- 1.026 
      (0.010) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -- -- -- -- 0.997 
      (0.004) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 2.229 -- 3.385 -- -- 
  (0.274)  (0.369)   
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- 9.508 -- -- -- 15.821 
  (11.956)    (19.950) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 13.675 -- -- -- 6.847 
  (23.761)    (12.018) 
Original LTV part 3 -- 118.507 -- -- -- 130.738 
  (643.129)    (711.834) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 10.032 -- -- -- 8.073 
  (9.608)    (7.842) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 37,692.552 -- -- -- 9,044.227 
  (229,744.910)    (55,481.191) 
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 1.909 1.749 1.908 1.811 1.909 1.901 
 (0.281) (0.968) (0.281) (0.988) (0.281) (1.053) 
Log loan size part 2 1.094 1.178 1.094 1.674 1.094 1.013 
 (0.294) (0.735) (0.294) (1.038) (0.294) (0.641) 
Log loan size part 3 2.517 1.318 2.517 1.328 2.517 0.952 
 (0.709) (0.642) (0.709) (0.640) (0.709) (0.476) 
Log loan size part 4 1.071 1.537 1.071 1.527 1.071 1.385 
 (0.271) (0.487) (0.271) (0.478) (0.271) (0.478) 
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Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 1.144 1.097 1.144 1.092 1.144 1.101 
 (0.018) (0.037) (0.018) (0.037) (0.018) (0.037) 
Loan age part 2 1.022 1.002 1.022 0.994 1.022 0.995 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) 
Loan age part 3 0.999 0.975 0.999 0.976 0.999 0.976 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Loan age part 4 1.003 0.986 1.003 0.994 1.003 0.987 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
The credit score part 2 -- 0.005 -- 0.002 -- 0.004 
  (0.020)  (0.010)  (0.016) 
The credit score part 3 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
The credit score part 4 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 1.008 32.914 1.008 65.453 1.008 29.409 
 (0.752) (72.155) (0.751) (144.506) (0.752) (64.284) 
DTI part 2 1.173 0.598 1.174 0.940 1.174 0.697 
 (1.249) (1.257) (1.249) (1.996) (1.249) (1.467) 
DTI part 3 0.246 10.867 0.246 8.676 0.246 9.949 
 (0.264) (20.433) (0.264) (16.380) (0.264) (18.843) 
DTI part 4 2.278 0.071 2.279 0.066 2.277 0.097 
 (1.638) (0.080) (1.639) (0.075) (1.638) (0.111) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.633 0.860 0.633 0.803 0.633 0.843 
 (0.135) (0.333) (0.135) (0.310) (0.135) (0.326) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 1.030 1.022 1.030 1.015 1.030 1.023 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Time period part 2 0.964 1.015 0.964 1.016 0.964 1.020 
 (0.002) (0.024) (0.002) (0.024) (0.002) (0.024) 
Time period part 3 1.014 0.979 1.014 0.975 1.014 0.977 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) 
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Table 32. Results comparison in Miami 
  Prepayment and Default are Dependent Variables 
   
 
  Right censored dataset Deleting modification dataset 
   
 
 
 
  The credit score for 
prepayment and 
default 
The credit score for 
default 
The credit score for 
prepayment and 
default 
The credit score for 
default 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Certain explanatory 
variables 
Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC 
 
 
1 original LTV, the negative 
equity dummy 
0.9282 -11694.2 0.9282 -11680.7 0.9274 -11443.9 0.9274 -11651.6 
2 negative equity, original 
LTV 
 
0.9282 -11700.7 0.9282 -11687.2 0.9274 -11438.1 0.9274 -11657.9 
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3 the negative equity dummy 0.928 -11701.2 0.928 -11687.7 0.9272 -11470.7 0.9272 -11658.3 
 
 
  Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are Dependent Variables 
   
 
  Right censored dataset Deleting modification dataset 
   
 
 
 
  The credit score for 
prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency 
The credit score for 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score for 
prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency 
The credit score for 
90-days-delinquency 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Certain explanatory 
variables 
Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC 
 
 
1 original LTV, the negative 
equity dummy 
0.9248 -11956.8 
 
0.9247 -11942.8 0.9249 -11779.8 0.9249 -11765.5 
2 the negative equity dummy 
 
0.9246 -11962.3 0.9246 -11948.3 0.9248 -11785.9 0.9248 -11771.6 
3 negative equity, original 
LTV 
0.9248 -11963.7 0.9248 -11949.7 0.925 -11786.7 0.925 -11772.4 
 
 
 
Table 33. Coefficients for Tampa: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, the credit score for both the prepayment and the default 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 the negative equity dummy is one 
of explanatory variables 
the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
negative equity and the negative 
equity dummy are explanatory 
variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.723 -- -0.723 -- -0.723 -- 
 (0.338)  (0.338)  (0.338)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 2.233 -- 2.233 -- 2.233 -- 
 (1.145)  (1.145)  (1.145)  
Call option part 2 7.040 -- 7.041 -- 7.040 -- 
 (1.255)  (1.255)  (1.255)  
Call option part 3 7.647 -- 7.647 -- 7.649 -- 
 (0.977)  (0.977)  (0.977)  
Call option part 4 1.858 -- 1.858 -- 1.859 -- 
 (0.656)  (0.656)  (0.656)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.591 -- 0.599 -- 0.624 
  (0.179)  (0.179)  (0.180) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.013 -- 0.004 -- 0.012 
  (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.060) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- -- -- -- -- 0.030 
      (0.033) 
Negative equity part 2 -- -- -- -- -- 0.009 
      (0.020) 
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Negative equity part 3 -- -- -- -- -- 0.015 
      (0.013) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -- -- -- -- 0.006 
      (0.005) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 1.234 -- 0.974  0.837 
  (0.114)  (0.125)  (0.264) 
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- -- -- 1.347 -- -- 
    (1.118)   
Original LTV part 2 -- -- -- 2.003 -- -- 
    (1.216)   
Original LTV part 3 -- -- -- 3.266 -- -- 
    (0.872)   
Original LTV part 4 -- -- -- -4.650 -- -- 
    (6.120)   
Original LTV part 5 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
       
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 0.533 0.420 0.533 0.381 0.533 0.447 
 (0.104) (0.414) (0.104) (0.419) (0.104) (0.414) 
Log loan size part 2 0.849 -0.046 0.849 -0.031 0.849 -0.133 
 (0.177) (0.515) (0.177) (0.514) (0.177) (0.518) 
Log loan size part 3 0.082 -0.066 0.082 -0.156 0.082 -0.405 
 (0.198) (0.474) (0.198) (0.479) (0.198) (0.496) 
Log loan size part 4 0.687 -0.055 0.687 -0.096 0.687 -0.330 
 (0.136) (0.303) (0.136) (0.305) (0.136) (0.343) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 0.123 0.168 0.123 0.167 0.123 0.170 
 (0.010) (0.058) (0.010) (0.058) (0.010) (0.058) 
Loan age part 2 0.010 0.030 0.010 0.035 0.010 0.027 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.017) 
Loan age part 3 0.004 -0.012 0.004 -0.012 0.004 -0.015 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
Loan age part 4 0.009 -0.002 0.009 -0.007 0.009 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 1.248 -7.010 1.247 -7.529 1.248 -7.262 
 (1.100) (2.216) (1.100) (2.194) (1.100) (2.229) 
The credit score part 2 1.492 -7.116 1.492 -6.467 1.492 -6.349 
 (1.464) (3.712) (1.464) (3.696) (1.464) (3.719) 
The credit score part 3 2.000 -6.078 2.000 -6.451 2.000 -6.554 
 (1.552) (4.687) (1.552) (4.682) (1.552) (4.691) 
The credit score part 4 5.670 -25.519 5.670 -24.291 5.669 -24.578 
 (2.102) (8.400) (2.102) (8.380) (2.102) (8.385) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 -0.683 -3.425 -0.683 -3.753 -0.683 -3.373 
 (0.511) (1.762) (0.511) (1.774) (0.511) (1.759) 
DTI part 2 0.191 4.606 0.191 4.522 0.191 4.656 
 (0.733) (2.184) (0.733) (2.181) (0.733) (2.187) 
DTI part 3 -0.593 1.014 -0.592 0.662 -0.592 0.837 
 (0.832) (1.975) (0.832) (1.977) (0.832) (1.977) 
DTI part 4 0.175 0.616 0.175 0.685 0.175 0.518 
 (0.536) (1.080) (0.536) (1.088) (0.536) (1.079) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.626 -0.563 -0.626 -0.532 -0.626 -0.511 
 (0.212) (0.581) (0.212) (0.581) (0.212) (0.581) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 0.021 0.008 0.021 0.010 0.021 0.010 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.042 -0.037 0.054 -0.037 0.035 
 (0.001) (0.036) (0.001) (0.036) (0.001) (0.036) 
Time period part 3 0.012 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.007 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
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Table 34. Odds ratio for Tampa: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, the credit score for both the prepayment and the default 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 the negative equity dummy is one 
of explanatory variables 
the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
negative equity and the negative 
equity dummy are explanatory 
variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 0.485 -- 0.485 -- 0.485 -- 
 (0.164)  (0.164)  (0.164)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 9.327 -- 9.326 -- 9.329 -- 
 (10.678)  (10.677)  (10.682)  
Call option part 2 1,141.531 -- 1,142.131 -- 1,140.857 -- 
 (1,432.569)  (1,433.323)  (1,431.724)  
Call option part 3 2,094.932 -- 2,094.291 -- 2,098.459 -- 
 (2,046.269)  (2,045.644)  (2,049.712)  
Call option part 4 6.409 -- 6.412 -- 6.417 -- 
 (4.203)  (4.205)  (4.208)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.806 -- 1.820 -- 1.867 
  (0.323)  (0.326)  (0.336) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 1.013 -- 1.004 -- 1.012 
  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.061) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- -- -- -- -- 1.030 
      (0.034) 
Negative equity part 2 -- -- -- -- -- 1.009 
      (0.020) 
Negative equity part 3 -- -- -- -- -- 1.015 
      (0.014) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -- -- -- -- 1.006 
      (0.006) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 3.435 -- 2.648  2.310 
  (0.390)  (0.330)  (0.609) 
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- -- -- 3.844 -- -- 
    (4.297)   
Original LTV part 2 -- -- -- 7.408 -- -- 
    (9.005)   
Original LTV part 3 -- -- -- 26.204 -- -- 
    (22.857)   
Original LTV part 4 -- -- -- 0.010 -- -- 
    (0.059)   
Original LTV part 5 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
       
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 1.704 1.522 1.704 1.463 1.704 1.563 
 (0.178) (0.631) (0.178) (0.614) (0.178) (0.647) 
Log loan size part 2 2.338 0.955 2.338 0.970 2.338 0.876 
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 (0.414) (0.492) (0.414) (0.499) (0.414) (0.454) 
Log loan size part 3 1.086 0.936 1.086 0.856 1.086 0.667 
 (0.215) (0.444) (0.215) (0.410) (0.215) (0.331) 
Log loan size part 4 1.987 0.946 1.987 0.908 1.987 0.719 
 (0.270) (0.287) (0.270) (0.277) (0.270) (0.247) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 1.130 1.183 1.130 1.182 1.130 1.185 
 (0.011) (0.069) (0.011) (0.069) (0.011) (0.069) 
Loan age part 2 1.010 1.031 1.010 1.036 1.010 1.027 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.017) 
Loan age part 3 1.004 0.988 1.004 0.988 1.004 0.985 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
Loan age part 4 1.009 0.998 1.009 0.993 1.009 1.000 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 3.482 0.001 3.480 0.001 3.482 0.001 
 (3.831) (0.002) (3.829) (0.001) (3.831) (0.002) 
The credit score part 2 4.447 0.001 4.447 0.002 4.447 0.002 
 (6.513) (0.003) (6.513) (0.006) (6.513) (0.007) 
The credit score part 3 7.387 0.002 7.388 0.002 7.389 0.001 
 (11.468) (0.011) (11.469) (0.007) (11.471) (0.007) 
The credit score part 4 290.016 0.000 289.981 0.000 289.843 0.000 
 (609.607) (0.000) (609.536) (0.000) (609.245) (0.000) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 0.505 0.033 0.505 0.023 0.505 0.034 
 (0.258) (0.057) (0.258) (0.042) (0.258) (0.060) 
DTI part 2 1.210 100.131 1.210 91.988 1.210 105.232 
 (0.887) (218.661) (0.887) (200.625) (0.887) (230.139) 
DTI part 3 0.553 2.757 0.553 1.938 0.553 2.310 
 (0.460) (5.445) (0.460) (3.831) (0.460) (4.566) 
DTI part 4 1.191 1.851 1.191 1.984 1.191 1.678 
 (0.639) (2.000) (0.639) (2.159) (0.639) (1.811) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.535 0.570 0.534 0.587 0.534 0.600 
 (0.113) (0.331) (0.113) (0.342) (0.113) (0.349) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 1.021 1.008 1.021 1.010 1.021 1.010 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Time period part 2 0.963 1.043 0.963 1.055 0.963 1.035 
 (0.001) (0.037) (0.001) (0.038) (0.001) (0.037) 
Time period part 3 1.010 1.007 1.010 1.008 1.010 1.007 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
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Table 35. Coefficients for Tampa: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, the credit score for both the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 the negative equity dummy is one 
of explanatory variables 
the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
negative equity is one of 
explanatory variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.721 -- -0.721 -- -0.722 -- 
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 (0.338)  (0.338)  (0.338)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 2.359 -- 2.359 -- 2.359 -- 
 (1.161)  (1.161)  (1.161)  
Call option part 2 6.919 -- 6.920 -- 6.919 -- 
 (1.278)  (1.278)  (1.278)  
Call option part 3 7.890 -- 7.890 -- 7.891 -- 
 (0.982)  (0.982)  (0.982)  
Call option part 4 2.061 -- 2.061 -- 2.061 -- 
 (0.653)  (0.653)  (0.653)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.436 -- 0.446 -- 0.472 
  (0.127)  (0.128)  (0.128) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.028 -- 0.021 -- 0.027 
  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.055) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- -- --  -- 0.096 
      (0.017) 
Negative equity part 2 -- -- --  -- 0.007 
      (0.018) 
Negative equity part 3 -- -- --  -- 0.008 
      (0.013) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -- --  -- 0.000 
      (0.006) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 1.022 -- 0.766 -- -- 
  (0.101)  (0.111)   
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- -- -- 2.353 -- -- 
    (1.001)   
Original LTV part 2 -- -- -- 1.045 -- -- 
    (1.074)   
Original LTV part 3 -- -- -- 3.062 -- -- 
    (0.811)   
Original LTV part 4 -- -- -- -5.963 -- -- 
    (5.901)   
Original LTV part 5 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
       
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 0.543 0.424 0.543 0.342 0.543 0.426 
 (0.105) (0.353) (0.105) (0.360) (0.105) (0.351) 
Log loan size part 2 0.865 -0.221 0.865 -0.246 0.865 -0.280 
 (0.177) (0.456) (0.177) (0.456) (0.177) (0.457) 
Log loan size part 3 0.077 -0.195 0.077 -0.263 0.077 -0.444 
 (0.198) (0.436) (0.198) (0.440) (0.198) (0.454) 
Log loan size part 4 0.684 -0.036 0.684 -0.077 0.684 -0.128 
 (0.136) (0.279) (0.136) (0.281) (0.136) (0.306) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.132 0.133 0.137 
 (0.011) (0.044) (0.011) (0.044) (0.011) (0.044) 
Loan age part 2 0.015 0.029 0.015 0.034 0.015 0.028 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) 
Loan age part 3 0.003 -0.017 0.003 -0.017 0.003 -0.018 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Loan age part 4 0.009 -0.004 0.009 -0.009 0.009 -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 1.152 -8.766 1.152 -9.117 1.153 -8.928 
 (1.104) (1.891) (1.104) (1.858) (1.104) (1.890) 
The credit score part 2 1.311 -9.215 1.311 -8.762 1.311 -8.996 
 (1.437) (3.333) (1.437) (3.312) (1.437) (3.335) 
The credit score part 3 1.902 -7.200 1.902 -7.495 1.902 -7.333 
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 (1.594) (4.541) (1.594) (4.537) (1.594) (4.543) 
The credit score part 4 5.488 -27.576 5.488 -26.365 5.488 -27.141 
 (2.108) (8.162) (2.108) (8.142) (2.108) (8.154) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 -0.733 -2.521 -0.733 -2.882 -0.733 -2.413 
 (0.512) (1.683) (0.512) (1.697) (0.512) (1.679) 
DTI part 2 0.209 5.062 0.209 4.988 0.209 5.185 
 (0.735) (2.013) (0.735) (2.013) (0.735) (2.015) 
DTI part 3 -0.520 1.441 -0.520 1.104 -0.520 1.355 
 (0.834) (1.792) (0.834) (1.794) (0.834) (1.792) 
DTI part 4 0.106 0.522 0.106 0.662 0.106 0.477 
 (0.538) (0.976) (0.538) (0.983) (0.538) (0.975) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.626 -0.424 -0.626 -0.380 -0.626 -0.366 
 (0.212) (0.504) (0.212) (0.504) (0.212) (0.504) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 0.021 0.010 0.021 0.013 0.021 0.012 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.035 -0.037 0.046 -0.037 0.031 
 (0.001) (0.031) (0.001) (0.031) (0.001) (0.031) 
Time period part 3 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.002 0.010 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
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Table 36. Odds ratios for Tampa: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, the credit score for both the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 the negative equity dummy is one 
of explanatory variables 
the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
negative equity is one of 
explanatory variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 0.486 -- 0.486 -- 0.486 -- 
 (0.164)  (0.164)  (0.164)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 10.578 -- 10.577 -- 10.580 -- 
 (12.277)  (12.276)  (12.279)  
Call option part 2 1,011.708 -- 1,012.267 -- 1,011.313 -- 
 (1,293.275)  (1,293.989)  (1,292.770)  
Call option part 3 2,670.345 -- 2,670.144 -- 2,673.736 -- 
 (2,621.138)  (2,620.943)  (2,624.465)  
Call option part 4 7.854 -- 7.855 -- 7.858 -- 
 (5.127)  (5.128)  (5.130)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.546 -- 1.562 -- 1.603 
  (0.197)  (0.199)  (0.205) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 1.029 -- 1.022 -- 1.028 
  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.056) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- -- --  -- 1.101 
      (0.018) 
Negative equity part 2 -- -- --  -- 1.007 
132 
 
 
      (0.018) 
Negative equity part 3 -- -- --  -- 1.009 
      (0.013) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -- --  -- 1.000 
      (0.006) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- 2.780 -- 2.152 -- -- 
  (0.280)  (0.238)   
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- -- -- 10.515 -- -- 
    (10.526)   
Original LTV part 2 -- -- -- 2.843 -- -- 
    (3.054)   
Original LTV part 3 -- -- -- 21.372 -- -- 
    (17.328)   
Original LTV part 4 -- -- -- 0.003 -- -- 
    (0.015)   
Original LTV part 5 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
       
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 1.721 1.528 1.721 1.407 1.721 1.532 
 (0.181) (0.539) (0.181) (0.506) (0.181) (0.538) 
Log loan size part 2 2.376 0.802 2.376 0.782 2.376 0.756 
 (0.422) (0.365) (0.422) (0.356) (0.422) (0.345) 
Log loan size part 3 1.080 0.822 1.080 0.769 1.080 0.642 
 (0.214) (0.359) (0.214) (0.338) (0.214) (0.291) 
Log loan size part 4 1.981 0.964 1.981 0.925 1.981 0.880 
 (0.270) (0.269) (0.270) (0.260) (0.270) (0.269) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 1.143 1.143 1.143 1.141 1.143 1.147 
 (0.013) (0.050) (0.013) (0.050) (0.013) (0.051) 
Loan age part 2 1.015 1.030 1.015 1.034 1.015 1.028 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) 
Loan age part 3 1.003 0.983 1.003 0.983 1.003 0.982 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Loan age part 4 1.009 0.996 1.009 0.991 1.009 0.996 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 3.166 0.000 3.164 0.000 3.166 0.000 
 (3.495) (0.000) (3.493) (0.000) (3.496) (0.000) 
The credit score part 2 3.710 0.000 3.709 0.000 3.709 0.000 
 (5.330) (0.000) (5.330) (0.001) (5.329) (0.000) 
The credit score part 3 6.697 0.001 6.697 0.001 6.698 0.001 
 (10.671) (0.003) (10.671) (0.003) (10.674) (0.003) 
The credit score part 4 241.788 0.000 241.772 0.000 241.696 0.000 
 (509.773) (0.000) (509.744) (0.000) (509.580) (0.000) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 0.480 0.080 0.480 0.056 0.480 0.090 
 (0.246) (0.135) (0.246) (0.095) (0.246) (0.150) 
DTI part 2 1.233 157.962 1.233 146.624 1.233 178.610 
 (0.906) (318.038) (0.906) (295.208) (0.906) (359.864) 
DTI part 3 0.594 4.225 0.594 3.015 0.594 3.876 
 (0.496) (7.571) (0.496) (5.407) (0.496) (6.947) 
DTI part 4 1.112 1.685 1.112 1.938 1.112 1.611 
 (0.599) (1.645) (0.598) (1.906) (0.599) (1.570) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.535 0.655 0.535 0.684 0.535 0.694 
 (0.113) (0.330) (0.113) (0.345) (0.113) (0.349) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 1.021 1.010 1.021 1.013 1.021 1.012 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Time period part 2 0.964 1.036 0.964 1.047 0.964 1.031 
 (0.001) (0.032) (0.001) (0.032) (0.001) (0.032) 
Time period part 3 1.010 1.001 1.010 1.002 1.010 1.001 
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 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 6112 
 
 
Table 37. Results comparison in Tampa 
  Prepayment and Default are Dependent Variables 
   
 
  Right censored dataset Deleting modification dataset 
   
 
 
 
  The credit score for 
prepayment and 
default 
The credit score for 
default 
The credit score for 
prepayment and 
default 
The credit score for 
default 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Certain explanatory 
variables 
Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC 
 
 
1 the negative equity dummy 0.9283 -21862.5 0.9283 -21869.4 0.9275 -21820 0.9274 -21824.9 
2 original LTV, the negative 
equity dummy 
0.9284 -21869 0.9283 -21876 0.9275 -21826.6 0.9275 -21831.5 
3 negative equity, the 
negative equity dummy 
0.9284 -21873.2 0.9283 -21880.2 0.9275 -21830.8 0.9274 -21835.7 
 
 
  Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are Dependent Variables 
   
 
  Right censored dataset Deleting modification dataset 
   
 
 
 
  The credit score for 
prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency 
The credit score for 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score for 
prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency 
The credit score for 
90-days-delinquency 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Certain explanatory 
variables 
Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC 
 
 
1 the negative equity dummy 0.9255 -22354.3 0.9254 -22358.3 0.9256 -22020.5 0.9256 -22022.6 
2 original LTV, the negative 
equity dummy 
0.9255 -22359.3 0.9255 -22363.2 0.9257 -22025.5 0.9256 -22027.6 
3 negative equity 0.9255 -22366.6 0.9254 -22370.5 0.9256 -22031.9 0.9256 -22034 
 
 
 
Table 38. Coefficients for Detroit: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, the credit score for both the prepayment and the default 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 original loan-to-value is one of 
explanatory variables 
the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
negative equity and original loan-
to-value are explanatory variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
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Prepayment penalty 0.531 -- 0.531 -- 0.531 -- 
 (0.457)  (0.457)  (0.457)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 4.746 -- 4.746 -- 4.746 -- 
 (1.946)  (1.946)  (1.946)  
Call option part 2 22.409 -- 22.409 -- 22.409 -- 
 (1.871)  (1.871)  (1.871)  
Call option part 3 8.305 -- 8.305 -- 8.305 -- 
 (1.199)  (1.199)  (1.199)  
Call option part 4 0.776 -- 0.776 -- 0.776 -- 
 (0.850)  (0.850)  (0.850)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.209 -- 0.213 -- 0.217 
  (0.172)  (0.172)  (0.172) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- -0.030 -- -0.036 -- -0.038 
  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- -- -- -- -- 0.048 
      (0.028) 
Negative equity part 2 -- -- -- -- -- -0.028 
      (0.029) 
Negative equity part 3 -- -- -- -- -- -0.002 
      (0.024) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -- -- -- -- -0.008 
      (0.011) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- -- -- 0.117 -- -- 
    (0.177)   
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- 5.569 -- 5.414 -- 5.214 
  (1.669)  (1.676)  (1.661) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 3.607 -- 3.242 -- 2.772 
  (2.806)  (2.858)  (2.886) 
Original LTV part 3 -- 0.426 -- 0.286 -- 1.127 
  (7.196)  (7.204)  (7.267) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 5.311  5.227 -- 5.479 
  (1.190)  (1.196)  (1.235) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 2.423 -- 2.090 -- 3.198 
  (7.104)  (7.119)  (7.211) 
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 0.750 -1.095 0.750 -1.102 0.750 -1.101 
 (0.186) (0.272) (0.186) (0.272) (0.186) (0.278) 
Log loan size part 2 1.014 -0.516 1.014 -0.528 1.014 -0.439 
 (0.273) (0.580) (0.273) (0.580) (0.273) (0.595) 
Log loan size part 3 0.749 -1.666 0.749 -1.667 0.749 -1.528 
 (0.248) (0.682) (0.248) (0.682) (0.248) (0.697) 
Log loan size part 4 1.324 -0.083 1.324 -0.081 1.324 0.096 
 (0.155) (0.546) (0.155) (0.546) (0.155) (0.583) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 0.064 0.173 0.064 0.172 0.064 0.172 
 (0.010) (0.047) (0.010) (0.047) (0.010) (0.047) 
Loan age part 2 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 -0.013 -0.009 -0.013 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.015) 
Loan age part 3 -0.003 0.011 -0.003 0.010 -0.003 0.010 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) 
Loan age part 4 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 4.487 -7.495 4.487 -7.464 4.487 -7.305 
 (1.486) (2.296) (1.486) (2.296) (1.486) (2.309) 
The credit score part 2 0.431 -7.211 0.431 -7.173 0.431 -7.162 
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 (1.793) (3.934) (1.793) (3.933) (1.793) (3.938) 
The credit score part 3 8.199 -9.115 8.199 -9.089 8.198 -9.614 
 (2.232) (6.581) (2.232) (6.579) (2.232) (6.594) 
The credit score part 4 0.228 -20.403 0.228 -20.349 0.228 -19.982 
 (3.016) (12.295) (3.016) (12.299) (3.016) (12.315) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 -0.247 0.431 -0.247 0.447 -0.247 0.491 
 (0.870) (2.520) (0.870) (2.520) (0.870) (2.521) 
DTI part 2 0.280 -0.456 0.280 -0.497 0.280 -0.729 
 (1.139) (3.159) (1.139) (3.159) (1.139) (3.164) 
DTI part 3 -0.151 4.716 -0.151 4.737 -0.151 4.975 
 (0.977) (2.392) (0.977) (2.392) (0.977) (2.403) 
DTI part 4 -0.653 2.140 -0.653 2.158 -0.653 2.214 
 (0.698) (1.259) (0.698) (1.259) (0.698) (1.255) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.421 0.652 -0.421 0.648 -0.421 0.665 
 (0.229) (0.333) (0.229) (0.334) (0.229) (0.334) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.008 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Time period part 2 -0.045 0.083 -0.045 0.082 -0.045 0.083 
 (0.002) (0.021) (0.002) (0.021) (0.002) (0.021) 
Time period part 3 0.032 -0.045 0.032 -0.045 0.032 -0.045 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 3167 
 
 
Table 39. Odds ratio for Detroit: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, the credit score for both the prepayment and the default 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 original loan-to-value is one of 
explanatory variables 
the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
negative equity and original loan-
to-value are explanatory variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 1.700 -- 1.700 -- 1.700 -- 
 (0.776)  (0.776)  (0.776)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 115.153 -- 115.163 -- 115.160 -- 
 (224.135)  (224.154)  (224.147)  
Call option part 2 5.396e+09 -- 5.396e+09 -- 5.396e+09 -- 
 (1.010e+10)  (1.010e+10)  (1.010e+10)  
Call option part 3 4,042.849 -- 4,043.310 -- 4,042.498 -- 
 (4,846.310)  (4,846.860)  (4,845.893)  
Call option part 4 2.173 -- 2.172 -- 2.172 -- 
 (1.847)  (1.846)  (1.846)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.232 -- 1.237 -- 1.242 
  (0.212)  (0.213)  (0.213) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.970 -- 0.965 -- 0.963 
  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- -- -- -- -- 1.049 
      (0.029) 
136 
 
 
Negative equity part 2 -- -- -- -- -- 0.972 
      (0.029) 
Negative equity part 3 -- -- -- -- -- 0.998 
      (0.024) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -- -- -- -- 0.992 
      (0.011) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- -- -- 1.124 -- -- 
    (0.199)   
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- 262.101 -- 224.434 -- 183.774 
  (437.505)  (376.177)  (305.247) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 36.864 -- 25.595 -- 15.997 
  (103.424)  (73.146)  (46.168) 
Original LTV part 3 -- 1.531 -- 1.331 -- 3.086 
  (11.018)  (9.587)  (22.426) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 202.522  186.289 -- 239.644 
  (240.970)  (222.832)  (295.902) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 11.278 -- 8.083 -- 24.488 
  (80.119)  (57.539)  (176.591) 
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 2.118 0.334 2.118 0.332 2.118 0.333 
 (0.394) (0.091) (0.394) (0.090) (0.394) (0.093) 
Log loan size part 2 2.756 0.597 2.756 0.590 2.756 0.645 
 (0.751) (0.346) (0.751) (0.342) (0.751) (0.384) 
Log loan size part 3 2.115 0.189 2.115 0.189 2.115 0.217 
 (0.524) (0.129) (0.524) (0.129) (0.524) (0.151) 
Log loan size part 4 3.759 0.920 3.759 0.922 3.759 1.101 
 (0.581) (0.503) (0.581) (0.504) (0.581) (0.642) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 1.066 1.189 1.066 1.188 1.066 1.188 
 (0.010) (0.056) (0.010) (0.056) (0.010) (0.056) 
Loan age part 2 0.991 0.988 0.991 0.987 0.991 0.987 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) 
Loan age part 3 0.997 1.011 0.997 1.010 0.997 1.010 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) 
Loan age part 4 1.001 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.001 0.999 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 88.812 0.001 88.823 0.001 88.861 0.001 
 (132.005) (0.001) (132.022) (0.001) (132.079) (0.002) 
The credit score part 2 1.539 0.001 1.539 0.001 1.539 0.001 
 (2.759) (0.003) (2.759) (0.003) (2.759) (0.003) 
The credit score part 3 3,635.538 0.000 3,635.527 0.000 3,634.758 0.000 
 (8,116.133) (0.001) (8,116.111) (0.001) (8,114.395) (0.000) 
The credit score part 4 1.256 0.000 1.256 0.000 1.256 0.000 
 (3.787) (0.000) (3.787) (0.000) (3.789) (0.000) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 0.781 1.539 0.781 1.563 0.781 1.634 
 (0.679) (3.879) (0.679) (3.938) (0.679) (4.120) 
DTI part 2 1.323 0.634 1.323 0.608 1.323 0.483 
 (1.506) (2.001) (1.506) (1.921) (1.506) (1.527) 
DTI part 3 0.860 111.698 0.860 114.045 0.860 144.728 
 (0.840) (267.210) (0.840) (272.851) (0.840) (347.819) 
DTI part 4 0.520 8.498 0.520 8.650 0.521 9.154 
 (0.363) (10.701) (0.363) (10.889) (0.363) (11.489) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.656 1.920 0.656 1.911 0.657 1.945 
 (0.150) (0.640) (0.150) (0.637) (0.150) (0.649) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 1.006 1.009 1.006 1.009 1.006 1.008 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Time period part 2 0.956 1.087 0.956 1.085 0.956 1.087 
 (0.002) (0.022) (0.002) (0.022) (0.002) (0.023) 
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Time period part 3 1.033 0.956 1.033 0.956 1.033 0.956 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 3167 
 
 
Table 40. Coefficients for Detroit: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, the credit score for both the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 original loan-to-value is one of 
explanatory variables 
the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
negative equity and original loan-
to-value are explanatory variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 0.524 -- 0.524 -- 0.524 -- 
 (0.457)  (0.457)  (0.457)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 4.520 -- 4.520 -- 4.520 -- 
 (1.979)  (1.979)  (1.979)  
Call option part 2 22.314 -- 22.314 -- 22.314 -- 
 (1.920)  (1.920)  (1.920)  
Call option part 3 9.101 -- 9.101 -- 9.100 -- 
 (1.214)  (1.214)  (1.214)  
Call option part 4 1.182 -- 1.182 -- 1.182 -- 
 (0.851)  (0.851)  (0.851)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.088 -- 0.090 -- 0.090 
  (0.131)  (0.131)  (0.131) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.058 -- 0.055 -- 0.061 
  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- -- -- -- -- 0.020 
      (0.027) 
Negative equity part 2 -- -- -- -- -- -0.023 
      (0.029) 
Negative equity part 3 -- -- -- -- -- -0.004 
      (0.023) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -- -- -- -- -0.005 
      (0.010) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- -- -- 0.055 -- -- 
    (0.165)   
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- 5.318 -- 5.258 -- 5.169 
  (1.571)  (1.578)  (1.574) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 2.635 -- 2.469 -- 2.471 
  (2.373)  (2.425)  (2.446) 
Original LTV part 3 -- 2.800 -- 2.758 -- 3.730 
  (6.591)  (6.595)  (6.661) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 5.377 -- 5.337 -- 5.612 
  (1.090)  (1.096)  (1.125) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 1.115 -- 0.936 -- 2.176 
  (6.520)  (6.540)  (6.641) 
Log loan size variables       
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Log loan size part 1 0.799 -0.813 0.799 -0.816 0.799 -0.797 
 (0.190) (0.263) (0.190) (0.263) (0.190) (0.268) 
Log loan size part 2 1.006 -0.685 1.006 -0.689 1.006 -0.598 
 (0.276) (0.536) (0.276) (0.536) (0.276) (0.547) 
Log loan size part 3 0.780 -1.301 0.780 -1.303 0.780 -1.191 
 (0.249) (0.620) (0.249) (0.620) (0.249) (0.630) 
Log loan size part 4 1.308 -0.330 1.308 -0.329 1.308 -0.207 
 (0.155) (0.506) (0.155) (0.506) (0.155) (0.541) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 0.064 0.130 0.064 0.130 0.064 0.130 
 (0.010) (0.035) (0.010) (0.035) (0.010) (0.035) 
Loan age part 2 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 -0.008 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) 
Loan age part 3 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Loan age part 4 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 4.491 -8.282 4.491 -8.276 4.491 -8.164 
 (1.468) (2.026) (1.468) (2.026) (1.468) (2.036) 
The credit score part 2 -0.295 -13.044 -0.295 -13.014 -0.295 -13.129 
 (1.831) (3.843) (1.831) (3.843) (1.831) (3.850) 
The credit score part 3 8.540 -3.255 8.540 -3.255 8.540 -3.473 
 (2.247) (6.303) (2.247) (6.302) (2.247) (6.314) 
The credit score part 4 -0.172 -27.148 -0.172 -27.105 -0.172 -27.043 
 (3.115) (12.545) (3.115) (12.546) (3.115) (12.567) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 -0.124 0.787 -0.124 0.793 -0.124 0.780 
 (0.872) (2.371) (0.872) (2.371) (0.872) (2.372) 
DTI part 2 0.227 1.160 0.227 1.143 0.227 1.040 
 (1.142) (2.862) (1.142) (2.862) (1.142) (2.865) 
DTI part 3 -0.197 3.890 -0.197 3.892 -0.197 4.063 
 (0.985) (2.152) (0.985) (2.152) (0.985) (2.160) 
DTI part 4 -0.535 1.677 -0.535 1.687 -0.535 1.712 
 (0.702) (1.199) (0.702) (1.199) (0.702) (1.198) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.479 0.659 -0.479 0.658 -0.479 0.662 
 (0.235) (0.304) (0.235) (0.304) (0.235) (0.305) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Time period part 2 -0.045 0.040 -0.045 0.039 -0.045 0.041 
 (0.002) (0.019) (0.002) (0.019) (0.002) (0.019) 
Time period part 3 0.031 -0.035 0.031 -0.035 0.031 -0.035 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 3152 
 
 
Table 41. Odds ratios for Detroit: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, the credit score for both the prepayment and the 
90-days-delinquency 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 original loan-to-value is one of 
explanatory variables 
the negative equity dummy and 
original loan-to-value are 
explanatory variables 
negative equity and original loan-
to-value are explanatory variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
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Prepayment penalty 1.689 -- 1.689 -- 1.689 -- 
 (0.771)  (0.771)  (0.771)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 91.851 -- 91.855 -- 91.846 -- 
 (181.808)  (181.817)  (181.799)  
Call option part 2 4.907e+09 -- 4.907e+09 -- 4.907e+09 -- 
 (9.420e+09)  (9.420e+09)  (9.419e+09)  
Call option part 3 8,960.957 -- 8,961.448 -- 8,958.873 -- 
 (10,880.620)  (10,881.210)  (10,878.110)  
Call option part 4 3.260 -- 3.260 -- 3.261 -- 
 (2.775)  (2.775)  (2.775)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.092 -- 1.095 -- 1.095 
  (0.143)  (0.143)  (0.143) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 1.059 -- 1.056 -- 1.062 
  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.046) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- -- -- -- -- 1.021 
      (0.027) 
Negative equity part 2 -- -- -- -- -- 0.977 
      (0.028) 
Negative equity part 3 -- -- -- -- -- 0.996 
      (0.023) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -- -- -- -- 0.995 
      (0.010) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- -- -- 1.057 -- -- 
    (0.174)   
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- 204.052 -- 192.021 -- 175.697 
  (320.611)  (303.011)  (276.499) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 13.949 -- 11.809 -- 11.836 
  (33.104)  (28.633)  (28.955) 
Original LTV part 3 -- 16.450 -- 15.762 -- 41.696 
  (108.424)  (103.951)  (277.757) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 216.345 -- 207.952 -- 273.779 
  (235.805)  (227.934)  (307.935) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 3.049 -- 2.550 -- 8.815 
  (19.881)  (16.678)  (58.538) 
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 2.223 0.443 2.223 0.442 2.223 0.451 
 (0.422) (0.117) (0.422) (0.116) (0.422) (0.121) 
Log loan size part 2 2.735 0.504 2.735 0.502 2.735 0.550 
 (0.754) (0.270) (0.754) (0.269) (0.754) (0.301) 
Log loan size part 3 2.182 0.272 2.182 0.272 2.182 0.304 
 (0.543) (0.169) (0.543) (0.168) (0.543) (0.192) 
Log loan size part 4 3.698 0.719 3.698 0.720 3.698 0.813 
 (0.572) (0.364) (0.572) (0.364) (0.572) (0.440) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 1.066 1.139 1.066 1.139 1.066 1.139 
 (0.010) (0.040) (0.010) (0.040) (0.010) (0.040) 
Loan age part 2 0.992 0.997 0.992 0.997 0.992 0.998 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) 
Loan age part 3 0.996 1.003 0.996 1.002 0.996 1.004 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Loan age part 4 1.002 1.003 1.002 1.003 1.002 1.002 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 89.172 0.000 89.179 0.000 89.195 0.000 
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 (130.868) (0.001) (130.878) (0.001) (130.901) (0.001) 
The credit score part 2 0.744 0.000 0.744 0.000 0.744 0.000 
 (1.363) (0.000) (1.363) (0.000) (1.363) (0.000) 
The credit score part 3 5,114.252 0.039 5,114.199 0.039 5,113.635 0.031 
 (11,490.884) (0.243) (11,490.768) (0.243) (11,489.499) (0.196) 
The credit score part 4 0.842 0.000 0.842 0.000 0.842 0.000 
 (2.621) (0.000) (2.621) (0.000) (2.623) (0.000) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 0.883 2.197 0.883 2.211 0.883 2.182 
 (0.770) (5.207) (0.770) (5.241) (0.770) (5.176) 
DTI part 2 1.255 3.191 1.255 3.137 1.255 2.828 
 (1.433) (9.134) (1.433) (8.979) (1.433) (8.102) 
DTI part 3 0.821 48.924 0.821 49.016 0.821 58.156 
 (0.809) (105.275) (0.809) (105.469) (0.809) (125.615) 
DTI part 4 0.586 5.348 0.586 5.405 0.586 5.540 
 (0.411) (6.412) (0.411) (6.481) (0.411) (6.639) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
 
0.620 1.933 0.620 1.930 0.620 1.938 
 (0.146) (0.588) (0.146) (0.588) (0.146) (0.591) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 1.007 1.008 1.007 1.008 1.007 1.007 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Time period part 2 0.956 1.040 0.956 1.040 0.956 1.042 
 (0.002) (0.020) (0.002) (0.020) (0.002) (0.020) 
Time period part 3 1.032 0.966 1.032 0.966 1.032 0.965 
 (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 3152 
 
 
Table 42. Results comparison in Detroit 
  Prepayment and Default are Dependent Variables 
   
 
  Right censored dataset Deleting modification dataset 
   
 
 
 
  The credit score for 
prepayment and default 
The credit score for 
default 
The credit score for 
prepayment and default 
The credit score for 
default 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Certain explanatory 
variables 
Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC 
 
 
1 original LTV 0.9246 -11836.532 0.9244 -11858.5 0.9236 -11798.998 0.9233 -11818.9 
2 original LTV, the 
negative equity dummy 
0.9246 -11840.344 0.9244 -11862.3 0.9236 -11802.819 0.9233 -11822.7 
3 negative equity, original 
LTV 
0.9247 -11850.587 0.9244 -11872.5 0.9236 -11813.206 0.9233 -11833.1 
 
 
  Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are Dependent Variables 
   
 
  Right censored dataset Deleting modification dataset 
   
 
 
 
  The credit score for 
prepayment and 90-days-
delinquency 
The credit score for 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score for 
prepayment and 90-days-
delinquency 
The credit score for 
90-days-delinquency 
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Rank Certain explanatory 
variables 
Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC 
 
 
1 original LTV 0.9211 -12034.2 0.9209 -12052.9 0.9212 -11841.5 0.921 -11858.5 
2 original LTV, the 
negative equity dummy 
0.9211 -12038.2 0.9209 -12056.9 0.9212 -11845.2 0.921 -11862.2 
3 negative equity, original 
LTV 
0.9211 -12049.4 0.9209 -12068.1 0.9212 -11855.2 0.921 -11872.2 
 
 
 
Table 43. Coefficients for Las Vegas: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, the credit score only for default 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 negative equity is one of 
explanatory variables 
negative equity and the negative 
equity dummy are explanatory 
variables 
negative equity and original 
loan-to-value are explanatory 
variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.674 -- -0.674 -- -0.675 -- 
 (0.504)  (0.504)  (0.504)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 2.166 -- 2.166 -- 2.166 -- 
 (1.404)  (1.404)  (1.404)  
Call option part 2 4.922 -- 4.923 -- 4.923 -- 
 (1.539)  (1.539)  (1.539)  
Call option part 3 9.522 -- 9.522 -- 9.521 -- 
 (1.232)  (1.232)  (1.232)  
Call option part 4 2.995 -- 2.995 -- 2.996 -- 
 (0.766)  (0.766)  (0.766)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.653 -- 0.637 -- 0.652 
  (0.227)  (0.227)  (0.227) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.014 -- 0.012 -- 0.028 
  (0.098)  (0.098)  (0.098) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.035 -- 0.015 -- 0.032 
  (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.011) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.025 -- 0.028 -- 0.024 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.022 -- 0.022 -- 0.020 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 0.006 -- 0.006 -- 0.003 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- -- -- 0.404 -- -- 
    (0.360)   
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- -- -- -- -- 1.080 
      (1.419) 
Original LTV part 2 -- -- -- -- -- -1.350 
      (1.792) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -- -- -- -- 10.099 
      (8.380) 
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Original LTV part 4 -- -- -- -- -- 1.625 
      (1.020) 
Original LTV part 5 -- -- -- -- -- 1.140 
      (7.401) 
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 0.657 0.372 0.657 0.353 0.657 0.247 
 (0.138) (0.580) (0.138) (0.582) (0.138) (0.589) 
Log loan size part 2 0.948 1.146 0.948 1.167 0.948 1.178 
 (0.224) (0.704) (0.224) (0.704) (0.224) (0.705) 
Log loan size part 3 -0.101 -0.637 -0.101 -0.643 -0.101 -0.560 
 (0.249) (0.563) (0.249) (0.563) (0.249) (0.563) 
Log loan size part 4 0.404 -1.217 0.404 -1.215 0.404 -0.989 
 (0.220) (0.431) (0.220) (0.431) (0.220) (0.439) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 0.166 0.605 0.166 0.605 0.166 0.599 
 (0.015) (0.291) (0.015) (0.292) (0.015) (0.291) 
Loan age part 2 0.001 0.078 0.001 0.077 0.001 0.080 
 (0.006) (0.024) (0.006) (0.024) (0.006) (0.024) 
Loan age part 3 0.001 -0.018 0.001 -0.018 0.001 -0.013 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) 
Loan age part 4 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 -- -4.319 -- -4.219 -- -4.664 
  (2.618)  (2.619)  (2.643) 
The credit score part 2 -- -0.282 -- -0.334 -- -0.466 
  (3.584)  (3.585)  (3.592) 
The credit score part 3 -- -11.989 -- -11.938 -- -11.518 
  (5.191)  (5.189)  (5.187) 
The credit score part 4 -- -17.205 -- -17.193 -- -17.356 
  (8.697)  (8.696)  (8.712) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 0.739 0.671 0.739 0.655 0.739 0.838 
 (0.582) (1.782) (0.582) (1.780) (0.582) (1.788) 
DTI part 2 -1.280 2.275 -1.280 2.312 -1.279 2.279 
 (0.871) (2.175) (0.871) (2.174) (0.871) (2.176) 
DTI part 3 -0.720 1.049 -0.720 1.025 -0.720 0.849 
 (0.882) (1.856) (0.882) (1.856) (0.882) (1.859) 
DTI part 4 0.265 -0.400 0.265 -0.432 0.265 -0.463 
 (0.723) (1.263) (0.723) (1.264) (0.723) (1.261) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.575 -0.320 -0.575 -0.322 -0.575 -0.278 
 (0.309) (0.713) (0.309) (0.713) (0.309) (0.715) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 0.035 -0.009 0.035 -0.009 0.035 -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Time period part 2 -0.044 0.055 -0.044 0.056 -0.044 0.051 
 (0.001) (0.030) (0.001) (0.030) (0.001) (0.030) 
Time period part 3 0.016 -0.030 0.016 -0.030 0.016 -0.028 
 (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.002) (0.015) 
Time period part 4 -- 0.047 -- 0.047 -- 0.048 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 4487 
 
Table 44. Odds ratio for Las Vegas: Prepayment and default are dependent variables, the credit score only for default 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 negative equity is one of 
explanatory variables 
negative equity and the negative 
equity dummy are explanatory 
negative equity and original 
loan-to-value are explanatory 
143 
 
 
variables variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 0.509 -- 0.509 -- 0.509 -- 
 (0.257)  (0.257)  (0.257)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 8.725 -- 8.725 -- 8.725 -- 
 (12.249)  (12.248)  (12.248)  
Call option part 2 137.345 -- 137.352 -- 137.436 -- 
 (211.397)  (211.407)  (211.537)  
Call option part 3 13,661.278 -- 13,659.570 -- 13,648.683 -- 
 (16,835.353)  (16,833.252)  (16,819.863)  
Call option part 4 19.976 -- 19.982 -- 20.005 -- 
 (15.309)  (15.313)  (15.332)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.922 -- 1.890 -- 1.919 
  (0.435)  (0.430)  (0.435) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 1.014 -- 1.013 -- 1.029 
  (0.100)  (0.099)  (0.101) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- 1.035 -- 1.016 -- 1.033 
  (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.012) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 1.025 -- 1.028 -- 1.024 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 1.022 -- 1.022 -- 1.021 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 1.006 -- 1.006 -- 1.003 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- -- -- 1.497 -- -- 
    (0.539)   
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- -- -- -- -- 2.944 
      (4.177) 
Original LTV part 2 -- -- -- -- -- 0.259 
      (0.465) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -- -- -- -- 24,307.274 
      (203,693.947) 
Original LTV part 4 -- -- -- -- -- 5.079 
      (5.181) 
Original LTV part 5 -- -- -- -- -- 3.125 
      (23.131) 
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 1.930 1.450 1.930 1.423 1.930 1.281 
 (0.266) (0.842) (0.266) (0.829) (0.266) (0.755) 
Log loan size part 2 2.580 3.145 2.580 3.212 2.580 3.247 
 (0.578) (2.214) (0.578) (2.261) (0.578) (2.289) 
Log loan size part 3 0.904 0.529 0.904 0.526 0.904 0.571 
 (0.225) (0.298) (0.225) (0.296) (0.225) (0.322) 
Log loan size part 4 1.497 0.296 1.497 0.297 1.497 0.372 
 (0.329) (0.127) (0.329) (0.128) (0.329) (0.163) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 1.180 1.832 1.180 1.831 1.180 1.821 
 (0.017) (0.534) (0.017) (0.534) (0.017) (0.529) 
Loan age part 2 1.001 1.081 1.001 1.080 1.001 1.084 
 (0.006) (0.026) (0.006) (0.026) (0.006) (0.026) 
Loan age part 3 1.001 0.982 1.001 0.982 1.001 0.987 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) 
Loan age part 4 1.005 1.001 1.005 1.002 1.005 1.001 
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 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 -- 0.013 -- 0.015 -- 0.009 
  (0.035)  (0.039)  (0.025) 
The credit score part 2 -- 0.755 -- 0.716 -- 0.627 
  (2.704)  (2.568)  (2.253) 
The credit score part 3 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
The credit score part 4 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 2.094 1.955 2.094 1.924 2.094 2.312 
 (1.219) (3.485) (1.219) (3.425) (1.219) (4.133) 
DTI part 2 0.278 9.725 0.278 10.096 0.278 9.767 
 (0.242) (21.149) (0.242) (21.949) (0.242) (21.251) 
DTI part 3 0.487 2.853 0.487 2.787 0.487 2.338 
 (0.429) (5.295) (0.429) (5.171) (0.429) (4.346) 
DTI part 4 1.303 0.670 1.303 0.649 1.304 0.630 
 (0.943) (0.847) (0.943) (0.820) (0.943) (0.794) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.563 0.726 0.563 0.725 0.563 0.757 
 (0.174) (0.518) (0.174) (0.517) (0.174) (0.541) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 1.036 0.991 1.036 0.991 1.036 0.993 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Time period part 2 0.957 1.057 0.957 1.057 0.957 1.053 
 (0.001) (0.031) (0.001) (0.031) (0.001) (0.031) 
Time period part 3 1.016 0.971 1.016 0.971 1.016 0.972 
 (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.014) 
Time period part 4 -- 1.048 -- 1.048 -- 1.050 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 4487 
 
Table 45. Coefficients for Las Vegas: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, the credit score only for 90-days-
delinquency 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 negative equity is one of 
explanatory variables 
negative equity and the negative 
equity dummy are explanatory 
variables 
negative equity and original 
loan-to-value are explanatory 
variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.676 -- -0.676 -- -0.676 -- 
 (0.504)  (0.504)  (0.504)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 2.120 -- 2.120 -- 2.120 -- 
 (1.426)  (1.426)  (1.426)  
Call option part 2 4.970 -- 4.970 -- 4.970 -- 
 (1.565)  (1.565)  (1.565)  
Call option part 3 9.866 -- 9.866 -- 9.866 -- 
 (1.240)  (1.240)  (1.240)  
Call option part 4 3.302 -- 3.302 -- 3.304 -- 
 (0.763)  (0.763)  (0.763)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
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The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 0.603 -- 0.557 -- 0.589 
  (0.178)  (0.180)  (0.178) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 0.045 -- 0.041 -- 0.061 
  (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.090) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.049 -- 0.003 -- 0.047 
  (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.011) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.024 -- 0.032 -- 0.023 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.020 -- 0.019 -- 0.018 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 0.005 -- 0.005 -- 0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- -- -- 0.977 --  
    (0.316)   
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- -- -- -- -- 0.444 
      (1.295) 
Original LTV part 2 -- -- -- -- -- -0.976 
      (1.663) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -- -- -- -- 7.206 
      (7.833) 
Original LTV part 4 -- -- -- -- -- 1.504 
      (0.970) 
Original LTV part 5 -- -- -- -- -- 5.300 
      (6.384) 
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 0.661 0.119 0.661 0.062 0.661 0.031 
 (0.140) (0.525) (0.140) (0.529) (0.140) (0.535) 
Log loan size part 2 1.041 1.261 1.041 1.316 1.041 1.304 
 (0.219) (0.652) (0.219) (0.652) (0.219) (0.653) 
Log loan size part 3 -0.168 -0.676 -0.168 -0.690 -0.169 -0.607 
 (0.252) (0.538) (0.252) (0.538) (0.252) (0.538) 
Log loan size part 4 0.423 -0.746 0.423 -0.741 0.423 -0.551 
 (0.218) (0.380) (0.218) (0.381) (0.218) (0.388) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 0.164 0.350 0.164 0.348 0.164 0.345 
 (0.015) (0.101) (0.015) (0.101) (0.015) (0.101) 
Loan age part 2 0.002 0.029 0.002 0.029 0.002 0.033 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.018) 
Loan age part 3 0.001 -0.024 0.001 -0.025 0.001 -0.019 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) 
Loan age part 4 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 -- -5.413 -- -5.184 -- -5.648 
  (2.395)  (2.395)  (2.421) 
The credit score part 2 -- -0.943 -- -1.089 -- -0.938 
  (3.371)  (3.371)  (3.380) 
The credit score part 3 -- -12.784 -- -12.618 -- -12.417 
  (4.844)  (4.840)  (4.843) 
The credit score part 4 -- -13.987 -- -13.964 -- -14.219 
  (8.413)  (8.407)  (8.434) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 0.896 0.373 0.895 0.331 0.896 0.460 
 (0.585) (1.680) (0.585) (1.674) (0.585) (1.685) 
DTI part 2 -1.488 3.688 -1.488 3.787 -1.488 3.734 
 (0.875) (2.050) (0.875) (2.048) (0.875) (2.051) 
DTI part 3 -0.683 -0.142 -0.683 -0.198 -0.683 -0.411 
 (0.885) (1.741) (0.885) (1.740) (0.885) (1.745) 
DTI part 4 0.340 -0.545 0.340 -0.624 0.340 -0.594 
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 (0.722) (1.207) (0.722) (1.207) (0.722) (1.203) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
-0.601 -0.398 -0.601 -0.399 -0.601 -0.374 
 (0.309) (0.713) (0.309) (0.713) (0.309) (0.714) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 0.035 -0.007 0.035 -0.008 0.035 -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Time period part 2 -0.043 0.030 -0.043 0.031 -0.043 0.026 
 (0.001) (0.028) (0.001) (0.028) (0.001) (0.028) 
Time period part 3 0.015 -0.034 0.015 -0.033 0.015 -0.032 
 (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.014) 
Time period part 4 -- 0.039 -- 0.039 -- 0.041 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 4473 
 
 
Table 46. Odds ratios for Las Vegas: Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are dependent variables, the credit score only for 90-days-delinquency 
 #1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
#1 dataset with right censored 
mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 negative equity is one of 
explanatory variables 
negative equity and the negative 
equity dummy are explanatory 
variables 
negative equity and original 
loan-to-value are explanatory 
variables 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
Prepayment 90-days-
delinquency 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty 0.509 -- 0.509 -- 0.508 -- 
 (0.256)  (0.256)  (0.256)  
Call option variables       
Call option part 1 8.333 -- 8.332 -- 8.333 -- 
 (11.879)  (11.877)  (11.878)  
Call option part 2 143.972 -- 143.987 -- 144.064 -- 
 (225.292)  (225.317)  (225.437)  
Call option part 3 19,270.157 -- 19,264.699 -- 19,257.001 -- 
 (23,894.858)  (23,888.093)  (23,878.565)  
Call option part 4 27.163 -- 27.180 -- 27.210 -- 
 (20.715)  (20.728)  (20.751)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
      
The unemployment rate 
part 1 
-- 1.828 -- 1.745 -- 1.803 
  (0.326)  (0.314)  (0.322) 
The unemployment rate 
part 2 
-- 1.046 -- 1.042 -- 1.062 
  (0.093)  (0.093)  (0.095) 
Negative equity variables       
Negative equity part 1 -- 1.050 -- 1.003 -- 1.048 
  (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.011) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 1.024 -- 1.032 -- 1.023 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 1.020 -- 1.019 -- 1.019 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 1.005 -- 1.005 -- 1.002 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
The negative equity 
dummy 
-- -- -- 2.656 --  
    (0.838)   
Original loan-to-value 
variables 
      
Original LTV part 1 -- -- -- -- -- 1.558 
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      (2.018) 
Original LTV part 2 -- -- -- -- -- 0.377 
      (0.627) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -- -- -- -- 1,347.897 
      (10,557.942) 
Original LTV part 4 -- -- -- -- -- 4.501 
      (4.368) 
Original LTV part 5 -- -- -- -- -- 200.299 
      (1,278.672) 
Log loan size variables       
Log loan size part 1 1.938 1.126 1.938 1.064 1.938 1.032 
 (0.271) (0.591) (0.271) (0.563) (0.271) (0.552) 
Log loan size part 2 2.833 3.530 2.833 3.727 2.833 3.686 
 (0.621) (2.302) (0.622) (2.430) (0.622) (2.405) 
Log loan size part 3 0.845 0.508 0.845 0.502 0.845 0.545 
 (0.213) (0.273) (0.213) (0.270) (0.213) (0.293) 
Log loan size part 4 1.527 0.474 1.527 0.477 1.527 0.577 
 (0.333) (0.180) (0.333) (0.181) (0.333) (0.224) 
Loan age variables       
Loan age part 1 1.178 1.419 1.178 1.416 1.178 1.412 
 (0.017) (0.143) (0.017) (0.144) (0.017) (0.143) 
Loan age part 2 1.002 1.030 1.002 1.029 1.002 1.033 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.018) 
Loan age part 3 1.001 0.977 1.001 0.976 1.001 0.981 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) 
Loan age part 4 1.005 1.003 1.005 1.003 1.005 1.002 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
The credit score 
variables 
      
The credit score part 1 -- 0.004 -- 0.006 -- 0.004 
  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.009) 
The credit score part 2 -- 0.389 -- 0.337 -- 0.392 
  (1.312)  (1.135)  (1.324) 
The credit score part 3 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
The credit score part 4 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 -- 0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
      
DTI part 1 2.449 1.451 2.449 1.392 2.449 1.585 
 (1.432) (2.438) (1.432) (2.331) (1.432) (2.671) 
DTI part 2 0.226 39.981 0.226 44.140 0.226 41.864 
 (0.197) (81.945) (0.197) (90.397) (0.198) (85.874) 
DTI part 3 0.505 0.868 0.505 0.821 0.505 0.663 
 (0.447) (1.511) (0.447) (1.428) (0.447) (1.157) 
DTI part 4 1.405 0.580 1.405 0.536 1.406 0.552 
 (1.015) (0.700) (1.015) (0.647) (1.015) (0.664) 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
0.548 0.672 0.548 0.671 0.548 0.688 
 (0.170) (0.479) (0.170) (0.478) (0.170) (0.491) 
Time period variables       
Time period part 1 1.035 0.994 1.035 0.992 1.035 0.994 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Time period part 2 0.958 1.030 0.958 1.031 0.958 1.026 
 (0.001) (0.028) (0.001) (0.029) (0.001) (0.028) 
Time period part 3 1.015 0.967 1.015 0.967 1.015 0.969 
 (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.014) 
Time period part 4 -- 1.040 -- 1.040 -- 1.042 
  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
 
 
 Number of mortgages 4473 
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Table 47. Results comparison in Las Vegas 
  Prepayment and Default are Dependent Variables 
   
 
  Right censored dataset Deleting modification dataset 
   
 
 
 
  The credit score for 
prepayment and 
default 
The credit score for 
default 
The credit score for 
prepayment and 
default 
The credit score for 
default 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Certain explanatory 
variables 
Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC 
 
 
1 negative equity 0.9243 -15460.4 0.9243 -15453.3 
 
0.9232 
 
-15416.7 0.9231 -15408.7 
2 negative equity and the 
negative equity dummy 
0.9243 -15464 0.9243 -15456.9 
 
0.9232 -15420.3 0.9231 -15412.3 
3 negative equity and 
original LTV 
0.9243 -15477.9 0.9243 -15470.8 0.9232 -15434.2 0.9231 -15426.1 
 
 
  Prepayment and 90-days-delinquency are Dependent Variables 
   
 
  Right censored dataset Deleting modification dataset 
   
 
 
 
  The credit score for 
prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency 
The credit score for 
90-days-delinquency 
The credit score for 
prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency 
The credit score for 
90-days-delinquency 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rank Certain explanatory 
variables 
Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC Pseudo 
R2 
BIC 
 
 
1 negative equity 0.9218 -15691 0.9218 -15681.7 0.9216 -15476.2 0.9215 -15466.1 
2 negative equity and the 
negative equity dummy 
0.9218 -15691 0.9218 -15681.7 0.9216 -15476.8 0.9216 -15466.7 
3 negative equity and 
original LTV 
0.9218 -15708.7 
 
0.9218 -15699.4 0.9216 -15494.5 0.9216 -15484.4 
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equity. In Detroit, the value of negative equity and the negative equity dummy have an 
insignificant effect on the default decision, in conflict with hypotheses H4 and H5. Therefore, for 
the default/90-days-delinquency decision, negative equity is not a determinant factor.  
In Miami and Detroit, the consistently positive effect of the loan-to-value supports H6 
that mortgages with a higher LTV (a lower down-payment) are more likely to default (have 
delinquency). Moreover, in Detroit, the effect of the original loan-to-value are more significant 
compared with the effect of the value of negative equity, which makes it become a more 
determinant factor for default/delinquent decision.  In Tampa and Las Vegas, the results of the 
original loan-to-value partially support H6. In Tampa, when the original loan-to-value is above 
the third quartile, its effect becomes insignificantly negative. In Las, Vegas, when the original 
loan-to-value is above the first quartile and is below the second quartile, its effect becomes 
insignificantly negative. 
In Miami and Las Vegas, the credit score is only used to explain the default/90-days-
delinquency risk. The negative effect of the credit score in these two MSAs supports H7 that 
households with higher credit score are less likely to default their mortgages. In Tampa and 
Detroit, the credit score is used to explain both termination risks. The effect of the credit score on 
the default/90-days-delinquency risk is negative which supports H7 and its effect on the 
prepayment risk is positive which indicates that households with higher credit score are more 
likely to prepay their mortgages.  
In Miami, Tampa, and Las Vegas, the debt-to-income ratio has no clear effect on both the 
prepayment risk and the default/90-days-delinquency risk. In Detroit, the debt-to-income ratio 
has a positive effect on the default/90-days-delinquency risk and has no clear effect on the 
prepayment risk.  
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To argue that the results of Miami, Tampa, Detroit and Las Vegas are significantly 
different from those for Phoenix, the results of these four MSAs are compared with the 95% 
confident interval of the coefficients for Phoenix. The models used for comparison include the 
value of negative equity, the negative equity dummy and the original loan-to-value as 
explanatory variables. Moreover, the credit score is used to explain both prepayment and 
default/90-days-delinquency risk. The comparison results are listed in table 48.  
[insert Table 48 here] 
The main comparison results show that, for Miami, the coefficients of the second and the 
fourth spline of the value of call option, the coefficient of the first spline of the unemployment 
rate and the coefficient of the second spline of the value of negative equity for the 90-days-
delinquency risk, the coefficients of the third and the fourth spline of original loan-to-value, the 
coefficients of log loan size for prepayment risk, the coefficients of loan age for the default and 
90-days-delinquency risk, the coefficients of the first and the third spline of the credit score, and 
the coefficients of the debt-to-income ratio for the default and 90-days-delinquency risk are 
outside the 95% confidence interval of the results in Phoenix.  
For Tampa, the coefficient of the first spline of the value of call option, the coefficient of 
the first spline of the unemployment rate for default, the coefficient of the second spline of the 
unemployment rate for 90-days-delinquency, the coefficient of the third spline of the value of 
negative equity for the 90-days-delinquency risk, the coefficients of the third and the fourth 
spline of original loan-to-value, the coefficients of the first and the fourth spline of log loan size 
for prepayment risk, the coefficients of the loan age for prepayment, the coefficient of the second 
spline of the credit score, and the coefficients of the first and the second spline of the debt-to- 
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Table 48. Results comparison for five MSAs 
Explanatory Variable Miami Tampa Detroit Las Vegas 
Prepayment penalty The coefficient is within 
the confidence interval of 
Phoenix  
The coefficient is within 
the confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
The coefficient is outside 
the confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
The coefficient is within 
the  confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
The value of call 
option 
The coefficients of the 
second and the fourth 
spline are outside the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix, and the 
coefficients of the first and 
the third spline are within 
the interval 
The coefficient of the first 
spline is outside the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix, the coefficients of 
other splines are within the 
interval 
The coefficients of the 
second and the fourth spline 
are outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix, and the 
coefficients of the first and 
the third spline are within 
the interval 
The coefficients of all 
splines are outside the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
The unemployment 
rate 
For default, the 
coefficients of all splines 
are within the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For default, the coefficient 
of the first spline is outside 
the confidence interval of 
Phoenix, and the 
coefficient of the second 
spline is within the interval 
For default, the coefficient 
of the second spline is 
outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix, and the 
coefficient of the first spline 
is within the interval 
For default, the coefficients 
of all splines are outside 
the confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient of the first 
spline is outside the 
confidence interval and the 
coefficient of the second 
spline is within the interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient of the 
second spline is outside the 
confidence interval and the 
coefficient of the first 
spline is within the interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of all splines 
are outside the confidence 
interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of all 
splines are outside the 
confidence interval 
The value of negative 
equity 
For default, the 
coefficients of all splines 
are within the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For default, the 
coefficients of all splines 
are within the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For default, the coefficients 
of all splines are outside the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For default, the coefficients 
of all splines are within the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient of the 
second spline is outside the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient of the third 
spline is outside the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of the 
second, third and fourth 
spline are outside the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of all 
splines are within the 
confidence interval 
The negative equity 
dummy 
For default, the coefficient 
is within the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For default, the coefficient 
is within the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For default, the coefficient 
is outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For default, the coefficient 
is outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient is within the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient is within the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient is outside the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient is within the 
confidence interval 
Original LTV For default, the 
coefficients of the third 
and the fourth spline are 
outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix, the 
coefficients of other 
splines are within the 
interval 
For default, the coefficient 
of the fourth spline is 
outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix, the 
coefficients of other 
splines are within the 
interval 
For default, the coefficient 
of the fourth spline is 
outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix, the 
coefficients of other splines 
are within the interval 
For default, the coefficients 
of the second, third and 
fourth spline are outside 
the confidence interval of 
Phoenix, the coefficients of 
other splines are within the 
interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient of the third 
spline is outside the 
confidence interval and the 
coefficients of other 
splines are within the 
interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of the third 
and the fourth spline are 
outside the confidence 
interval and the 
coefficients of other 
splines are within the 
interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of the third 
and the fourth spline are 
outside the confidence 
interval and the coefficients 
of other splines are within 
the interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of the first, 
third and the fourth spline 
are outside the confidence 
interval 
Log loan size For prepayment, the 
coefficients of the second, 
third and fourth spline are 
outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficients of the first and 
the fourth spline are 
outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficients of the third and 
the fourth spline are outside 
the confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficients of the third and 
the fourth spline are 
outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For default, the 
coefficients of all splines 
are within the confidence 
interval 
For default, the 
coefficients of all splines 
are within the confidence 
interval 
For default, the coefficients 
of the first and the third 
spline are outside the 
confidence interval 
For default, the coefficients 
of the second and the 
fourth spline are outside 
the confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of all 
splines are within the 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of all 
splines are within the 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient of the first 
spline is outside the 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of the 
second and the fourth 
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confidence interval confidence interval confidence interval spline are outside the 
confidence interval 
Loan age For prepayment, the 
coefficients of the second 
and fourth spline are 
outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficients of the first, 
third and fourth spline are 
outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficients of all splines are 
outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix  
For prepayment, the 
coefficient of the first 
spline is outside the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For default, the 
coefficients of all splines 
are outside the confidence 
interval 
For default, the coefficient 
of the second spline is 
outside the confidence 
interval 
For default, the coefficients 
of all splines are outside the 
confidence interval 
For default, the coefficients 
of the third and fourth 
spline are outside the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of all 
splines are outside the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient of the first 
spline is outside the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of all splines 
are outside the confidence 
interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of the first, 
third and fourth spline are 
outside the confidence 
interval 
The credit score For prepayment, the 
coefficients of the first and 
third spline are outside the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficient of the second 
spline is outside the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficients of all splines are 
outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficients of the second 
and fourth spline are 
outside the confidence 
interval of Phoenix 
For default, the 
coefficients of all splines 
are within the confidence 
interval 
For default, the 
coefficients of all splines 
are within the confidence 
interval 
For default, the coefficients 
of all splines are within the 
confidence interval 
For default, the coefficients 
of the second and third are 
outside the confidence 
interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
coefficients of all splines 
are within the confidence 
interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
coefficients of all splines 
are within the confidence 
interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
coefficients of all splines are 
within the confidence 
interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient of the 
second spline is outside the 
confidence interval 
Debt-to-income ratio For prepayment, the 
coefficient of the first 
spline is outside the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficient of the fourth 
spline is outside the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficients of the second 
and fourth spline are outside 
the confidence of Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficients of the first and 
second spline are outside 
the confidence of Phoenix 
For default, the 
coefficients of the first, 
second and fourth spline 
are outside the confidence 
interval 
For default, the 
coefficients of the first and 
second spline are outside 
the confidence interval 
For default, the coefficients 
of the third and fourth spline 
are outside the confidence 
interval 
For default, the coefficients 
of all splines are within the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of the 
second and fourth spline 
are outside the confidence 
interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient of the first 
spline is outside the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient of the third 
spline is outside the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficients of all 
splines are within the 
confidence interval 
The dummy for the 
number of units  
For prepayment, the 
coefficient is within the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficient is within the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficient is within the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For prepayment, the 
coefficient is within the 
confidence interval of 
Phoenix 
For default, the coefficient 
is within the confidence 
interval 
For default, the coefficient 
is within the confidence 
interval 
For default, the coefficient 
is outside the confidence 
interval 
For default, the coefficient 
is within the confidence 
interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient is within the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient is within the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient is outside the 
confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, 
the coefficient is within the 
confidence interval 
The confidence interval indicates the 95% confidence interval of the coefficients for Phoenix. 
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income ratio for default and 90-days-delinquency are outside the 95% confidence interval of the 
results in Phoenix.  
For Detroit, the coefficient of the indicator for prepayment penalty, the coefficient of the 
second and the fourth spline of the value of call option, the coefficients of the unemployment 
rate, the coefficients of the value of negative equity, the coefficient of the negative equity 
dummy, the coefficients of the third and the fourth spline of original loan-to-value, the 
coefficients of the first, the third and the fourth spline of log loan size, the coefficients of the loan 
age, the coefficients of the credit score for prepayment, and the coefficients of the second, the 
third and the fourth spline of the debt-to-income ratio, and the coefficient of The dummy for the 
number of units for default and 90-days-delinquency are outside the 95% confidence interval of 
the results in Phoenix. Overall, almost all of the coefficients in Detroit are outside the confident 
interval.   
For Las Vegas, the coefficients of the value of call option, the coefficients of the 
unemployment rate, the coefficient of the negative equity dummy for default, the coefficients of 
the first, the third and the fourth spline of original loan-to-value, the coefficients of the second, 
the third and the fourth spline of log loan size, the coefficients of the first, the third and the 
fourth spline of loan age, the coefficients of the second, the third and fourth spline of the credit 
score, and the coefficients of the first and the second spline of the debt-to-income ratio for 
prepayment are outside the 95% confidence interval of the results in Phoenix. 
To sum up, most of the results in Miami, Tampa, and Las Vegas support Hypotheses H1 
to H8, and some of the results in these MSAs are significantly different from the results in 
Phoenix. In Detroit, the results partially support Hypothesis and almost all of the results are 
154 
 
 
significantly different from the results in Phoenix. Therefore, in the following section, this paper 
presents a Wald test to show the equality of results across MSAs. 
The Wald Test for the Equality of the Coefficients among Five MSAs 
Follain and Giertz (2016) find evidence against the assumption of a national housing 
market. A related question is whether financial market for housing differs across MSAs in 
United State. In this section, a formal statistical test for whether people with similar 
characteristics across MSAs face similar outcome risks is presented.  A Wald test is constructed 
to test the equality of the coefficients among five MSAs. 
Assume the null hypothesis is:  
𝐻0:⁡𝛽𝑝1 = 𝛽𝑝2 = 𝛽𝑝3 = 𝛽𝑝4 = 𝛽𝑝5⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝛽𝑑1 = 𝛽𝑑2 = 𝛽𝑑3 = 𝛽𝑑4 = 𝛽𝑑5 
In which the 𝛽𝑝1and ⁡𝛽𝑑1 are the vectors of coefficients for the prepayment and default/90-days-
delinquency, respectively, for Phoenix; 𝛽𝑝2 and ⁡𝛽𝑑2  are the vectors of coefficients for the 
prepayment and default/90-days-delinquency, respectively, for Miami;  𝛽𝑝3 and ⁡𝛽𝑑3  are the 
vectors of coefficients for the prepayment and default/90-days-delinquency, respectively, for 
Tampa;  𝛽𝑝4and ⁡𝛽𝑑4  are the vectors of coefficients for the prepayment and default/90-days-
delinquency, respectively, for Detroit;  𝛽𝑝5 and ⁡𝛽𝑑5  are the vectors of coefficients for the 
prepayment and default/90-days-delinquency, respectively, for Las Vegas.  The null hypothesis 
can also be presented as 
𝐻0:⁡𝛽𝑝1 − 𝛽𝑝2 = 𝛽𝑝2 − 𝛽𝑝3 = 𝛽𝑝3 − 𝛽𝑝4 = 𝛽𝑝4 − 𝛽𝑝5 = 0⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝛽𝑑1 − 𝛽𝑑2 = 𝛽𝑑2 − 𝛽𝑑3 = 𝛽𝑑3 − 𝛽𝑑4 = 𝛽𝑑4 − 𝛽𝑑5 = 0 
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A general form of the null hypothesis will be 𝐻0:⁡𝑅𝛽 = 0. Assume the vector of coefficients 𝛽 is 
constructed as 𝛽 = [𝛽𝑝1⁡𝛽𝑑1⁡𝛽𝑝2⁡𝛽𝑑2⁡𝛽𝑝3⁡𝛽𝑑3⁡𝛽𝑝4⁡𝛽𝑑4⁡𝛽𝑝5⁡𝛽𝑑5]
′, to find the general form of the 
𝐻0, the 𝑅 matrix is assumed to be 
𝑅 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 1
−1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ −1
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 1
−1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ −1
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 1
−1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ −1
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 1
−1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ −1]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then  
𝑅𝛽 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 1
−1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ −1
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 1
−1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ −1
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 1
−1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ −1
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
0 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 0
1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 1
−1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ −1]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛽𝑝1
𝛽𝑑1
𝛽𝑝2
𝛽𝑑2
𝛽𝑝3
𝛽𝑑3
𝛽𝑝4
𝛽𝑑4
𝛽𝑝5
𝛽𝑑5]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝛽𝑝1 − 𝛽𝑝2
𝛽𝑑1 − 𝛽𝑑2
𝛽𝑝2 − 𝛽𝑝3
𝛽𝑑2 − 𝛽𝑑3
𝛽𝑝3 − 𝛽𝑝4
𝛽𝑑3 − 𝛽𝑑4
𝛽𝑝4 − 𝛽𝑝5
𝛽𝑑4 − 𝛽𝑑5]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, the Wald test will be 
𝑊 = (𝑅?̂? − 0)
′
[𝑅⁡𝐸𝑠𝑡⁡𝐴𝑠𝑦⁡𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?)𝑅′]
−1
(𝑅?̂? − 0) 
= (𝑅?̂?)
′
[𝑅⁡𝐸𝑠𝑡⁡𝐴𝑠𝑦⁡𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?)𝑅′]
−1
(𝑅?̂?)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
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The W belongs to a Chi-square distribution with the degree of freedom equal to the number of 
restrictions. 
This paper only tests the equality of the coefficients for the important variables to 
determine the prepayment and default (90-days-deliqnuency) risk. The coefficients of the 
indicator of the prepayment penalty, the first and the last spline of the value of the call option, 
the first and the last spline of the value of negative equity and the negative equity dummy are 
tested. The results show that, W = 6065.853 for the model using the prepayment and default as 
the dependent variables, and W = 3837.716 for the model using the prepayment and 90-days-
delinquency as the dependent variables. Both values are larger than 𝜒2
0.05
= 36.415  at the 
degree of freedom equal to 24. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and the coefficients 
estimated for each MSA are not equal. The inequality of the coefficients among five MSAs 
indicates that there is not a national financial market for housing and that the financial markets 
for housing are heavily influenced by local characteristics. Bradley, Cutts and Liu (2015) and 
Lam, Dunsky, and Kelly (working paper) fail to consider this in their studies and they pool 
observations across locations to analyze the termination risks of single-family mortgages. 
Summary  
After analyzing mortgage termination behaviors in five MSAs using different dependent 
variables and explanatory variables, results indicate the signs of important explanatory variables 
are consistent with the proposed hypotheses, with some exceptions. Moreover, the results of the 
Wald test also support the argument that there is not a national financial market for housing and 
that the financial markets for housing are heavily influenced by local characteristics. The 
important results are summarized below. 
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Hypothesis 1 posits a negative relationship between the prepayment penalty indicator and 
the prepayment risk and is supported by the results of Phoenix, Miami, Tampa and Las Vegas. 
However, the effect of the indicator on the prepayment risk is insignificant in Detroit.  
Hypothesis 2 states a positive relationship exists between the value of the call option and 
the prepayment risk and is supported in all MSAs included in this paper. The significantly 
positive effect of the value of the call option supports the argument that when the value of the 
call option is “in the money,” households have more incentive to prepay their mortgages. 
However, the positive effect may not be significant in a few ranges of the value. 
Hypothesis 3 states the monthly unemployment rate has a positive effect on the default 
risk and is partially supported by the results discussed in this paper. The positive effect of the 
unemployment rate exists in Phoenix, Tampa, Detroit and Las Vegas. When the unemployment 
rate is below the second quartile, the positive effect is significant in Phoenix, Miami and Las 
Vegas and it is significant in Tampa when the rate is above the second quartile. The effect of the 
unemployment rate on the 90-days-delinquency is very similar to its effect on the default.  
Hypothesis 4 posits a positive relationship between negative equity and the default risk 
and is supported by the results of Phoenix, Miami, Tampa and Las Vegas. In Phoenix and Las 
Vegas, when negative equity ranges between the first quartile and the third quartile, the negative 
effect is significant. In Miami, when negative equity either falls below the first quartile or rises 
above the second quartile, the impact is significant, and in Tampa, the effect is only significant 
when negative equity falls below the first quartile. On the other hand, in Detroit, negative equity 
has a significantly positive effect on the default decision when it falls below the first quartile, 
and the effect becomes insignificantly negative when it rises above the first quartile. The effect 
of negative equity on the 90-days-delinquency is very similar to its effect on the default. 
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Hypothesis 5 suggests a positive coefficient for the negative equity dummy and is 
supported by all MSAs discussed in this paper. In Phoenix, Miami, Tampa and Las Vegas, the 
negative equity dummy has a significantly positive relationship with the default/90-days-
delinquency risk. However, only in Detroit is the effect insignificant.  
Hypothesis 6 posits that the original loan-to-value positively affects the default risk and is 
supported by the results.  In Phoenix, Miami, Tampa and Detroit, the original loan-to-value ratio 
is significantly and positively correlated to the default/90-days-delinquency risk in most ranges. 
However, when the ratio ranges between the 75th and 95th percentile for Phoenix; between the 
first and the third quartile for Miami; above the third quartile for Tampa; and between the first 
and the third quartile for Detroit, the effect becomes insignificant. On the other hand, in Las 
Vegas, the effect of original loan-to-value on the default/90-days-delinquency risk is 
insignificant. 
Hypothesis 7 states that the effect of the credit score on the default risk is negative and is 
supported by results in all MSAs. This paper discusses the effect of the credit score on both 
prepayment and default/90-days-delinquency risks, as well as the effect of the credit score only 
on the default/90-days-delinquency risk. 
Results for Phoenix are summarized below. Generally, the credit score has a strongly 
positive effect on the prepayment risk (except when the credit score ranges between the second 
and the third quartile when the effect becomes insignificant). Comparatively, it has a strong 
negative impact on the default risk (except when the credit score ranges between the second and 
the third quartile and the effect becomes insignificant). When using the credit score only in the 
default risk and not in the prepayment risk, the effect of the credit score is still significantly 
negative, but the coefficients decrease slightly.  
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For Miami and Las Vegas, the models with the credit score only in the default/90-days-
delinquency risk are showed in the paper because these models have relatively larger BICs. The 
effect of the credit score on the default/90-days-delinquency risk is negative, and the effect is 
significant when the credit score falls below the first quartile or rises above the second quartile.  
For Tampa and Detroit, the models with the credit score in both prepayment and default 
risks are showed also because of the larger BIC. The effect of the credit score on the prepayment 
risk is positive. However, the effect is significant when the credit score rises above the third 
quartile for Tampa and falls below the first quartile or ranges between the second and the third 
quartile for Detroit. Comparatively, the effect of the credit score on the default/90-days-
delinquency risk is significantly negative, and the effect is insignificant for the credit score 
ranges between the second and the third quartile.  
Hypothesis 8 posits that the relationship between the debt-to-income ratio and the default 
risk is positive and is partially supported by the results. For Phoenix, Miami, Tampa and Las 
Vegas the effect of the debt-to-income ratio is not consistent for the prepayment risk, and it has a 
insignificantly positive relationship with the default/90-days-delinquency risk. For Detroit, the 
effect of the debt-to-income ratio is inconsistent for both the prepayment and default/90-days-
delinquency risks.  
In Phoenix, Miami, Tampa and Las Vegas, the effect of The dummy for the number of 
units is negative on both the prepayment and default/90-days-delinquency risks. This indicates 
mortgages covering more than one house unit are less likely to prepay or default. However, in 
Detroit, The dummy for the number of units has a significantly negative impact on the 
prepayment risk and a significantly positive impact on the default/90-days-delinquency risk. 
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There, mortgages covering more than one house unit are more likely to default/delinquent than to 
prepay.  
Generally, the younger mortgages, which stay on the market less than one or two years, 
are more likely to be either prepaid or defaulted/delinquent. But the older mortgages, which 
survived in the market for a long time, are more likely to be prepaid than defaulted or delinquent. 
However, the results of this study indicate the effect of the log loan size is highly sensitive to 
which dependent variables and explanatory variables are being used.  
This study also constructs a Wald test to test the equality of the coefficients among five 
MSAs and the result shows that the coefficients among MSAs are significantly different.  This 
result indicates that there is not a national financial market for housing and that the financial 
markets for housing are heavily influenced by local characteristics. Bradley, Cutts and Liu (2015) 
and Lam, Dunsky, and Kelly (working paper) do not consider this in their studies and they pool 
observations across locations to analyze the termination risks of single-family mortgages. 
Chapter 2 
Introduction 
In earlier studies, the proportional hazards model has been widely used to analyze the 
prepayment or default risks of mortgages. Green and Shoven (1986), Schwart and Torous (1989), 
Quigley and Van Order (1990), Follain, Ondrich and Sinha (1995) use this model to analyze the 
prepayment risk; Quigley and Van Order (1991, 1995) wrote a series of papers on implementing 
the method to estimate the default risk. The basic likelihood function based on the proportional 
hazards model is showed in the following: 
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𝑙(𝛽) =∏{[1 − exp(− exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽))]
𝛿𝑖 ×∏exp(−exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽))
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
}
𝑁
𝑖=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.1 
where 𝛿𝑖  equal 1 when individual 𝑖  terminates the status, 𝑧𝑖(𝑡)  is the individual specific 
characteristics, and 𝛽 is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. 
In more recent studies, the competing risks model has become a popular methodology to 
analyze the prepayment and default risks simultaneously in the mortgage market. Among 
different frameworks used to construct the competing risks model, the proportional hazards 
model is widely used. One way to directly construct the competing risks model using the 2.1 
framework is  
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑙(𝛽) =∏∏[(1 − exp⁡(− exp(𝑧𝑝(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)))exp⁡(−exp(𝑧𝑑(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))]
𝛿𝑝
[(1
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
− exp⁡(− exp(𝑧𝑑(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)))exp⁡(− exp(𝑧𝑝(𝑠)𝛽𝑝))]
𝛿𝑝
exp (−(exp(𝑧𝑑(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
+ exp(𝑧𝑝(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)))
1−𝛿𝑝−𝛿𝑑
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.2⁡⁡⁡ 
An important assumption for model 2.2 is that the time in the analysis is a discrete time. 
When a default/prepayment occurs in the time period 𝑡 − 1  to 𝑡 , regardless of whether the 
mortgage is continued or prepaid/defaulted after time 𝑡 , the mortgage is treated as 
default/prepayment and is removed from the sample. One significant weakness of this 
assumption is that it does not consider the time period between the default/prepayment point and 
the time point 𝑡. Therefore, model 2.2 could lead to estimation bias. To include the time period 
between the default/prepayment point and the time point 𝑡 in the calculation, Sueyoshi (1992) 
introduces a methodology based on double integrals to construct a more accurate competing risks 
model. The concept of the methodology is widely used in later studies. Deng, Quigley and Van 
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Order (1996; 2000) and Deng (1997) are examples of implementing the method to analyze the 
termination risks of the thirty-year, fixed-rate, single-family mortgages, and Wenyi Huang and 
Jan Ondrich (2002) is an example of analyzing the termination risks of the multifamily 
mortgages. 
Although the model based on Sueyoshi’s methodology is widely used in the literature, the 
process of constructing the competing risks model is ambiguous. This paper clearly presents the 
process of calculating this model based on the proportional hazards model using Sueyoshi’s 
method and then implements the model to analyze the termination risks of single-family 
mortgages in Phoenix.  
Ding, Tian, Yu and Guo (2012) construct a new model based on a class of transformation 
survival models to analyze the risk of bankruptcy. The model is controlled by a transformation 
parameter 𝑐. When 𝑐 = 0, the model is the proportional hazards model and when 𝑐 > 0, the 
model transfers to different forms. An important argument made by the authors is that the 
proportional hazards model is not the best model to analyze the risk of bankruptcy. Therefore, a 
question is raised by this argument: whether the proportional hazards model is the best model to 
analyze the default/prepayment risk of single-family mortgages, and if it is not which model will 
be the best? 
To answer these questions, this paper constructs a new competing risks model based on a 
class of transformation survival models and Sueyoshi’s method and uses it to analyze the 
termination risks of the single-family mortgages in Phoenix. The model is controlled by the 
transformation parameters 𝑐𝑝 (for the prepayment risk) and 𝑐𝑑 (for the default risk). When 𝑐𝑝 =
0 and 𝑐𝑑 = 0, it is the competing risks model based on the proportional hazards model, and when 
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𝑐𝑝 > 0and 𝑐𝑑 > 0, its framework is changed according to the value of 𝑐𝑝 and 𝑐𝑑 . The results 
show that the proportional hazards framework is the best model to estimate the prepayment risk, 
but it is not the best model to estimate the default/90-days-delinquency risk.  
The results of both models support the important arguments made in Chapter 1.  The 
prepayment penalty has a significantly negative effect on the prepayment decision. The effect of 
the value of the call option on the prepayment risk is significantly positive. In addition, the 
unemployment rate has a positive relationship with the default/90-days-delinquency. Moreover, 
the value of negative equity, the negative equity dummy and the original loan-to-value generally 
are positively related to the default/90-days-delinquency. As expected, the credit score has a 
strong positive effect on the prepayment; comparatively, it has a strong negative impact on the 
default. The debt-to-income ratio does not appear to affect prepayment, but it has a positive 
effect on the default/90-days-delinquency. Comparing the coefficients estimated by three 
competing risks models, the coefficients estimated by the model based on the Sueyoshi’s 
proportional hazards are insignificantly distinguishable in sign from those estimated by the 
model based on multinomial logit. Moreover, the coefficients estimated by the model based on a 
class of transformation survival models are significantly different from those estimated by the 
other two models.  
The remaining information in this chapter is separated into three sections. In section II, 
literature reviews and the detail process of constructing the competing risks model is introduced. 
In section III, the dataset and results are clearly discussed. The summary is offered in section IV. 
Literature Review 
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As noted above, the proportional hazards model is the most popular method used to 
analyze the prepayment or default risks of mortgages in previous studies. 
As the first researcher who introduced the proportional hazards model into the discrete 
time survival analysis, Cox (1972, 1975) discusses a method to estimate the coefficients in the 
proportional hazards model by a partial likelihood function. However, the method is not 
computationally feasible with large data sets that contain many failure times or with grouped 
survival data.  
Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) 11 develop a maximum likelihood estimation to estimate 
the coefficients in the proportional hazards model and implement it to analyze the survival rate 
of 11,442 breast cancer patients. The detail process of constructing the model follows. 
Let 𝑇𝑖 be a random variable representing the failure time of individual 𝑖. Let 𝑍𝑖(𝑡) be a 
vector of time-dependent characteristics for individual 𝑖. Finally, let 𝛿𝑖 equal 1 when individual 𝑖 
terminate the status. Then the hazard for individual 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝜆𝑖(𝑡), is defined by the equation 
lim
ℎ→0+
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑡 + ℎ > 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡|𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡]
ℎ
= 𝜆𝑖(𝑡) 
The hazard is parameterized using the Cox proportional hazards form 
𝜆𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜆0(𝑡) exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.3 
where 𝜆0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard at time 𝑡. 
The probability of an individual surviving until time 𝑡+1 conditional on that it has 
survived until 𝑡 is given by  
                                                          
11 The model introduced by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) is a general model, which can be implemented in any 
survival analysis. However, this paper mainly focuses on using it to analyze the termination risk of single-family 
mortgages. 
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𝑃[𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 + 1|𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡] = exp (−∫ 𝜆𝑖(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑡+1
𝑡
) 
= exp (− exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽)∫ 𝜆0(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑡+1
𝑡
)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= exp(−exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽 + 𝛾(𝑡)))⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= exp(−exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽))⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.4 
where 𝛾(𝑡) = ln⁡(∫ 𝜆0(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑡+1
𝑡
), 𝑧𝑖(𝑡) contains 𝑍𝑖(𝑡) and the baseline,  and the  𝛽 in the last line 
of 2.2 contains 𝛾(𝑡). 
The likelihood function for a sample of N individuals will be 
𝑙(𝛽) =∏{[1 − exp(− exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽))]
𝛿𝑖 ×∏exp(−exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽))
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
}
𝑁
𝑖=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.5 
and the log-likelihood function is  
𝐿(𝛽) =∑{𝛿𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔[1 − exp⁡(−exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽))] −∑exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
}
𝑁
𝑖−1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.6 
where t = min⁡(int(Ti), Ci) and Ci⁡ is the censoring time. 
Meyer (1990) points out that the Prentice and Gloeckler approach makes no assumptions 
about the baseline hazard. By reconstructing the function 2.3, Meyer includes unobserved 
heterogeneity in the following the model: 
𝜆𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜃𝑖𝜆0(𝑡) exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.7 
where 𝜃𝑖  is a random variable that is assumed to be independent of 𝑍𝑖(𝑡) . Then the log-
likelihood function 2.6 becomes 
166 
 
 
𝐿(𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜃) =∑{𝑙𝑜𝑔[∫exp [−𝜃∑exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑠)𝛽 + 𝛾(𝑠))
𝑡−1
𝑠=0
] 𝑑𝑢(𝜃) − 𝛿𝑖∫exp [−𝜃∑exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑠)𝛽 + 𝛾(𝑠))
𝑡
𝑠=0
] 𝑑𝑢(𝜃)]}
𝑁
𝑖−1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.8 
𝑢(𝜃) is the distribution of 𝜃 and the commonly used distribution is the gamma distribution with 
mean one and variance 𝜎212. Function 2.6 is the fundamental approach used in the previous 
studies to analyze either the prepayment or default risks in the mortgages market. Studies by 
Green and Shoven (1986), Schwart and Torous (1989) and Quigley and Van Order (1990) 
implement the method to analyze the prepayment risk, and studies by Quigley and Van Order 
(1991, 1995) use the method to analyze the default risk. When the unobserved heterogeneity is 
considered in the analysis, function 2.8 is applied. The paper by Follain, Ondrich and Sinha 
(1995) is one of the examples that uses the model to analyze the prepayment risk of the 
multifamily mortgages.  
The methodology by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Meyer (1990) is only useful for 
analyzing the event with a single failure type. When there are two or more failure types involved 
into the analysis, which means there are at least three choices (continue the event, terminate the 
event with prepayment, and terminate the event with default) to be chosen in each time period, 
the competing risks model should be applied.  
Sueyoshi (1992) develops the proportional hazards model into a competing risks model 
by writing the likelihood of an event that has not terminated at the end of the sample period 𝑡 as:  
𝐿𝑡
𝐶(𝛽) = ∫ ⁡∫ 𝑓(𝑢1, 𝑢2)𝑑𝑢1𝑑𝑢2
∞
α𝑡
2
∞
α𝑡
1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.9 
                                                          
12 If the distribution for 𝜃 is gamma with mean one and variance 𝜎2, the model 2.8 becomes: 
𝐿(𝛽,𝛾,𝜎2) =∑log⁡{[1 + 𝜎2∑exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑠)𝛽 + 𝛾(𝑠))
𝑡−1
𝑠=0
]
−𝜎−2
− 𝛿𝑖 [1 + 𝜎
2∑exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑠)𝛽 + 𝛾(𝑠))
𝑡
𝑠=0
]
−𝜎−2
}
𝑁
𝑖−1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.8 
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The likelihood of an event terminating with prepayment is 
𝐿𝑡
𝑃(𝛽) = ∫ ⁡∫ 𝑓(𝑢1, 𝑢2)𝑑𝑢1𝑑𝑢2
∞
g(𝑢1)
α𝑡
1
α𝑡−1
1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.10 
in which 𝑔(𝑢1) = ⁡α𝑡−1
2 + (𝑢1 − α𝑡−1
1 )
α𝑡
2−α𝑡−1
2
α𝑡
1−α𝑡−1
1 . 
Finally, the likelihood of an event terminating with default is 
𝐿𝑡
𝐷(𝛽) = ∫ ⁡∫ 𝑓(𝑢1, 𝑢2)𝑑𝑢1𝑑𝑢2
∞
g(𝑢2)
α𝑡
2
α𝑡−1
2
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.11 
in which  
𝑔(𝑢2) = ⁡α𝑡−1
1 + (𝑢2 − α𝑡−1
2 )
α𝑡
1 − α𝑡−1
1
α𝑡
2 − α𝑡−1
2  
𝑓(𝑢) = exp(−𝑢)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
α𝑡
1 =∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
α𝑡
2 =∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
α𝑡−1
1 =∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)⁡
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
α𝑡−1
2 =∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
The competing risks model based on the proportional hazards model will be 
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⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐿(𝛽) =∑∑{𝛿𝑝 [− ln (1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
) + ln⁡(1 − exp(−(exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝) + exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))))]
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝛿𝑑 [− ln (1 +
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
) + ln⁡(1 − exp(−(exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑) + exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝))))]
+ 𝛿𝑐 [−exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)− exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]} ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.12 
in which 𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡), 𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡) are vectors of time-dependent explanatory variables for event 𝑖  to be 
terminated with prepayment and default, respectively. 𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝑑  are coefficients to be estimated. 
Moreover, 𝛿𝑝 is the indicator for whether prepayment is chosen, 𝛿𝑑 is the indicator for whether 
default is chosen and 𝛿𝑐 is the indicator for whether the event continues without termination. The 
general calculation process is shown in Appendix B.  
The basic structure of the above competing risks model is frequently used in more recent 
empirical studies to analyze the competing risks of prepayment and default. The papers by Deng, 
Quigley and Van Order (1996) and Deng (1997) are examples using the method to analyze 
thirty-year, fixed-rate, single-family mortgages issued from 1976 to 1983. As previously 
mentioned, Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000), and Wenyi Huang and Jan Ondrich (2002) 
incorporate the unobserved heterogeneity into the competing risks model, with the former using 
it to analyze the single-family mortgages and the latter using it to analyze the multifamily 
mortgages. 
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As mentioned above, a study by Ding, Tian, Yu and Guo (2012) 13 introduces a new 
model based on a class of discrete transformation survival models. This method gives the 
estimation more flexibility. The detail model is listed in the following. 
Let 𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 ≥ 𝑡), 𝑡 = 1,… 𝑡𝑘  be the survival function based on the explanatory 
variables 𝑍(⁡𝑡). The conditional probability that individual 𝑖 fails at time 𝑡 given it has survived 
at time 𝑡 − 1 is 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃(𝑇 = 𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡 − 1)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.13 
Also, let  
𝐺 [−𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑆(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡 − 1)
] = exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽) 𝐺 [−𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑆0(𝑡)
𝑆0(𝑡 − 1)
] ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.14 
where 𝐺 was a strictly increasing transformation function with 𝐺(0) = 0⁡and 𝐺(∞) = ∞. 𝑆0(. )is 
the baseline survival function when 𝑍(⁡𝑡) = 0. 
When transformation function 𝐺 belongs to the family 
𝐺(𝑥) = {
1
𝑐
[exp(𝑐𝑥) − 1], 𝑐 > 0
𝑥,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑐 = 0
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.15 
the class of discrete-time transformation survival models will become 
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = {
1 −
1
[1 + 𝑐𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼 + 𝑍(𝑡)𝛽)]
1
𝑐
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑐 > 0
1 − exp⁡[−exp⁡(𝛼 + 𝑍(𝑡)𝛽)],⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑐 = 0
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.16 
                                                          
13 The model introduced by Ding, Tian, Yu and Guo (2012) is used to analyze the firm bankruptcy; therefore, their 
assumption is based on whether a firm files for bankruptcy at time t. However, this paper is based on a more general 
assumption to make a more general model.   
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Note that when 𝑐 = 0, the proposed discrete-time transformation survival model is equivalent to 
the traditional proportional hazards model. The likelihood function for the proposed discrete 
transformation survival model for a sample of N is  
𝑙(𝛽) =∏∏𝑝𝑖𝑠
𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑠)
(1−𝛿𝑖)
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.17 
in which 𝛿𝑖 = 1 when individual 𝑖 fails at time t. 
In the paper by Ding et al. (2012), the model is used to analyze the risk of firm 
bankruptcy based on a dataset that contains all publicly traded companies in the United States 
between 1981 and 2006. The estimated coefficients change according to the different values of 
the c being controlled. Moreover, the results show that when c is around 10, the model reaches 
the maximum log likelihood. This suggests that the traditional proportional hazards model is not 
the best framework to estimate the risk of the bankruptcy.  
When two different termination types (such as prepayment and default) are involved in 
the survival analysis, a competing risks model is developed based on Ding et al. (2012) and 
Sueyoshi (1992). The log-likelihood function for a sample of N is  
𝐿(𝛽) =∑∑{𝛿𝑝 [− ln (1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
)
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ ln⁡(1 − exp (−(𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)] + 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)])))]
+ 𝛿𝑑 [− ln (1 +
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
)
+ ln⁡(1 − exp (−(𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)] + 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)])))]
+ 𝛿𝑐[−𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)] − 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]]} ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.18 
171 
 
 
The transformation function 𝐺 is given by: 
𝐺𝑝(𝑥) = {
1
𝑐𝑝
[exp(𝑐𝑝𝑥) − 1], 𝑐𝑝 > 0
𝑥,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑐𝑝 = 0
 
𝐺𝑑(𝑥) = {
1
𝑐𝑑
[exp(𝑐𝑑𝑥) − 1], 𝑐𝑑 > 0
𝑥,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑐𝑑 = 0
 
Hence, when 𝐺𝑝(𝑥) = 𝑥 and 𝐺𝑑(𝑥) = 𝑥, the log-likelihood function for the sample is the same 
as the function 2.12. When 𝐺𝑝(𝑥) =
1
𝑐𝑝
[exp(𝑐𝑝𝑥) − 1] and 𝐺𝑑(𝑥) =
1
𝑐𝑑
[exp(𝑐𝑑𝑥) − 1], the log-
likelihood function for the sample is: 
𝐿(𝛽) =∑∑{𝛿𝑝 [− ln(1 +
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
1
𝑐𝑝
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑝 exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝))
)
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ ln⁡(1 − [1 + 𝑐𝑝 exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
−
1
𝑐𝑝 [1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
−
1
𝑐𝑑)]
+ 𝛿𝑑 [− ln(1 +
1
𝑐𝑝
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑝 exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝))
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
)
+ ln⁡(1 − [1 + 𝑐𝑝 exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
−
1
𝑐𝑝 [1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
−
1
𝑐𝑑)]
+ 𝛿𝑐 [−
1
𝑐𝑝
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑝 exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)) −
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))]} ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.19 
Moreover, when 𝐺𝑝(𝑥) = 𝑥 and when 𝐺𝑑(𝑥) =
1
𝑐𝑑
[exp(𝑐𝑑𝑥) − 1], the log-likelihood function 
for the sample is: 
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𝐿(𝛽) =∑∑{𝛿𝑝 [− ln(1 +
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
)
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ ln⁡(1 − exp⁡(− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝) −
1
𝑐𝑑
ln⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))))]
+ 𝛿𝑑 [− ln (1 +
𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
)
+ ln⁡(1 − exp⁡(− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝) −
1
𝑐𝑑
ln⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))))]
+ 𝛿𝑐 [− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝) −
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))]} ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2.20 
The detailed calculation process is in Appendix C.  
Results 
Models 2.12 and 2.19 are first used to analyze the competing risks of the prepayment and 
default of the single-family mortgages in Phoenix. The results of model 2.19 show that when 
cp = 0.00003 and cd = 268.49, the maximum log-likelihood is reached for monthly data. The 
trend of the log-likelihood based on the change of cp is shown in figures 24 and 25. It presents 
that with the value of cp decreased to 0
+, the value of the log-likelihood continues to increase. 
This suggests the proportional hazards framework is the best option to estimate the prepayment 
risk. Moreover, the trend of the log-likelihood based on the change of cd is showed in figures 26 
and 27. It presents that with the value of cd  increased, the value of the log-likelihood first 
increases to a maximum point and then continues to decrease. This suggests that an optimal 
value of cd needs to be estimated to get the maximum log likelihood. Therefore, model 2.20 is 
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used to estimate the competing risks of prepayment and default and the results are showed in the 
following.  
[insert Figures 24 through 27 here] 
This section clearly explains the results of models 2.12 and 2.20. Then the results are 
compared with the 95 percent confident interval of the coefficients estimated by the competing 
risks model based on the multinomial logit. For each model, two sets of dependent variables are 
analyzed, the prepayment and the default being the first, and the prepayment and the 90-days-
delinquency being the second. For both groups of dependent variables, the indicator for a 
prepayment penalty and the value of the call option are used to explain the prepayment risk; the 
unemployment rate, negative equity, a dummy for negative equity and original loan-to-value are 
used to explain the default/90-days-delinquency risk; the credit score, the debt-to-income ratio, 
log mortgage size, current loan age in months, a dummy for house unit and time period dummies 
are used to explain both risks. Moreover, the dataset used in this chapter is the dataset with the 
modified mortgages being right censored one month before the modification date. 
Model 1: The competing risks model based on Sueyoshi’s proportional hazards model 
Table 50 shows the results of the competing risks of prepayment and default/90-days-
delinquency estimated by model 2.12. The results of the model using prepayment and default as 
dependent variables are first explained in detail. The difference of the results of the model using 
prepayment and 90-days-delinquency as dependent variables is then discussed. 
[insert Tables 49 through 50 here] 
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Figure 24. log-likelihood values for monthly prepayments based on the change of 
cp
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Figure25. log-likelihood values for yearly prepayments based on the change of cp
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-6200
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Figure 26. log-likelihood values for monthly defaults based on the change of cd
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Figure 27. log-likelihood values for yearly defaults based on the change of cd
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Table 49. The monthly results for Phoenix based on Meyer’s proportional hazards model 
  
                                                   Dependent Variables 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment 90-days-delinqeuncy 
 (Default is 
right censored) 
 
(Prepayment is 
right censored) 
 
(90-days-delinquency 
is right censored) 
 
(Prepayment is right 
censored) 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.803 -- -0.817 -- 
 (0.230)  (0.231)  
Call option variables     
Call option part 1  5.347 -- 5.361 -- 
 (0.879)  (0.887)  
Call option part 2 7.403 -- 7.270 -- 
 (0.883)  (0.902)  
Call option part 3 7.837 -- 8.300 -- 
 (0.663)  (0.671)  
Call option part 4 1.867 -- 2.146 -- 
 (0.418)  (0.414)  
The unemployment rate variables     
The unemployment rate part 1 -- 0.272 -- 0.308 
  (0.104)  (0.076) 
The unemployment rate part 2 -- 0.112 -- 0.190 
  (0.058)  (0.051) 
Negative equity variables     
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.012 -- 0.012 
  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.018 -- 0.019 
  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.013 -- 0.017 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -0.000 -- -0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
The negative equity dummy -- 0.935 -- 0.780 
  (0.211)  (0.197) 
Original loan-to-value variables      
Original LTV part 1 -- 3.192 -- 2.278 
  (1.170)  (0.910) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 1.738 -- 0.509 
  (1.222)  (1.098) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -6.188 -- -7.088 
  (5.325)  (4.952) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 3.334 -- 3.320 
  (0.749)  (0.694) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 2.371 -- 2.423 
  (4.506)  (4.188) 
Log loan size variables     
Log loan size part 1 0.746 0.348 0.778 0.135 
 (0.077) (0.370) (0.078) (0.312) 
Log loan size part 2 0.829 -0.453 0.824 0.012 
 (0.122) (0.425) (0.122) (0.383) 
Log loan size part 3 0.206 -0.124 0.218 -0.526 
 (0.130) (0.373) (0.132) (0.345) 
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Log loan size part 4 0.979 -0.023 0.971 -0.049 
 (0.093) (0.267) (0.093) (0.244) 
Loan age variables     
Loan age part 1 0.139 0.418 0.138 0.240 
 (0.007) (0.116) (0.008) (0.048) 
Loan age part 2 0.002 0.077 0.003 0.040 
 (0.003) (0.017) (0.004) (0.014) 
Loan age part 3 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
Loan age part 4 0.006 -0.006 0.006 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score variables     
The credit score part 1 1.771 -7.898 1.335 -8.340 
 (0.670) (1.470) (0.663) (1.269) 
The credit score part 2 3.440 -5.847 3.467 -8.840 
 (0.923) (2.471) (0.923) (2.287) 
The credit score part 3 0.936 -2.685 0.862 -5.026 
 (1.212) (3.892) (1.248) (3.864) 
The credit score part 4 6.864 -20.699 6.608 -21.205 
 (1.637) (6.729) (1.643) (6.618) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
    
DTI part 1 -0.848 1.156 -0.859 2.351 
 (0.369) (1.557) (0.369) (1.530) 
DTI part 2 0.927 2.772 1.020 3.430 
 (0.495) (1.574) (0.495) (1.465) 
DTI part 3 -0.664 0.724 -0.679 1.097 
 (0.539) (1.440) (0.541) (1.316) 
DTI part 4 0.326 0.645 0.354 0.543 
 (0.344) (0.756) (0.345) (0.693) 
The dummy for the number of 
units 
-0.541 -0.525 -0.599 -0.028 
 (0.224) (0.709) (0.230) (0.503) 
Time period variables     
Time period part 1 0.022 -0.004 0.022 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.035 -0.036 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.009) 
Time period part 3 0.017 0.005 0.016 0.008 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) 
Prepayment dummy  -15.852 -- -15.915 -- 
 (0.992)  (0.991)  
Default dummy  -- -15.063 -- -9.479 
  (4.506)  (3.663) 
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Table 50. Monthly results for Phoenix: the competing risks models based on Sueyoshi’s proportional hazards model 
 The competing risks of the 
prepayment and the default  
The competing risks of the prepayment 
and the 90-days-delinqeuncy 
  
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment 90-days-delinqeuncy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.803 -- -0.809 -- 
 (0.230)  (0.230)  
Call option variables     
Call option part 1  5.342 -- 5.377 -- 
 (0.879)  (0.887)  
Call option part 2 7.394 -- 7.238 -- 
 (0.883)  (0.902)  
Call option part 3 7.817 -- 8.283 -- 
 (0.663)  (0.671)  
Call option part 4 1.838 -- 2.123 -- 
 (0.418)  (0.414)  
The unemployment rate variables     
The unemployment rate part 1 -- 0.269 -- 0.306 
  (0.104)  (0.076) 
The unemployment rate part 2 -- 0.112 -- 0.189 
  (0.058)  (0.051) 
Negative equity variables     
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.012 -- 0.012 
  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.018 -- 0.020 
  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.013 -- 0.017 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -0.000 -- -0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.003) 
The negative equity dummy -- 0.934 -- 0.780 
  (0.211)  (0.197) 
Original loan-to-value variables      
Original LTV part 1 -- 3.226 -- 2.285 
  (1.171)  (0.909) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 1.725 -- 0.495 
  (1.222)  (1.098) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -6.195 -- -7.021 
  (5.324)  (4.954) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 3.326 -- 3.313 
  (0.749)  (0.694) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 2.375 -- 2.419 
  (4.508)  (4.188) 
Log loan size variables     
Log loan size part 1 0.745 0.340 0.775 0.137 
 (0.078) (0.370) (0.078) (0.312) 
Log loan size part 2 0.828 -0.460 0.825 -0.015 
 (0.122) (0.425) (0.122) (0.382) 
Log loan size part 3 0.205 -0.127 0.215 -0.520 
 (0.130) (0.373) (0.132) (0.345) 
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Log loan size part 4 0.979 -0.033 0.970 -0.062 
 (0.093) (0.267) (0.093) (0.244) 
Loan age variables     
Loan age part 1 0.139 0.417 0.138 0.239 
 (0.007) (0.116) (0.008) (0.048) 
Loan age part 2 0.002 0.077 0.003 0.039 
 (0.003) (0.017) (0.004) (0.014) 
Loan age part 3 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
Loan age part 4 0.006 -0.006 0.006 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score variables     
The credit score part 1 1.784 -7.901 1.353 -8.334 
 (0.670) (1.469) (0.663) (1.269) 
The credit score part 2 3.453 -5.916 3.449 -8.913 
 (0.923) (2.471) (0.923) (2.288) 
The credit score part 3 0.945 -2.736 0.942 -4.977 
 (1.212) (3.894) (1.248) (3.864) 
The credit score part 4 6.870 -20.730 6.470 -21.226 
 (1.637) (6.733) (1.644) (6.615) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
    
DTI part 1 -0.846 1.170 -0.862 2.407 
 (0.369) (1.557) (0.369) (1.531) 
DTI part 2 0.925 2.750 1.012 3.331 
 (0.495) (1.574) (0.496) (1.465) 
DTI part 3 -0.664 0.747 -0.684 1.191 
 (0.539) (1.440) (0.541) (1.317) 
DTI part 4 0.325 0.633 0.358 0.523 
 (0.344) (0.756) (0.345) (0.693) 
The dummy for the number of 
units 
-0.539 -0.522 -0.602 -0.031 
 (0.224) (0.708) (0.230) (0.504) 
Time period variables     
Time period part 1 0.022 -0.004 0.022 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.035 -0.036 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.009) 
Time period part 3 0.017 0.004 0.016 0.007 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.008) 
Prepayment dummy  -15.854 -- -15.887 -- 
 (0.992)  (0.991)  
Default dummy  -- -14.984 -- -9.527 
  (4.505)  (3.665) 
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The effect of the indicator for a prepayment penalty is negative. The odds for mortgages 
with a prepayment penalty are only 0.448 times as high as the same odds for mortgages without a 
prepayment penalty. 
The effect of the value of the call option is always positive and the significantly positive 
effect supports the argument that when the value of the call option is “in the money,” households 
have more incentive to prepay their mortgages. Because the range for any spline segment is less 
than one, it is meaningless to discuss a unit increase in the call option. Therefore, the odds ratios 
for the value of the call option are not discussed. Instead, this paper directly looks at the 
coefficients. This holds true throughout the paper whenever any explanatory variable has a spline 
segment less than one. When the value of the call option is below -0.025, the coefficient is 5.342 
(the standard error is 0.879). When the value of the call option ranges between -0.025 and 0.037, 
the coefficient increases to 7.394 (the standard error is 0.883). When the value of the call option 
ranges between 0.037 and 0.102, the coefficient again increases to 7.817 (the standard error is 
0.663). However, when the value of the call option is above 0.102, the coefficient drops to 1.838 
(the standard error is 0.418).  
The positive effect of the monthly unemployment rate indicates that the default risk is 
higher in the months with the higher unemployment rate. When the unemployment rate is below 
5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.309 times with a 1 percent increase 
in the unemployment rate. When the rate is above 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity 
increase by 1.119 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. 
The results of negative equity strongly support the argument that when the put option is 
“in the money,” households have more incentive to default their mortgages. When negative 
equity is below 18.366, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.012 times with a 1 
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unit increase in negative equity. When negative equity ranges between 18.366 and 37.804, the 
odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.018 times with a 1 unit increase in negative 
equity. When the range is between 37.804 and 62.910, the odds of default relative to continuity 
increase by 1.013 times with a 1 unit increase in negative equity. However, when the negative 
equity is above 62.910, the odds of default relative to continuity will not change with 1 unit 
increases.  
The effect of negative equity dummy is significantly positive. The odds for mortgages 
with negative equity being defaulted instead of continued are 2.545 times as high as the same 
odds for mortgages with non-negative equity.  
In most ranges, the coefficients of original loan-to-value are positive, which means the 
mortgages with higher loan-to-value have a higher default risk. However, when its value ranges 
between 0.780 and 0.800, the effect becomes insignificantly negative. When original loan-to-
value is below 0.650, the coefficient is 3.226 and the standard error is 1.171. In ranges between 
0.650 and 0.780, the coefficient drops to 1.725 and the standard error is 1.222. When value 
ranges are between 0.780 and 0.800, the coefficient becomes insignificantly negative, which is -
6.195 and the standard error is 5.324. In ranges between 0.800 and 0.950, the coefficient 
becomes significantly positive again, which is 3.326 and the standard error is 0.749. Finally, 
when original loan-to-value is above 0.950, the coefficient drops to 2.375 and the standard error 
is 4.508.  
The results of this study indicate that the credit score has a strongly positive effect on the 
prepayment decision and a significantly negative effect on the default decision. The coefficient is 
1.784 for prepayment (the standard error is 0.670) and is -7.901 for default (the standard error is 
1.469) when the credit score is below 0.688. The coefficient increases to 3.453 for prepayment 
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(the standard error is 0.923) and to -5.916 for default (the standard error is 2.471) when the credit 
score ranges between 0.688 and 0.736.  However, the coefficient decreases to 0.945 for 
prepayment (the standard error is 1.212) and increases to -2.736 for default (the standard error is 
3.894) when the credit score ranges between 0.736 and 0.774. The coefficient dramatically 
increases to 6.870 for prepayment (the standard error is 1.637) and drops to -20.730 for default 
(the standard error is 6.733) when the credit score is above 0.744. These results indicate both 
termination risks are sensitive to the high-level credit score. The households with higher credit 
scores are more likely to prepay and less likely to default.   
The effect of the debt-to-income ratio on the prepayment and default risk is not 
significant.  
The dummy for the number of units has a negative effect on both termination risks. The 
odds for mortgages covering more than one house unit being prepaid instead of continued are 
about 0.583 times as high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. 
Moreover, the odds for mortgages covering more than one house unit being defaulted instead of 
continued are about 0.593 times as high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house 
unit. The results show that the mortgages for larger houses are less likely to be prepaid or 
defaulted than the mortgages for smaller houses. 
Log loan size has a positive effect on the prepayment risk and a negative effect on the 
default risk in most ranges. The odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 2.106 
times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size when loan size is below $105,030. In this range, the 
odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.405 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan 
size. When ranges are between $105,030 and $149,941, the odds of prepayment relative to 
continuity increase by 2.289 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. In this range, the odds 
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of default relative to continuity decrease by 0.631 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
However, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 1.228 times with a 1 unit 
increase in log loan size when ranges are between $149,941 and $210,029. In this range, the odds 
of default relative to continuity decrease by 0.881 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
Furthermore, when size is above $210,029, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity 
increase by 2.662 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. In this range, the odds of default 
relative to continuity decrease by 0.968 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
Generally, loan age has a strongly positive relationship with the prepayment, but its effect 
is insignificantly negative when its value is between 24 and 45 months. When the loan age is 
below 24 months, the effect of loan age on the default decision is significantly positive. However, 
when loan age is above 24 months, its effect on default becomes significantly negative. When 
loan age is below 11 months, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 1.149 
times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. In this range, the odds of default relative to continuity 
increase by 1.517 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. When ranges are between 11 and 24 
months, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 1.002 times with a 1 unit 
increase in loan age. In this range, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.080 
times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. When loan age ranges between 24 and 45 months, the 
odds of prepayment relative to continuity decrease by 0.998 times with a 1 unit increase in loan 
age. In this range, the odds of default relative to continuity decrease by 0.994 times with a 1 unit 
increase in loan age. When loan age is above 45 months, the odds of prepayment relative to 
continuity increase again by 1.006 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age, and the odds ratio for 
default remains the same as 0.994 in this range. 
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The time period in each model is also controlled. The results show mortgages are more 
likely to be prepaid from March 1999 to July 2003 and are less likely to be prepaid from July 
2003 to November 2008. Prepayment increases again after November 2008. On the other hand, 
before January 2008, mortgages are less likely to default. However, starting from January 2008, 
mortgages become more likely to default. 
Table 50 also shows the results of the competing risks of prepayment and 90-days-
delinquency based on model 2.12. The effect of each explanatory variable is almost the same as 
the effect in the model using prepayment and default as the dependent variables, with the 
absolute value of the coefficients slightly changed. However, the dummy for the number of units 
has a smaller effect on the 90-days-delinquency risk, the odds for mortgages covering more than 
one house unit being delinquent instead of continued are about 0.969 times as high as the same 
odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. Moreover, the 90-days-delinquency risk 
continues to increase starting from March 1999. 
Model 2: The competing risks model based on a class of transformation survival models 
Tables 51 and 52 show the monthly and yearly results estimated by model 2.20.  The 
results of the model using monthly prepayment and default as dependent variables are first 
explained in detail. The difference of the results of the model using monthly prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency as dependent variables is then discussed. A general comparison of monthly 
and yearly results is listed at the end.   
[insert Table 51 here] 
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Table 51. Monthly results for Phoenix: the competing risks models based on a class of discrete transformation 
survival models for default and 90-days-delinqeuncy with maximum cd 
 The competing risks of the 
prepayment and the default  
The competing risks of the prepayment 
and the 90-days-delinqeuncy 
  
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment 90-days-delinqeuncy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.796 -- -0.808 -- 
  (0.231)   (0.231)   
Call option variables         
Call option part 1  5.357 -- 5.378 -- 
  (0.909)   (0.917)   
Call option part 2 7.403 -- 7.256 -- 
  (0.883)   (0.901)   
Call option part 3 7.826 -- 8.271 -- 
  (0.659)   (0.667)   
Call option part 4 1.85 -- 2.129 -- 
  (0.428)   (0.425)   
The unemployment rate variables         
The unemployment rate part 1 -- 0.169 -- 0.316 
    (0.144)   (0.102) 
The unemployment rate part 2 -- 0.142 -- 0.338 
    (0.127)   (0.119) 
Negative equity variables         
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.019 -- 0.025 
    (0.025)   (0.025) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.047 -- 0.042 
    (0.020)   (0.019) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.034 -- 0.052 
    (0.017)   (0.016) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 0.004 -- 0.002 
    (0.010)   (0.009) 
The negative equity dummy -- 1.445 -- 1.176 
    (0.363)   (0.336) 
Original loan-to-value variables          
Original LTV part 1 -- 4.007 -- 2.641 
    (1.716)   (1.289) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 4.541 -- 2.643 
    (2.311)   (2.038) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -26.494 -- -26.752 
    (11.748)   (10.352) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 7.701 -- 6.664 
    (1.816)   (1.548) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 13.581 -- 19.727 
    (16.742)   (14.733) 
Log loan size variables         
Log loan size part 1 0.746 0.523 1.343 -16.949 
  (0.075) (0.563) (0.659) (3.182) 
Log loan size part 2 0.825 -1.489 3.482 -25.734 
  (0.121) (0.822) (0.925) (5.483) 
Log loan size part 3 0.208 0.714 0.857 -3.862 
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  (0.130) (0.811) (1.244) (7.484) 
Log loan size part 4 0.978 -0.154 6.658 -38.376 
  (0.093) (0.551) (1.653) (11.108) 
Loan age variables         
Loan age part 1 0.139 0.411 0.777 0.267 
  (0.008) (0.170) (0.076) (0.426) 
Loan age part 2 0.002 0.108 0.823 -0.617 
  (0.003) (0.030) (0.122) (0.677) 
Loan age part 3 -0.002 0.005 0.216 -0.041 
  (0.002) (0.012) (0.132) (0.714) 
Loan age part 4 0.006 -0.012 0.971 -0.349 
  (0.001) (0.006) (0.093) (0.489) 
The credit score variables         
The credit score part 1 1.768 -17.092 0.138 0.247 
  (0.664) (3.764) (0.008) (0.065) 
The credit score part 2 3.449 -19.683 0.003 0.061 
  (0.922) (6.000) (0.004) (0.024) 
The credit score part 3 0.932 -2.364 -0.002 -0.002 
  (1.206) (7.861) (0.002) (0.011) 
The credit score part 4 6.843 -39.567 0.006 -0.009 
  (1.647) (12.507) (0.001) (0.005) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
        
DTI part 1 -0.839 0.218 -0.861 2.163 
  (0.372) (2.482) (0.372) (2.237) 
DTI part 2 0.928 6.627 1.013 6.661 
  (0.494) (3.104) (0.495) (2.771) 
DTI part 3 -0.671 0.495 -0.679 2.342 
  (0.538) (3.174) (0.540) (2.724) 
DTI part 4 0.316 2.758 0.356 1.798 
  (0.344) (1.816) (0.345) (1.575) 
The dummy for the number of 
units 
-0.545 -1.147 
-0.601 0.863 
  (0.224) (1.301) (0.230) (0.824) 
Time period variables         
Time period part 1 0.022 -0.008 0.022 0.003 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Time period part 2 -0.037 0.080 -0.036 0.009 
  (0.001) (0.024) (0.001) (0.021) 
Time period part 3 0.017 -0.006 0.016 0.006 
  (0.001) (0.018) (0.001) (0.017) 
Prepayment dummy  -15.853 -- -15.905 -- 
  (0.962)   (0.967)   
Default dummy  -- -11.121 -- -5.876 
    (7.127)   (5.163) 
Maximum gd -- 5.592 -- 5.452 
    (0.216)   (0.190) 
 
                                                                          Number of mortgages 12,734                               Number of mortgages 12,698  
 
 
186 
 
 
The effect of the indicator for a prepayment penalty is negative. The odds for mortgages 
with a prepayment penalty are only 0.451 times as high as the same odds for mortgages without a 
prepayment penalty. 
The effect of the value of the call option is always significantly positive. When the value 
of the call option is below -0.025, the coefficient is 5.357 (the standard error is 0.909). When the 
value of the call option ranges between -0.025 and 0.037, the coefficient increases to 7.403 (the 
standard error is 0.883). When the value of the call option ranges between 0.037 and 0.102, the 
coefficient again increases to 7.826 (the standard error is 0.659). However, when the value of the 
call option is above 0.102, the coefficient drops to 1.850 (the standard error is 0.428).  
The positive effect of the monthly unemployment rate indicates the default risk is higher 
in the months with the higher unemployment rate. When the unemployment rate is below 5.700, 
the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.184 times with a 1 percent increase in the 
unemployment rate. When the rate is above 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity 
increase by 1.153 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. 
The coefficients of negative equity show an insignificant positive effect. This result is 
different from that given by the competing risks model based on the multinomial logit and the 
proportional hazards. In those two models, the effect of negative equity splines is significant. 
However, the effect of negative equity dummy is significantly positive. The odds for mortgages 
with negative equity being defaulted instead of continued are 4.242 times as high as the same 
odds for mortgages with non-negative equity.  
In most ranges, the coefficients of original loan-to-value partially are positive, which 
means the mortgages with higher loan-to-value have a higher risk of default. However, when its 
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value ranges between 0.780 and 0.800, the effect becomes insignificantly negative. When 
original loan-to-value is below 0.650, the coefficient is 4.007 and the standard error is 1.716. In 
ranges between 0.650 and 0.780, the coefficient increases to 4.541 and the standard error is 2.311. 
When value ranges are between 0.780 and 0.800, the coefficient becomes insignificantly 
negative, which is -26.494 and the standard error is 11.748. In ranges between 0.800 and 0.950, 
the coefficient becomes significantly positive again, which is 7.701 and the standard error is 
1.816. Finally, when original loan-to-value is above 0.950, the coefficient further increases to 
13.581 and the standard error is 16.742.  
The results of this study indicate that the credit score has a strongly positive effect on the 
prepayment decision and a significantly negative effect on the default decision. The coefficient is 
1.768 for prepayment (the standard error is 0.664) and is -17.092 for default (the standard error is 
3.764) when the credit score is below 0.688. The coefficient increases to 3.449 for prepayment 
(the standard error is 0.922) and to -19.683 for default (the standard error is 6.000) when the 
credit score ranges between 0.688 and 0.736. However, the coefficient decreases to 0.932 for 
prepayment (the standard error is 1.206) and increases to -2.364 for default (the standard error is 
7.861) when the credit score ranges between 0.736 and 0.774. The coefficient dramatically 
increases to 6.843 for prepayment (the standard error is 1.647) and drops to -39.567 for default 
(the standard error is 12.507) when the credit score is above 0.744. These results indicate both 
termination risks are sensitive to the high-level credit score. The households with high credit 
scores are more likely to prepay and less likely to default.   
The effect of the debt-to-income ratio on the prepayment and default risks is insignificant. 
The dummy for the number of units has a negative effect on both prepayment and default, and 
the effect is significant for prepayment. The odds for mortgages covering more than one house 
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unit being prepaid instead of continued are about 0.580 times as high as the same odds for 
mortgages covering only one house unit. Moreover, the odds for mortgages covering more than 
one house unit being defaulted instead of continued are about 0.318 times as high as the same 
odds for mortgages covering only one house unit.  
Log loan size has a positive effect on the prepayment risk and a negative effect on the 
default risk in most ranges. The odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 2.109 
times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size when the size is below $105,030. In this range, the 
odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.687 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan 
size. When ranges are between $105,030 and $149,941, the odds of prepayment relative to 
continuity increase by 2.281 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. In this range, the odds 
of default relative to continuity decrease by 0.226 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
However, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 1.231 times with a 1 unit 
increase in log loan size when ranges are between $149,941 and $210,029. In this range, the odds 
of default relative to continuity increase by 2.042 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
Furthermore, when size is above $210,029, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity 
increase by 2.659 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. In this range, the odds of default 
relative to continuity decrease by 0.857 times with a 1 unit increase in log loan size. 
Generally, loan age has a strongly positive relationship with the prepayment, but its effect 
is insignificantly negative when its value is between 24 and 45 months. When the loan age is 
below 45 months, the effect of loan age on the default decision is significantly positive. However, 
when loan age is above 45 months, its effect on default becomes significantly negative. When 
loan age is below 11 months, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 1.149 
times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. In this range, the odds of default relative to continuity 
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increase by 1.508 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. When ranges are between 11 and 24 
months, the odds of prepayment relative to continuity increase by 1.002 times with a 1 unit 
increase in loan age. In this range, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.114 
times with a 1 unit increase in loan age. When loan age ranges between 24 and 45 months, the 
odds of prepayment relative to continuity rapidly decrease by 0.998 times with a 1 unit increase 
in loan age. In this range, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.005 times with a 
1 unit increase in loan age. When loan age is above 45, the odds of prepayment relative to 
continuity increase again by 1.006 times with a 1 unit increase in loan age, and the odds ratio for 
default decrease to 0.998 in this range. 
The time period in each model is also controlled. The results show mortgages are more 
likely to be prepaid from March 1999 to July 2003 and are less likely to be prepaid from July 
2003 to November 2008. The possibility of prepayment increases again after November 2008. 
On the other hand, before January 2008, mortgages are less likely to default. However, starting 
from January 2008, mortgages become more likely to default. 
Table 51 also shows the monthly results of the competing risks of prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency based on model 2.20. The effect of the most explanatory variables is very 
similar with that in the model using prepayment and default as the dependent variable. The 
coefficients of the value of the call option, unemployment rate, log loan size for prepayment 
slightly increase, as well as the coefficients of log loan size for 90-days-delinquency decrease 
considerably. The effect of the credit score in this model become insignificant and the effect of 
log loan size become stronger.  
Table 52 shows the yearly results of the competing risks of prepayment and default (90-
days-delinquency) based on model 2.20. In this model, the optimum value of 𝑐𝑑 is around 26.44. 
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Compared with the results using the monthly prepayment and default as dependent variables, the 
effect of each explanatory variable in the yearly model keeps the same with the absolute value of 
the coefficients slightly increase. Compared with the results using the monthly prepayment and 
90-days-delinquency as dependent variables, the effect of the most explanatory variable keeps 
the same. However, in the yearly model, the positive effect of the credit score on prepayment and 
the negative effect of the credit score on default are much stronger than the monthly results. 
Moreover, the absolute value of the coefficients of log loan size for the 90-days-delinquecy risk 
drops dramatically.  
[insert Tables 52 through 53 here] 
Table 53 shows the comparison of the results among the competing risks models based 
on multinomial logit, Sueyoshi’s proportional hazard, and a class of transformation survival 
models. The comparison of the results shows that the coefficients estimated by the model based 
on Sueyoshi’s proportional hazards all fall into the 95 percent confidence interval of the 
coefficients estimated by the model based on multinomial logit. This means that, for the single-
family mortgages in Phoenix, the termination risks estimated by these two models are 
insignificantly distinguishable. When comparing the results estimated by the model based on a 
class of transformation survival models with those estimated by the model based on the 
multinomial logit, and the prepayment and default are used as dependent variables, the 
coefficients for prepayment all fall into the 95 percent confidence interval; however, most of the 
coefficients for default fall beyond the confidence interval. When the prepayment and 90-days-
delinquency are used as dependent variables, most of the coefficients for both termination risks 
fall beyond the confidence interval. This means the termination risks estimated by this model 
will be significantly different from those estimated by the other two models. 
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Table 52. Yearly results for Phoenix: the competing risks models based on a class of discrete transformation survival 
models with maximum cp and cd 
 The competing risks of the 
prepayment and the default  
The competing risks of the 
prepayment and the 90-days-
delinqeuncy 
  
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment 90-days-
delinqeuncy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.825 -- -0.829 -- 
 (0.213)  (0.207)  
Call option variables     
Call option part 1  7.077 -- 7.473 -- 
 (0.402)  (0.828)  
Call option part 2 8.081 -- 8.497 -- 
 (0.324)  (0.817)  
Call option part 3 3.679 -- 3.708 -- 
 (0.303)  (0.614)  
Call option part 4 2.903 -- 2.881 -- 
 (0.314)  (0.378)  
The unemployment rate variables     
The unemployment rate part 1 -- 0.417 -- 0.564 
  (0.127)  (0.090) 
The unemployment rate part 2 -- 0.250 -- 0.284 
  (0.078)  (0.071) 
Negative equity variables     
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.025 -- 0.053 
  (0.015)  (0.023) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.027 -- 0.023 
  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.069 -- 0.054 
  (0.017)  (0.016) 
Negative equity part 4 -- -0.001 -- 0.004 
  (0.010)  (0.008) 
The negative equity dummy -- 1.596 -- 1.054 
  (0.073)  (0.318) 
Original loan-to-value variables      
Original LTV part 1 -- 4.284 -- 2.670 
  (0.270)  (1.174) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 4.222 -- 2.477 
  (0.299)  (1.825) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -28.617 -- -25.683 
  (3.301)  (8.854) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 7.816 -- 6.463 
  (0.410)  (1.341) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 16.982 -- 17.918 
  (4.005)  (8.210) 
Log loan size variables     
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Log loan size part 1 0.722 0.726 0.744 0.290 
 (0.042) (0.199) (0.071) (0.379) 
Log loan size part 2 0.847 -1.560 0.833 -0.574 
 (0.098) (0.353) (0.107) (0.583) 
Log loan size part 3 0.153 0.471 0.177 0.132 
 (0.114) (0.209) (0.116) (0.582) 
Log loan size part 4 1.035 -0.064 1.020 -0.275 
 (0.084) (0.338) (0.080) (0.439) 
Loan age variables     
Loan age part 1 0.935 4.331 0.980 7.633 
 (0.212) (1.346) (0.461) (2.278) 
Loan age part 2 0.616 2.190 0.617 1.267 
 (0.030) (0.284) (0.031) (0.172) 
Loan age part 3 0.020 0.241 0.024 0.105 
 (0.016) (0.100) (0.016) (0.082) 
Loan age part 4 0.071 -0.103 0.070 -0.075 
 (0.009) (0.052) (0.009) (0.050) 
The credit score variables     
The credit score part 1 1.634 -16.203 1.158 -17.044 
 (0.373) (1.070) (0.642) (2.722) 
The credit score part 2 3.371 -22.458 3.433 -24.957 
 (0.590) (0.801) (0.883) (3.897) 
The credit score part 3 0.928 -0.654 0.815 -3.151 
 (0.892) (1.205) (1.194) (4.163) 
The credit score part 4 7.625 -43.609 7.290 -37.850 
 (1.331) (0.799) (1.572) (7.204) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
    
DTI part 1 -0.861 0.284 -0.886 2.139 
 (0.226) (1.655) (0.344) (2.047) 
DTI part 2 0.957 6.776 1.068 6.755 
 (0.255) (0.646) (0.475) (1.867) 
DTI part 3 -0.518 0.211 -0.545 2.752 
 (0.259) (1.460) (0.513) (2.125) 
DTI part 4 0.276 3.617 0.301 1.913 
 (0.227) (0.935) (0.289) (1.458) 
The dummy for the number of 
units -0.482 -1.180 -0.523 0.673 
 (0.200) (0.108) (0.210) (0.933) 
Time period variables     
Time period part 1 0.110 0.001 0.105 0.117 
 (0.015) (0.047) (0.015) (0.038) 
Time period part 2 -0.426 0.357 -0.420 -0.118 
 (0.008) (0.128) (0.009) (0.112) 
Time period part 3 0.139 0.014 0.138 -0.019 
 (0.011) ((0.135) (0.012) (0.126) 
Prepayment dummy  -12.390 -- -12.345 -- 
 (0.210)  (0.461)  
Default dummy  -- -14.147 -- -10.846 
  (1.346)  (2.278) 
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Maximum gd -- 3.275  3.008 
  (0.113)  (0.230) 
 
                                                                         Number of mortgages 12,734                               Number of mortgages 12,698  
 
Table 53. Results comparison for three competing risks models 
Explanatory Variable The competing risks model based on 
Sueyoshi’s proportional hazards model 
The competing risks model based on a class of 
transformation survival models 
Prepayment penalty The coefficient is within the confidence 
interval  
The coefficient is within the confidence interval  
The value of call option The coefficients are within the confidence 
interval 
The coefficients are within the confidence interval 
The unemployment rate For default, the coefficients are within the 
confidence interval 
For default, the coefficients are within the confidence 
interval 
 For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficients 
are within the confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, the coefficient of the first 
spline is within the confidence interval and the 
coefficient of the second spline is outside the interval 
The value of negative 
equity 
For default, the coefficients are within the 
confidence interval 
For default, the coefficients of the second and the 
third spline are outside the confidence interval  
 For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficients 
are within the confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, the coefficients of the 
second and the third spline are outside the confidence 
interval 
The negative equity 
dummy 
For default, the coefficient is within the 
confidence interval 
For default, the coefficient is outside the confidence 
interval 
 For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficient is 
within the confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, the coefficient is outside the 
confidence interval 
Original LTV For default, the coefficients are within the 
confidence interval 
For default, the coefficients of all splines except the 
first one are outside the confidence interval  
 For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficients 
are within the confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinquency, the coefficients of the third, 
the fourth and the fifth spline are outside the 
confidence interval 
Log loan size For prepayment, the coefficients are within 
the confidence interval 
For prepayment, when using prepayment and default 
as dependent variables, the coefficients are within the 
confidence interval. When using prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency as dependent variables, the 
coefficients of all splines are outside the confidence 
interval 
 For default, the coefficients are within the 
confidence interval 
For default, the coefficients of the second and the 
third spline are outside the confidence interval 
 For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficients 
are within the confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficients of all 
splines are outside the confidence interval 
Loan age For prepayment, the coefficients are within 
the confidence interval 
For prepayment, when using prepayment and default 
as dependent variables, the coefficients are within the 
confidence interval. When using prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency as dependent variables, the 
coefficients of all splines are outside the confidence 
interval 
 For default, the coefficients are within the 
confidence interval 
For default, the coefficients are within the confidence 
interval 
 For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficients 
are within the confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficients of all 
splines except the first one are outside the confidence 
interval 
The credit score For prepayment, the coefficients are within 
the confidence interval 
For prepayment, when using prepayment and default 
as dependent variables, the coefficients are within the 
confidence interval. When using prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency as dependent variables, the 
coefficients of the second and the fourth spline are 
outside the confidence interval 
 For default, the coefficients are within the For default, the coefficients of all splines except the 
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confidence interval third one are outside the confidence interval 
 For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficients 
are within the confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficients of all 
splines except the third one are outside the confidence 
interval 
Debt-to-income ratio For prepayment, the coefficients are within 
the confidence interval 
For prepayment, when using prepayment and default 
as dependent variables, the coefficients are within the 
confidence interval. When using prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency as dependent variables, the 
coefficients of all splines are outside the confidence 
interval 
 For default, the coefficients are within the 
confidence interval 
For default, the coefficients of the second and the 
fourth splines are outside the confidence interval 
 For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficients 
are within the confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficient of the first 
spline is outside the confidence interval 
The dummy for the 
number of units 
For prepayment, the coefficient is within 
the confidence interval 
For prepayment, the coefficient is within the 
confidence interval 
 For default, the coefficient is within the 
confidence interval 
For default, the coefficient is within the confidence 
interval 
 For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficient is 
within the confidence interval 
For 90-days-delinqunecy, the coefficient is within the 
confidence interval 
The confidence interval indicates the 95% confidence interval of the coefficients for the competing risks model based on the 
multinomial logit 
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Summary 
This chapter presents the detail process of constructing the competing risks model based 
on the proportional hazards model by using Sueyoshi’s methodology. This model involves the 
time period between the termination point and the time point t+1 in the analysis, all of which 
make the estimation more accurate. Moreover, this research constructs a new competing risks 
model based on a class of transformation survival models by controlling the different values of 
the transformation parameters, the model transfers from the proportional hazards model to 
different frameworks, thereby making makes the results more flexible. Moreover, by estimating 
the maximum likelihood function, the results show the proportional hazards framework is the 
best model to estimate the prepayment risk, but it is not the best model to estimate the default/90-
days-delinquency risk. 
These two models are used to analyze the termination risks of the single-family 
mortgages in Phoenix. The results of both models support most of the hypothesis made by the 
previous literature.  
For both models, the indicator for a prepayment penalty has a negative effect on the 
prepayment risk. The significantly positive effect of the value of the call option supports the 
argument that when the value of the call option is “in the money,” households have more 
incentive to prepay their mortgages. And the positive effect of the value of negative equity 
supports the argument that when the value of the put option is “in the money,” households have 
more incentive to default/delinquent their mortgages. Moreover, the months with higher 
unemployment rate have a higher default/delinquency risk. And the mortgages with higher loan-
to-value are more likely to be defaulted/delinquent. Generally, the debt-to-income ratio has no 
clear effect on the prepayment risk, but it has a positive effect on the default/delinquency risk. 
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Consistent with the results in previous studies, the credit score has a strong positive effect 
on the prepayment risk and a significantly negative effect on the default risk for both models. 
However, its effect is not significant for the monthly 90-days-delinquency risk when using the 
model based on a class of transformation survival models. In this model, log loan size has a 
much stronger effect on the monthly 90-days-delinquency risk compared with the results 
estimated by the model based on Sueyoshi’s proportional hazards model. 
The comparison of the results among the three models shows the coefficients estimated 
by the model based on Sueyoshi’s proportional hazards and those estimated by the model based 
on the multinomial logit are insignificantly distinguishable in sign. However, the coefficients 
estimated by the model based on a class of transformation survival models are significantly 
different from those estimated by the other two models. This research continues in Chapter 3 by 
involving the unobserved heterogeneity into the analysis. 
Chapter 3 
Introduction 
Unobserved heterogeneity is an important component that should be considered in the 
modeling process, even though it is not commonly involved in the analysis of the termination 
risks of the mortgages. Follain, Ondrich, and Sinha (1995) involve a multiplicative form of 
unobserved heterogeneity 𝜃𝑖 into a proportional hazards model to analyze the prepayment risk of 
multifamily mortgages. The results clearly show that the coefficients estimated by the model 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity are significantly larger than those estimated by the 
model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity. Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000) 
control unobserved heterogeneity in a competing risks model to analyze the termination risks of 
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the thirty-year, fixed-rate, single-family mortgages. They find that unobserved heterogeneity 
among borrowers plays an important role in accounting for the borrowers’ termination behavior, 
particularly with respect to the prepayment behavior. Wenyi Huang and Jan Ondrich (2002) use 
the same model to analyze the termination risks of the multifamily mortgages. Comparing the 
coefficients estimated by the models with and without unobserved heterogeneity, the authors 
present that the absolute value of the coefficients increases sharply in the model with unobserved 
heterogeneity. Previous literature clearly shows that the estimated prepayment hazard and default 
hazard can be largely different between models with and without controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
This paper uses latent classes to control unobserved heterogeneity of two different groups 
of borrowers and constructs three competing risks models based on the multinomial logit, the 
proportional hazards model and a class of transformation survival models. The models allow the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables to be different between two groups of borrowers by 
keeping the baseline the same (the coefficients of the loan age splines are the same for the two 
groups of borrowers). This study uses these three models to analyze the competing risks of 
prepayment and default of the single-family mortgages in Phoenix and compares the average 
conditional hazard for prepayment, default and 90-days-delinquency estimated by models 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity with those estimated by models that do not control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. The results show that when the loan age is between 79 and 93 months, 
between 103 and 118 months and above 165 months, models that do not control for unobserved 
heterogeneity underpredict the average conditional prepayment hazard compared with models 
that control for unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, when the loan age is between 120 and 165 
months, models that do not control for unobserved heterogeneity highly overpredict the 
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prepayment hazard. For the average conditional default and 90-days-delinquency hazard, models 
that do not control for unobserved heterogeneity overpredict the average conditional hazard 
compared with models that control for unobserved heterogeneity between around 49 and 94 
months. The average conditional hazard for default/90-days-delinquency is very similar between 
two models in all other ranges. 
Because the default rate remains high during the 2007-2009 Housing Bust, another 
interesting question concerns the shape of the default/90-days-delinquency hazard in the absence 
of a boom and bust. This paper constructs a simulation that assumes that housing prices remain 
constant after September 2004. Suppose that the value of the property changes from 𝑉0 to 𝑉𝑁. To 
keep the original loan-to-value ratio unchanged, the size of mortgages borrowed from the bank 
changes from 𝐿0  to 𝐿𝑁 , which leads to a change in the debt-to-income ratio. Because the 
remaining balance of the mortgage and the value of the property change, value of the negative 
equity and the negative equity dummy change as well. The average conditional default hazard 
and the average conditional 90-days-delinquency hazard change accordingly. The paper 
compares the simulated conditional hazards with those estimated based on the real trend of the 
housing price and shows that, in the case when the housing price changes across time, the 
average conditional hazard dramatically increases from around age month 11 and reaches the 
maximum hazard at around age month 54, and then sharply decreases until around age month 93. 
This dramatic change of the average conditional hazard trend disappears in the case when the 
housing price is assumed to be unchanged after September 2004. The simulated average 
conditional hazard slowly increases from age month 1 up to age month 169 with an average 
increase rate of 3.72 percent for default hazard and 1.80 percent for 90-days-delinquency hazard. 
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The average difference of the conditional hazard is approximately 0.21 percent between the two 
cases.  
The paper is separated into five sections. Section II summarizes the previous studies on 
the methodology of controlling unobserved heterogeneity and develops three competing risks 
models based on latent classes to control unobserved heterogeneity. In section III, the dataset and 
results are clearly discussed. The simulation analysis is presented in section IV. The summary is 
offered in section V. 
Literature Review 
Two famous articles by Elbers and Ridder (1982) and by Heckman and Singer (1984) 
develop a multiplicative form of unobserved heterogeneity. 
The conditional hazard with unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be 
𝜃(𝑡, 𝑥, 𝛽, 𝑣) = 𝛷(𝑥, 𝛽)𝜓(𝑡)𝑣⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.1 
in both papers, where ⁡𝛷(𝑥, 𝛽)  is a function of observed time invariant variables x with 
coefficient β, 𝜓(𝑡) being the time dependence of the probability and 𝑣 is an unobserved 
heterogeneity. Assume that 𝐹(𝑣)is the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity⁡𝑣, and 𝑍(𝑡) =
∫ 𝜓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0
, then the duration distribution corresponding to 3.1 is 
𝐺(𝑡, 𝑥, 𝛽, 𝑣) = 1 − ∫ exp⁡(−
∞
0
𝛷(𝑥, 𝛽)𝑍(𝑡)𝑣)𝑑𝐹(𝑣)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.2 
Equation 3.2 can be determined by the dataset. 
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Elbers and Ridder(1982) argue that to distinguish the effect of time dependence 𝜓(𝑡) and 
the effect of unobserved heterogeneity 𝑣 in the context of the proportional hazards model, the 
following three assumptions need to be satisfied. 
Assumption 1. Unobserved heterogeneity 𝑣  is non-negative with distribution function 
𝐹(𝑣) and 𝐸(𝑣) = 1. 
 Assumption 2. The function 𝑍(𝑡) is defined on [0,∞) can be written as the integral of a 
non-negative integrable function ⁡𝜓(𝑡) which is defined on [0,∞), i.e. 𝑍(𝑡) = ∫ 𝜓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝑡
0
 for 
𝑡 > 0. 
Assumption 3. The set 𝑆, 𝑥𝜖𝑆, is an open set in 𝑅𝑘. The function 𝛷 is defined on 𝑆 and is 
non-negative, differentiable and non-constant 𝑆. 
The authors prove that, based on the above three assumptions and the differentiation of 
equation 3.2, 𝑍(𝑡) and the distribution of 𝑣 are uniquely identified because of the variation of 
individual probabilities with the explanatory variables 𝑥.  
Heckman and Singer (1984) argue that the mean of unobserved heterogeneity 𝑣 does not 
have to be finite but only requires a restriction on the tail of the true distribution. Moreover, the 
authors argue that the explanatory variables are not a requirement when identifying the 
distributions 𝐹(𝑣)  and the conditional duration densities. The authors keep using the above 
assumption 3 in their paper and change the assumptions 1 and 2 to the following: 
Assumption 1∗ . Unobserved heterogeneity 𝑣  is non-negative with nondefective 
distribution function 𝐹(𝑣).⁡𝑣 do not possess moments of any order. However, as an absolutely 
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continuous distributions with 𝐸(𝑣) = ∞, the density function⁡𝑓(𝑣) has to satisfy the following 
tail condition 
𝑓(𝑣)~
𝑐
(ln(𝑣))𝛿𝑣(1+ )𝐿(𝑣)
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.3 
as 𝑣 → ∞, where 𝑐 > 0, 0 < < 1, 𝛿 ≥ 0 and 𝐿(𝑣) is slowly varying in the sense of Karamata 
14. If 𝑣 is a discrete valued random variable, the relationship 3.3 needs to be replaced by the 
following requirement: 
𝑑𝐹(𝑣) = {
𝑃𝑘⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑣 = 𝑣𝑘 , 0 < 𝑣0 < 𝑣1 < ⋯⁡
0⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒⁡0 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ ∞⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.4 
and 𝑣𝑘~𝑐𝑘, as 𝑘 → ∞, where 𝑃𝑘~
𝑐
(ln(𝑘))𝛿𝑘(1+ )𝐿(𝑘)
 for 0 < < 1 and 𝛿 ≥ 0. This assumption is 
weaker than the assumption 1, but the tails of the true distribution are required to die off at a fast 
rate to make sure the equations 3.3 and 3.4 are satisfied.  
Assumption 2∗ . A crossover condition 𝑍  is defiend as 𝑍 ∈ £ = {𝑍(𝑡), 𝑡 ≥ 0:⁡𝑍(𝑡)⁡is a 
nonnegative increasing function with 𝑍(0) = 0 and ∃𝑐 > 0 and 𝑡+ not depending on the function 
𝑍(𝑡) such that 𝑍(𝑡+) = 𝑐 where 𝑐 is a known constant. This assumption is more restricted than 
the previously mentioned assumption 2 and plays an important role in the identification process. 
Based on the above three assumptions and the relationship between the distribution 𝐹(𝑣) 
and equation 3.3, the authors prove the identifiability of 𝐹(𝑣). Moreover, if the functional form 
of the hazard is known, such as Box-Cox hazards, by applying certain restrictions on the 
moments of 𝐹(𝑣) , the distribution of 𝐹(𝑣)  can be identified without any requirement of 
regressors in the model. 
                                                          
14 See Feller (1971, P. 275) for a good discussion of slowly varying functions.   
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Meyer (1990) involves a multiplicative form of unobserved heterogeneity 𝜃𝑖  in an 
interval-censored  proportional hazard model for which the log-likelihood function is 
𝐿(𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜃) =∑{𝑙𝑜𝑔[∫exp [−𝜃∑exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑠)𝛽 + 𝛾(𝑠))
𝑡−1
𝑠=0
] 𝑑𝑢(𝜃) − 𝛿𝑖∫exp [−𝜃∑exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑠)𝛽 + 𝛾(𝑠))
𝑡
𝑠=0
] 𝑑𝑢(𝜃)]}
𝑁
𝑖−1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.5 
When model 3.5 is used in the empirical studies, the most common assumption of the 
distribution of 𝜃𝑖is the gamma distribution with mean equal to one and variance equal to 𝜎
2. 
Under this assumption, model 3.5 will become 
𝐿 (𝛽,𝛾,𝜎2) =∑𝑙𝑜𝑔{[1 +𝜎2∑exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑠)𝛽 + 𝛾(𝑠))
𝑡−1
𝑠=0
]
−𝜎−2
− 𝛿𝑖 [1 +𝜎2∑exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑠)𝛽 + 𝛾(𝑠))
𝑡
𝑠=0
]
−𝜎−2
}
𝑁
𝑖−1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.6 
Follain, Ondrich and Sinha (1995) implement model 3.6 to analyze the prepayment risk of the 
multifamily mortgages. The results show that the coefficients 𝛽  estimated by the model 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity are significantly larger than those estimated by the 
model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity.  
In recent studies, the competing risks model has been developed to analyze the 
termination risks of the mortgages. When it involves unobserved heterogeneity in the analysis, 
the most commonly used model in previous studies is 
𝐿(𝛽𝑝 , 𝛾𝑝, 𝛽𝑑 , 𝛾𝑑) =∏{[1 − exp⁡(− exp (𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝(𝑡))) − 𝑐𝑖(𝑡)]
𝛿𝑝𝑖 [1 − exp⁡(− exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑 + 𝛾𝑑(𝑡)))
𝑁
𝑖=1
− 𝑐𝑖(𝑡)]
𝛿𝑑𝑖exp⁡(− exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝(𝑡)
− exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑 + 𝛾𝑑(𝑡)))∏exp⁡(−exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝(𝑠) − exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑 + 𝛾𝑑(𝑠)))
𝑡−1
𝑠=0
} ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.7 
in which 𝑐𝑖(𝑡) = 0.5 [1 − exp⁡(− exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝(𝑡) − exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑 + 𝛾𝑑(𝑡))) + exp (−exp (𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝 + 𝛾𝑝(𝑡))) +
exp⁡(− exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑 + 𝛾𝑑(𝑡))]. Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000) apply model 3.7 to analyze the 
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competing risks of prepayment and default of thirty-year, fixed-rate single-family mortgages. 
They find that unobserved heterogeneity among borrowers plays an important role in accounting 
for the borrowers’ termination behavior, particularly with respect to the prepayment behavior. 
Wenyi Huang and Jan Ondrich (2002) apply model 3.7 to analyze the competing risks of 
prepayment and default of multifamily mortgages. Comparing the coefficients estimated by the 
models with and without unobserved heterogeneity, the authors present that the absolute value of 
the coefficients increases sharply in the model with unobserved heterogeneity. 
Muthen and Masyn (2005) involve a general latent variable in the discrete-time survival 
analysis to control unobserved heterogeneity. The model allows for individuals belonging to 
different subpopulations without the subpopulation membership being observed. By controlling 
the group-specific characteristics, the coefficient of the same explanatory variable can be 
different among subpopulations. This method offers more flexible results. The general latent 
variable framework is listed below.  
Let 𝑐 denote a latent categorical variable with K classes, 𝑐𝑖 ∈ {1,… , 𝐾}, where 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑘 if 
individual 𝑖  belongs to class 𝑘 . The class c is determined by individual characteristics 𝑧  by 
multinomial logit regression  
𝑃(𝑐𝑖 = 𝑘|𝑥𝑖) =
exp⁡(𝛼𝑘+𝛾𝑘𝑥𝑖)
∑ exp⁡(𝛼𝑠+𝛾𝑠𝑥𝑖)
𝐾
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.8  
where 𝛼𝑘 is the logit intercept and 𝛾𝑘 is the logit slope. The last class is a reference class with 
𝛼𝑘 = 0  and 𝛾𝑘 = 0 . The hazard conditional on individual 𝑖  belongs to class 𝑘  is 
𝑃(𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡|𝑐𝑖 = 𝑘, 𝑥𝑖), and the survival function conditional  on individual 𝑖 belongs to class 𝑘 is 
𝑃(𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡|𝑐𝑖 = 𝑘, 𝑥𝑖). Then the likelihood function for the entire sample is  
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𝐿 =∏𝑃(𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡|𝑥𝑖)
𝛿𝐼∏𝑃(𝑇𝑖 > 𝑠|𝑥𝑖)
𝑡−1
𝑠=0
𝑛
𝑖=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.9 
This paper implements the structure of latent variables in three competing risks models—
the model based on the multinomial logit, the model based on the proportional hazards model 
and the model based on a class of transformation survival models. To make the analysis simpler, 
this paper assumes the latent variables belong to two categories and the baseline (loan age 
splines) does not change between two categories. The models are used to analyze the competing 
risks of prepayment and default/90-days-delinquency of the single-family mortgages in Phoenix. 
Let 𝐶𝑖𝑗 denote a latent categorical variable with two classes. The probability of individual 
𝑖 belongs to the class 𝑗 is defined by 𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1) = 𝑃𝑗 and the relationship between 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 is 
𝑃1 + 𝑃2 = 1. 
Let 𝑇𝑖 denote the termination month for mortgage 𝑖. No termination month can exceed 
the number of months in the term of a mortgage or a censoring month. Let 𝑘𝑖  denote the 
minimum of the number of months in the term of the mortgage and the censoring month. 
Therefore,  
𝑇𝑖 = min⁡(𝑇𝑖
𝐷 , 𝑇𝑖
𝑃, 𝑘𝑖),                                                      3.10       
        
where 𝑇𝑖
𝐷 denotes the random termination month of default for mortgage 𝑖, and 𝑇𝑖
𝑝denotes the 
random termination month of prepayment for mortgage 𝑖.  
Let 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡) and 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡) be the d-dimensional time-variant covariate vector that influences 
the prepayment and the default decision, respectively, for the mortgagor at time 𝑡. Moreover, 
these covariate vectors also determine which class individual 𝑖 would belong to. 𝛼 is the baseline, 
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which does not change between the two groups of individuals. In this paper, the baseline is the 
loan age spline. Finally, let 𝛿𝑝 be the indicator for a prepayment, 𝛿𝑑 be the indicator for whether 
default and 𝛿𝑐 be the indicator for no prepayment or default.  
The following constructs the likelihood function and the average conditional hazard with 
latent classes for the competing risks models based on the multinomial logit, the proportional 
hazards, and a class of transformation survival models.  
1. The likelihood function and the average conditional hazard with latent classes for the 
competing risks model based on the multinomial logit 
The probability of a mortgage 𝑖 belonging to class 𝑗 prepaying at time 𝑡 conditional on 
surviving past time 𝑡 − 1 is given by: 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ℎ𝑃(𝑡|𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1⁡) =
exp⁡(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.11⁡ 
The probability of a mortgage 𝑖 belonging to class 𝑗 defaulting at time 𝑡 conditional on surviving 
past time 𝑡 − 1 is given by: 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ℎ𝑖
𝐷(𝑡|𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1⁡) =
exp⁡(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
,⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.12 
The probability of a mortgage 𝑖 surviving past time 𝑡 and belongs to class 𝑗 is given by: 
𝑆𝑖⁡(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1) =
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.13 
The likelihood of a mortgage 𝑖 continuing past time 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑙𝑖
𝐶(𝑡) =∑𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1)
2
𝑗=1
⁡× ⁡∏𝑆𝑖 ⁡(𝑠/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1)
t
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
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⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∑𝑃𝑗
2
𝑗=1
×∏
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
t
𝑠=1
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.14 
The likelihood of a mortgage 𝑖 prepaying at time 𝑡 is: 
𝑙𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) =∑𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1) ×⁡ℎ
𝑃(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1⁡)
2
𝑗=1
⁡⁡× ⁡∏𝑆𝑖 ⁡(𝑠/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1)
t−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∑𝑃𝑗
2
𝑗=1
×
exp⁡(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
×∏
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
t−1
𝑠=1
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.15 
And the likelihood of a mortgage 𝑖 defaulting at time 𝑡 is: 
𝑙𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) =∑𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1) ×⁡ℎ
𝐷(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1⁡)
2
𝑗=1
⁡⁡× ⁡∏𝑆𝑖 ⁡(𝑠/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1)
t−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∑𝑃𝑗
2
𝑗=1
×
exp⁡(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
×∏
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
t−1
𝑠=1
,⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.16 
Therefore, the likelihood function for a sample of N individuals is now given by: 
𝑙(𝛽) =∏𝑙𝑖
𝑃(𝑡)𝛿𝑝𝑙𝑖
𝐷(𝑡)𝛿𝑑𝑙𝑖
𝐶(𝑡)𝛿𝑐
𝑁
𝑖=1
⁡ 
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=∏∑𝑃𝑗
2
𝑗=1
× (
exp⁡(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
)
𝛿𝑝𝑁
𝑖=1
× (
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
)
𝛿𝑑
× (
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
)
𝛿𝑐
×∏
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
t−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.17 
And the log-likelihood function is  
𝐿(𝛽) =∑∑𝑃𝑗
2
𝑗=1
× (
exp⁡(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
)
𝛿𝑝𝑁
𝑖=1
× (
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
)
𝛿𝑑
× (
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
)
𝛿𝑐
×∏
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
t−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.18 
Without heterogeneity, the conditional hazard for prepayment is: 
ℎ𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) = Pr⁡(𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡/𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 − 1),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
exp⁡(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝑃)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝑃)
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.19 
And the conditional hazard for default is: 
⁡ℎ𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) = Pr(𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡/𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 − 1) ,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
exp⁡(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝐷)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝑃)
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.20 
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With heterogeneity, the prepayment hazard conditional on individual 𝑖  belonging to 
group 𝑗 is defined by equation 3.11 and the default hazard conditional on individual 𝑖 belonging 
to group 𝑗  is defined by equation 3.12. This paper assumes that the conditional hazard for 
prepayment at 𝑡 = 1 is⁡ℎ𝑖
𝑃(1) = ⁡∑ 𝑃𝑗ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑃(1)2𝑗=1  and the conditional hazard for default at 𝑡 = 1 
is ⁡ℎ𝑖
𝐷(1) = ⁡∑ 𝑃𝑗ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝐷(1)2𝑗=1 . This assumption also can be used in the models based on 
proportional hazard and a class of transformation survival models. 
Therefore, when 𝑡 > 1, the conditional hazard for prepayment is given by: 
ℎ𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) = ⁡∑
exp⁡(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
2
𝑗=1
×
𝑃𝑗∏
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
∑ 𝑃𝑘∏
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
2
𝑘=1 ⁡
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.21 
And when 𝑡 > 1 the conditional hazard for default is given by: 
ℎ𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) = ⁡∑
exp⁡(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
2
𝑗=1
×
𝑃𝑗∏
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
∑ 𝑃𝑘∏
1
1 + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷) + exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
2
𝑘=1 ⁡
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.22 
The average conditional hazard with latent classes for prepayment will be ℎ̅𝑃(𝑡) =
1
𝑁
∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑃(𝑡)𝑁𝑖=1 , 
and the average conditional hazard with latent classes for default will be ℎ̅𝐷(𝑡) =
1
𝑁
∑ ℎ𝑖
𝐷(𝑡)𝑁𝑖=1 .  
2. The likelihood function and the average conditional hazard with latent classes for the 
competing risks model based on the proportional hazards model 
The probability of a mortgage 𝑖 belonging to class 𝑗 prepaying at time 𝑡 conditional on 
surviving past time 𝑡 − 1 is given by: 
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⁡ℎ𝑖
𝑃(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1⁡) =
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))) 3.23 
The probability of a mortgage 𝑖 belonging to class 𝑗 defaulting at time 𝑡 conditional on surviving 
past time 𝑡 − 1 is given by: 
ℎ𝐷(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1⁡) =
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))) ⁡⁡3.24 
The probability of a mortgage 𝑖 belonging to class 𝑗 surviving past time 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑆𝑖⁡(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1) = exp (−(exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.25 
The likelihood of a mortgage 𝑖 continuing past time 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑙𝑖
𝐶(𝑡) =∑𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1)
2
𝑗=1
⁡× ⁡∏𝑆𝑖 ⁡(𝑠/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1)
t
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∑𝑃𝑗
2
𝑗=1
×∏exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))
t
𝑠=1
, 𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.26 
The likelihood of a mortgage 𝑖 prepaying at time 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑙𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) = ∑𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1) ×⁡ℎ
𝑃(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1⁡)
2
𝑗=1
⁡⁡× ⁡∏𝑆𝑖 ⁡(𝑠/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1)
t−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∑𝑃𝑗
2
𝑗=1
×
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
×∏exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))
t−1
𝑠=1
,⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.27 
And the likelihood of a mortgage 𝑖 defaulting at time 𝑡 is given by: 
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𝑙𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) =∑𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1) ×⁡ℎ
𝐷(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1⁡)
2
𝑗=1
⁡⁡× ⁡∏𝑆𝑖 ⁡(𝑠/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1)
t−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∑𝑃𝑗
2
𝑗=1
×
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
×∏exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))
t−1
𝑠=1
,⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.28 
Therefore, the likelihood function for a sample of N individuals is now given by: 
𝑙(𝛽) =∏𝑙𝑖
𝑃(𝑡)𝛿𝑝𝑙𝑖
𝐷(𝑡)𝛿𝑑𝑙𝑖
𝐶(𝑡)𝛿𝑐
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
=∏∑𝑃𝑗
2
𝑗=1
×
(
  
 1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
)
  
 
𝛿𝑝
𝑁
𝑖=1
×
(
  
 1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
)
  
 
𝛿𝑑
× (exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
𝛿𝑐
×∏exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))
t−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.29 
And the log-likelihood function is  
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𝐿(𝛽) =∑∑𝑃𝑗
2
𝑗=1
×
(
  
 1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
)
  
 
𝛿𝑝
𝑁
𝑖=1
×
(
  
 1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
)
  
 
𝛿𝑑
× (exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
𝛿𝑐
×∏exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))
t−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.30 
Without heterogeneity, the conditional hazard for the prepayment is: 
ℎ𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) ⁡= Pr⁡(𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡/𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 − 1),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖⁡⁡ 
=
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝐷)
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝑃)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝐷)))) ⁡⁡⁡⁡3.31 
And the conditional hazard for the default is: 
ℎ𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) = Pr⁡(𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡/𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 − 1),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖⁡⁡ 
=
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝑃)
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝐷)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝐷))) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.32 
With heterogeneity, the prepayment hazard conditional on individual 𝑖  belonging to 
group 𝑗 is defined by equation 3.23 and the default hazard conditional on individual 𝑖 belonging 
to group 𝑗  is defined by equation 3.24. Therefore, when 𝑡 > 1 , the conditional hazard for 
prepayment is given by: 
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ℎ𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) = ⁡∑
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
2
𝑗=1
×
𝑃𝑗 exp(−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))𝑡−1𝑠=1 )
∑ 𝑃𝑘 exp(−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑘
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑘
𝐷))𝑡−1𝑠=1 )
2
𝑘=1 ⁡
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.33 
And when 𝑡 > 1, the conditional hazard for default is given by: 
ℎ𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) = ⁡∑
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
2
𝑗=1
×
𝑃𝑗 exp(−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))𝑡−1𝑠=1 )
∑ 𝑃𝑘 exp(−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑘
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑘
𝐷))𝑡−1𝑠=1 )
2
𝑘=1 ⁡
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.34 
The average conditional hazard with latent classes for prepayment will be ℎ̅𝑃(𝑡) =
1
𝑁
∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑃(𝑡)𝑁𝑖=1 , 
and the average conditional hazard with latent classes for default will be ℎ̅𝐷(𝑡) =
1
𝑁
∑ ℎ𝑖
𝐷(𝑡)𝑁𝑖=1 .  
3. The likelihood function and the average conditional hazard with latent classes for the 
competing risks model based on a class of transformation survival models 
The probability of a mortgage 𝑖 belonging to class 𝑗 prepaying at time 𝑡 conditional on 
surviving past time 𝑡 − 1 is given by: 
⁡ℎ𝑖
𝑃(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1⁡) =
1
1 +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
× (1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.35 
The probability of a mortgage 𝑖 belonging to class 𝑗 defaulting at time 𝑡 conditional on surviving 
past time 𝑡 − 1 is given by: 
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ℎ𝐷(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1⁡) =
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))
× (1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.36 
The probability of a mortgage 𝑖 belonging to class 𝑗 surviving past time 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑆𝑖 ⁡(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1) = exp (−(exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.37 
After estimating 𝑐𝑑1  and 𝑐𝑑2 , the result for 𝑐𝑑2  was found to be close to zero, which 
makes the proportional hazards model become the best model to analyze the default risk for 
group 2 individuals. Therefore, for group 1 individuals, the conditional hazard for the 
prepayment, the conditional hazard for the default and the survival functions are shown in 3.35, 
3.36 and 3.37. For group 2 individuals, the conditional hazard for the prepayment, the 
conditional hazard for the default, and the survival functions are shown in 3.23, 3.24 and 3.25. 
The likelihood of a mortgage 𝑖 continuing past time 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑙𝑖
𝐶(𝑡) =∑𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1)
2
𝑗=1
⁡× ⁡∏𝑆𝑖 ⁡(𝑠/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1)
t
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= 𝑃1 ×∏exp(−(exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽1
𝐷))))
t
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
+𝑃2 ×∏exp (−(exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝐷)))
t
𝑠=1
, 𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.38 
The likelihood of a mortgage 𝑖 prepaying at time 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑙𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) =∑𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1) ×⁡ℎ
𝑃(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1⁡)
2
𝑗=1
⁡⁡× ⁡∏𝑆𝑖 ⁡(𝑠/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1)
t−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
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= 𝑃1 ×
1
1 +
1
𝑐𝑑1
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷))
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃)
× (1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑1
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷)))))
×∏exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽1
𝐷))))
t−1
𝑠=1
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡+⁡𝑃2 ×
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝐷)
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝑃)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝐷))))
×∏exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝐷)))
t−1
𝑠=1
,⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.39 
And the likelihood of a mortgage 𝑖 defaulting at time 𝑡 is given by: 
𝑙𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) = ∑𝑃𝑟(𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1) ×⁡ℎ
𝐷(𝑡/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1⁡)
2
𝑗=1
⁡⁡× ⁡∏𝑆𝑖 ⁡(𝑠/𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 1)
t−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= 𝑃1 ×
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))
× (1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑1
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷)))))
×∏exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽1
𝐷))))
t−1
𝑠=1
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡+⁡𝑃2 ×
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝑃)
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝐷)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝐷))))
×∏exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝐷)))
t−1
𝑠=1
,⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.40 
Therefore, the likelihood function for a sample of N individuals is now given by: 
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𝑙(𝛽) =∏𝑙𝑖
𝑃(𝑡)𝛿𝑝𝑙𝑖
𝐷(𝑡)𝛿𝑑𝑙𝑖
𝐶(𝑡)𝛿𝑐
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=∏𝑃1 ×
(
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
1
𝑐𝑑1
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷))
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃)
𝑁
𝑖=1
× (1 − exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑1
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷)))))
)
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑝
×
(
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))
× (1 − exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑1
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷)))))
)
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑑
× exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷))))
𝛿𝑐
×
×∏exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽1
𝐷))))+𝑃2
t−1
𝑠=1
×
(
 
 
 1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
)
 
 
 
𝛿𝑝
×
(
 
 
 1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
)
 
 
 
𝛿𝑑
× (exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
𝛿𝑐
×∏exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))
t−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.41⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
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And the log-likelihood function is  
𝐿(𝛽) =∑𝑃1 ×
(
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
1
𝑐𝑑1
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷))
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃)
𝑁
𝑖=1
× (1 − exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑1
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷)))))
)
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑝
×
(
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))
× (1 − exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑1
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷)))))
)
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑑
× exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷))))
𝛿𝑐
×
×∏exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽1
𝐷))))
t−1
𝑠=1
+𝑃2
×
(
 
 
 1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
)
 
 
 
𝛿𝑝
×
(
 
 
 1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃)
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
)
 
 
 
𝛿𝑑
× (exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑗
𝐷))))
𝛿𝑐
×∏exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))
t−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.42 
Without heterogeneity, the conditional hazard for the prepayment is: 
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ℎ𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) ⁡= Pr⁡(𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡/𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 − 1),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡ 
=
1
1 +
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝐷))
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑃)
(1 − exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝐷))))) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.43 
And the conditional hazard for the default is: 
ℎ𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) ⁡= Pr⁡(𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡/𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 − 1),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1…𝑇𝑖 ⁡⁡ 
=
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝑃)
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝐷))
(1 − exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽
𝐷))))) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3.44 
With heterogeneity, the prepayment hazard conditional on individual 𝑖  belonging to 
group 1 is defined by equation 3.35 and the default hazard conditional on individual 𝑖 belonging 
to group 1 is defined by equation 3.36. Moreover, the prepayment hazard conditional on 
individual 𝑖 belong to group 2 is defined by equation 3.23 and the default hazard conditional on 
individual 𝑖  belong to group 2 is defined by equation 3.24. Therefore, when 𝑡 > 1 , the 
conditional hazard for prepayment is given by: 
ℎ𝑖
𝑃(𝑡) = ⁡
1
1 +
1
𝑐𝑑1
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑1 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷))
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃)
(1 − exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑1
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑1 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷))))) 
×⁡
𝑃1 exp(−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))𝑡−1𝑠=1 )
2
𝑃1 exp (−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))𝑡−1𝑠=1 ) + 𝑃2 exp(−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝐷))𝑡−1𝑠=1 )⁡
+
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝐷)
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝑃)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝐷))))
×
𝑃2 exp(−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝐷))𝑡−1𝑠=1 )
𝑃1 exp (−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))𝑡−1𝑠=1 ) + 𝑃2 exp(−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝐷))𝑡−1𝑠=1 )⁡
⁡⁡3.45 
And when 𝑡 > 1, the conditional hazard for default is given by: 
ℎ𝑖
𝐷(𝑡) = ⁡
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃)
1
𝑐𝑑1
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑1 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷))
(1 − exp(−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑1
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑1 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽1
𝐷))))) 
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×⁡
𝑃1 exp(−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))𝑡−1𝑠=1 )
2
𝑃1 exp (−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))𝑡−1𝑠=1 ) + 𝑃2 exp(−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝐷))𝑡−1𝑠=1 )⁡
+
1
1 +
exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝑃)
exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝐷)
(1 − exp (−(exp(𝛼𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽2
𝐷))))
×
𝑃2 exp(−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝐷))𝑡−1𝑠=1 )
𝑃1 exp (−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝑃) +
1
𝑐𝑑𝑗
log(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑗 exp(𝛼
𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑗
𝐷)))𝑡−1𝑠=1 ) + 𝑃2 exp(−∑ (exp(𝛼
𝑃 + 𝑍𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝑃) + exp(𝛼𝐷 + 𝑍𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽2
𝐷))𝑡−1𝑠=1 )⁡
⁡⁡3.46 
The average conditional hazard with latent classes for prepayment will be ℎ̅𝑃(𝑡) =
1
𝑁
∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑃(𝑡)𝑁𝑖=1 , 
and the average conditional hazard with latent classes for default will be ℎ̅𝐷(𝑡) =
1
𝑁
∑ ℎ𝑖
𝐷(𝑡)𝑁𝑖=1 .  
Results 
This section presents the results of using the above three competing risks models with 
heterogeneity to analyze the termination risks of the single-family mortgages in Phoenix. The 
average conditional hazards estimated by the above models are compared with those estimated 
by models that do not control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
For each model, two sets of dependent variables are analyzed, the prepayment and the 
default being the first, and the prepayment and the 90-days-delinquency being the second. For 
both groups of dependent variables, the indicator for a prepayment penalty and the value of the 
call option are used to explain the prepayment risk; the unemployment rate, negative equity, a 
dummy for negative equity and original loan-to-value are used to explain the default/90-days-
delinquency risk; the credit score, the debt-to-income ratio, log mortgage size, current loan age 
in months, a dummy for units and time period dummies are used to explain both risks. Moreover, 
the dataset used in the paper is the dataset with mortgages being right censored one month before 
the modification. 
Results 1: The results of the competing risks model with latent classes based on the multinomial 
logit 
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Table 54 shows the results of the competing risks of prepayment and default based on 
model 3.18.  The result shows the probability of a mortgage belonging to the group 1 individuals 
is 0.762 and belonging to the group 2 individuals is 0.238. Compared the important coefficients 
across groups, the major differences are summarized in the following. The indicator for a 
prepayment penalty has a negative on the prepayment risk for both groups and its effect on the 
group 1 mortgages is stronger. The value of call option has a positive effect on the prepayment 
risk and it has a lager effect on the group 2 mortgages. The negative equity dummy has a positive 
effect on the default/90-days-delinquency risk and its effect on the group 1 mortgages is larger.  
Moreover, the credit score has a positive effect on the prepayment risk and its effect on the group 
2 mortgages is stronger.  The detail information of the results is listed below.   
[insert Table 54 here] 
For groups 1 and 2 mortgages, the effect of the indicator for a prepayment penalty is 
negative. The odds for mortgages with the prepayment penalty are only 0.372 times as high as 
the same odds for mortgages without a prepayment penalty in group 1. While the odds for 
mortgages with the prepayment penalty are 0.732 times as high as the same odds for mortgages 
without a prepayment penalty in group 2. This means that the prepayment penalty has a greater 
impact on the group 1 mortgages.   
The effect of the value of the call option is all positive and the significantly positive 
effect supports the argument that when the value of the call option is “in the money,” households 
have more incentive to prepay their mortgages. Moreover, the coefficients for the group 2 
mortgages are larger than those for the group 1 mortgages. 
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Table 54. The monthly results for Phoenix based on the multinomial logit with prepayment and default as dependent 
variables (Baseline is loan age, 𝑃1 =0.762, 𝑃2 = 0.238) 
 Group 1 Mortgages Group 2 Mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.988 -- -0.312 -- 
 (0.290)  (0.631)  
Call option variables     
Call option part 1 5.677 -- 27.273 -- 
 (0.877)  (4.756)  
Call option part 2 7.024 -- 70.861 -- 
 (0.978)  (15.931)  
Call option part 3 4.461 -- 33.962 -- 
 (0.872)  (3.750)  
Call option part 4 0.200 -- 0.784 -- 
 (0.596)  (1.074)  
The unemployment rate variables     
The unemployment rate part 1 -- 0.196 -- 0.051 
  (0.098)  (0.055) 
The unemployment rate part 2 -- 0.069 -- 0.118 
  (0.052)  (0.006) 
Negative equity variables     
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.019 -- -0.041 
  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.022 -- -0.020 
  (0.009)  (0.012) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.014 -- -0.025 
  (0.005)  (0.011) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 0.002 -- -0.028 
  (0.003)  (0.009) 
The negative equity dummy -- 1.038 -- 0.775 
  (0.204)  (0.004) 
Original loan-to-value variables      
Original LTV part 1 -- 3.206 -- 3.843 
  (1.003)  (0.013) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 2.038 -- 1.444 
  (0.844)  (0.004) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -4.365 -- -7.508 
  (0.377)  (0.004) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 3.611 -- 2.804 
  (0.751)  (0.004) 
Original LTV part 5 -- -1.746 -- 2.904 
  (1.150)  (0.004) 
Log loan size variables     
Log loan size part 1 0.516 0.461 1.864 -0.303 
 (0.104) (0.251) (0.363) (0.223) 
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Log loan size part 2 0.663 -0.529 1.924 -0.562 
 (0.158) (0.419) (0.450) (0.006) 
Log loan size part 3 -0.184 -0.400 1.614 -0.115 
 (0.171) (0.401) (0.467) (0.004) 
Log loan size part 4 1.176 0.314 0.533 -0.037 
 (0.129) (0.274) (0.319) (0.004) 
Loan age variables     
Loan age part 1 0.127 0.413 0.127 0.413 
 (0.007) (0.124) (0.007) (0.124) 
Loan age part 2 0.010 0.074 0.010 0.074 
 (0.003) (0.016) (0.003) (0.016) 
Loan age part 3 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Loan age part 4 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score variables     
The credit score part 1 0.572 -9.275 7.866 -6.664 
 (0.711) (1.478) (1.977) (0.014) 
The credit score part 2 1.311 -10.379 12.305 -7.110 
 (0.958) (1.679) (1.728) (0.004) 
The credit score part 3 1.029 -1.358 0.669 -2.262 
 (0.825) (1.993) (2.205) (0.004) 
The credit score part 4 3.964 -26.265 19.578 -24.822 
 (1.108) (3.070) (4.003) (0.004) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
    
DTI part 1 -1.424 0.613 1.795 0.950 
 (0.449) (0.898) (1.196) (0.006) 
DTI part 2 1.497 3.981 -0.462 3.332 
 (0.563) (0.797) (0.982) (0.004) 
DTI part 3 -0.553 1.011 -0.791 0.619 
 (0.623) (0.898) (0.901) (0.004) 
DTI part 4 0.369 1.452 0.162 0.778 
 (0.431) (0.816) (0.810) (0.004) 
The dummy for the number of 
units -0.298 -0.667 -1.499 -0.443 
 (0.275) (0.727) (0.654) (0.004) 
Time period variables     
Time period part 1 0.021 -0.004 0.014 -0.951 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.012) 
Time period part 2 -0.024 0.048 -0.140 -0.098 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.008) (0.035) 
Time period part 3 -0.001 0.008 0.139 -0.037 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) 
Prepayment dummy  -12.025 -- -37.117 -- 
 (1.268)  (4.470)  
Default dummy  -- -14.767 -- -12.597 
  (2.703)  (0.020) 
 
                                                                          Number of mortgages 12,734   
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The effect of the monthly unemployment rate for both groups is positive. For the group 1 
mortgages, when the unemployment rate is below 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity 
increase by 1.217 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. When the rate is 
above 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.071 times with a 1 percent 
increase in the unemployment rate. For the group 2 mortgages, when the unemployment rate is 
below 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.052 times with a 1 percent 
increase in the unemployment rate. When the rate is above 5.700, the odds of default relative to 
continuity increase by 1.125 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. 
The effect of negative equity on the default risk is consistently positive for the group 1 
mortgages; however, the effect is insignificant for the group 2 mortgages. Therefore, the negative 
equity splines are a strong factor in determining the default risk for the group 1 mortgages, but 
not a strong factor for the group 2 mortgages. Moreover, the effect of negative equity dummy for 
both groups is significantly positive, which supports that when the put option is “in the money,” 
households have more incentive to default their mortgages. For the group 1 mortgages, the odds 
for mortgages with negative equity being defaulted instead of continued are 2.834 times as high 
as the same odds for mortgages with non-negative equity. For group 2 mortgages, the odds for 
mortgages with negative equity being defaulted instead of continued are 2.171 times as high as 
the same odds for mortgages with non-negative equity  
The results of original loan-to-value partially support the previous literature that the 
original loan-to-value has a positive effect on the default risk. When its value ranges between 
0.780 and 0.800, the effect becomes insignificant for both groups, and when its value ranges 
above 0.950, the effect is negative for group 1 mortgages. 
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Consistent with the results in previous studies, the credit score has a strong negative 
effect on the default risk for both groups of mortgages. Moreover, the results of this study 
indicate it has a strongly positive effect on the prepayment decision for both groups of mortgages. 
The results also indicate that both termination risks are sensitive to the high-level credit score. 
The households in both groups with high credit scores are more likely to prepay and less likely to 
default.   
The effect of the debt-to-income ratio on the default risk is significantly positive for 
group 2 mortgages, which supports the hypothesis that household with high debt-to-income ratio 
are more likely to default. However, its effect on the default risk is insignificant for group 1 
mortgages. Moreover, for the prepayment risk, the effect of the debt-to-income ratio is 
inconsistent for both groups.  
The dummy for the number of units has a negative effect on both the prepayment and 
default risks for both groups of mortgages. For group 1, the odds for mortgages covering more 
than one house unit being prepaid instead of continued are about 0.742 times as high as the same 
odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. Moreover, the odds for mortgages covering 
more than one house unit being defaulted instead of continued are about 0.513 times as high as 
the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. For group 2, the odds for mortgages 
covering more than one house unit being prepaid instead of continued are about 0.223 times as 
high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. Moreover, the odds for 
mortgages covering more than one house unit being defaulted instead of continued are about 
0.642 times as high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit.  The results 
show the mortgages for larger houses are less likely to be prepaid or defaulted than the 
mortgages for smaller houses. Moreover, the housing unit has a larger effect on the prepayment 
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risk for the group 2 mortgages and has a larger effect on the default risks for the group 1 
mortgages. 
Log loan size has a significantly positive effect on the prepayment. However, the effect is 
negative when the loan size ranges between $149,941 and $210,029 for the group 1 mortgages. 
On the other hand, its effect on the default is negative. However, when the size is below 
$105,030 and above $210,029, the effect becomes positive for group 1 mortgages.  
As the baseline, the loan age has the same effect for both groups of mortgages. The 
results in this paper show that it has a strongly positive relationship with both the prepayment 
and the default risks and the effect for both risks is the strongest when loan age is below 11 
months.  
The paper also controls for the time period. The results show that mortgages are more 
likely to be prepaid from March 1999 to July 2003 for both groups and are less likely to be 
prepaid from July 2003 to November 2008. For group 1, prepayment continues decreasing after 
November 2008, but for group 2, prepayment increases after November 2008. On the other hand, 
for group 1, before January 2008, mortgages are less likely to default. However, starting from 
January 2008, mortgages become more likely to default. For group 2, the likelihood of default is 
consistently low.  
Table 55 shows the results of the competing risks of prepayment and 90-days-
delinquency based on model 3.18.  The effect of each explanatory variable is almost the same as 
the effect in the model using prepayment and default as the dependent variable, with the absolute 
value of the coefficients slightly changed. However, the dummy for the number of units has a 
positive effect on the 90-days-delinquency risk for the group 1 mortgages, the odds for 
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mortgages covering more than one unit being delinquent instead of continued are about 1.078 
times as high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. 
[insert Table 55 here] 
Figures 28 and 29 show the comparison of the average conditional hazard for prepayment 
with and without controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The average conditional hazards for 
prepayment in figure 28 are based on the model using prepayment and default as dependent 
variables, and those in figure 29 are based on the model using prepayment and 90-days-
delinquency as dependent variables. 
[insert Figures 28 through 31 here] 
The results in figure 28 show that when the loan age is below 107 months, the average 
conditional hazard for the prepayment is similar for the models with and without controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity. When the loan age is between 107 and 119 months and above 165 
months, the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity underpredicts the average 
conditional hazard compared with the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Moreover, when the loan age is between 119 and 165 months, the model that does not control for 
unobserved heterogeneity is overpredicts the hazard compared with the model that controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
The results in figure 29 show that when the loan age is below 77 months, the average 
conditional hazard for the prepayment is similar across the models with and without controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity. When the loan age is between 77 and 95 months, between 103 and 
121 months and above 165 months, the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity 
underpredicts the average conditional hazard compared with the model that controls for 
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Table 55. The monthly results for Phoenix based on the multinomial logit with prepayment and 90-days-delinquency 
as dependent variables (Baseline is loan age, 𝑃1 =0.783, 𝑃2 = 0.217) 
 Group 1 Mortgages Group 2 Mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.973 -- -0.326 -- 
 (0.294)  (0.577)  
Call option variables     
Call option part 1 5.642 -- 33.250 -- 
 (0.847)  (5.124)  
Call option part 2 7.212 -- 81.848 -- 
 (0.915)  (26.159)  
Call option part 3 4.900 -- 38.360 -- 
 (0.792)  (1.930)  
Call option part 4 0.662 -- 0.968 -- 
 (0.571)  (0.800)  
The unemployment rate variables     
The unemployment rate part 1 -- 0.223 -- 0.036 
  (0.071)  (0.018) 
The unemployment rate part 2 -- 0.153 -- 0.129 
  (0.047)  (0.004) 
Negative equity variables     
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.020 -- -0.038 
  (0.013)  (0.004) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.024 -- -0.022 
  (0.008)  (0.004) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.020 -- -0.023 
  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 0.000 -- -0.031 
  (0.003)  (0.004) 
The negative equity dummy -- 0.873 -- 0.705 
  (0.195)  (0.004) 
Original loan-to-value variables      
Original LTV part 1 -- 2.151 -- 4.225 
  (0.812)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 0.680 -- 1.312 
  (0.869)  (0.004) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -2.387 -- -8.259 
  (3.311)  (0.004) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 3.043 -- 2.549 
  (0.667)  (0.004) 
Original LTV part 5 -- -0.824 -- 3.194 
  (0.383)  (0.004) 
Log loan size variables     
Log loan size part 1 0.561 0.190 1.955 -0.309 
 (0.086) (0.280) (0.257) (0.053) 
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Log loan size part 2 0.661 0.028 2.036 -0.619 
 (0.145) (0.323) (0.421) (0.005) 
Log loan size part 3 -0.100 -0.849 1.540 -0.105 
 (0.157) (0.348) (0.446) (0.004) 
Log loan size part 4 1.132 0.234 0.552 -0.041 
 (0.114) (0.243) (0.317) (0.004) 
Loan age variables     
Loan age part 1 0.127 0.234 0.127 0.234 
 (0.007) (0.045) (0.007) (0.045) 
Loan age part 2 0.010 0.037 0.010 0.037 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.012) 
Loan age part 3 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Loan age part 4 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score variables     
The credit score part 1 0.415 -10.251 6.492 -6.060 
 (0.699) (1.358) (1.623) (0.005) 
The credit score part 2 1.507 -11.562 12.428 -7.821 
 (0.822) (2.111) (1.666) (0.004) 
The credit score part 3 0.938 -6.055 1.015 -2.056 
 (0.897) (2.323) (2.160) (0.004) 
The credit score part 4 3.792 -24.243 19.638 -27.304 
 (0.889) (2.382) (2.030) (0.004) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
    
DTI part 1 -1.443 2.046 2.114 0.863 
 (0.422) (1.377) (0.954) (0.005) 
DTI part 2 1.471 4.195 0.058 3.665 
 (0.548) (1.252) (0.671) (0.004) 
DTI part 3 -0.613 1.638 -0.757 0.563 
 (0.601) (1.237) (1.086) (0.004) 
DTI part 4 0.492 1.253 -0.258 0.856 
 (0.398) (0.745) (0.785) (0.004) 
The dummy for the number of 
units -0.333 0.075 -1.594 -0.402 
 (0.282) (0.630) (0.671) (0.004) 
Time period variables     
Time period part 1 0.021 0.001 0.014 -1.053 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.012) 
Time period part 2 -0.025 0.015 -0.145 -0.089 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) 
Time period part 3 0.001 0.012 0.144 -0.041 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) 
Prepayment dummy  -12.441 -- -37.982 -- 
 (0.995)  (3.298)  
90-days-delinquecy dummy  -- -8.095 -- -11.455 
  (3.346)  (0.007) 
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Figure 28. The average conditional hazard for prepayment for the competing risks model based on the 
multinomial logit (prepayment and default as dependent variables) 
 
Figure 29. The average conditional hazard for prepayment for the competing risks model based on the 
multinomial logit (prepayment and 90-days-delinquency as dependent variables) 
 
Figure 30. The average conditional hazard for default for the competing risks model based on the multinomial 
logit (prepayment and default as dependent variables) 
 
Figure 31. The average conditional hazard for 90-days-delinquency for the competing risks model based on the 
multinomial logit (prepayment and 90-days-delinquency as dependent variables) 
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unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, when the loan age is between 121 and 165 months, the 
model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity is overpredicts the hazard compared 
with the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity.  
Figure 30 shows the comparison of the average conditional hazard for default with and 
without unobserved heterogeneity. It shows that, when the loan age is below 48 months, the 
average conditional hazard for default is similar across the models with and without controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity. When the loan age is between 48 and 96 months, the model that does 
not control for unobserved heterogeneity overpredicts the average conditional hazard compared 
with the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity. When the loan age is above 99 
months, the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity slightly underpredicts the 
average conditional hazard. 
Figure 31 compares the average conditional hazard for 90-days-delinquency with and 
without unobserved heterogeneity. It shows that, when the loan age is below 42 months and 
above 94 months, the average conditional hazard for 90-days-delinquency is similar across the 
models with and without controls for unobserved heterogeneity. When the loan age is between 
42 and 94 months, the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity overpredicts the 
average conditional hazard compared with the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity.  
Results 2: The results of the competing risks model with latent classes based on the proportional 
hazards model 
Table 56 shows the results of the competing risks of prepayment and default based on 
model 3.30. The results estimated by this model are very similar to the results given by model 
3.18.  The probability of a mortgage borrowed by the group 1 individuals is 0.763 and borrowed 
230 
 
 
by the group 2 individuals is 0.237. Compared the important coefficients across groups, the 
major differences are summarized in the following. The indicator for a prepayment penalty has a 
negative on the prepayment risk for both groups and its effect on the group 1 mortgages is 
stronger. The value of call option has a positive effect on the prepayment risk and it has a lager 
effect on the group 2 mortgages. The negative equity dummy has a positive effect on the 
default/90-days-delinquency risk and its effect on the group 1 mortgages is larger.  Moreover, the 
credit score has a positive effect on the prepayment risk and its effect on the group 2 mortgages 
is stronger.  The detail information of the results is listed below.   
[insert Table 56 here] 
For groups 1 and 2 individuals, the effect of the indicator for a prepayment penalty is 
negative. The odds for mortgages with a prepayment penalty are only 0.376 times as high as the 
same odds for mortgages without a prepayment penalty in group 1. While the odds for mortgages 
with a prepayment penalty are 0.744 times as high as the same odds for mortgages without a 
prepayment penalty in group 2. This means the prepayment penalty has a greater impact on the 
group 1 mortgages.  
The effect of the value of the call option is all positive and the significantly positive 
effect supports the argument that when the value of the call option is “in the money,” households 
have more incentive to prepay their mortgages. Moreover, the coefficients for the group 2 
mortgages are larger than those for the group 1 mortgages. 
The effect of the monthly unemployment rate for both groups is positive. For the group 1 
mortgages, when the unemployment rate is below 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity 
increase by 1.218 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. When the rate is  
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Table56. The monthly results for Phoenix based on Sueyoshi’s proportional hazards model with prepayment and 
default as dependent variables (Baseline is loan age, 𝑃1 =0.763, 𝑃2 = 0.237) 
 Group 1 Mortgages Group 2 Mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.978 -- -0.296 -- 
 (0.280)  (0.110)  
Call option variables     
Call option part 1 5.704 -- 27.354 -- 
 (0.509)  (0.129)  
Call option part 2 6.802 -- 70.891 -- 
 (0.489)  (0.047)  
Call option part 3 4.513 -- 31.577 -- 
 (0.537)  (3.231)  
Call option part 4 0.276 -- 0.677 -- 
 (0.384)  (0.493)  
The unemployment rate variables     
The unemployment rate part 1 -- 0.197 -- 0.051 
  (0.100)  (0.005) 
The unemployment rate part 2 -- 0.070 -- 0.118 
  (0.055)  (0.005) 
Negative equity variables     
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.019 -- -0.041 
  (0.014)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.022 -- -0.020 
  (0.008)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.014 -- -0.025 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 0.002 -- -0.028 
  (0.003)  (0.005) 
The negative equity dummy -- 1.034 -- 0.775 
  (0.209)  (0.005) 
Original loan-to-value variables      
Original LTV part 1 -- 3.079 -- 3.843 
  (0.559)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 2.127 -- 1.444 
  (0.318)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -4.335 -- -7.508 
  (0.082)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 3.518 -- 2.804 
  (0.442)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 5 -- -1.627 -- 2.904 
  (0.170)  (0.005) 
Log loan size variables     
Log loan size part 1 0.506 0.433 1.822 -0.303 
 (0.020) (0.114) (0.077) (0.005) 
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Log loan size part 2 0.655 -0.512 1.822 -0.562 
 (0.130) (0.233) (0.270) (0.005) 
Log loan size part 3 -0.183 -0.395 1.543 -0.115 
 (0.156) (0.204) (0.191) (0.005) 
Log loan size part 4 1.161 0.300 0.520 -0.037 
 (0.116) (0.256) (0.257) (0.005) 
Loan age variables     
Loan age part 1 0.126 0.411 0.126 0.411 
 (0.007) (0.107) (0.007) (0.107) 
Loan age part 2 0.010 0.074 0.010 0.074 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.015) 
Loan age part 3 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Loan age part 4 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score variables     
The credit score part 1 0.534 -9.214 7.916 -6.664 
 (0.227) (0.549) (0.344) (0.005) 
The credit score part 2 1.490 -9.948 11.322 -7.110 
 (0.353) (0.578) (1.349) (0.005) 
The credit score part 3 0.939 -1.688 0.976 -2.262 
 (0.161) (0.630) (0.895) (0.005) 
The credit score part 4 3.883 -25.992 19.230 -24.822 
 (0.173) (0.388) (0.481) (0.005) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
    
DTI part 1 -1.406 0.621 1.832 0.950 
 (0.341) (0.149) (0.479) (0.005) 
DTI part 2 1.486 3.932 -0.580 3.332 
 (0.305) (0.208) (0.600) (0.005) 
DTI part 3 -0.554 1.015 -0.738 0.619 
 (0.248) (0.264) (0.209) (0.005) 
DTI part 4 0.363 1.400 0.095 0.778 
 (0.324) (0.286) (0.469) (0.005) 
The dummy for the number of 
units -0.298 -0.661 -1.457 -0.443 
 (0.262) (0.128) (0.233) (0.005) 
Time period variables     
Time period part 1 0.021 -0.004 0.013 -0.951 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Time period part 2 -0.024 0.047 -0.135 -0.098 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) 
Time period part 3 -0.001 0.008 0.135 -0.037 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) 
Prepayment dummy  -11.876 -- -36.541 -- 
 (0.180)  (0.851)  
Default dummy  -- -14.430 -- -12.597 
  (0.488)  (0.005) 
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above 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.073 times with a 1 percent 
increase in the unemployment rate. For the group 2 mortgages, when the unemployment rate is 
below 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.052 times with a 1 percent 
increase in the unemployment rate. When the rate is above 5.700, the odds of default relative to 
continuity increase by 1.125 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. 
The effect of negative equity on the default risk is consistently positive for the group 1 
mortgages; however, the effect is insignificant for the group 2 mortgages. Therefore, the negative 
equity splines are not a strong factor for the group 2 mortgages. Moreover, the effect of negative 
equity dummy for both groups is significantly positive, which supports that when the put option 
is “in the money,” households have more incentive to default their mortgages. For the group 1 
mortgages, the odds for mortgages with negative equity being defaulted instead of continued are 
2.812 times as high as the same odds for mortgages with non-negative equity. For group 2 
mortgages, the odds for mortgages with negative equity being defaulted instead of continued are 
2.171 times as high as the same odds for mortgages with non-negative equity  
The results of original loan-to-value partially support the previous literature that the 
original loan-to-value has a positive effect on the default risk. When its value ranges between 
0.780 and 0.800, the effect becomes insignificantly negative for both groups, and when its value 
ranges above 0.950, the effect is negative for group 1 mortgages. 
Consistent with the results in previous studies, the credit score has a strong negative 
effect on the default risk for both groups of mortgages. Moreover, the results indicate it has a 
strongly positive effect on the prepayment decision for both groups of mortgages. The results 
also indicate that both termination risks are sensitive to the high-level credit score, which means 
the households with high credit scores are more likely to prepay and less likely to default.   
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The effect of the debt-to-income ratio on the default risk is significantly positive for both 
groups of mortgages, which supports the hypothesis that households with high debt-to-income 
ratio are more likely to default. However, for the prepayment risk, the effect of the debt-to-
income ratio is inconsistent for both groups.  
The dummy for the number of units has a negative effect on both the prepayment and 
default risks for both groups of mortgages. For group 1, the odds for mortgages covering more 
than one house unit being prepaid instead of continued are about 0.742 times as high as the same 
odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. Moreover, the odds for mortgages covering 
more than one house unit being defaulted instead of continued are about 0.516 times as high as 
the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. For group 2, the odds for mortgages 
covering more than one house unit being prepaid instead of continued are about 0.233 times as 
high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. Moreover, the odds for 
mortgages covering more than one house unit being defaulted instead of continued are about 
0.642 times as high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. The results 
show the mortgages for larger houses are less likely to be prepaid or defaulted than the 
mortgages for smaller houses. 
Log loan size has a significantly positive effect on the prepayment. However, the effect is 
negative when the loan size ranges between $149,941 and $210,029 for the group 1 mortgages. 
On the other hand, its effect on the default is negative. However, when the size is below 
$105,030 and above $210,029, the effect becomes positive for group 1 mortgages.  
As the baseline, the loan age has the same effect for both groups of mortgages. The 
results in this paper show it has a strongly positive relationship with both the prepayment risk 
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and the default risk and the effect for both risks is the strongest when loan age is below 11 
months.  
The paper also controls for the time period. The results show that mortgages are more 
likely to be prepaid from March 1999 to July 2003 for both groups and are less likely to be 
prepaid from July 2003 to November 2008. For group 1, prepayment continues decreasing after 
November 2008, but for group 2, prepayment increases after November 2008. On the other hand 
before January 2008 for group 1, mortgages are less likely to default. However, starting from 
January 2008, mortgages become more likely to default. For group 2, the likelihood of default is 
consistently low.  
Table 57 shows the results of the competing risks of prepayment and 90-days-
delinquency based on model 3.30. The effect of each explanatory variable is very similar to the 
effect in the model using prepayment and default as the dependent variable, with the absolute 
value of the coefficients slightly changed. However, the dummy for the number of units has a 
positive effect on the 90-days-delinquency risk for the group 1 mortgages, the odds for 
mortgages covering more than one unit being delinquent instead of continued are about 1.058 
times as high as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. 
[insert Table 57 here] 
Figures 32 and 33 shows the comparison of the average conditional hazard for 
prepayment with and without controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The average conditional 
hazards for prepayment in figure 32 are based on the model using prepayment and default as 
dependent variables, and those in figure 33 are based on the model using prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency as dependent variables. 
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Table 57. The monthly results for Phoenix based on Sueyoshi’s proportional hazards model with prepayment and 
90-days-delinquency as dependent variables (Baseline is loan age, 𝑃1 =0.783, 𝑃2 = 0.217) 
 Group 1 Mortgages Group 2 Mortgages 
  
 
 
 
 Prepayment Default Prepayment Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.964 -- -0.313 -- 
 (0.292)  (0.581)  
Call option variables     
Call option part 1 5.621 -- 29.364 -- 
 (0.811)  (5.607)  
Call option part 2 6.996 -- 77.043 -- 
 (0.870)  (16.630)  
Call option part 3 4.968 -- 35.353 -- 
 (0.782)  (2.739)  
Call option part 4 0.697 -- 0.874 -- 
 (0.575)  (1.098)  
The unemployment rate variables     
The unemployment rate part 1 -- 0.223 -- 0.050 
  (0.070)  (0.005) 
The unemployment rate part 2 -- 0.152 -- 0.118 
  (0.045)  (0.005) 
Negative equity variables     
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.020 -- -0.041 
  (0.013)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.023 -- -0.020 
  (0.008)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.019 -- -0.025 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 0.000 -- -0.028 
  (0.003)  (0.005) 
The negative equity dummy -- 0.870 -- 0.775 
  (0.190)  (0.005) 
Original loan-to-value variables      
Original LTV part 1 -- 2.124 -- 3.842 
  (0.820)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 0.678 -- 1.444 
  (0.838)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -2.399 -- -7.508 
  (3.445)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 2.974 -- 2.804 
  (0.675)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 5 -- -0.687 -- 2.904 
  (0.956)  (0.005) 
Log loan size variables     
Log loan size part 1 0.554 0.173 1.879 -0.307 
 (0.092) (0.242) (0.218) (0.014) 
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Log loan size part 2 0.651 0.037 1.935 -0.562 
 (0.139) (0.326) (0.414) (0.005) 
Log loan size part 3 -0.102 -0.842 1.470 -0.115 
 (0.140) (0.351) (0.434) (0.005) 
Log loan size part 4 1.117 0.226 0.540 -0.037 
 (0.111) (0.241) (0.303) (0.005) 
Loan age variables     
Loan age part 1 0.126 0.233 0.126 0.233 
 (0.007) (0.045) (0.007) (0.045) 
Loan age part 2 0.010 0.036 0.010 0.036 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.013) 
Loan age part 3 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Loan age part 4 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
The credit score variables     
The credit score part 1 0.406 -10.047 6.350 -6.664 
 (0.654) (1.360) (1.566) (0.005) 
The credit score part 2 1.693 -11.220 11.340 -7.110 
 (0.931) (1.947) (1.514) (0.005) 
The credit score part 3 0.699 -6.259 2.236 -2.262 
 (0.866) (2.836) (1.929) (0.005) 
The credit score part 4 3.920 -24.266 18.213 -24.822 
 (0.942) (5.163) (2.888) (0.005) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
    
DTI part 1 -1.411 2.097 2.004 0.950 
 (0.430) (1.433) (1.388) (0.005) 
DTI part 2 1.436 4.129 -0.037 3.332 
 (0.563) (1.343) (1.354) (0.005) 
DTI part 3 -0.595 1.651 -0.779 0.619 
 (0.612) (1.250) (1.458) (0.005) 
DTI part 4 0.480 1.200 -0.227 0.778 
 (0.392) (0.745) (0.873) (0.005) 
The dummy for the number of 
units -0.333 0.056 -1.532 -0.443 
 (0.279) (0.587) (0.646) (0.005) 
Time period variables     
Time period part 1 0.020 0.001 0.013 -0.952 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) 
Time period part 2 -0.024 0.014 -0.139 -0.098 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) 
Time period part 3 0.000 0.012 0.139 -0.037 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) 
Prepayment dummy  -12.341 -- -36.644 -- 
 (1.125)  (2.494)  
Default dummy  -- -8.046 -- -12.598 
  (2.920)  (0.005) 
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[insert Figures 32 through 35 here] 
Figures 32 and 33 present very similar results. When the loan age is below 79 months, the 
average conditional hazard for the prepayment is similar across the models with and without 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity. When the loan age is between 79 and 93 months, between 
103 and 118 months and above 165 months, the model that does not control for unobserved 
heterogeneity underpredicts the average conditional hazard compared with the model that 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, when the loan age is between 120 and 165 
months, the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity is overpredicts the hazard 
compared with the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Figure 34 shows the comparison of the average conditional hazard for default with and 
without unobserved heterogeneity. It shows that, when the loan age is below 49 months, the 
average conditional hazard for default is similar across the models with and without controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity. When the loan age is between 49 and 89 months, the model that does 
not control for unobserved heterogeneity overpredicts the average conditional hazard compared 
with the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity. When the loan age is above 102 
months, the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity slightly underpredicts the 
average conditional hazard. 
Figure 35 compares the average conditional hazard for 90-days-delinquency with and 
without unobserved heterogeneity. It shows that, when the loan age is below 48 months, the 
average conditional hazard for 90-days-delinquency is similar across the models with and 
without unobserved heterogeneity. When the loan age is between 48 and 89 months, the model 
that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity overpredicts the average conditional hazard 
compared with the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity. When the loan age is above  
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Figure 32. The average conditional hazard for prepayment for the competing risks model based on the 
proportional hazards model (prepayment and default as dependent variables) 
 
Figure 33. The average conditional hazard for prepayment for the competing risks model based on the 
proportional hazards model (prepayment and 90-days-delinquency as dependent variables) 
 
Figure 34. The average conditional hazard for default for the competing risks model based on the proportional 
hazards model (prepayment and default as dependent variables) 
 
Figure 35. The average conditional hazard for 90-days-delinquency for the competing risks model based on the 
proportional hazards model (prepayment and 90-days-delinquency as dependent variables) 
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95 months, the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity slightly underpredicts 
the average conditional hazard. 
Results 3: The results of the competing risks model with latent classes based on a class of 
transformation survival models 
Table 58 shows the results of the competing risks of prepayment and default based on 
model 3.42. The results estimated by this model are very similar to the results given by model 
3.30 because the coefficients of the prepayment risk for the group 1 mortgages and the 
coefficients of both risks for the group 2 mortgages are estimated by the proportional hazards 
framework. In the following part, this paper presents the results, which are different from those 
given by model 3.30.  
[insert Table 58 here] 
Based on the results in table 58, the probability of a mortgage belonging to the group 1 
individuals is 0.772 and belonging to the group 2 individuals is 0.228, and the best 
transformation parameter 𝐶𝑑 for the group 1 mortgages is 73.807.  
For groups 1 and 2 individuals, the effect of the indicator for a prepayment penalty is 
negative. The odds for mortgages with a prepayment penalty are 0.754 times as high as the same 
odds for mortgages without a prepayment penalty for group 2 mortgages.  
The effect of the value of the call option is all positive and the coefficients for the group 2 
mortgages are larger than those for the group 1 mortgages. The value of the coefficients for 
group 2 mortgages is slightly higher than those given by model 3.30.    
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Table 58. The monthly results for Phoenix based on a Class of Transformation Survival Models for group 1 default 
and Sueyoshi’s proportional hazards model for group 2 default and for group 1 and group 2 prepayment (Baseline is 
loan age, 𝑃1 =0.772, 𝑃2 = 0.228,⁡𝐶𝑑for group 1 is  73.807) 
 Group 1 Mortgages Group 2 Mortgages 
  
   Prepayment              Default 
 
   Prepayment               Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.979 -- -0.282 -- 
 (0.273)  (0.340)  
Call option variables     
Call option part 1 5.693 -- 28.099 -- 
 (0.339)  (0.640)  
Call option part 2 6.938 -- 71.590 -- 
 (0.320)  (0.606)  
Call option part 3 4.590 -- 32.600 -- 
 (0.253)  (0.440)  
Call option part 4 0.231 -- 0.756 -- 
 (0.367)  (0.619)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
    
The unemployment rate part 1 -- 0.102 -- 0.051 
  (0.110)  (0.005) 
The unemployment rate part 2 -- 0.045 -- 0.118 
  (0.081)  (0.005) 
Negative equity variables     
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.022 -- -0.041 
  (0.018)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.035 -- -0.020 
  (0.013)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.021 -- -0.025 
  (0.009)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 0.007 -- -0.028 
  (0.006)  (0.005) 
The negative equity dummy -- 1.297 -- 0.775 
  (0.254)  (0.005) 
Original loan-to-value variables      
Original LTV part 1 -- 3.683 -- 3.843 
  (0.235)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 3.489 -- 1.444 
  (1.018)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -15.940 -- -7.508 
  (6.842)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 6.107 -- 2.804 
  (0.397)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 1.351 -- 2.904 
  (1.939)  (0.005) 
Log loan size variables     
Log loan size part 1 0.525 0.612 1.805 -0.305 
 (0.043) (0.120) (0.055) (0.005) 
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Log loan size part 2 0.635 -1.108 1.913 -0.562 
 (0.134) (0.350) (0.310) (0.005) 
Log loan size part 3 -0.164 0.014 1.538 -0.115 
 (0.160) (0.201) (0.313) (0.005) 
Log loan size part 4 1.168 0.307 0.483 -0.037 
 (0.117) (0.333) (0.277) (0.005) 
Loan age variables     
Loan age part 1 0.126 0.393 0.126 0.393 
 (0.007) (0.110) (0.007) (0.110) 
Loan age part 2 0.010 0.091 0.010 0.091 
 (0.003) (0.019) (0.003) (0.019) 
Loan age part 3 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.009 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) 
Loan age part 4 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
The credit score variables     
The credit score part 1 0.409 -15.731 8.491 -6.664 
 (0.438) (1.223) (0.531) (0.005) 
The credit score part 2 1.656 -16.662 11.306 -7.110 
 (0.397) (1.401) (0.458) (0.005) 
The credit score part 3 0.873 -3.024 1.659 -2.262 
 (0.393) (1.002) (0.485) (0.005) 
The credit score part 4 4.287 -33.435 17.916 -24.822 
 (0.519) (4.098) (0.133) (0.005) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
    
DTI part 1 -1.430 -0.554 1.951 0.950 
 (0.350) (1.161) (0.478) (0.005) 
DTI part 2 1.495 6.671 -0.692 3.332 
 (0.287) (1.041) (0.537) (0.005) 
DTI part 3 -0.646 0.274 -0.410 0.619 
 (0.271) (0.876) (0.637) (0.005) 
DTI part 4 0.370 2.632 0.015 0.778 
 (0.364) (0.606) (0.711) (0.005) 
The dummy for the number of 
units -0.303 -1.008 -1.466 -0.443 
 (0.245) (0.522) (0.106) (0.005) 
Time period variables     
Time period part 1 0.021 -0.007 0.014 -0.952 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Time period part 2 -0.024 0.083 -0.138 -0.098 
 (0.001) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005) 
Time period part 3 -0.001 -0.005 0.140 -0.037 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) 
Prepayment dummy  -12.011 -- -36.861 -- 
 (0.371)  (0.396)  
Default dummy  -- -11.871 -- -12.598 
  (0.445)  (0.005) 
 
                                                                          Number of mortgages 12,734   
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The effect of the monthly unemployment rate for both groups is positive. For the group 1 
mortgages, when the unemployment rate is below 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity 
increase by 1.107 times with a 1 percent increase in the unemployment rate. When the rate is 
above 5.700, the odds of default relative to continuity increase by 1.046 times with a 1 percent 
increase in the unemployment rate. The results using model 3.42 for the group 1 mortgages are 
lower than those using model 3.30.  
The effect of negative equity on the default risk is consistently positive for the group 1 
mortgages; however, the effect is insignificantly negative for the group 2 mortgages. Therefore, 
the negative equity splines are not a strong factor for the group 2 mortgages. Moreover, the effect 
of negative equity dummy for both groups is significantly positive, which supports that when the 
put option is “in the money,” households have more incentive to default their mortgages. For the 
group 1 mortgages, the odds for mortgages with negative equity being defaulted instead of 
continued are 3.658 times as high as the same odds for mortgages with non-negative equity. The 
result is higher than that from model 3.30 
The results of original loan-to-value partially support the previous literature that the 
original loan-to-value has a positive effect on the default risk. When its value ranges between 
0.780 and 0.800, the effect becomes insignificantly negative for both groups. 
Consistent with the results in previous studies, the credit score has a strong negative 
effect on the default risk for both groups of mortgages. Moreover, the results indicate it has a 
strongly positive effect on the prepayment decision for both groups of mortgages. The results 
also indicate that both termination risks are sensitive to the high-level credit score which means 
that the households with high credit scores are more likely to prepay and less likely to default. 
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Moreover, compared with the results by model 3.30, the absolute value of the coefficients in this 
model is much higher. 
The effect of the debt-to-income ratio on the default risk is significantly positive for 
group 2 mortgages, which support the hypothesis that household with high debt-to-income ratio 
are more likely to default. However, its effect on the default risk is insignificant for group 1 
mortgages. Moreover, for the prepayment risk, the effect of the debt-to-income ratio is 
inconsistent for both groups.  
The dummy for the number of units has a negative effect on both the prepayment and 
default risks for both groups of mortgages. For group 1, the odds for mortgages covering more 
than one house unit being prepaid instead of continued are about 0.738 times as high as the same 
odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. Moreover, the odds for mortgages covering 
more than one house unit being defaulted instead of continued are about 0.365 times as high as 
the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit. Compared with the results given by 
model 3.30, the effect of the dummy for the number of units is slightly higher.  
Log loan size has a significantly positive effect on the prepayment. However, the effect is 
negative when the loan size ranges between $149,941 and $210,029 for the group 1 mortgages. 
On the other hand, its effect on the default is positive for the group 1 mortgages and is negative 
for the group 2 mortgages.  
As the baseline, the loan age has the same effect for both groups of mortgages. The effect 
of loan age for both risks in this model is positive and is slightly lower than that in model 3.30 
for default risk. Moreover, the effect of both risks is the strongest when loan age is below 11 
months.  
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The paper also controls for the time period; before January 2008, group 1 mortgages are 
less likely to default, from January 2008 to June 2010 mortgages are more likely to default. After 
June 2010, the likelihood of default decreases again.  
Table 59 shows the results of the competing risks of prepayment and 90-days-
delinquency based on model 3.42. The effect of each explanatory variable is very similar to the 
effect in the model using prepayment and default as the dependent variable, with the absolute 
value of the coefficients changes a little bit. However, the dummy for the number of units has a 
positive effect on the 90-days-delinquency risk for group 1 mortgages, the odds for mortgages 
covering more than one unit being delinquent instead of continued are about 3.865 times as high 
as the same odds for mortgages covering only one house unit.  
[insert Table 59 here] 
Figures 36 and 37 shows the comparison of the average conditional hazard for 
prepayment with and without controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The average conditional 
hazards for prepayment in figure 36 are based on the model using prepayment and default as 
dependent variables, and those in figure 37 are based on the model using prepayment and 90-
days-delinquency as dependent variables. 
[insert Figures 36 through 39 here] 
Figures 36 and 37 present very similar results. When the loan age is below 79 months, the 
average conditional hazard for the prepayment is similar across the models with and without 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity. When the loan age is between 79 and 93 months, between 
103 and 118 months and above 165 months, the model that does not control for unobserved 
heterogeneity underpredicts the average conditional hazard compared with the model that  
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Table 59. The monthly results for Phoenix based on a Class of Transformation Survival Models for group 1 90-days-
deliqneucy and Sueyoshi’s proportional hazards model for group 2 90-days-deliqneucy and for group 1 and group 2 
prepayment (Baseline is loan age, 𝑃1 =0.786, 𝑃2 = 0.214,⁡𝐶𝑑for group 1 is  78.579) 
 Group 1 Mortgages Group 2 Mortgages 
  
   Prepayment              Default 
 
   Prepayment               Default 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepayment penalty -0.964 -- -0.323 -- 
 (0.292)  (0.632)  
Call option variables     
Call option part 1 5.629 -- 29.659 -- 
 (0.835)  (4.418)  
Call option part 2 7.053 -- 76.627 -- 
 (0.901)  (13.178)  
Call option part 3 5.018 -- 35.634 -- 
 (0.818)  (2.976)  
Call option part 4 0.625 -- 0.882 -- 
 (0.605)  (1.183)  
The unemployment rate 
variables 
    
The unemployment rate part 1 -- 0.197 -- 0.050 
  (0.082)  (0.005) 
The unemployment rate part 2 -- 0.195 -- 0.118 
  (0.079)  (0.005) 
Negative equity variables     
Negative equity part 1 -- 0.027 -- -0.041 
  (0.019)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 2 -- 0.036 -- -0.020 
  (0.013)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 3 -- 0.039 -- -0.025 
  (0.010)  (0.005) 
Negative equity part 4 -- 0.006 -- -0.028 
  (0.006)  (0.005) 
The negative equity dummy -- 1.109 -- 0.775 
  (0.268)  (0.005) 
Original loan-to-value variables      
Original LTV part 1 -- 2.416 -- 3.842 
  (0.932)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 2 -- 1.973 -- 1.444 
  (0.987)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 3 -- -15.520 -- -7.508 
  (0.813)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 4 -- 5.035 -- 2.804 
  (1.020)  (0.005) 
Original LTV part 5 -- 7.549 -- 2.904 
  (9.626)  (0.005) 
Log loan size variables     
Log loan size part 1 0.570 0.314 1.804 -0.309 
 (0.092) (0.338) (0.274) (0.012) 
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Log loan size part 2 0.629 -0.373 2.010 -0.562 
 (0.145) (0.539) (0.435) (0.005) 
Log loan size part 3 -0.083 -0.559 1.409 -0.115 
 (0.153) (0.557) (0.461) (0.005) 
Log loan size part 4 1.128 0.081 0.513 -0.037 
 (0.114) (0.401) (0.307) (0.005) 
Loan age variables     
Loan age part 1 0.126 0.233 0.126 0.233 
 (0.007) (0.049) (0.007) (0.049) 
Loan age part 2 0.010 0.049 0.010 0.049 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017) 
Loan age part 3 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.007 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) 
Loan age part 4 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
The credit score variables     
The credit score part 1 0.375 -16.702 6.599 -6.664 
 (0.666) (2.162) (1.607) (0.005) 
The credit score part 2 1.589 -23.037 11.816 -7.110 
 (0.934) (2.657) (1.341) (0.005) 
The credit score part 3 0.859 -5.375 1.675 -2.262 
 (0.801) (2.724) (1.564) (0.005) 
The credit score part 4 3.950 -34.688 18.317 -24.822 
 (0.874) (1.723) (3.324) (0.005) 
The debt-to-income ratio 
variables 
    
DTI part 1 -1.465 1.309 2.262 0.950 
 (0.434) (1.988) (1.417) (0.005) 
DTI part 2 1.448 6.870 -0.182 3.332 
 (0.549) (1.801) (1.471) (0.005) 
DTI part 3 -0.648 2.076 -0.533 0.619 
 (0.566) (1.744) (1.445) (0.005) 
DTI part 4 0.474 1.976 -0.265 0.778 
 (0.392) (1.191) (0.958) (0.005) 
The dummy for the number of 
units -0.251 1.352 -1.614 -0.443 
 (0.267) (0.942) (0.645) (0.005) 
Time period variables     
Time period part 1 0.020 0.001 0.014 -0.953 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) 
Time period part 2 -0.025 0.033 -0.140 -0.098 
 (0.001) (0.014) (0.007) (0.005) 
Time period part 3 0.000 0.003 0.141 -0.037 
 (0.002) (0.012) (0.009) (0.005) 
Prepayment dummy  -12.493 -- -36.019 -- 
 (1.133)  (2.823)  
Default dummy  -- -5.325 -- -12.598 
  (4.007)  (0.005) 
 
                                                                       Number of mortgages 12,734   
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Figure 36. The average conditional hazard for prepayment for the competing risks model based on a class of 
transformation survival models (prepayment and default as dependent variables) 
 
Figure 37. The average conditional hazard for prepayment for the competing risks model based on a class of 
transformation survival models (prepayment and 90-days-delinquency as dependent variables) 
 
Figure 38. The average conditional hazard for default for the competing risks model based on a class of 
transformation survival models (prepayment and default as dependent variables) 
 
Figure 39. The average conditional hazard for 90-days-delinquency for the competing risks model based on a 
class of transformation survival models (prepayment and 90-days-delinquency as dependent variables) 
 
249 
 
 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, when the loan age is between 120 and 165 
months, the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity is highly overpredicts the 
hazard compared with the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Figure 38 shows the comparison of the average conditional hazard for default with and 
without unobserved heterogeneity. It shows that, when the loan age is between 50 and 96 months, 
the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity overpredicts the average 
conditional hazard compared with the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The 
average conditional hazard for default is similar across two models in all other ranges. 
Figure 39 compares the average conditional hazard for 90-days-delinquency with and 
without unobserved heterogeneity. It shows that, when the loan age is between 49 and 92 months, 
the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity overpredicts the average 
conditional hazard compared with the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The 
average conditional hazard for 90-days-delinquency is similar across two models in all other 
ranges. 
Simulation of the Stable Housing Price 
The Case-Shiller index in Figure 40 shows that, starting from around September 2004, 
the housing price index dramatically increases from 141.64 to 227.01 in August 2007, and then 
sharply decreases to 103.56 in May 2010. The boom and bust of the housing price becomes the 
main trigger of the financial crisis that happened in around 2008 and the default rate of the 
mortgages remains high during the crisis. This paper simulates what the average conditional 
default hazard and the average conditional 90-days-delinquency hazard when the housing price 
remains the same since September 2004. 
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 [insert Figure 40 here] 
Assuming that the housing price stops changing after September 2004, let  𝐶𝑆𝑁indicate 
the new Case-Shiller index and 𝐶𝑆0 indicate the original Case-Shiller index. Before September 
2004, the new index is equal to the original Case-Shiller index (𝐶𝑆𝑁 = 𝐶𝑆0) and after September 
2004, the index remains the same as the one in September 2004 (𝐶𝑆𝑁 = 𝐶𝑆0⁡𝑎𝑡⁡𝑠𝑒𝑝⁡2004 =
141.64). Therefore, the new value of the property will change to 𝑉𝑁 = 𝑉0
𝐶𝑆𝑁
𝐶𝑆0
. To keep the 
original loan-to-value unchanged, the new loan size 𝐿𝑁 = 𝐿0
𝐶𝑆𝑁
𝐶𝑆0
. When the loan size changes, 
the debt-to-income ratio also changes to 𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑁⁡𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐷𝑇𝐼0
𝐶𝑆𝑁
𝐶𝑆0
. Because the negative equity is 
calculated as the difference between the remaining balance and the property value in each month, 
the change of the loan size and property value leads to the change of the negative equity. The 
detailed calculation of the new negative equity can be found in Appendix D. After estimating the 
average conditional default hazard and the average conditional 90-days-delinquency hazard 
based on the new dataset by the above three competing risks models, the results are compared 
with those calculated by the original dataset. 
[insert Figures 41 through 43 here] 
Figures 41, 42 and 43 show the comparison results of the average conditional hazard for 
default estimated by three models. The results indicate that, in the case with the actual housing 
prices, the estimated average conditional default hazard increases dramatically from 0.04 percent 
when the age month is 11 to the maximum 0.51 percent when the age month is 54, and then 
sharply decreases to 0.17 percent when the age month is 93. After that, the average conditional 
default hazard slowly changes until the age month reaches 169. In the case where the housing 
price is constant after September 2004, the simulated average conditional hazard increases  
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Figure 40. Monthly Case-Shiller Index 
 
Figure 41. The comparison of simulated and non-simulated average conditional default hazards for the 
competing risks model based on the multinomial logit 
 
Figure 42. The comparison of simulated and non-simulated average conditional default hazards for the 
competing risks model based on the proportional hazards model 
 
Figure 43. The comparison of simulated and non-simulated average conditional default hazards for the 
competing risks model based on a class of transformation survival models 
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slowly from age month 1 up to age month 169 with an average increase rate of 3.72 percent. The 
figures clearly show that the sharp increase and decrease of the default hazard between age 
month 10 and 93 is deleted by keeping the housing price unchanged and the average difference 
of the conditional hazard is 0.21 percent across two cases.  
The comparison results of the conditional 90-days-delinquency hazard estimated by three 
models are presented in figures 44, 45 and 46. The results indicate that, in the case with the 
actual housing prices, the estimated average conditional 90-days-delinquency hazard increases 
dramatically from 0.05 percent when the age month is 9 to the maximum 0.56 percent when the 
age month is 47, and then sharply decreases to 0.18 percent when the age month is 94. After that, 
the average conditional 90-days-delinquency hazard slowly changes until the age month reaches 
169. In the case where the housing price is constant after September 2004, the simulated average 
conditional hazard increases slowly from age month 1 up to age month 169 with an average 
increase rate of 1.80 percent. The figures clearly show the sharp increase and decrease of the 90-
days-delinquency hazard between age month 9 and 94 is deleted by keeping the housing price 
unchanged and the average difference of the conditional hazard is 0.20 percent across two cases.  
[insert Figures 44 through 46 here] 
Summary 
The results of the three models controlling unobserved heterogeneity support most of the 
hypothesis made by the previous literature. For the three models, the probability that a mortgage 
belongs to group 1 individuals is around 0.766 and the probability that a mortgage belongs to 
group 2 individuals is around 0.234. 
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Figure 44. The comparison of simulated and non-simulated average conditional 90-days-delinquency hazards 
for the competing risks model based on the multinomial logit 
 
Figure 45. The comparison of simulated and non-simulated average conditional 90-days-delinquency hazards 
for the competing risks model based on the proportional hazards model 
 
Figure 46. The comparison of simulated and non-simulated average conditional 90-days-delinquency hazards 
for the competing risks model based on a class of transformation survival models 
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Compared the coefficients across groups, the major differences are summarized in the 
following. The indicator for a prepayment penalty has a negative on the prepayment risk for both 
groups and its effect on the group 1 mortgages is stronger. The value of call option has a positive 
effect on the prepayment risk and it has a lager effect on the group 2 mortgages. The effect of 
unemployment rate is positive and it has a larger effect on group 1 mortgages when the rate is 
below 5.7 and a larger effect on group 2 mortgages when the rate is above 5.7. The negative 
equity dummy has a positive effect on the default/90-days-delinquency risk and its effect on the 
group 1 mortgages is larger.  The original loan-to-value has a stronger positive effect on the 90-
days-delinquency for the group 2 mortgages. The credit score has a positive effect on the 
prepayment risk and its effect on the group 2 mortgages is stronger. The dummy for the number 
of units has a negative effect on both prepayment and default risks for both groups of mortgages. 
And the effect is stronger on prepayment risk for the group 2 mortgages. Moreover, it has a 
positive effect on the 90-days-delinquency risk for the group 1 mortgages. 
The paper also compares the average conditional hazard for prepayment, default and 90-
days-delinquency estimated by models with and without unobserved heterogeneity. The results 
show that when the loan age is younger than 79 months, the average conditional hazard for the 
prepayment is similar across the models with and without controls for unobserved heterogeneity. 
When the loan age is between 79 and 93 months, between 103 and 118 months and above 165 
months, the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity underpredicts the average 
conditional prepayment hazard compared with the model that controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Moreover, when the loan age is between 120 and 165 months, the model that does 
not control for unobserved heterogeneity highly overpredicts the prepayment hazard compared 
with the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity. For the average conditional default 
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and 90-days-delinquency hazard, overall, when the loan age is between around 49 and 94 months, 
the model that does not control for unobserved heterogeneity overpredicts the average 
conditional hazard compared with the model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity. The 
average conditional hazard for default and 90-days-delinquency is very similar across the two 
models in all other ranges. 
By assuming that housing prices remain constant after September 2004 and the original 
loan-to-value remains unchanged, the value of the property, the mortgage size, the debt-to-
income ratio, the value of the negative equity and the negative equity dummy change 
accordingly. The simulated average conditional default and 90-days-delinquency hazards are 
compared with those estimated based on the real trend of the housing price. The results shows 
that, in the case when housing prices change across time, the average conditional hazard 
dramatically increases from around age month 11 and reaches the maximum hazard at around 
age month 54, and then sharply decreases until around age month 93. This dramatic change of 
the average conditional hazard trend disappears in the case when housing prices are assumed to 
be unchanged after September 2004. The simulated average conditional hazard slowly increases 
from age month 1 up to age month 169 with an average increase rate of 3.72 percent for default 
hazard and 1.80 percent for 90-days-delinquency hazard. The average difference of the 
conditional hazard is approximately 0.21 percent between the two cases.  
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Appendix A 
The calendar-time prepayment rate is calculated as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖 =
𝑝𝑖
𝑠𝑚𝑖 ⁡
 
in which 𝑃𝑟𝑖 is the prepayment rate in month 𝑖, 𝑝𝑖 is the number of prepayments in month 𝑖, and 
𝑠𝑚𝑖  is the number of surviving mortgages in month 𝑖 , which equals surviving mortgages in 
month 𝑖 − 1 plus the number of mortgages originated in month 𝑖 minus the number of mortgages 
terminated in month 𝑖. When 𝑖 = 1, 𝑠𝑚𝑖 equals the number of mortgages originated in month 𝑖 
minus the number of mortgages terminated in month 𝑖.  
The calendar-time default rate is calculated as: 
𝐷𝑟𝑖 =
𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑚𝑖⁡
 
in which 𝐷𝑟𝑖 is the default rate in month 𝑖, 𝑑𝑖 is the number of defaults in month 𝑖, and 𝑠𝑚𝑖 is the 
number of surviving mortgages in month 𝑖. 
        The value of the call option is computed as the ratio of the difference between the market 
value of the mortgage and the book value of the mortgage to the market value of the mortgage.  
𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡𝑗 − 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡𝑗
= 1 −
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡𝑗
 
in which 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 is the book value of a mortgage at age t months, which is calculated as: 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡 = ∑
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦⁡𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
(1 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒/12)𝑖
360−𝑡
𝑖=1
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and 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡𝑗 is the market value of a mortgage at age t months in calendar month j, 
which is calculated as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡𝑗 = ∑
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦⁡𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
(1 + 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗/12)𝑖
360−𝑡
𝑖=1
 
When calculating book value, the contract rate is used, which is original interest rate in the 
dataset. The market interest rate used in a given calendar year j is calculated by the average note 
rate of mortgages originated in that year in the data. 
Negative equity is an important determinant of default risk. Equity is negative when the 
property is worth less than the remaining balance. When equity is negative, the holder has more 
incentive to default to keep their wealth.  
The functions used to calculate this are: 
𝑋𝑖 = 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 − 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 
𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒⁡𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = {
𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑋𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓𝑋𝑖 < 0⁡
0⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑋𝑖 ≥ 0
 
in which current property value at month 𝑖 is calculated as: 
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖 = exp⁡(ln (
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒⁡𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟⁡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒⁡𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟⁡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥0
)) × 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
where𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒⁡𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟⁡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥0  is the Case-Shiller index at the note date of a mortgage and 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒⁡𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟⁡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 is the Case-Shiller index at month 𝑖. And the remaining balance at month 𝑖 
is calculated as: 
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𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 =
𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒[(1 +
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
12 )
360
− (1 +
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
12 )
𝑖]
(1 +
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
12 )
360
− 1
 
Appendix B 
The following process is constructing the competing risks model based on the duration 
model introduced by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), Bruce D. Meyer (1990) and the 
specification discussed by Glenn T. Sueyoshi (1992). This competing risks model can be 
implemented in any discrete time duration analysis involving three choices in each time period; 
however, this study only focuses on analyzing the competing risks of prepayment and default in 
the single-family mortgage market. 
According to the duration model introduced by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Meyer 
(1990), two choices are involved in each time period—continue the event and terminate the 
event. Therefore, the likelihood of event 𝑖 to be continued at time t is 
𝐿𝑡
𝐶(𝛽) =∏exp(−exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽))
𝑡
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= exp(−exp(𝑧𝑖(1)𝛽)) exp(−exp(𝑧𝑖(2)𝛽))… exp(−𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽))⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= exp(−exp(𝑧𝑖(1)𝛽) − exp(𝑧𝑖(2)𝛽)…− 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽))⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= exp (−∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡
𝑠=1
)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= exp(−∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡
𝑠=1
) − 0⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
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=⁡− [exp(−∞) − exp (−∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡
𝑠=1
)]⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= ∫ ⁡(−exp(−𝑢))′ 𝑑𝑢
∞
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= ∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢)𝑑𝑢
∞
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡A. 1 
The likelihood of event 𝑖 to be terminating at time t is 
𝐿𝑡
𝑇(𝛽) = (1 − exp(−exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽)))∏exp(−exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽))
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
=∏exp(−exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽))
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
−⁡∏exp(−exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽))
𝑡
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= exp (−∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
) −⁡exp (−∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡
𝑠=1
)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= − [exp(−∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡
𝑠=1
) −⁡exp(−∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡]⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= ∫ ⁡(−exp(−𝑢))′ 𝑑𝑢
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡
𝑠=1
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= ∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢)𝑑𝑢
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡
𝑠=1
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= ∫ ⁡𝑓(𝑢)𝑑𝑢
𝛼𝑡
𝛼𝑡−1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡A. 2 
in which 𝑓(𝑢) = exp(−𝑢), 𝛼𝑡 = ∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡
𝑠=1 , and 𝛼𝑡−1 = ∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1 . 
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When there are three choices involved, continue the mortgage, prepayment and default, 
based on the specification in Sueyoshi’s paper, the likelihood of continuing at time t is 
𝑙𝑡
𝐶(𝛽) = ∫ ⁡∫ 𝑓(𝑢1, 𝑢2)𝑑𝑢1𝑑𝑢2
∞
α𝑡
2
∞
α𝑡
1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= ∫ ⁡𝑓(𝑢1)𝑑𝑢1∫ 𝑓(𝑢2)𝑑𝑢2
∞
α𝑡
2
∞
α𝑡
1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= ∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢1) 𝑑𝑢1
∞
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡
𝑠=1
∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢2) 𝑑𝑢2
∞
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽)
𝑡
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= exp(−∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡
𝑠=1
)exp(−∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡
𝑠=1
)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
=∏exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)) exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
𝑡
𝑖=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡A. 3 
The likelihood of prepaying is 
𝑙𝑡
𝑃(𝛽) = ∫ ⁡∫ 𝑓(𝑢1, 𝑢2)𝑑𝑢1𝑑𝑢2
∞
α𝑡
2
α𝑡
1
α𝑡−1
1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∫ ⁡𝑓(𝑢1)𝑑𝑢1∫ 𝑓(𝑢2)𝑑𝑢2
∞
α𝑡
2
α𝑡
1
α𝑡−1
1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢1) 𝑑𝑢1
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡
𝑠=1
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢2) 𝑑𝑢2
∞
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= [exp(−∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
) − exp(−∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡
𝑠=1
)] exp(−∑exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡
𝑠=1
) 
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⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= [1 − exp (−exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝))] exp(−∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
)exp(−∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡
𝑠=1
) 
= [1 − exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝))] exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑))∏exp(− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)) exp(− exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡A. 4 
Similarly, the likelihood of defaulting is 
𝑙𝑡
𝐷(𝛽) = ∫ ⁡∫ 𝑓(𝑢1, 𝑢2)𝑑𝑢1𝑑𝑢2
∞
α𝑡
1
α𝑡
2
α𝑡−1
2
 
= [1 − exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑))] exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝))∏exp(− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)) exp(− exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡A. 5 
Therefore, the likelihood function for a sample of N individuals is now given by: 
𝑙(𝛽) =∏𝑙𝑡
𝑃(𝛽)𝛿𝑝𝑙𝑡
𝐷(𝛽)𝛿𝑑𝑙𝑡
𝐶(𝛽)𝛿𝑐
𝑁
𝑆=1
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=∏{[1 − exp(−exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝))] exp(− exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑))}
𝛿𝑝
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡{[1 − exp(−exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑))]exp⁡(−exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝))}
𝛿𝑑
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡{exp(− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)) exp⁡(−exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑))}
𝛿𝑐∏exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)) exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=∏∏{[1 − exp(−exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝))] exp(− exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))}
𝛿𝑝
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
{[1 − exp(− exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))] exp(− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝))}
𝛿𝑑
⁡{exp(− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)) exp(− exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))}
𝛿𝑐
⁡⁡⁡𝐴. 6 
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in which 𝛿𝑝 is the indicator for prepaying, 𝛿𝑑is the indicator for defaulting, and 𝛿𝑐is the indicator 
for continuing.  
An important assumption for model 2.2 is that the time in the analysis is a discrete time 
rather than a grouped time. When a default/prepayment occurs in the time period 𝑡, the mortgage 
is treated as default/prepayment and is removed from the sample. One of the significant 
weakness of this assumption is that it does not consider the time period between the 
default/prepayment point and the time point 𝑡 + 1. Therefore, model 2.2 could lead to estimation 
bias. 
One of the weaknesses of likelihood function A.6 is that it does not consider the time 
period between a prepayment or default and the final point in that period. Therefore, model A.6 
could lead to estimation bias. Based on the specification in Sueyoshi (1992), a 𝑔(𝑢) function is 
involved to estimate the missing part. The new likelihood of prepaying is 
𝐿𝑡
𝑃(𝛽) = ∫ ⁡∫ 𝑓(𝑢1, 𝑢2)𝑑𝑢1𝑑𝑢2
∞
g(𝑢1)
α𝑡
1
α𝑡−1
1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∫ ⁡𝑓(𝑢1)∫ 𝑓(𝑢2)𝑑𝑢2
∞
g(𝑢1)
𝑑𝑢1
α𝑡
1
α𝑡−1
1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢1)
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡
𝑠=1
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢2) 𝑑𝑢2𝑑𝑢1
∞
g(𝑢1)
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢1)
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡
𝑠=1
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
exp⁡(−𝑢1
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
−∑exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
+
exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
)𝑑𝑢1 
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⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢1(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
) −∑exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡
𝑠=1
∑ exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
+
exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
)𝑑𝑢1 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
1
1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
[exp(−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
)∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
−∑exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
+
exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
)
− exp(−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
)∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡
𝑠=1
−∑exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
+
exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
)]⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
1
1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
(1 − exp(−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
) exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝))) ⁡exp⁡(−(1
+
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
)∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
)exp⁡(−∑exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡−1
𝑖=1
+
exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
) 
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⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
1
1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
(1 − exp(−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
) exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝))) ⁡exp⁡(−(1
+
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
)∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
−∑exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
+
exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
) 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
1
1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
(1 − exp(−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
) exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝))) 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡exp⁡(−∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
)exp⁡(−∑exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
) 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
1
1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
(1 − exp(−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
) exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝))) 
∏exp(− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)) exp(− exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴. 7 
in which the 𝑔(𝑢1) function is: 
𝑔(𝑢1) = ⁡α𝑡−1
2 + (𝑢1 − α𝑡−1
1 )
α𝑡
2 − α𝑡−1
2
α𝑡
1 − α𝑡−1
1 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= 𝑢1
α𝑡
2 − α𝑡−1
2
α𝑡
1 − α𝑡−1
1 + α𝑡−1
2 − α𝑡−1
1
α𝑡
2 − α𝑡−1
2
α𝑡
1 − α𝑡−1
1 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= 𝑢1
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
+∑exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
−∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
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Similarly, the new likelihood of defaulting is 
𝐿𝑡
𝐷(𝛽) = ∫ ⁡∫ 𝑓(𝑢1, 𝑢2)𝑑𝑢1𝑑𝑢2
∞
g(𝑢2)
α𝑡
2
α𝑡−1
2
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
1
1 +
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
(1 − exp(−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
) exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑))) 
∏exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)) exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴. 8 
in which the 𝑔(𝑢2) function is: 
𝑔(𝑢2) = ⁡α𝑡−1
1 + (𝑢2 − α𝑡−1
2 )
α𝑡
1 − α𝑡−1
1
α𝑡
2 − α𝑡−1
2 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= 𝑢𝑆
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
+∑exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
𝑡−1
𝑖=1
−∑exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
 
The likelihood of a continuation at time t is given by A.3. Therefore, the new likelihood function 
for a sample of N individuals is now given by: 
𝐿(𝛽) =∏𝐿𝑡
𝑃(𝛽)𝛿𝑝𝐿𝑡
𝐷(𝛽)𝛿𝑑𝐿𝑡
𝐶(𝛽)𝛿𝑐
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=∏
{
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
(1 − exp(−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
) exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)))
}
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑝
𝑁
𝑖=1
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⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡
{
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
(1 − exp(−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)
) exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)))
}
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑑
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡{exp(− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)) exp⁡(− exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑))}
𝛿𝑐
∏exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)) exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=∏∏
{
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
(1 − exp(−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
) exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)))
}
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑝
𝑡
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑆=1
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡
{
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
(1 − exp(−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
) exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)))
}
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑑
 
⁡{exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)) exp(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))}
𝛿𝑐
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴. 9 
Therefore, the log-likelihood function for the entire sample is: 
𝐿(𝛽) =∑∑{𝛿𝑝 [− ln (1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
) + ln⁡(1 − exp (−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
) exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)))]
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝛿𝑑 [− ln (1 +
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
) + ln⁡(1 − exp (−(1 +
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
) exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)))]
+ 𝛿𝑐[− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝) − exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]} 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=∑∑{𝛿𝑝 [− ln (1 +
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
) + ln⁡(1 − exp(−(exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝) + exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))))]
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝛿𝑑 [− ln (1 +
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)
) + ln⁡(1 − exp(−(exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑) + exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝))))]
+ 𝛿𝑐 [−exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)− exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]} ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴. 10 
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in which 𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡), 𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡) are vectors of time dependent explanatory variables for prepayment and 
default, respectively. 𝛽𝑝, 𝛽𝑑  are coefficients to be estimated. Moreover, 𝛿𝑝  is the indicator for 
prepayment, 𝛿𝑑  is the indicator for default and 𝛿𝑐  is the indicator for a continuation without 
termination. 
Appendix C 
The following process is constructing the competing risks model based on the duration 
model introduced by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Bruce D. Meyer (1990), the 
specification discussed by Glenn T. Sueyoshi (1992) and a class of discrete transformation 
survival models introduced by Adam Ding et al (2012). This competing risks model can be 
implemented in any discrete time duration analysis involving three choices in each time period; 
however, this study only focuses on analyzing the competing risks of prepayment and default in 
the single-family mortgage market. 
The paper by Adam Ding et al (2012) showed that the survival function 𝑆(𝑡) =
𝑃(𝑇 ≥ 𝑡), 𝑡 = 1,… 𝑡𝑘 and hence 
𝑆(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡 − 1)
= 𝑃(𝑇 ≥ 𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡 − 1)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵. 1 
and 
𝐺 [−𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑆(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡 − 1)
] = exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽) 𝐺 [−𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑆0(𝑡)
𝑆0(𝑡 − 1)
]⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= exp(𝑍𝑖(𝑡)𝛽 + 𝛾(𝑡))⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵. 2 
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in which 𝐺  was a strictly increasing transformation function with 𝐺(0) = 0⁡and 𝐺(∞) = ∞ , 
𝛼𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [𝐺 [−𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑆0(𝑡)
𝑆0(𝑡−1)
]],𝑧𝑖(𝑡)is individual characteristics which contains characteristics𝑍𝑖(𝑡) 
and the base line, and 𝛽 in the last line of B.2 contains⁡𝛾(𝑡). 
Substitute B.2 into B.1,  
𝐺[−log⁡(𝑃(𝑇 ≥ 𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡 − 1))] = exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽) ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵. 3 
The paper by Meyer (1990) showed that the conditional survival model was: 
𝑃(𝑇 ≥ 𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡 − 1) = ⁡ exp(−exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽))⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵. 4 
Substitute B.4 into B.3, 
𝐺[−log⁡(𝑃(𝑇 ≥ 𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡 − 1))] = exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
𝐺[−log⁡(exp⁡(−exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽)))] = exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
𝐺[exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽)] = exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽) = 𝐺
−1[exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽)] ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵. 5 
Therefore, when 𝐺(𝑋) = 𝑋, exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽) = exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽), and 𝐺(𝑋) ≠ 𝑋, substitute exp⁡(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽) 
by 𝐺−1[exp(𝑧𝑖(𝑡)𝛽)]. 
When there are three choices involved, continue the mortgage, prepayment and default, 
and the transformation function is 𝐺𝑝(𝑥) for prepayment and 𝐺𝑑(𝑥) for default. Based on B.5 
and the calculation process in Appendix B, the likelihood of an event being continued at time t is 
𝐿𝑡
𝐶(𝛽) = ∫ ⁡∫ 𝑓(𝑢1, 𝑢2)𝑑𝑢1𝑑𝑢2
∞
𝛼∗𝑡
2
∞
𝛼∗𝑡
1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
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= ∫ ⁡𝑓(𝑢1)𝑑𝑢1∫ 𝑓(𝑢2)𝑑𝑢2
∞
𝛼∗𝑡
2
∞
𝛼∗𝑡
1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
= ∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢1) 𝑑𝑢1
∞
∑ 𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡
𝑠=1
∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢2) 𝑑𝑢2
∞
∑ 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
𝑡
𝑠=1
⁡⁡ 
= exp (−∑𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡
𝑠=1
)exp(−∑𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
𝑡
𝑠=1
)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
=∏exp(−𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]) exp(−𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)])
𝑡
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵. 6 
The likelihood of prepaying is 
𝐿𝑡
𝑃(𝛽) = ∫ ⁡∫ 𝑓(𝑢1, 𝑢2)𝑑𝑢1𝑑𝑢2
∞
g(𝑢1)
𝛼∗𝑡
1
𝛼∗𝑡
1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢1)
∑ 𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡
𝑠=1
∑ 𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢2) 𝑑𝑢2𝑑𝑢1
∞
g(𝑢1)
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∫ ⁡exp(−𝑢1)
∑ 𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡
𝑠=1
∑ 𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
exp⁡(−𝑢1
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
−∑𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
+
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
∑𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
)𝑑𝑢1 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= ∫ ⁡exp (−𝑢1(1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
) −∑𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
∑ 𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡
𝑠=1
∑ 𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
+
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
∑𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
)𝑑𝑢1 
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⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
1
1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
(1 − exp(−(1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
)𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]))⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡exp⁡(−(1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
)∑𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
−∑𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
+
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
∑𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
) 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
1
1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
(1 − exp(−(1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
)𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)])) 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡exp⁡(−∑𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
)exp⁡(−∑𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
) 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
1
1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
(1 − exp(−(1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
)𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)])) 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∏exp (−𝐺𝑝
−1[exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]) exp(−𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)])
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
1
1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
(1 − exp (− (𝐺𝑝
−1[exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)] + 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]))) 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∏exp (−𝐺𝑝
−1[exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]) exp(−𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)])
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵. 7 
 
in which the 𝑔(𝑢1) function is: 
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𝑔(𝑢1) = ⁡α𝑡−1
2 + (𝑢1 − α𝑡−1
1 )
α𝑡
2 − α𝑡−1
2
α𝑡
1 − α𝑡−1
1 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
           = 𝑢1
α𝑡
2−α𝑡−1
2
α𝑡
1−α𝑡−1
1 + α𝑡−1
2 − α𝑡−1
1 α𝑡
2−α𝑡−1
2
α𝑡
1−α𝑡−1
1 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= 𝑢1
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
+∑𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
−∑𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
 
Similarly, the likelihood of default is 
𝐿𝑡
𝐷(𝛽) = ∫ ⁡∫ 𝑓(𝑢1, 𝑢2)𝑑𝑢1𝑑𝑢2
∞
g(𝑢2)
𝛼∗𝑡
2
𝛼∗𝑡−1
2
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=
1
1 +
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
(1 − exp (− (𝐺𝑝
−1[exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)] + 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]))) 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∏exp (−𝐺𝑝
−1[exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]) exp(−𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)])
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵. 8 
in which the 𝑔(𝑢2) function is: 
𝑔(𝑢2) = ⁡α𝑡−1
1 + (𝑢2 − α𝑡−1
2 )
α𝑡
1 − α𝑡−1
1
α𝑡
2 − α𝑡−1
2 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡= 𝑢2
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
+∑𝐺𝑝
−1[exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
−∑𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
 
Therefore, the likelihood function for a sample of N individuals is now given by: 
𝑙(𝛽) =∏𝐿𝑡
𝑃(𝛽)𝛿𝑝𝐿𝑡
𝐷(𝛽)𝛿𝑑𝐿𝑡
𝐶(𝛽)𝛿𝑐
𝑁
𝑆=1
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⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=∏
{
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
(1 − exp(−(𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)] + 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)])))
}
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑝
𝑁
𝑆=1
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡
{
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)]
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)]
(1 − exp(−(𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)] + 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)])))
}
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑑
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡{exp (−𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑝)])exp(−𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑡)𝛽𝑑)])}
𝛿𝑐
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∏ exp (−𝐺𝑝
−1[exp (𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)])exp(−𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)])
𝑡−1
𝑠=1
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡=∏∏
{
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
(1 − exp (−(𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)] + 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)])))
}
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑝
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡
{
 
 
 
 
1
1 +
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
(1 − exp (−(𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)] + 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)])))
}
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑑
 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡{exp(−𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)])exp(−𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)])}
𝛿𝑐⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵. 9 
in which 𝛿𝑝is the indicator for prepayment, 𝛿𝑑is the indicator for default, and 𝛿𝑐is the indicator 
for whether the mortgage continued in a certain month. Therefore, the log-likelihood function for 
the entire sample is 
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𝐿(𝛽) =∑∑{𝛿𝑝 [− ln (1 +
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
)
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ ln⁡(1 − exp (−(𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)] + 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)])))]
+ 𝛿𝑑 [− ln (1 +
𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
)
+ ln⁡(1 − exp (−(𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)] + 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)])))]
+ 𝛿𝑐[−𝐺𝑝
−1[exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)] − 𝐺𝑑
−1[exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]]} ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵. 10 
When the transformation function 𝐺 is given by: 
𝐺𝑝(𝑥) = {
1
𝑐𝑝
[exp(𝑐𝑝𝑥) − 1], 𝑐𝑝 > 0
𝑥,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑐𝑝 = 0
 
𝐺𝑑(𝑥) = {
1
𝑐𝑑
[exp(𝑐𝑑𝑥) − 1], 𝑐𝑑 > 0
𝑥,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑐𝑑 = 0
 
Therefore,  
𝐺𝑝
−1(𝑥) = {
1
𝑐𝑝
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑝𝑥), 𝑐𝑝 > 0
𝑥,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑐𝑝 = 0
 
𝐺𝑑
−1(𝑥) = {
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑𝑥), 𝑐𝑑 > 0
𝑥,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑐𝑑 = 0
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Hence, when 𝐺𝑝(𝑥) = 𝑥 and 𝐺𝑑(𝑥) = 𝑥, the log-likelihood function for the sample is the same 
as the function 2.12. When Gp(x) =
1
cp
[exp(cpx) − 1] and Gd(x) =
1
cd
[exp(cdx) − 1], the log-
likelihood function for the sample is: 
𝐿(𝛽) =∑∑{𝛿𝑝 [− ln(1 +
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
1
𝑐𝑝
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑝 exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝))
)
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ ln⁡(1 − [1 + 𝑐𝑝 exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
−
1
𝑐𝑝 [1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
−
1
𝑐𝑑)]
+ 𝛿𝑑 [− ln(1 +
1
𝑐𝑝
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑝 exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝))
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
)
+ ln⁡(1 − [1 + 𝑐𝑝 exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)]
−
1
𝑐𝑝 [1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑)]
−
1
𝑐𝑑)]
+ 𝛿𝑐 [−
1
𝑐𝑝
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑝 exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)) −
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))]} ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵. 11 
Moreover, when 𝐺𝑝(𝑥) = 𝑥 and when 𝐺𝑑(𝑥) =
1
𝑐𝑑
[exp(𝑐𝑑𝑥) − 1], the log-likelihood function 
for the sample is: 
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𝐿(𝛽) =∑∑{𝛿𝑝 [− ln(1 +
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
)
𝑡
𝑠=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ ln⁡(1 − exp⁡(− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝) −
1
𝑐𝑑
ln⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))))]
+ 𝛿𝑑 [− ln (1 +
𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝)
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))
)
+ ln⁡(1 − exp⁡(− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝) −
1
𝑐𝑑
ln⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))))]
+ 𝛿𝑐 [− exp(𝑧𝑝𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑝) −
1
𝑐𝑑
log⁡(1 + 𝑐𝑑 exp(𝑧𝑑𝑖(𝑠)𝛽𝑑))]} ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵. 12 
Appendix D 
The simulation in this paper assumes the housing price stops changing after September 
2004. Let 𝐶𝑆𝑁 indicate the new Case-Shiller index and 𝐶𝑆0  indicate the original Case-Shiller 
index. Before September 2004, the index is the original Case-Shiller index (𝐶𝑆𝑁 = 𝐶𝑆0) and 
after September 2004, the index remains the same as the one on September 2004 (𝐶𝑆𝑁 =
𝐶𝑆0⁡𝑎𝑡⁡𝑠𝑒𝑝⁡2004). Therefore, the new value of the property is: 
𝑉𝑁 = 𝑉0
𝐶𝑆𝑁
𝐶𝑆0
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴. 1 
To keep the original loan-to-value unchanged, the loan size 𝐿0⁡should change to 𝐿𝑁 and 
the relationship between 𝐿0 and 𝐿𝑁 is  
⁡𝐿𝑁 = 𝐿𝑇𝑉 × 𝑉𝑁 = 𝐿𝑇𝑉 × 𝑉0
𝐶𝑆𝑁
𝐶𝑆0
= 𝐿0
𝐶𝑆𝑁
𝐶𝑆0
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴. 2 
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Once the loan size changes, the debt-to-income ratio 𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑁 also changes to 𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑁⁡𝑛𝑒𝑤  after 
September 2004. 
𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑁 =
⁡𝐿𝑁
(
𝑟
12 (1 +
𝑟
12)
360
)
((1 +
𝑟
12)
360
− 1)
𝐼0
=
⁡𝐿0
𝐶𝑆𝑁
𝐶𝑆0
(
𝑟
12 (1 +
𝑟
12)
360
)
((1 +
𝑟
12)
360
− 1)
𝐼0
= 𝐷𝑇𝐼0
𝐶𝑆𝑁
𝐶𝑆0
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴. 3 
in which 𝑟 is the contract rate and 𝐼0 is the original monthly income. 
Because the negative equity is calculated as the difference between the remaining balance 
and the property value in each month, the change of the loan size and property value leads to the 
change of the negative equity. The function used to calculate the new value of negative equity at 
month 𝑖 is: 
𝑋𝑁𝑖 = 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑁𝑖 − 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑁𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴. 4 
𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒⁡𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑁𝑖 = {
𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑠𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑋𝑁𝑖⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓𝑋𝑁𝑖 ⁡< 0⁡
0⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑋𝑁𝑖 ⁡≥ 0
 
in which, the new current property value at month 𝑖 is calculated as: 
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦⁡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑁𝑖 = exp(ln(
𝐶𝑆𝑁𝑖
𝐶𝑆𝑁0
))× 𝑉𝑁 = 𝑉𝑁
𝐶𝑆𝑁𝑖
𝐶𝑆𝑁0
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴. 5 
𝐶𝑆𝑁0is the new Case-Shiller index at the note date of a mortgage and 𝐶𝑆𝑁𝑖 is the new Case-
Shiller index at month 𝑖.  
And the new remaining balance at month 𝑖 is calculated as: 
𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑁𝑖 =
𝐿𝑁[(1 +
𝑟
12)
360
− (1 +
𝑟
12)
𝑖
]
(1 +
𝑟
12)
360
− 1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴. 6 
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